The Gulf of Finland (Finnish Suomenlahti, Estonian Soome laht, Swedish Finska viken) is a bay in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, washing the shores of Finland, Russia and Estonia. The western boundary of the bay is considered to be an imaginary line between the peninsula of Hanko and Cape Põyzaspea (located near the island of Osmussaar).
The area of the Gulf of Finland is 29.5 thousand km², the length is 420 km, the width is from 70 km in the throat to 130 km in the widest part (on the meridian of Powerful Island), and in the Neva Bay it decreases to 12 km., The average depth is 38 m ( maximum 121 m). A sea channel has been laid along the bottom of the Neva Bay for the passage of ships.
Due to the large inflow of fresh water from the rivers, especially from the Neva (2/3 of the total flow), the water of the bay has a very low salinity (from 0.2 to 9.2 ‰ at the surface and from 0.3 to 11.0 ‰ at bottom). The average water temperature in winter is about 0 °C, in summer 15-17 °C on the surface and 2-3 °C at the bottom.
The bay freezes from the end of November to the end of April (in warm winters it may not freeze all year round). Freezing begins in the eastern part of the bay and gradually spreads to the west.
Characterized by strong wind waves and surges of water during westerly winds, leading to floods. The complex of protective structures of St. Petersburg from floods, protective structures from floods in St. Petersburg, KZS, dam - a complex of dams and adjacent hydraulic structures (culverts and navigable structures), stretching across the Gulf of Finland from Bronka to Sestroretsk (Gorskaya village), through the island Kotlin, on which the city of Kronstadt is located (part of St. Petersburg). Construction was carried out from 1979 to 2011, the cost of the project as of the first ten days of August 2010 amounted to 87.3 billion rubles. The complex of facilities was fully commissioned on August 12, 2011.
The fighting on the Karelian Isthmus in the summer of 1941 was, as it were, in the shadow of the battle that took place south of Leningrad. The actions of the 23rd Army north of Leningrad were described very briefly, but almost all the works mentioned that the reason for the abandonment of Vyborg and the difficult situation in which the left-flank 50th Corps fell was the landing by the Finns of an amphibious assault on the coast of the Gulf of Finland. Here is how the history of the Leningrad Military District describes this event:
“The enemy tried to cut off the 43rd, 115th and 123rd rifle divisions from the rest of the forces and close them in a ring. With the help of an assault force landed south of Vyborg, the Finnish command succeeded in cutting off the coastal railway and highway leading to Leningrad.
In the current situation, the Military Council of the Front, with the knowledge of the Headquarters, allowed on August 28 the commander of the 23rd Army, Lieutenant General Gerasimov ... to withdraw three divisions from the Vyborg region in a southerly direction to the line of the former Mannerheim Line. But it was not possible to carry out this, since the enemy had already managed to tightly close the withdrawal routes.
Thus, it turns out that the landing by the Finns led not only to the occupation of a large territory, but also to the encirclement and the actual defeat of three Soviet divisions. No other landing operation on the Eastern Front has achieved such success! And how did the Finns succeed? Indeed, in the Vyborg Bay they did not have any military fleet at all, but the Soviet Baltic Fleet could freely operate here.
This article is an attempt to understand the true causes of the Vyborg tragedy, so a significant place in it will have to be given to actions on the land front. Nevertheless, we will start with landing operations ...
As a result of the 1940 peace treaty, the Soviet-Finnish border in the area immediately adjacent to the Gulf of Finland acquired a rather bizarre shape. At sea, it meandered between skerry islands, often lying a couple of hundred meters from each other, and on land, the Kiiskinalhti peninsula was connected to the rest of Soviet territory only by a narrow half-kilometer bridge with a bridge over the Koskolan-Yoki River, located almost close to the border.
The coastal section of the border was guarded by the 2nd commandant's office of the 33rd border detachment, its 5th outpost was located on the Kiiskinlahti peninsula, the 6th - on the adjacent islands of Laitsalmi, Payusari and Patio; The 7th outpost was located on the more distant islands, the northernmost of which was Martinsari. In addition, the 41st separate machine-gun battalion was stationed on the islands (in some sources it is called the Marine Corps battalion). Its headquarters and the 1st company were on the island of Payusari, the 2nd company was in the rear on the island of Pitkyapasi, and the 3rd company, reinforced by four 45-mm guns, was on the largest island of Patio; this company was under operational control of the commander of the 6th frontier post. The land sector did not have defensive structures, but bunkers for machine guns and light guns were equipped on Patio Island.
The entrance to the Vyborg Bay was covered by the Vyborg coastal defense sector under the command of Colonel V.T. Rumyantsev. In addition to the 41st separate machine gun battalion, this included the 22nd and 32nd separate artillery battalions - 12 coastal and anti-boat batteries with a caliber from 45 to 152 mm, as well as 10 separate field guns and the 27th separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion. The artillery of the 32nd division was located on the island of Pukkionsari, lying near the sea border line 5 kilometers seaward of Patio, as well as on the northern coast of the Vyborg Bay near the village of Ristsatama and on the Satamaniemi peninsula 15 km east of the border. The 22nd division was located on the islands of the Koivisto (Bjerke) archipelago - Piysari, Tiurinsari and Bjerke, lying along the eastern coast of the bay. The actions of the coastal defense units were supported by the skerry detachment of the KBF captain of the 3rd rank E.I. Lazo, based in Uuras (Trongzund) on the island of Uuransari - two divisions of gunboats, a division of self-propelled landing barges (all four barges of the "SB" type), a guard unit boats of the "MO" type, a division of minesweepers, a detachment of torpedo boats, a detachment of armored boats and three divisions of border boats.
As we can see, the antiamphibious defense of the coast and the islands was extremely weak - no one clearly expected the high activity of the Finns on the maritime section of the border.
The Vyborg area was defended by the 50th Rifle Corps of the 23rd Army - the 123rd and 43rd Rifle Divisions; the first of them held the defense along the border from the Gulf of Finland to the Saimaa Canal, the second - north of the Saimaa Canal to the Vuoksa (Vuoksi) River. Behind Vuoksa, starting from Enso, was the band of the 115th rifle division of the 19th rifle corps. Further north, in the area of Elisenvaara and Lazdenpohja, the 142nd Rifle Division of the 19th Rifle Corps was on the defensive, and even further north, the 168th Division of the 7th Army (later transferred to the 23rd Army). The role of the army reserve was performed by the 10th mechanized corps, however, already in early July, the main part of its forces was transferred to Karelia and near Luga. Only one 198th motorized division remained on the Karelian Isthmus, later also “torn apart” into separate regiments. All divisions were well equipped for that time - 10-12 thousand personnel each.
On the Finnish side, the 23rd Army was opposed by two army corps - IV (8th and 12th infantry divisions and 25th infantry regiment) and II (2nd, 15th and 18th infantry divisions). In addition, the 4th and 10th Infantry Divisions and the Light Brigade "T" were here as a reserve. Thus, there were eight calculated Finnish divisions against five Soviet divisions. Taking into account the greater completeness of the Finnish divisions (14 thousand versus 12 thousand), this gave the Finns more than one and a half superiority. Under these conditions, Soviet troops could only defend themselves ...
It is officially believed that Finland declared war on the Soviet Union on June 26, 1941 - after Soviet air raids on peacefully sleeping Finnish cities and airfields. However, the personnel of the 2nd commandant's office was put on alert already at five o'clock on June 22 - after the peaceful Finns began to openly (white night!) Install heavy machine guns at the bridge over the Koskelan-joki, and after that several aircraft crossed the border, heading towards Leningrad.
At about ten o'clock in the morning, peaceful Finns unexpectedly attacked a border detachment at the tower in the section of the 5th outpost to the west of the bridge, near the village of Kiiskinlahti. The border detachment was forced to retreat to the very outpost, located in the village. The Finns captured the tower and installed a machine gun there; at the same time they came to the mouth of the Koskelan-joki. A little later, another group of Finns crossed the border west of Kiiskinlahti and tried to capture the bridge leading to the island of Laitsalmi, but was stopped 200 meters from the bridge by machine-gun fire from border guards and marines.
Thus, the land road to the 5th outpost was cut. There was no walkie-talkie at the outpost, communication with the commandant's office was maintained only through an underwater telephone cable. Toward evening, the village of Kiiskinlahti had to be abandoned, and the bridge to the island of Laitsalmi had to be blown up. By order of the commander of the border detachment, the entire composition of the 5th, 6th and 7th outposts was transferred by boats to the mainland and took up defense along the banks of the Koskelan-Yoki River, and the defense of the islands was transferred to a marine battalion.
In addition, in repelling the Finnish attack on June 22, a group of MO-type boats under the command of Lieutenant Commander A. Finochko took part, supporting the border guards with fire from 45-mm cannons.
On June 23, the Finns, with the help of an infantry company, crossed Koskelan-joki along an unexploded bridge and tried to occupy the village of Koskela on its eastern shore, but fell into a "fire bag"; according to domestic data, the company was almost completely destroyed.
For a while there was a calm. On June 26, a concentration of Finnish troops was observed from the islands on the Khurpu Peninsula, as well as on the island of Tunholma, which lies just a kilometer west of Patio Island. On July 27, the 41st separate machine-gun battalion opened fire on the Finnish coast, forcing the enemy to cease activity. On June 29, the Finns from Khurpu, under the cover of a smoke screen and artillery fire, tried to land a boat landing (up to a hundred people) on Patio, but the landing was repulsed by the fire of the 41st separate pulbat.
Meanwhile, the batteries of the 32nd separate artillery battalion were firing at concentrations of Finnish troops near the border - mainly at the request of the ground forces. The Finns responded with artillery fire and air raids. On July 3, a tragedy occurred - as a result of aerial bombardment and artillery shelling, a forest caught fire on the island of Pukkionsari, and from it - ammunition depots. There was an explosion, as a result of which about half of the entire ammunition was lost, property and food were burned. Only on July 20 and 22 did we manage to win back - according to reports from artillerymen, a four-gun battery on the Hurppu peninsula and a two-gun battery in the Kiiskinlahti area, occupied by Finnish troops on June 22, were destroyed.
On the same day, July 3, the Finns captured the island of Martinsari, landing a boat landing here with a strength of up to a company. Having occupied Martinsari, conveniently located between Patio and Pukkionsari, the enemy immediately set about fortifying it and transferring new troops here.
On the night of July 16, Finnish boats appeared near Patio, but were driven away by artillery fire. On July 26, the Finns made two unsuccessful attempts to land directly on Pukkionsari, their boats were again driven away by machine gun fire. On July 26 and 27, the Finns again tried to land troops on the islands of Patio and Pukkionsari - or they simulated a landing. The same thing happened on August 1 on the coast of Laitsalmi. In all cases, the Finns did not manage to reach the shore.
The Soviet side took retaliatory actions - on the night of August 5-6, reconnaissance was carried out on the Kiiskinlahti peninsula occupied by the Finns and the small islands adjacent to Patio. It turned out that there was no enemy on some of them, so the 41st separate machine-gun battalion landed boat landings on the "empty" islands of Halsholma (Holsholm) and Raationsari, lying 500-1000 meters northwest of Patio. The rocky Rationsari and the lowland marshy Halsholma did not have any fortifications and it would have been very difficult to defend them - but this was a rare case in 1941 when Soviet troops entered enemy territory.
From August 5, sporadic shelling of the islands occupied by the enemy and his watercraft was carried out by the Kama gunboat. But on the whole, until the 20th of August, the situation in the area occupied by the 32nd artillery battalion remained relatively calm.
Meanwhile, the situation of the Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus in early August 1941 deteriorated significantly. As early as July 30, Mannerheim ordered the II Army Corps (1st, 15th and 18th Infantry Divisions) to launch an offensive at the junction of the 115th and 142nd Divisions, go to Lake Ladoga in the Khitol area and cut through the forces of the 23rd Army . The Finns managed to break through the Soviet defense only by August 5, on that day heavy fighting began for the Hiitola junction station, located at the northwestern corner of Ladoga, 22 km from the border.
At this stage of the fighting, the subjective factor came into play. Anticipating an unpleasant scenario, the commander of the Northern Front, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, on August 5 gave the new commander of the 23rd Army, Lieutenant General M. N. Gerasimov (who had replaced Lieutenant General Pshennikov the day before) an order: while continuing to hold Khyitol, withdraw through the remaining corridor of troops from under Sortavala and take up a strong defense on the outskirts of Kexholm. However, the next day this order was canceled by the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Direction, Marshal K. E. Voroshilov, who instructed to hold the Sortavala region at all costs.
Alas, on August 7, the left-flank 2nd Infantry Division of the II Army Corps occupied Lakhdenpokhya and went to Ladoga, thus cutting off Sortavala and the 168th Infantry Division defending it. On August 8, the 10th and 15th Finnish infantry divisions occupied Kirka-Khiitola, effectively cutting off the main forces of the 198th and 142nd rifle divisions (four regiments) from the rest of the 23rd Army.
Thus, the right wing of the 23rd Army was cut into three parts, two of which were pressed against the coast. But what is even worse - to the right of the 115th Infantry Division between Sayrala and Kexholm a gap of up to 30 km wide was formed, covered only by scattered remnants of units that had retreated here, often without communication between themselves and with the high command.
Even the introduction into battle of the 265th Infantry Division, hastily transferred from the reserve of the front, which had only 5539 people, did not help to turn the tide. Therefore, the counterattack on Hiitol, organized by the forces of this division on August 10, was not successful, although it delayed the Finnish offensive for two days. The situation could have been saved by the transfer of part of the forces from near Vyborg - however, the command of the direction demanded at all costs to hold the border line near Vyborg.
In addition, the command of the 23rd Army, under pressure from Voroshilov, instead of hastily withdrawing the cut-off formations along Ladoga and transferring them to the Kexholm area, tried to organize a breakthrough to the Khiitol area by land - not taking into account the heavy losses of the 168th, 142nd and 198th divisions and the clear superiority Finns in numbers. On August 12, the enemy occupied Sortavala, on the same day the 142nd and 198th divisions retreated to the Kippola Islands along the existing bridges.
As a result, the order of the front command to evacuate the lake was given only in the evening (at 16:15) on August 17th. In fact, the evacuation began even earlier. The 168th Rifle Division was taken out of Sortavala in the morning of August 16 - first to the island of Valaam, and then to the Shlisselburg area and Golsman Bay. On August 15, the evacuation of the 19th Rifle Corps (142nd and 198th divisions) began.
Alas, time was lost, and instead of the area south of Kexholm (Sortanlahti Bay, now Vladimirskaya), the troops had to be taken out to the bays of Morye and Saunaniemi (south of the mouth of Taipalen-Yoki). The evacuation lasted until August 23, the 168th Infantry Division was concentrated in the Shlisselburg area only by August 28. In total, from August 15 to 23, 23,600 thousand soldiers, 748 vehicles, 193 guns, 4,823 horses, as well as up to 18 thousand civilians were evacuated from the northern coast of Ladoga. In addition, even before the start of the evacuation, about 4 thousand wounded were taken out by water.
Thus, the Finns received about two weeks of odds, during which three of the seven divisions of the 23rd Army were actually "out of the game." Taking into account the losses of the Soviet troops, the superiority of the enemy on the Karelian Isthmus from about one and a half became at least three times, and in the area west of Kexholm - almost overwhelming. The command of the 23rd army reported to the front headquarters that the formations leading the battle were drained of blood, they had absolutely no reserves - but at the same time, two divisions, the 123rd and 43rd, continued to remain out of combat.
And the Finnish command took full advantage of the opportunities that opened up to it. On August 13, Mannerheim gave the order to the command of the II Army Corps: to go to Vuoksa as soon as possible and take bridgeheads on its southern coast. The attack on Vyborg from the east was postponed. Over the next week, the enemy almost completely occupied a vast territory in the large bend of Vuoksa, where only scattered Soviet units defended - two regiments of the 265th division, the 588th regiment of the 142nd division, the 5th and 33rd border detachments, the group of Colonel Donskov , a group of brigade commander Ostroumov. And that's all - against three Finnish divisions and one motorized brigade ...
True, the 10th and 15th divisions, partially pinned down by battles with the Soviet grouping cut off in the Khiitol region, and partially delayed by the stubborn defense of Kexholm, advanced rather slowly at first - Kexholm was occupied only on August 21. On the same day, the advance units of the 10th Infantry Division reached Vuoksa near Kiviniemi, and on August 22-23, the 15th Infantry Division occupied Taipale. But the 18th Infantry Division, which had practically no enemy in front of it, quickly pulled ahead. Already on August 16, she reached the Vuosalmi and Eurepa area, where no Soviet defense was organized. The next day, the 27th Infantry Regiment, along with a heavy artillery battalion, crossed the Vuoksa. On August 18, they were joined by the motorized brigade "T" advanced from the reserve. So the Finns received a bridgehead behind Vuoksa 14 km wide and up to 5 km deep, from which it was possible to attack both bypassing Vyborg and directly on Leningrad.
The trouble is that the Soviet command received news of the Finnish crossing at Vuosalmi only on August 20, and the number of troops transferred was estimated at two battalions. In the meantime, the Finnish command sent, after the 18th division, the 12th infantry division from the IV Army Corps from the Vyborg direction. Instead, against the 115th Infantry Division, the 4th Infantry Division of Colonel K. Viljanen was brought into battle from the command reserve. Somewhat later (August 26), the 10th Infantry Division was also redirected to Vuosalmi from the blown-up bridge near Kiviniemi.
As early as August 20, in connection with the sharply deteriorating situation, an order was issued by the commander of the 23rd Army under No. 027 / op to take up defense along the Vuoksa River. At the same time, the troops of the left wing of the army were withdrawn from the border, but it was strictly forbidden to leave Vyborg. The 43rd rifle division retreated to the city, and the 123rd and 115th divisions under its cover were to be withdrawn from the Vyborg "sack" in order to strengthen its neck.
In this regard, on the same day, August 20, the command of the Vyborg sector ordered the evacuation of the northern coast of the bay. Together with the artillerymen of the 32nd division, the left-flank units of the 123rd division, which remained in the area, were also taken out. The evacuation was carried out from the island of Pukkionsari, capes Ristiniemi and Satamaniemi, it was covered by a company of the 41st separate battalion and two platoons of the 51st separate rifle battalion.
Fighting on the Karelian Isthmus in July-August 1941
The Finns discovered the withdrawal of our troops and launched an offensive only two days later - the cover units entered into battle with the enemy only shortly before the end of the evacuation, which ended on the evening of August 22. Alas, there were still some losses - out of the three barges on which the division's materiel was taken out, one was destroyed by enemy fire. In addition, on August 23, at Cape Sayamaniemi, while removing the personnel of a machine-gun company, armored boat No. 215, which had landed on stones, died from enemy fire. Nevertheless, by the end of August 24, the remaining personnel of the cover company were removed by two other armored boats and a KM boat.
In the meantime, the Finns, having concentrated a sufficient number of forces on the bridgehead at Vuosalmi, went on the offensive on August 22. Already on August 23, the “T” brigade broke through to the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Kamyarya (not to be confused with the Kamyarya station!) Near Lake Kamyaryan-Jarvi (now Gavrilovskoye) 25 km east of Vyborg, where it connected with units of the 12th Infantry Division advancing from the north, forcing Vuoksa at Antrea. At the same time, the 18th Infantry Division, turning to the southeast, reached the line of Lake Muolan-Jarvi, Yaurepyan-Jarvi and the Salmenkaita River (now Lakes Deep and Bolshoye Rakovoe and the Bulatnaya River) between the Leipyasuo station and the Vuoksa bend.
On this day, the Soviet troops finally launched a counterattack: units of the 123rd and 115th rifle divisions attacked the Finns in the Mannikala area (10 km northeast of Vyborg) and near Kamär, trying to push the enemy back to Vuoksa. The counter-offensive was not successful, and in the meantime the Finns began to carry out another part of their plan. As early as August 22-23, the 8th Infantry Division of Colonel Vinel from the IV Army Corps reached the coast of the Vyborg Bay, cutting off and pressing the 245th regiment of the 43rd Infantry Division to the coast in the Repola area. The Finns immediately began preparing a crossing across the bay in order to strike at the rear of the Soviet troops near Vyborg.
The crossing was facilitated by the fact that the width of the water space between the two shores of the bay here is only one and a half kilometers. Finnish troops concentrated in the area of the villages of Porkansari and Piispansari, as well as on the island of Turkinsari, connected to the coast by a dam and a road running along it.
Finns are crossing the Vyborg Bay in boats
The crossing began on the morning of 24 August. The 3rd Battalion of the 45th Infantry Regiment was transported from Porkansari on motor boats and shutskor boats to Cape Keyhäsniemi, and the main part of the 24th Infantry Regiment was ferried south of it from Turkinsari Island to the Likhaniemi Peninsula. In the evening of the same day, the 2nd battalion of this regiment organized a crossing from the area of the village of Repola to the northern tip of the island of Suonionsaari, where the width of the strait was also about a kilometer. Already from this island, the Finns, on captured boats and improvised means, without any opposition, crossed the waters of the closed Trongsund roadstead and a half-kilometer navigable canal to the port of Uuras (Trongsund, now Vysotsk) on the island of Uuransaari.
Commander of the 4th Finnish Infantry Division Colonel K. Viljanen
By the evening of August 24, there were already two battalions of Finns on the Lihaniemi peninsula, another battalion was intended to capture Uuras. With the help of the available watercraft, it was impossible to transport vehicles and even field artillery across the bay, therefore, units of the 8th division had only 81-mm mortars with them as fire support, which significantly weakened their strike power. On the other hand, the Finns were greatly helped by a good knowledge of the area and its features - including those that are not indicated on topographic maps ...
On August 24, on the first day of the crossing, there was no opposition to the Finnish landing. Only on August 25, the Soviet boats ZK-35 and ZK-36 at the southern tip of the island of Suonionsaari, at the entrance to the closed roadstead of Uuras, fired from 45-mm guns at the "accumulation of enemy infantry and boats with landing troops" - according to the report of boatmen, three boats were destroyed.
A little later, larger ships were sent to the landing site. On August 26 and 27, from the area north of Uuras, the destroyers Strong and Stoyky, as well as the gunboat Kama, fired at the Finnish crossing and concentrations of enemy troops on the coast from a distance of 8-10 miles. A total of 1,037 130-mm shells were used up by the destroyers. Alas, the effect of shooting at the squares from almost the maximum distance turned out to be minimal, especially since the ships' entry into the sea and their preparation for the combat mission were hasty and disorganized. The naval communications officer at the headquarters of the 23rd Army was unable to organize the exchange of data between ships and ground units, since the flagship gunner of the fleet was not informed about the tasks assigned to the destroyers. Artillery reconnaissance and target designation were not carried out. Shooting on the Likhaniemi Peninsula on August 26, the destroyers themselves did not know who and where was on it, and the commander of the Stoyky B.P. Levchenko, even when writing his memoirs, was sincerely sure that the Likhaniemi Peninsula was located on the northern coast of the bay. According to reports from the destroyers, on August 27, a convoy of two transports and several boats was fired on, going to Cape Ristiniemi, both transports were sunk. What kind of "transports" they were remains unknown until now ...
Commander of the 8th Finnish Infantry Division, Colonel Vinel
On August 27 and 28, armored boats No. 213 and No. 214 made an attempt to disrupt the Finnish crossing to Likhaniemi - they attacked Finnish small vessels and, according to crew reports, sank 6 raid boats, two boats and a pontoon with ramming. It can be assumed that as a result of these actions, the buildup of enemy forces on the bridgehead was somewhat slowed down.
The first information about the landing of the Finns on Lihaniemi came to the headquarters of the Koivist (103rd) border detachment (commander - Major Nikityuk) rather quickly - already at 17:00 on August 24. Immediately, a group of border guards under the command of Captain M.A. Revun was sent to the landing area. Alas, there were only 30 people in the group, it was not possible to scrape together more.
Quickly assessing the situation, Captain Revun took up defense in the most convenient place - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Samola at the base of the peninsula, where its width did not exceed one and a half kilometers. The border guards fought all night, but they failed to block the exit from the peninsula - on August 25, the Finns marched along the shore of the Rauha-Lahti Bay and reached the railway and the Koivisto-Vyborg highway near the Sommee station (according to Finnish data, the latter was captured only on the morning of August 26 ).
Uuras harbour, Liihaniemi peninsula and Sommee station area. Finnish map
However, by this time, a detachment had already been transferred to the Kaislahti region as part of the combined company of the Koivist border detachment and the school of the junior command staff of the KBF under the general command of the chief of staff of the border detachment, Major Okhrimenko. The detachment took up defense in the area of the Kaislahti station, 2.5 kilometers southwest of the Sommee. The group of Captain Revun also reached Kaislahti on the afternoon of August 25 and joined the Okhrimenko detachment, losing 5 people killed and three wounded, but taking with them a lot of captured weapons and ammunition.
At 10 o’clock in the morning, a message was received that the enemy, who had landed the day before in the Uuras region, had reached the railway bridge connecting the Uuransaari skeleton with the mainland, and captured the village of Niemelya, as well as the brick factory located here, threatening the joy of the border guards with access to the rear. Major Okhrimenko sent here a consolidated company under the command of a reconnaissance platoon commander, Lieutenant Kozlov. Having unexpectedly attacked the enemy with the support of two 76-mm guns of the army battery, the company drove the enemy out of Niemel and from the territory of the brick factory, forcing him to retreat back to the bridge on Uuransari. According to our data, the Finns lost 50 people killed and 9 wounded in this battle (possibly, in the latter case, they mean taken prisoner), two mortars, many rifles, machine guns and grenades were captured. Our losses amounted to 20 people killed and wounded!
All day, the enemy, supported by mortar fire, attacked the Kaislahti station, coming close to it. However, at 6 am on August 26, after a raid by our aircraft, the border guards unexpectedly counterattacked the Finns and, after hand-to-hand combat on the northern outskirts of Kaislahti, threw the enemy back to the forest. Major Okhrimenko was mortally wounded in this fight; Major Uglov from the coastal defense of the KBF took command of the detachment.
On August 27, under pressure from the enemy, the consolidated detachment was forced to leave the Kaislahti station. The border guards retreated to the port of Johannes and took up defense along the Rokkalan-joki river, 5 kilometers south of Kaislahti. By the same time, the consolidated naval regiment, hastily formed in Koivisto, as part of the combined detachment of the Vyborg coastal defense sector and two battalions of the 5th separate marine brigade, transferred to Koivisto from the Izhora sector from the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, came here.
From August 27 to 29, sailors and border guards held the line along Rokkalan-joki, repeatedly turning into counterattacks and allowing units of the 23rd Army to reach Koivisto. Only on August 30, under increased pressure from the enemy, Johannes was abandoned, and the Soviet troops withdrew directly to Koivisto. On the same day, the 103rd border detachment was evacuated to the island of Koivisto, where, together with the school of junior officers of the KBF, it entered the reserve of the brigade commander of the KBF.
The occupation of the Sommee and Kaislahti stations by the Finns on August 26-27 played a fatal role in the fate of the Vyborg grouping of our troops (50th Rifle Corps - 123rd, 43rd and partially 115th Rifle Divisions). An attempted counteroffensive on August 24, carried out by a number of scattered strikes from different directions, did not lead to any results - although in the zone of the 18th Finnish division at the turn of Jaureppä and Lake Muolanjärvi, the Finns managed to be thrown back to Vuoksa for a while, and “in the night battle it came to hand-to-hand fights with the use of Finnish knives and hand grenades.
Having repelled scattered Soviet counterattacks, units of the 12th and 18th Infantry Divisions and the T brigade reached the area of the Leipyasuo and Kamärä stations, cutting off the railway and highway from Vyborg to Leningrad. At the same time, the 4th Infantry Division, advancing from the north, captured the Tienhaara station, pushing the Soviet troops back to Vyborg itself. By August 27, the 123rd Rifle Division, according to the report of its command, was divided into separate groups, some of which fought in encirclement.
The situation was aggravated by the fact that on August 23 the previously unified Northern Front was divided into two - Karelian and Leningrad; as a result, the inevitable confusion reigned in the headquarters for some time. However, at the request of the command of the 23rd Army for permission to leave Vyborg and retreat to the old border, the new leadership of the Lenfront responded with a categorical refusal. Only early in the morning of August 28, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, with the knowledge of the Headquarters, allowed the command of the 23rd Army to leave Vyborg and retreat to the "prepared line along the former Mannerheim Line" - which in reality did not exist.
Soviet T-38 tanks and armored vehicles abandoned at Sommee station
Characteristically, this order was dated 05:00 on August 28, while the directive of the army headquarters on the withdrawal was already signed at 04:15 on the same day. However, it was already too late - especially since the directive reached the troops only in the afternoon, and the withdrawal line indicated in it (from Muolaa to Rokkala) was already partially occupied by the Finns. The 123rd division, which had concentrated its main forces in the Syainio area (5 km southeast of Vyborg), had to make its way to the right of the railway, through the village of Huumola. An attempt by the 245th regiment of the division to recapture the Kamarya station ended in failure. The 115th division received an order from the commander to withdraw not to the southeast, but to the south, to Koivisto. This withdrawal was covered by the 272nd Regiment of the 123rd Division and the 576th Regiment of the 115th Division, defending in the area of the Karhusuo station, along the railway line from Vyborg to Yauryapya and to Valk-Jarvi. On August 29, units of the 4th Finnish division (5th infantry regiment) occupied Säinio, after which the rearguards of the 123rd and 115th divisions were cut off and defeated.
Contrary to the assertion of many subsequent historians, neither on August 28 nor on August 29 was the Finnish encirclement ring closed. Even the area of the village of Näyukki and Lake Näyukki-järvi (near Honkaniemi station, between Säinio and Kämärä) was captured by the 4th Infantry Division only on 29 August. However, as luck would have it, torrential autumn rains began, all the streams turned into turbulent streams, and the forest paths between Kämärä and Kaislahti turned out to be impassable for wheeled vehicles and heavy equipment. Therefore, the artillery and part of the convoys had to be abandoned - for example, on the wastelands of Korpellan-Autio, 7 km south of Syainio, the convoy and all the artillery of the 638th rifle regiment of the 115th division were left. However, the regiment itself, in the amount of 2000 people, was able to break through to Koivisto.
Artillery of the 43rd Infantry Division captured at Porlampy
No one even tried to break through the Primorsky highway - although there were no more than two regiments of Finns here, and without equipment and artillery, and until August 30, Soviet sailors and border guards held the city of Johannes and the line of the Rokallan-Yoki River. Without a doubt, an organized attack by three divisions (even if not at full strength), supported by divisional and corps artillery, would simply crush the flimsy positions of the units of the 8th Infantry Division and allow the 50th Rifle Corps to retreat to Koivisto without any problems, evacuating a large part of the technique and equipment.
Alas, this did not happen. On August 29, having left Vyborg, the commander of the rearguard of the 43rd Infantry Division decided to make his way to Koivisto east of the Primorskoye Highway, along forest roads through the villages of Julia-Sommee and Porlampi. However, the terrain here was even worse than in the Huumola area, through the swamps there were often not only roads, but even trails. As a result, the division simply got stuck at Porlampy, where it fought in encirclement for three days. On September 1, the resistance ceased - the Finns claim that the order to surrender was given by the commander of the division, Major General V. V. Kirpichnikov. According to the Finns, they found about 2,000 corpses on the battlefield, and 3,000 soldiers of the 43rd Infantry Division were taken prisoner. A huge amount of equipment was captured - artillery, cars, armored vehicles, which the division command did not even try to destroy.
Former commander of the 43rd Infantry Division, Major General V. V. Kirpichnikov in Finnish captivity
In total, according to Helge Seppel, during the battles for the Vyborg region, 9 thousand prisoners, 55 tanks, 306 various guns, 246 mortars, 272 machine guns, 673 vehicles and 4500 horses were captured. The losses of the Soviet troops killed by the Finns were estimated at 7 thousand people, the number of those who retreated to the Koivisto region - at 12 thousand.
Already on August 31, Finnish troops, encountering almost no resistance on their way, occupied Terijoki. On the same day, the 18th Infantry Division reached the old border in the Mainil area, and on September 1, battles were fought along the entire perimeter of the Karelian fortified area. Meanwhile, to the west, along the sea coast, hostilities were still going on in many places - so Fort Ino was occupied by units of the 12th Infantry Division only on September 3rd. Soviet garrisons also remained on the islands of the Vyborg Bay.
“After occupying the Virolahti skerries, the Finnish coastal defense formations were ordered to cross the Vyborg Bay and establish contact with units located further to the east. To do this, it was necessary to capture the islands of Teykarsari and Tuppuransari" writes Jurgen Meister. Further, he reports that on the morning of August 29, the 2nd Finnish coastal battalion (425 people), which left Vilayoka in the Vilayoen-lahti bay on boats, landed on Teikarsari (Teikarinsaari) Island, which lies west of Uurinsaari and covered the approaches to the harbors of the Vyborg Bay. According to Meister, the island was defended by a "reinforced Soviet company." The Finns landed in three steps on the western coast of the island. Around noon, several small Soviet ships tried to approach the island, but were forced to withdraw because the Finns opened fire with captured guns - I wonder which ones?
The description of this battle from the Soviet side is very different - primarily by dating. As early as August 20, from the island of Teikarsari, where the 1st outpost of the Koivist border detachment was located, a concentration of Finnish troops was observed on Cape Pitkäniemi (2.5 km west of the northern tip of the island) and Santasari Island (2 km north of Teikarsari). On the same day, the outpost was reinforced by 50 Red Navy soldiers from the coastal defense forces - thus, the "reinforced company" amounted to no more than 70 people.
According to the description of the military operations of the Koivist border detachment, the Finnish landing was landed on the island on August 25, and not on August 29 - which is more like the truth, because by the 29th the struggle for the Vyborg Bay had almost ended. The commander of the outpost, Lieutenant Devyatykh, who reported the landing, was ordered to hold the enemy on the northwestern tip of the island until the last opportunity, in order to make it possible to evacuate the artillery battery from Tuppuransari, which lies 2.5 kilometers to the south. The border guards and sailors did their duty - the enemy managed to capture Teikarsari, only by landing another company on it. No more information about the battle was received, because at the very beginning of it the radio station of the outpost was broken, and communication with the garrison ceased. On the only motor boat, six wounded were evacuated from the island, and several more people later reached Koivisto on a raft.
On August 31, the Finns also tried to land on the island of Tuppuransari (Tuppura), which lies southwest of Teikarsari, at the northern tip of the Kiperort Peninsula. However, this time the landing was repulsed by the fire of coastal battery No. 229.
However, this did not save the situation on land. On September 1, the command of the North-Western Direction decided to evacuate the remnants of the 50th Rifle Corps that had withdrawn to Koivisto to the islands of the Koivisto (Bjerke) archipelago, for which a special detachment was formed from gunboats, transports and boats of the skerry detachment. On the same day, units of the 43rd Rifle Division that had come out here were taken out of Koivisto, and units of the 123rd and 115th Rifle Divisions were taken out the next morning. To evacuate troops to Koivisto on the evening of September 1, transports VT-506 "Barta" and VT-507 "Otto Schmidt" were sent to guard two minesweepers and two boats of the "MO" type. The third steamer, VT-542 "Meero" (1866 brt), on the way to Koivisto on the night of September 2, was sunk off Cape Stirsuden by the Finnish torpedo boat "Syuoksyu" (initially it was believed that the transport was killed by a mine).
The evacuation began on the night of September 2, 1941 and ended early in the morning. Vice-Admiral Yu. A. Panteleev, the chief of staff of the KBF, who led the operation to withdraw troops, recalls that many soldiers were unarmed. In total, 14,000 people from the 115th and 123rd rifle divisions were transported to Kronstadt, including 2,000 wounded. Among those taken out was the commander of the 115th Infantry Division V.F. Konkov with his headquarters. Part of the troops (primarily coastal defense units and the remnants of the 43rd Infantry Division) were evacuated to the island of Bjerke, with them the number of evacuees by sea reached 20 thousand people.
By noon on September 2, the garrison of Tuppuransari Island, the personnel of the 229th coastal battery and the sailors from Koivisto covering the landing were removed. On the evening of September 2, the Finns entered the deserted city without a fight.
Main sources:G. A. Oleinikov. Heroic pages of the battle for Leningrad. Study of the course and analysis of some operations and battles on the Northern (Leningrad) and Volkhov fronts in 1941-1942. St. Petersburg: Nestor, 2000.
I. Kishkurno. Karelian isthmus. unknown war. 1941. St. Petersburg: Lubavich LLC, 2007.
V. Platonov. Border guards in the battles for the Motherland. Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Moscow, 1961.
V. F. Konkov. Time is near and far. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1985.
Yu. A. Panteleev. Sea front. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1965.
Combat Chronicle of the Navy. 1941–1942 Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1992.
From war to peace. USSR and Finland in 1939-1944. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press, 2006.
Siege of Leningrad in documents of declassified archives. Moscow: ACT; St. Petersburg: Polygon, 2004.
Border Troops of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. 1941. Collection of documents and materials. Moscow: Nauka, 1976.
Y. Meister. Eastern front. War at sea, 1941–1945. Moscow: Eksmo, 2005.
Notes:
Melzer W. Kampf um die Baltischen Inseln. Neckargemuend, 1960. S. 23.
Haupt W. Baltikum 1941. Neckaigemuend, 1963. S. 122. Conze W. Die Geschischte der 291. Infanterie-Division 1940–1945. Bad Nauheim, 1953. S. 96
Lukin V. The tragedy of the commandant Moonzund // Marine collection. 2006. No. 12.
History of the Order of Lenin of the Leningrad Military District. M.: Military Publishing House, 1974. S. 233.
See: V. Platonov. Border guards in the battles for the Motherland. Collection of examples of military operations of border guards in the early days of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. M .: Main Directorate of the Border Troops of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 1961. Pg. 6–8.
The described case was not the only one on the Karelian Isthmus. For example, on the morning of June 22, an outfit of the 14th outpost of the 2nd commandant's office of the Ensovsky border detachment was fired on from the Finnish side. At 7 am on June 23, in the same sector, a group of Finnish soldiers numbering about 50 people tried to attack the 14th outpost itself; when the covert attack failed, mortar fire was opened on the outpost from the Finnish side. In the battle, the chief of staff of the 2nd commandant's office, senior lieutenant Gelev, was killed. On June 23, at the site of the Vyborg border detachment, an aircraft arriving from Finland fired on cars with evacuated families of the commanders of the 272nd Infantry Regiment, and a Red Army soldier was killed. The next day, two Finnish soldiers were detained on our territory by the 1st outpost of the same detachment. Cases of attacks and shelling from the Finnish side (not even taking into account the actions of aviation) also took place in other parts of the border - for example, on June 25, at the site of the 2nd outpost of the Ukhta border detachment, a group of Finnish soldiers who crossed the border was fired upon and wounded junior political instructor Eliseev. At the site of the Rebolsky border detachment, traces of the landing of saboteurs-paratroopers were found - including 45 kg of TNT and a bag of food with Finnish inscriptions. But the most surprising incident occurred near Murmansk - here, at the site of the 12th outpost of the Kuolajärvi border district, on June 22 at 1:30 (that is, even before the German attack), a German corporal conducting reconnaissance on our territory was captured, who gave detailed testimony about the grouping of the German 9- th Infantry Division on Finnish territory in the area of Sarviselkä, Kuolajärvi, Kotala and on the deployment of the enemy for the offensive. See: Border Troops of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. 1941. Collection of documents and materials. Moscow: Nauka, 1976, pp. 390–391, 399, 430, 460, 474, 480–481. If the actions of German aviation from Finnish territory, as well as the deployment of sabotage groups (to blow up the locks of the White Sea-Baltic Canal) were actions, the decision on which was made at the level of the top military leadership of Finland, then the attacks on the border outposts were most likely the "amateur activities" of local Finnish commanders. Apparently, the Finnish military received an order to prepare an offensive and for this purpose to conduct reconnaissance of the adjacent territory, and some of them simply did not care that the official reason for the war had not yet been found.
Yu. V. Ladinsky. On the fairways of the Baltic. M.: Military publishing house. 1973. S. 44.
V. Platonov. Border guards in the battles for the Motherland. pp. 11–12.
On July 21, to facilitate management, together with the 361st regiment of the 71st rifle division, it was transferred from the 7th army to the 23rd army.
According to the memoirs of the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 168th Infantry Division S. N. Borshchev, the order of the front headquarters for a breakthrough by land was received on August 12, but the next day it was canceled and an order was given to evacuate along the lake. See: S. N. Borshchev. From the Neva to the Elbe. L.: Lenizdat, 1973. S. 24.
V. I. ACHKASOV Protection of sea communications in the Baltic during the Great Patriotic War // Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Great Patriotic War. 1941–1945 M .: Nauka, 1981. S. 173 (with reference to TsVMA, f. 2, d. 9222, l. 85; V. F. Tributs in his memoirs gives slightly different figures). 11,995 people, 112 guns and mortars, 1,823 horses, 136 vehicles were evacuated to Valaam Island (see: V. F. Tributs. The Baltics enter the battle. Kaliningrad, 1972, p. 96). As of August 19, the total losses of the 142nd division amounted to 3190 people - 1839 wounded, 611 killed and 740 missing. 12 152-mm guns, 6 122-mm howitzers, 52 mortars, 64 heavy and 140 light machine guns were lost (see: G. A. Oleinikov. Heroic pages of the defense of Leningrad. St. Petersburg: Nestor, 2000. S. 86.). About 6,000 people remained in the division - thus, the total losses of personnel and materiel amounted to only about a third, although according to earlier reports (dated August 10–12), they were fifty percent.
An infantry regiment, two battalions, two jaegers, a sapper and an artillery company, an anti-aircraft battery.
According to G. Oleinikov, the 2nd Infantry Division was also transferred here.
V. I. ACHKASOV, N. B. PAVLOVICH Soviet naval art in the Great Patriotic War. M.: Military Publishing House, 1973. S. 192.
B. P. Levchenko.... In the wake, without lights. L.: Lenizdat, 1981, pp. 82–83. True, Levchenko claims that the shooting was corrected by radio from the observation post of the Vyborg sector.
Bjerke, now Primorsk.
Suomen Sota 1941–1945 1951. S. 312. Cited. on: N. I. Baryshnikov. The offensive of the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus in August-September 1941 // From War to Peace. USSR and Finland in 1939-1944. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press, 2006. P. 269.
In total, by September 3, 5,500 people remained in the division. See: Siege of Leningrad in documents from declassified archives. Moscow: ACT; St. Petersburg: Polygon. 2004, p. 25.
V. V. Kirpichnikov turned out to be the only Soviet general who fell into Finnish captivity, so his photographs in captivity were widely published by Finnish propaganda. Upon his return from captivity in 1944, Major General Kirpichnikov was arrested and in 1950 sentenced to death; later posthumously rehabilitated.
Cm.: Jurgen Meister. Eastern front. War at sea, 1941–1945. Moscow: Eksmo. 2005, p. 33.
See: Border Troops of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. 1941. Collection of documents and materials. M.: Science. 1976. S. 686.
B. A. Vainer. Soviet sea transport in the Great Patriotic War. M.: Voenizdat, 1990. P. 35. See also: Vessels of the Ministry of the Navy that died during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. M.: GPINIIMT "Soyuzmorniiproekt", 1989.
In total, on September 5, the 23rd Army (together with units of the KaUR) had 44,000 people, 200 guns, 80 mortars, 400 easel and 600 light machine guns (see: Blockade of Leningrad in the documents of declassified archives. P. 184). Obviously, this does not include the 168th division, transferred to the 55th army and the 115th division, withdrawn from the 23rd army on September 4 and sent to take up defense along the Neva. The number of these divisions at the beginning of September was 12-15 thousand people. Thus, out of 5 full-blooded (123rd, 43rd, 115th, 142nd, 168th) and two incomplete (198th and 265th) divisions with a total strength (together with army and corps units) about 85 thousand in the battles on the Karelian Isthmus, 30 thousand people or about a third of the army were lost - mostly dead and missing.
Dedicated to the 72nd anniversary of the Victory
in the Great Patriotic War
August 24, 1942. Bolshoy Tyuters Island.
(History of one raiding operation of the KBF
in the Gulf of Finland in the second year of the Great Patriotic War)
Preface.
How does the idea arise - to explore and describe a specific historical episode? I am interested in the personality of Pristavko Vladimir Efimovich, who died in August 1942 in the waters of the Baltic. I must add that Pristavko Vladimir Efimovich is my relative.
By the way, “raiding operation” - this term is used in the document “Nominal List No. 9” “Irretrievable losses of the political composition of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet who died in battle with German fascism”, all go under the same order of the Head. Ch. PU RKVMF (Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Navy) No. 35s dated 17.09-42, Pristavko V.E. number 6 on this list.
The column "When and under what circumstances he died" reads "Killed on August 24, 1942 during a raid operation against the enemy in the Gulf of Finland."
By the way, the same list includes: at number 3, regimental commissar Lelyakin Ivan Mikhailovich, military commissar of a separate division of patrol ships of the Protection of the Water District of the KBF, at number 4, senior political instructor Evgeny Aleksandrovich Lunegov, military commissar of the patrol ship "Storm" of the Protection of the Water District of the KBF. In the documents of both the wording: died on August 24, 1942. when performing a combat operation in the area of \u200b\u200bthe island of B. Tyuters, when a ship was blown up by a mine. The difference in wording is apparently due to the fact that the loss report was written from different fleet units, to Pristavko V.E. from the political department of the Skerry Detachment, to Lunegov E.A. and Lelyakina I.M. from the headquarters of the OVR ships.
In any case, the KBF did not conduct other raiding operations these days.
Raiding operations in June 1941 were carried out by the Black Sea Fleet at the Romanian port of Constanta, by this time Romania had declared war on the USSR and was an ally of Germany. That operation did not bring much success, but the leader of the destroyers "Moskva" was lost: according to some sources, he was blown up by a mine, according to others he was fired upon from the shore and, when a shell hit, detonated the ammunition on the ship, the ship sank - a smaller part of the crew was raised from the water by Romanian boats and was captured, most of the crew died.
About Pristavko Vladimir Efimovich.
Born in 1912 in Tsarskoye Selo, now the city of Pushkin, in the suburbs of St. Petersburg. The Pristavko family has lived in this place for 200 years, since the founding of St. Petersburg, perhaps this surname has an artificial character from the words: attached, that is, attached to a place or occupation. That is, by origin, most likely, the Pristavko family are peasants or artisans. Whether the family has a Little Russian (Ukrainian) origin is unknown, the only sign of “Ukrainianism” is the ending “o”.
Tsarskoye Selo has been renowned for its dairy products from the early days of St. Petersburg's founding. Maybe Pristavko worked under the Finns - livestock breeders or supplied dairy products themselves: milk, cottage cheese, butter.
Let's not forget that Tsarskoye Selo is the residence of the Romanov dynasty.
It is difficult to find out exactly the occupation of Yefim Pristavko now. Perhaps, until 1917, he had a store or a shop, since, according to the recollections, the eldest son Vladimir, in his youth, wanted to trade, be a merchant or businessman.
In the family of Efim and Maria Vasilievna Pristavko, Vladimir was the eldest child, besides him there was also a younger brother Vasily and sister Raisa.
Vasily Efimovich was born in 1922 in the city of Pushkin, Leningrad Region, in 1939 he entered the Leningrad Military Engineering School. Since the beginning of the war, he served in the 42nd communications regiment, platoon commander of the 37th separate engineer battalion, lieutenant.
He went missing at the very beginning of the war - in July 1941. Killed (most likely) or captured and died in captivity (very likely). Judging by the information in the Memorial OBD, the 37th separate engineer battalion of the 42nd communications regiment has been involved in hostilities since the beginning of the war with Germany on the Southwestern Front. Apparently, Pristavko Vasily died in July 1941, somewhere near Kyiv (in the sister's letter, the date is July 18). He was 19 years old.
Sister Raisa made inquiries about Vasily through the draft board, but did not receive an exact answer about her brother. Vasily Pristavko was not married, had no children.
Raisa Efimovna, lived all her life in the city of Pushkin (except for the period of occupation 1941-1944), was married to pilot Alexei Nikitin, Hero of the Soviet Union (1943), colonel (1950). Alexey Nikitin - a participant in the war with Finland in 1939-1940, a participant in the Great Patriotic War from the first to the last day. He died after the war in 1951 in a flight accident. Raisa Efimovna was married to Alexei Nikitin with two sons.
Vladimir Efimovich Pristavko has been in the Navy since 1929. He entered the Leningrad Naval Political School (located in Leningrad on Stalin Avenue - now Moskovsky Prospekt), after graduating from the school he was sent to Kronstadt (1934).
In 1936 he marries Elsa Osipovna Kyakkinen. The Kyakkinen family, Ingrian Finns, lived in the village of Kukushkino (Kokushkino) in the Oranienbaum district. Vladimir's parents did not welcome this marriage, but Vladimir insisted on his own.
In the marriage of Vladimir and Elza Pristavko, there are two children: a daughter, born in 1937, and a son, born in 1938. There was also a boy, born in 1941, who died.
Before the war, Vladimir Pristavko served in Kronstadt, Shlisselburg, Tallinn (not for long after 1940), Tranzund near Vyborg (now Vysotsk).
In August 1941, even before the blockade of Leningrad, the family of V.E. Pristavko was evacuated from Kronstadt to the Chelyabinsk region.
Due to the fact that the Pristavko family lived in the Chelyabinsk region during the evacuation, Pristavko V.E. included in the Book of Memory of the Chelyabinsk Region.
It is known that Pristavko V.E. in 1941-1942 he was wounded, the wound was severe, so he was sent for treatment inland and, by the will of fate, to a hospital in the Urals, which was not far from the place of evacuation of his family. But while letters were circulating, the hospital - Kronstadt - Chelyabinsk region, Pristavko E.O. too late learned about the cure of her husband.
Pristavko V.E. had already left for his duty station in Kronstadt. So they never saw each other again. It turns out that V.E. Pristavko did not have the address of his family's stay in the evacuation at the time of his stay in the hospital.
Vladimir Efimovich died on August 24, 1942, he was 30 years old. Elza Osipovna in 1942 receives a notice of her husband's death.
Currently, the village of Kukushkino has not been preserved, the houses were destroyed during the hostilities in the Second World War, now this place is a southern suburb of the city of Lomonosov, Leningrad Region. The Finnish population from the frontline zone, it was the Oranienbaum bridgehead, was forcibly evacuated.
Elsa Osipovna and her children, since she was the widow of a deceased officer, were allowed to return to Kronstadt. When they returned, their apartment (two rooms) on the street. Sovetskaya, 41 was occupied by other people, all their personal belongings were gone. As the family of the deceased officer, they were given a room in a wooden house on the first floor, there were also such after the war in Kronstadt. The house was cold, stove heating with wood.
As often happens, even the closest relatives know little about the details of the death of their husband, father or grandfather. This is partly due to the existing concept of "military secrets" and therefore there was little information. Therefore, this study has two objectives:
1) Learn more about this little-known episode of the Great Patriotic War in military-historical terms;
2) To shed light on the circumstances of the death of Pristavko V.E., primarily for his relatives and descendants.
I realize that there is little information about that time and those events, a lot of time has passed, there are no eyewitnesses to the events, the episode was not previously described in detail, or I do not know about this description.
Spring and summer of 1942
The second year there is a war with Germany. After the counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow, when the plan of the Nazi invaders in Operation Typhoon was thwarted, the Germans were thrown back from Moscow by 150-250 km. It was a great joy for the Soviet people and for the whole of enslaved Europe. These are not stamps, this is how it was. There was a belief that indeed "our cause is just and victory will be ours." The terrible year 1941 has already passed, a year of heavy losses and defeats, an incredibly difficult year - when it was necessary to endure. It seemed that the Red Army was about to drive the fascist beast into its lair. It seemed that history would repeat itself with the "Great" army of Napoleon in 1812.
As time and the leadership of the USSR showed, in the person of Stalin, despite the objections of the military, Zhukova mainly decided that the time had come - to drive the aggressor to the west, in other words - to start large offensive operations.
Tymoshenko, having decided that the moment had come for the rehabilitation of him as a commander, in the eyes of the Supreme Civil Code, proposed the offensive of the South-Western Front to Kharkov. N.S. Khrushchev, a member of the Front Armed Forces, also participated in this decision. Supreme Civil Code Stalin I.V. endorsed this initiative.
The attack started well. But then the Germans delivered powerful blows to the flanks of the Southwestern Front. And here is the result - in May, a heavy defeat for the troops of the South-Western Front Timoshenko near Kharkov, 200 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army were captured. Timoshenko's troops retreat.
And in June, the Germans begin a wide and large-scale offensive in the south in Operation Blau (blue - German). In the same month, the Crimean Front of the Red Army was defeated: the front ceased to exist: dead, wounded, prisoners, only a small part managed to cross the Kerch Strait, Kerch was abandoned. The situation of Sevastopol becomes hopeless, German aviation controls a significant part of the Black Sea. Manstein began the assault on Sevastopol.
On July 2, the city was abandoned, so to speak, 90 thousand soldiers and commanders of the army and navy were taken prisoner. The command of the Black Sea Fleet and the Separate Primorsky Army managed to evacuate in submarines at night. The whole Crimea is in the hands of the Germans.
Hitler sends Manstein's 11th army near Leningrad.
Operation Blue is progressing well. Two armies are advancing: the 6th field Paulus and the 4th tank Gotha. The 6th Army is forcing the Don, then the bare steppe to the Volga, beyond the Volga Asia begins. For Goth, the direction to the Caucasus was determined, and this direction is the main one for Operation Blau, Hitler needs Baku and Grozny oil. The direction to Stalingrad for Hitler is auxiliary and at first does not matter much.
In mid-August, the 6th Army was already near Stalingrad. August 23 (remember this day) - the day of the fatal bombardment of Stalingrad by the 4th air fleet of Richthofen. The city is one big fire and turned into a pile of stones, oil burns and pours into the Volga. 40 thousand inhabitants of the city died in one day. It seemed that the city would be easy prey for the Germans, but it would become a grave for the 6th Army, but that would be later.
Heavy fighting is going on in the center near Rzhev and Demyansk. All attempts by the Red Army to push the front to the west ended in heavy losses and the death of entire armies (for example, the 33rd Army of General Efremov in April 1942, the 2nd Shock Army of General Vlasov in July 1942).
In the northwest, in July 1942, the Lyuban operation of the 2nd shock army of General Vlasov ended in failure (April-July 1942). The army died, Vlasov surrendered on the border of the Leningrad and Novgorod regions. The blockade of Leningrad continues. The Leningrad Front is commanded by General Govorov. After the unsuccessful Lyuban operation, planning began for a joint operation of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to break the blockade in the Mginsk-Sinyavino direction, the deadline was mid-August 1942. Forces were being accumulated to break the blockade.
But the Germans also had Manstein in August with the 11th Army and siege guns arrived near Leningrad.
In August-September there will be heavy fighting south of Leningrad and Ladoga.
By the middle of 1942, an extremely difficult situation had developed for the Red Army and the people, especially on the southern flank, where another catastrophe occurred with the Southwestern Front. Hitler's divisions reached the Volga and the Caucasus mountains, the Crimea was lost. The Black Sea Fleet, after the loss of Crimea and Novorossiysk, lost almost all bases on the Black Sea.
The country was on the brink of defeat.
In August 1942, the situation for the country was no better than a year ago, and strategically even worse.
Fighting in the Baltic in the summer of 1942.
Leningrad has been under blockade since September 8, 1941. From the Karelian Isthmus and along the Svir River are the Finnish troops of Manerheim. From the south, the city is blocked by the 18th army of the Wehrmacht. Both sides do not have the strength to change the position of the front line.
In April 1942, the enemy's plan to destroy the ships of the Baltic Fleet, which were stationed on the ice-bound Neva, during Operation Aisshtoss, was thwarted by air strikes.
The KBF in the Baltic is still blocked in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. In connection with the danger of shelling ships in Kronstadt, back in October 1941, a decision was made: to relocate large surface ships of the fleet to Leningrad. Since then, surface ships have been stationed in the Neva, in particular the cruiser Kirov near Vasilyevsky Island. The cruiser "Aurora" stands at the wall in the port of Oranienbaum. The ships participate in counter-battery combat, shelling the positions of German troops near Leningrad, and participate in repelling enemy air raids.
Submarines and one brigade of torpedo boats were also relocated to Leningrad.
In Kronstadt there is the headquarters of the main base of the fleet, the Training Detachment, airfields, artillery batteries, warehouses and other parts of the fleet. The Marine Plant and Arsenal worked.
A separate training division of submarines was also subordinated to the command of the base. In Kronstadt, ships of a detachment of ships under construction and repair, a brigade of torpedo boats were stationed.
For the defense of the water area of the base, which stretched 100 miles west of Kronstadt, there were three formations of ships: the Protection of the Water Area (OVR), which included two divisions of minesweepers, two divisions of patrol boats (MO - "small hunters" for submarines) and a division of network minelayers, Skerry detachment of ships.
Kronstadt under constant fire from German artillery from Strelna and Peterhof. Periodically, German bombers raid Kronstadt.
The number of inhabitants of the city has greatly decreased. Families of military personnel and civilians who were not employed in units and enterprises of the fleet were evacuated inland. Soldiers and residents of the city are dying under shells. Just one example:
On August 24, 1942, during the shelling of Kronstadt, Chief Petty Officer Andrey Pavlovich Ganichev and Red Navy sailors Artem Anufrievich Morozov and Nikolai Vasilievich Golubev were killed, they served on guard near Anchor Square.
Since the spring of 1942, Germany and Finland began to equip anti-submarine lines in the Baltic.
On May 9, 1942, the Germans began laying mines in the Gulf of Finland. Old barriers were renovated and strengthened, new ones were installed. The most extensive and numerous of them were Nashorn (between Porkkala-Udd and the island of Naisaar, only 1,915 mines) and Seeigel (east of Gogland, a total of 5,779 mines, 1,450 mine defenders, 200 subversive checkers).
In total, in the spring and summer of 1942, the Germans laid 12,873 mines in the Gulf of Finland. Together with the mines that were exposed last year, their number in the Gulf of Finland exceeded 21,000. More than a hundred different ships and boats were deployed directly at the barriers. Thus, an anti-submarine barrier more than 150 miles deep was formed.
In terms of the complexity of the navigation situation, in terms of the saturation of anti-submarine forces and means, the Gogland and Nargen-Porkkaludd lines were the most powerful, blocking the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland.
The boundary that blocked the bay along the line of about. Vigrund - oh. Big Tyuters - Fr. Gogland, consisted of antenna, bottom and anchor magnetic mines, set in tiers throughout the depth, a wide system of observation and communication posts, searchlight installations and coastal batteries located on the islands.
The main line was deployed between about. Nargen and Cape Porkkala Udd. The depth of the bay here is 25-60 m and only in one place it reaches 80 m, the width is 20 miles. The main obstacle for the boats was a two-row steel net suspended from numerous floats and put on heavy anchors. Separate sections of it up to 250 m long and up to 40-70 m high blocked the entire bay from the southern to the northern coast. Soviet submarines repeatedly tried to cut or torpedo this network, but were convinced of the futility of these attempts.
The Germans have no large ships in the Baltic, except in September 1941, when a Kriegsmarine squadron of large surface ships, including the battleship Tirpitz, was concentrated on the exit from the Gulf of Finland. The German leadership believed that in the event of the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt by the Wehrmacht, the Soviet Baltic Fleet would make an attempt to break through from the Baltic to the North Sea to the ports of England or to Sweden for internment.
Submarines, patrol ships and torpedo boats, and aviation are constantly operating.
But the main thing that the Germans created in the Gulf of Finland is an anti-submarine line: minefields, nets, artillery batteries on the islands.
The Finns actively helped them in this, because the islands were mainly under the jurisdiction of Finland until the war of 1940.
Oddly enough, but the main opponent of the KBF in the Gulf of Finland was the Finnish Navy, as an ally of Germany.
“The naval forces of Finland included 2 coastal defense battleships, 5 submarines, 4 gunboats, 7 patrol ships, 10 patrol boats, 10 surface minelayers, 25 minesweepers, 5 torpedo boats, 4 mine boats, 2 floating bases” .
But Germany also had impressive naval forces in the Baltic. “Just before the start of the war, a German detachment consisting of 48 ships and boats, including six minelayers, 20 minesweepers, 10 patrol boats and 12 torpedo boats, was relocated from Germany to Finland for operations against our fleet in the Gulf of Finland.”
The main tasks of the Finnish Navy and the German Navy in the Baltic were:
1) Prevention of a breakthrough of the KBF forces from the Gulf of Finland to conduct combat operations, including near the coast of Finland and to the Tallinn region.
2) Protection of transport communications in the Baltic from Sweden to Germany.
It was extremely difficult for a submarine to pass the anti-submarine line and enter the Baltic, the boats were blown up by mines and died with all their crews.
In total, in the spring-summer of 1942, the Germans (and Finns) in the Gulf of Finland exposed 12.873 mines. Together with the mines that were exposed last year, their number in the Gulf of Finland exceeded 21,000. More than a hundred different ships and boats were deployed directly at the barriers. Thus, an anti-submarine barrier more than 50 miles deep was formed.
The command of the KBF is trying to intensify the combat activity of the fleet forces.
The Military Council of the Baltic Fleet, following the instructions of the People's Commissar of the Navy, presented its considerations for the summer campaign:
“... The main task of the fleet for 1942 is to inflict maximum damage on the enemy in his communications and clog Finnish skerries with mines. The great length of the longitudinal communication of the Gulf of Finland and the need in connection with this to have an intermediate maneuverable base for the actions of our light forces and the exit of submarines pose a priority task for the fleet - mastering the island of Gogland and the island of B. Tyuters.
To do this, it is necessary to break through from the Gulf of Finland to the Baltic and fight on communications. Submarines were the main strike force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.
Unfortunately, after the winter of 41/42, large surface ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet did not make any attempts to leave Leningrad for the Baltic.
Why did it happen?
Likely causes:
1) The technical readiness of the ships did not allow them to go to sea
2) The crews were reduced to a minimum and all personnel fought as part of the naval brigades on the land front, except for the gunners who supported the troops of the Leningrad Front with fire. As you know, the naval brigades suffered very heavy losses.
3) There was a ban on large surface ships entering the Gulf of Finland due to fear of their losses on mines, from the impact of enemy aircraft and submarine attacks.
But by 1942, the KBF had a significant composition of surface ships: 2 battleships ("October Revolution", "Petropavlovsk"), 3 cruisers ("Kirov", "Maxim Gorky", "Petropavlovsk"), 10 destroyers and a destroyer leader, several gunboats. They were dispersed in the Neva, Neva Bay and Ladoga. It was the strongest fleet in terms of large surface ships.
With regard to the submarines of the KBF, the above reasons apparently did not exist.
In order to continuously influence the enemy's sea lanes, the submarines were deployed in three echelons. The deployment of the first echelon refers to the beginning of June 1942. The boats left Leningrad singly and in small groups for a month. The transition was made in three stages: the first - from Leningrad to Kronstadt, the second - from Kronstadt to about. Lavensari, the third - from Fr. Lavensari to the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. All nine boats that went on the campaign successfully crossed the minefields in the Gulf of Finland and, breaking into the Baltic Sea, began operations on enemy communications.
On August 9, when part of the submarines of the first echelon still continued to operate in positions, the deployment of the second echelon began.
On September 16, the first boat of the third echelon "S-9" (commander captain-lieutenant A. I. Mylnikov) entered the position.
Cases of undermining submarines on antenna mines ("Shch-407", "Shch-323", "Shch-310") have become more frequent. The number of encounters and combat encounters between our boats and enemy patrol and search ships increased, the pursuit became longer, and the number of depth charges dropped sharply increased. Attacks against heavily guarded transports were fraught with great difficulty and risk.
In 1942, 384 submariners were lost in the Baltic. These were very serious losses for the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. I must say that in any fleet, submariners are, as a rule, specialists and their training takes time and conditions. Let us recall how furious Hitler was when Marinesco drowned the Wilhelm Gustloff on S-13, on which there were 2,000 German submariners from Pillau.
During the entire Second World War, 49 KBF submarines perished in the Baltic. (in 1941 - 30 submarines, the largest number for the war, but in 1942, 13 submarines died, 11 of them when breaking through the lines in the Gulf of Finland.
As the analysis shows, most of the boats were blown up by mines while forcing anti-submarine lines. At the same time, the Finnish and German navies played an active role in the death of our submarines: submarines, patrol ships and aviation.
If the boat was forced to surface in the zone of action of enemy forces, then it became a target for coastal batteries on the islands, patrol ships and enemy aircraft. There were also cases of ramming our submarines by enemy ships. But what is characteristic, the Germans and Finns failed to capture a single KBF submarine
It was an unimaginable shame to surrender the boat as a prisoner, it is possible that some boats were blown up by the crews and the command of the boat.
During the 1942 campaign, despite the extremely unfavorable situation, the KBF submarines destroyed 48 transports (123,376 brt), made 40 military campaigns, including 30 in the Baltic Sea, while 11 submarines were lost: two "babies" type "M", 8 type "Sch" and 1 type "C".
Skerry squad.
It is necessary to find out the history of appearance, location and composition of the Skerry detachment, in which Pristavko Vladimir Efimovich served.
The coastal defense in the Baltic consisted of three fortified sectors - Kronstadt, Gogland and Vyborg.
A detachment of skerry ships was supposed to act in the interests of the latter.
Before the war, the skerry detachment was based in Tranzund near Vyborg (now the city of Vysotsk), in Finland. The base in Tranzund was transferred to the USSR after the "Winter War", December 1939-March 1940, and it was based on the ships of the 1st Baltic detachment of border ships, which were based in Tranzund. There were plans to form the Skerry Brigade of ships, where the training ship was to become the headquarters ship "Leningradsovet" Captain 3rd rank Lazo E.I. was appointed commander of the brigade being formed 06/22/1941-04/1942 (only until April 1942).
The basis for the Skerry detachment was ships from the 1st Baltic detachment of border ships. With the beginning of the war, the training ship of the fleet "Leningradsovet" was transferred to the structure of the Skerry Detachment.
"Leningradsovet" remained a training ship until the start of World War II. He commanded the ship (commander captain 3rd rank N. N. Amelko), later admiral.
"The protection of the maritime border in the Baltic Sea was carried out by the 1st and 2nd Baltic detachments of border ships. The 1st Baltic detachment of border ships, commanded by Senior Lieutenant S.P. Zheldakov (Chief of Staff Senior Lieutenant Z.F. Slepenko, Deputy for senior political officer D.I. Pavlenko), was part of the Leningrad border district and consisted of three divisions: 1st (commander senior lieutenant A.S. Evstratov, deputy political officer senior political officer K.M. Gavrish) and 2nd (commander captain-lieutenant V.P. Stepanenko, deputy political instructor M.S. Perlov) divisions were based in the city of Tranzund (now Vysotsk), 3rd (commander senior lieutenant A.I. Kirsanov, deputy political officer senior political officer V. K. Molodtsov) - in Oranienbaum (Lomonosov)".
With the outbreak of war on June 22, plans for the formation of the Skerry Brigade were interrupted.
On June 23, 1941, the 1st Baltic Detachment in full strength (seven boats MO - 2, seven boats ZK and 14 boats KM) was transferred to the OVR of the Kronstadt naval base of the KBF.
With the outbreak of war, the Leningrad Council Management Company was supposed to be part of the skerry ship detachment as a floating base. At the appointed time, the ship was mobilized and on June 27, 1941, arrived in Tranzund, where the detachment was concentrated.
The training ship "Leningradsovet" from Tranzund was sent first to Kronstadt, then to Tallinn. The headquarters of the mine defense of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Yu. F. Rall was located on the old corvette.
Participated in the Tallinn crossing on August 28-30, 1941. After repairs in Kronstadt, he took up a position on the Neva in Leningrad.
The last place of base in front of Kronstadt of the Skerry detachment was Tranzund (in different sources you find different sounds in Russian - Trongsund, Tronzund, Trongsund) near Vyborg.
In August, Finnish troops launched an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. The border guards of the NKVD stubbornly defended themselves, which cannot be said about the Red Army in this direction.
“On the morning of August 25, the enemy bypassed the city of Vyborg from the east and entered the seaside highway, pursuing the retreating units of the Red Army, but in the area of the Kaislahti station, the enemy was stopped by the consolidated company of the border guards of the 103rd border detachment and the school of junior command personnel of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of the chief of staff 103 th border detachment Major Okhrimenko. At the same time, the enemy, having occupied Tranzund (Vysotsk - the author's note), began to advance towards the Niemel region (Medianka - the author's note). Thus, the group of Captain M.A. Revun was cut off from his troops. However, having replenished weapons and ammunition at the expense of the enemy, the border guards fought their way out of the encirclement and joined the group of Major Okhrimenko, while losing five people killed and three wounded, including Captain M.A. Revun.
And the Skerry detachment from Tranzund was forced to relocate to Kronstadt, in terms of composition, exactly, 3 BKA and 4 MO (BKA - armored boats, MO - "sea hunters").
As a result of the reorganization of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, carried out in early September 1941, after the breakthrough of the fleet from Tallinn to Kronstadt, all minesweeping, barrage and anti-submarine forces that were previously part of the Mine Defense, the OVR of the Main Naval Base and the Kronstadt Naval Base, as well as the Skerry detachment of ships, were brought together in a single OVR of the KBF (commander captain of the 2nd rank I.G. Svyatov).
The OVR of the KBF included a trawling detachment, a barrage detachment, a fighter detachment and a separate division of patrol ships, as well as means of protecting raids.
A separate division of patrol ships was formed from specially built patrol ships, as well as from mobilized civilian ships. They were supposed to serve on distant patrol lines, to provide protection for convoys at the sea crossing. The division was commanded by Captain 3rd Rank Nikitchenko Pavel Eremeevich.
The military commissar of the division, regimental commissar Lelyakin I.M., worked together with him.
From August 1942 to September 1943, Rear Admiral Vdovichenko Dmitry Danilovich commanded the Skerry detachment of the KBF, before commanding the Skkerny detachment from March to August 1942 he was the chief of staff of the Kronstadt naval base, that is, the main base of the KBF.
In 1942, boats of the Skherny detachment of the KBF, the Fighter detachment of the OVR of the Leningrad Naval Base and the division of armored boats of the Ladoga military flotilla operated on the Gulf of Finland, the Neva River and in Lake Ladoga. The number of armored boats that were part of a particular formation varied depending on the operational situation. To participate in various operations, armored boats were transferred from one formation to another, and sometimes to operational subordination to the army command.
As part of the Skerry detachment, there was the 9th dntshch, a division of low-speed minesweepers, consisting of the minesweepers Lyapidevsky, Engineer, Som, Izhorets-20, which received numbers from 91 to 94 inclusive, as well as two groups of combat boats: boat minesweepers and guards. The group of boat minesweepers included 6 P-type boats and 4 Yaroslavets-type boats. The group of patrol boats included boats MO No. 121, 122, 123, 171, 172, 173, which received numbers from 931 to 936 inclusive.
The armored boats of the KBF, as a rule, provided artillery support for patrols and caravans between Leningrad and Kronstadt. Landing operations on the rivers were carried out much less frequently, however, the boats played a very important role in them. As a rule, these were BKA armored boats of project 1124 manufactured by the Izhora plant.
In addition to escorting convoys between Leningrad and Kronstadt, one of the main tasks of the fleet in 1942 was to ensure the escort of submarines in the Gulf of Finland and to meet them after the return of their military campaigns.
The enemy failed to recapture the islands of Gogland, Bolshoy Tyuters and Sommers in 1942: they had garrisons with artillery batteries, enemy ships were on duty near the islands: patrol ships, torpedo ships. The Gulf of Finland was a flight zone for Finnish and German aviation. All the way from Kronstadt to Lavensari was under fire from the Finnish coastal batteries from the northern coast of the bay. The fight for the fairways was fierce.
The skerry detachment, as a formation of ships, was subordinate to the commander of the main base of the fleet, and one of its tasks was to ensure the deployment of submarines from Kronstadt-Lavensari.
“Forty-five to sixty miles from Kronstadt to Lavensari, the enemy looked through from the northern coast, and as soon as even a single ship appeared, the numerous guns of the Finnish batteries opened heavy fire. But our minesweepers, and later escort surface ships, protecting the submarines, which were mostly on the surface, skillfully maneuvering, avoided hits. The art of putting up smoke screens and the strict discipline of radio communication during conversations on ultrashort waves between ships also helped. And when the situation allowed, the submarines, having reached the beam of the Shepelevsky lighthouse, sank and went independently in a submerged position to Lavensari, to their maneuverable base in the Gulf of Finland.
Of course, these measures could neither prevent a new hidden laying of mines on the axis of the fairway, nor avoid a direct attack by the enemy with forces superior to the firepower of any of our convoys.
Lavensari was under constant attack from Finnish aviation, so our submarines were there during the day only in a submerged position on the ground.
In August 1942, the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet decided to conduct a raiding operation on the coast and islands occupied by the enemy: lay mines and block the Narva Bay and strike at ships and coastal batteries on about. Big Tyuters and about. Gogland.
What preceded this raiding operation.
In August, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts, units of the Leningrad naval base, artillery and aviation of the fleet were in full swing preparing for an offensive operation in the Sinyavino direction.
Its plan was to defeat the Mginsk-Sinyavino grouping of the enemy and lift the blockade from land with the assistance of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Flotilla with the counter strikes of the two fronts of Leningrad and Volkhov. It was quite clear that our troops had to crush a well-prepared and heavily fortified enemy defense with a large number of natural and artificial obstacles.
The troops of the Volkhov Front were assigned the main role in this operation: they were preparing to break through the enemy defenses south of Sinyavino, defeat the Sinyavino-Mginsk grouping and, having reached the Neva, join up with the troops of the Leningrad Front.
Looking ahead, the operation began on August 19, 1942 with the offensive of the Leningrad Front in the Sinyavino direction with the landing of the Baltic Fleet sailors near the village of Ivanovskoye. The offensive went on until September 10 and then was stopped.
And on August 13, a party activist took place in Smolny. “The commander of the troops L. A. Govorov, a member of the Military Council of the Front A. A. Zhdanov, the secretaries of the Leningrad regional and city committees of the party, the head of the political department of the front K. P. Kulik, members of the Military Council of the Fleet arrived at this meeting ... .. At the meeting in detail tasks were set out to intensify the combat activity of the fleet at sea and on Lake Ladoga. A. A. Zhdanov made a big speech.
It can be concluded that the leadership of the city and the command of the front demanded that the fleet intensify operations in the Baltic.
This is in addition to the actions of submarines, which since May have been breaking through into the Baltic in three echelons and, as shown above, have suffered heavy losses.
And on August 15, the Military Council of the Front was in Smolny, where the commander of the KBF Tributs was summoned along with the commanders and commissars of the 4th submarine. Zhdanov "attentively listened to the reports of the boat commanders on the conditions for forcing the Gulf of Finland, the situation and enemy opposition in the area of positions."
This meeting became another point for conducting a raiding operation in the Baltic.
The command of the fleet was tasked with carrying out an operation by surface forces on the enemy's coast - with the placement of mines in the Narva Bay and shelling of enemy ships on patrol near the island of B. Tyuters and coastal batteries. The development of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the Skerry Detachment, Rear Admiral Vdovichenko D.D.
Rear Admiral Vdovichenko, the commander of the Skerry Detachment, developed and submitted for approval to the commander of the Main Naval Base an operation plan to mine the entrance to the port of Narva and deliver artillery strikes against the enemy ship patrol on the Eastern Gogland Reach. In addition, it was supposed to fire enemy batteries on Bolshoy Tyuters Island.
The purpose of the operation is to deliver an artillery strike on the enemy ship's patrol near about. B. Tyuters, according to other sources, for shelling enemy batteries on the island.
Another version of the operation plan:
"In August, an attempt was made to support the breakthrough of the submariners with a forceful action. It was supposed that a detachment of surface forces would go to the islands of Gogland and Bolshoy Tyuters to suppress enemy PLO forces."
Bolshoy Tyuters is an island in the central part of the Gulf of Finland, 30 km (19 miles) south of Kotka, Finland and southeast of Gogland, 108 km west of Kotlin (Kronstadt) Island.
Big Tyuters is a granite rock about 2.5 km across with two capes: Tuomarniemi and Teiloniemi. Its area is about 8.3 km2.
Beginning in December 1941, the command of the KBF made attempts to recapture the islands of Gogland and B. Tyuters from the enemy (Finland), which were abandoned during the retreat in 1941.
Distance reference:
Kronstadt - Seskar 70 km
Lavansari - Gogland 42 km
Lavansari - Seskar 20 km
Lavansari - B. Tyuters 18 km
Shepelevo - Seskar 42 km
B. Tyuters - Gogland 33 km
On October 31, 1941, the ships with the personnel, materiel and supplies of the Bolshoi Tyuters garrison moved to Kronstadt.
In December 1941, troops landed on Gogland, breaking 42 km on the ice from Lavensari Island (now the island is called Moshchny). But the attempt ended with the fact that the landing force recaptured the island, then almost completely died and the island again, in March 1942, passed into the hands of the Finnish enemy. The island of Bolshoy Tyuters had the same fate, the garrison left the island.
In May, the fleet tried to conduct an amphibious operation on Sommers Island. The operation ended in failure. There have been losses.
With the capture of the islands of Hogland and B. Tyuters, Germany and Finland began to rapidly build an anti-submarine line using these islands, which, however, for some reason was of secondary importance compared to the anti-submarine line Nargen Island-Cape Porkkala-Udd.
The key to this frontier was the islands of Gogland and Bolshoy Tyuters.
The frontier was saturated with mines and it was very difficult to approach the island of B. Tyuters. And the approaches to the minefields were covered by artillery batteries on the island. It turned out a vicious circle. It was necessary to disable the artillery batteries on the islands, and only then sweep the minefields at the turn.
Near the islands, enemy ship patrols were constantly on duty: patrol ships and torpedo boats.
Naval aviation could significantly help, but the KBF did not have enough aviation for everything, it was necessary to restrain enemy aircraft from attacks on the city and the fleet in Kronstadt and Leningrad, to cover the Oranienbaum bridgehead.
And in general, the Air Force of the Fleet had problems with the presence of bombers.
During this period, the entire aviation of the fleet was thrown to ensure the breakthrough of the blockade and the defeat of the Mginsk-Sinyavino grouping of the enemy with counter strikes from the two fronts of Leningrad and Volkhov. And the main forces of the fleet were aimed at ensuring this particular operation, which began on August 19.
Raid operation.
On August 21, the operation plan was approved. To participate in it, 3 battleships (T-204, T-211 and T-217), the gunboat "Red Banner" and the patrol ship "Storm" were allocated.
On August 22, 1942, at 23.00, a convoy left the main base of the KBF, from Kronstadt, consisting of the Burya patrol ship, Krasnoe Znamya CL, Shch-304 submarine, 3 BTShch (T-204, T-211 and T-217), 4 MO boats ("sea hunter").
The convoy to Lavensari Island, and then to B. Tyuters, left on August 22, at the very height of the operation in the Mginsk-Sinyavino direction.
At the crossing on the submarine Shch-304 ("Komsomolets") captain 3rd rank Ya.P. Afanasiev, there was a serious breakdown of the diesel engine and there was nothing to think about continuing the campaign.
The boat stopped at the island. Apparently, later, she was towed to Kronstadt for repairs.
Submarine Shch-304 will die after October 29, when, upon receiving an order to return to the base, it will stop communicating, presumably the submarine was blown up by a mine in the Gulf of Finland, the exact location is unknown, 42 sailors - crew members died on it.
On August 23, at 6:50 a.m., the convoy arrived at Lavensari Island.
Apparently, two BTSC, the gunboat "Red Banner" remained in Lavensari or went to Kronstadt.
On August 23, at about 23.00, a detachment of four torpedo boats with barrage mines, five patrol boats of the Ministry of Defense, TFR "Storm" and BTShch T-204 "Fugas" left the raid from the Lavensari raid in the direction of Narva Bay.
A detachment of ships moved in a wake column at a speed of 9 knots, the lead was the BTShch "Fugas".
At 0.53 on August 24, the TFR "Storm" was forced to stall the move, since the BTShch "Fugas" lost both paravanes.
Note. Paravane - a towed underwater vehicle to protect the ship from anchor contact mines. Developed in 1914-1918. It is a metal body with a deflector wing, a travel depth stabilizer and a cutting torch. Installed on both sides of the ship. When the ship moves, the paravane moves away from the side and keeps the trawling part of the cable at a given depth. When a paravane encounters a mine, its minreply is retracted along the minesweeping part from the ship and is cut with a cutter. The floating mines are destroyed.
At 2.12 "Storm" gave a low speed, a minute later a mine exploded from the starboard side of the first KO (aft compartment). The ship listed 25° to starboard, broke into two parts, and sank in 3 minutes at the point with coordinates. 59 ° 49 "N 27 ° 30" E, 15 km southeast of the island of B. Tyuters, about 9 miles (that is, one hour to the island at a speed of 9 knots).
Part of the crew was picked up from the water by MO boats. Detachment commander, commander of a separate division of patrol ships captain 2nd rank Nikitchenko P.E. and the commander of the patrol ship "Storm" Captain 3rd rank Makletsov A.A. were seriously wounded.
On the TFR “Storm”, only from the crew of the ship (according to the state - 109 people), 75 officers, foremen and sailors died, including the military commissar of the patrol ship division, regimental commissar Lelyakin I.M. All the dead remained at sea, only st. eng. l-ta Panfilova A.F. raised the wounded, he died from his wounds and was buried on the island of Lavensari (now Moshchny Island), in another document, he was buried in the waters of the Gulf of Finland.
With the full staffing of the crew, 33 people could lift out of the water. But we can assume that the TFR "Storm" did not have a full staff of personnel.
On August 24 at 04.19 (after 2 hours 07 minutes) in the same area, 6 km to the west, a T-204 "Fugas" battleship hit a mine and sank, 9 km southeast of B. Tyuters Island.
The sun rose at this point on 24.08.1942 only 05.38.
59 ° 48.6 "N 27 ° 23.5" E - flooding point of the BTShch T-204 "Fugas", depth 46 meters.
Died: minesweeper commander captain-lieutenant Gillerman V.L. and 23 crew members, including 4 ship's officers. According to the state in the BTSC -60 people, but just like on the TFR "Storm" there might not have been a full crew staff.
More than half of the BTSC crew, 36 people with a full staff, could lift the MO boats out of the water. But according to the stories, only one person was rescued from the minesweeper, and he soon died.
If this is so, then the minesweeper had a crew far from full staff from the state.
Note. KL - gunboat, BTShch - basic minesweeper, MO - boat "sea hunter", TKA - torpedo boat.
The base minesweeper "Fugas" T-204 was part of the minesweeping brigade of the OVR of the main base of the fleet (Kronstadt).
Commander of the BTShch T-204 "Fugas" Captain-Lieutenant Gillerman Vladimir Lvovich, died on August 24, 1942. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
Note. According to the documents (OBD "Memorial"), the date of death of the personnel of the BTShch "Fugas" is August 25, although it was at 04.19 on 24.08.1942 in a matter of minutes.
On which of the dead ships Pristavko V.E. was unknown. Probably, there should be an order in the Skherny detachment for the battalion commissar Pristavko V.E., about his participation in the raid operation, where there could be information about which ship he was supposed to be on. I assume that he was on a minesweeper on a campaign.
There, he would have had more chances to escape, only if he was not in the wheelhouse at the time of the explosion: together with other ship officers - the commander of the minesweeper, Capt. Lt. Gillerman, assistant commander, Sr. Lt. .l-tom Solovyov and the military commissar of the minesweeper art. political commissar Sesyunin.
If V.E. Pristavko was in the cabin of the minesweeper, then he had no chance of escaping. But there is no reason to assert that all the dead officers were in the cabin of the minesweeper, there were no witnesses left.
Among those raised from the water Pristavko V.E. was not, and he was declared dead in the Gulf of Finland.
Torpedo boats from the detachment continued the operation and successfully completed the laying of mines in the Narva Bay, after the death of the TFR "Storm" and the BTShch "Fugas".
August 26 KL "Red Banner" accompanied by T-207, T-210 and T-215 returned to the main fleet base of Kronstadt.
The operation partially achieved its goals: the mines in the Narva Bay were exposed, but the detachment of ships did not enter into a fire collision with the enemy in the area of the island of B. Tyuters, two ships were lost during mine explosions - a patrol ship and a base minesweeper. 100 sailors died: 12 officers, 26 foremen, 62 sailors.
TFR "Storm"
Time of death 02.16 24.08.1942
Coordinates 59°49"N 27°30"E
Number of dead -75
Senior in the campaign: captain 2nd rank Nikitchenko P.E. - severely wounded
regimental commissar - Lelyakin I.M. - died;
The commander of the ship is Captain 3rd Rank Makletsov A.A. - severely wounded
Commissar of the ship Art. political instructor Lunegov E.A. - died.
BTShch "Fugas"
Time of death 04.19 24.08.1942
Coordinates 59°48.6"N 27°23.5"E
Number of dead - 25
The ship's commander - Capt. Dr. Gilerman V.L. -died
Commissar of the ship - Art. political instructor Sesyunin G.A. - died.
Killed, except crews:
1. Pristavko Vladimir Efimovich, battalion commissar, Art. Instructor for organizational and party work of the political department of the Skerry Detachment of the KBF, at the BTShch "Fugas"
2. Lelyakin Ivan Mikhailovich, regimental commissar, military commissar of a separate division of patrol ships of the OVR KBF, on the TFR "Storm".
Note.
1. The submarine "Shch-304", which was accompanied by a detachment of ships in the convoy, went missing after October 29, was declared dead, along with 42 crew members.
2. KL "Red Banner" will be torpedoed on November 19, 1942 by Finnish torpedo boats in the bay of Norre-Kappellaht (Lavensari Island). A significant part of the ship's crew will die.
Eternal memory to the heroes of the sailors-Baltic 1941-1945!
Bibliography
1. Tributs V.F. The Baltics Fight, ed. 1985
2. E. Chirva "Underwater war in the Baltic: 1939-1945", M., "Yauza", "Eksmo", 2009
3. "The combat path of the Soviet Navy", edited by A.V. Basova, 1988
In 1941, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF) was forced to retreat to Leningrad from the islands. Fortunately, the Soviet troops managed to hold their positions on Lavensaari (Powerful Island), Peninsaari (Small Island) and Seskara. In winter, the KBF forces managed to recapture Gogland and Bolshoi Tyuters, but they failed to hold them until the start of navigation in 1942.
In May, the German fleet laid large minefields, codenamed "Siegel" (sea urchin), east and southeast of Gogland. Their main goal is to prevent the breakthrough of Soviet submarines into the central Baltic.
German warships kept watch behind the barriers - as a rule, submarine hunters and large M-type minesweepers, but in 1942 our submariners repeatedly managed to successfully overcome the Gogland anti-submarine line, enter the operational space and cause serious damage to the enemy.
The enemy constantly improved his minefields. For several months, our submarines could not break through them at all. Heavy air and sea battles were constantly going on.
In September 1944, the Red Army, with the support of the fleet, managed to withdraw Finland from the war, and the German troops retreated deep into Estonia. The islands and waters again came under the control of the Red Army.
Today, on these islands, the Gogland team, together with the Search Movement of Russia, is looking for the remains of Soviet soldiers who died here: participants in landing operations, victims of the Tallinn crossing (evacuation of the Baltic Fleet from the besieged Tallinn to Kronstadt, during which dozens of ships and thousands of people died at the end of August 1941 ). So far, unfortunately, only fragments have been found. The landscape is very complex, and historical documents on burials cannot be found either in Russian, or in German, or in Finnish archives.
Chronicle of events
Gogland
The island was abandoned by Soviet troops on December 7, 1941 and immediately taken under control by the Finns. On January 2, 1942, after an unprecedented multi-kilometer transition from Moshchny Island on newly established ice, a detachment of Colonel Barinov defeated the Finnish garrison with a surprise attack and liberated the island. The heroic defense of Gogland began.
About five hundred Soviet soldiers fought with a numerically superior enemy, being in fact in a four-fold ring of enemy blockade. They managed to hold the westernmost point of the entire front for almost three months. The soldiers imitated the presence of a large garrison - they kindled stoves in houses left by the civilian population, but enemy scouts exposed this maneuver.
On March 27, 1942, the Finnish troops, having a sevenfold advantage in manpower and absolute superiority in artillery, launched an assault. As a result of a heavy battle, the Soviet troops had to leave Gogland and retreat to Powerful Island. More than 200 people died.
The Finnish garrison stationed on the island held Gogland until Finland left the war against the USSR on September 19, 1944. It is noteworthy that one of the conditions for the cessation of hostilities was the withdrawal of German troops from the territory of Finland before September 15th. It was on this day that German troops attempted to capture the island, but were defeated. It is noteworthy that a few days ago, enemy Soviet aviation came to the aid of the Finns.
Sommers
Sommers Island is located 11 kilometers north of Gogland. It was abandoned by the KBF forces on December 30, 1941, and already in January it was occupied by the Finns, who placed a reinforced garrison there.
On July 8-12, 1942, a large-scale air-sea battle between the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the combined Finnish-German fleet unfolded around Sommers - the first battle of this kind since the beginning of World War II. It involved 18 warships, 90 combat boats and other support units, about 150 aircraft.
Capturing Sommers was fundamentally important for a number of reasons, but the main one was that it had an excellent view of Powerful Island, where the Soviet units were stationed. However, the operation to capture the island was doomed to failure, as it was poorly designed. People were sent to certain death.
Powerful
Ostrom Powerful, or, as the Finns called it, Lavensaari, is located 45 kilometers east of Gogland. At the end of August 1941, it was fortified, and after the Soviet troops were forced to leave Gogland, it turned out to be the westernmost point controlled by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. It was from here that submarines, fighter aircraft and landings on Gogland, Sommers and Tyuters left. This happened despite the fact that Lavensaari was in the triple ring of the blockade!
Sescar
Seskar Island is located 27 kilometers east of Powerful Island. It was defended by parts of the Marine Regiment from the Lavensaari garrison.
At the end of August 1941, the KBF installed coastal batteries on it. In winter, an ice road with a length of 71 kilometers operated between Seskar and Shepelevsky lighthouse. In 1943, an airfield was built, from which fighters and attack aircraft of the KBF Air Force began to fly. In June 1944, several reconnaissance groups were formed from the volunteers of the Seskar garrison. All of them died heroically on the Birch Islands.
Nerva
Until June 1944, Nerva Island did not belong to any of the warring parties, but after the Soviet landing, the enemy tried unsuccessfully to recapture it. .
Big Tyuters
Bolshoy Tyuters is an island with an area of only 8.3 square kilometers, on which a two thousandth German garrison and several dozen artillery points with the best weapons of that time were based. Experts say that the Germans defended Berlin with approximately the same forces. Until 2015, there were weapons on the island abandoned by the German troops during the retreat in 1944.
In a hurry to leave the island, without the ability to evacuate property, the Nazis rendered useless everything - from anti-aircraft guns to field kitchens and barrels, mined the main roads, the area around the positions, residential and office facilities.
In 2015, thanks to the efforts of the Russian Geographical Society, German equipment was evacuated from the island. The operation was unique, since nowhere in the world has such a "military reserve" been preserved, and, accordingly, no one has ever carried out work of this magnitude.
The objects were carefully transported and placed at one of the arsenals of the Leningrad region. Some of them have already become the basis of the Echo of War exhibition in Patriot Park.
Also, the search engines of the Russian Geographical Society discovered a German garrison cemetery on Bolshoy Tyuters, and in the summer of 2016, the 90th search battalion of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the People's Union of Germany for the care of military graves carried out exhumation work on it. The remains of 30 German servicemen were transported to the mainland for burial in a special cemetery near the village of Sologubovka, Leningrad Region.
Death Island - Treasure Island
These small patches of land are usually called the outer islands of the Gulf of Finland. The sea route to our northern capital is laid past them along the narrow water "tongue" that the Baltic has stuck out. On the one hand - Finland, on the other - Estonia; the main fairway passing nearby reminds of itself with ships sailing one after another, and here, in a deserted bearish corner on the islands, life seems to have stopped, preserving the evidence of bygone battles.
Ordinary citizens are denied access here: the border zone. However, in the past few years, members of the expeditions of the Russian Geographical Society managed to examine the St. Petersburg "terra incognita", who discovered many relics from the times of the Great Patriotic War here. With one of the searchers met the correspondent of "MK".
The barrel of an anti-aircraft gun. Photo by Artem Khutorskoy.
In total, there are 14 islands in the "outer" group. The largest of them is Gogland, whose area is about 21 sq. km. And the smallest ones barely reach 100-150 meters in diameter. Since ancient times, these pieces of land have been considered important strategic objects for controlling navigation in the Gulf of Finland, and therefore on the largest ones - Gogland, Moshchny, Seskar, Bolshoi Tyuters, Sommers - fortification work was actively carried out before, batteries and pillboxes were built from concrete, hollowed out in granite rocks caponiers, trenches, shelters.
From 1920 until 1940 the islands were part of Finland. After the victory of the USSR in the winter war, they were under the red flag, but not for long. At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Nazis planned, together with the Finns, to capture all the "external". However, several islands were still held by the Red Army and the Baltic Fleet. These few pieces of land were important areas for the defense of the Leningrad blockade ring. For some time, a kind of front line was established in the Gulf of Finland along the water: the eastern islands are behind us, the western ones are behind the enemy. It was very difficult to supply the garrisons of the Soviet part. The ships made their way there along the bay under blows from four sides: they were shot at from the right and left - from the shores of Finland and Estonia, occupied by the enemy, German aircraft attacked from above, and from below, from under the water, enemy submarines threatened ...
Even in the first period of the war, several times our sailors tried to return the lost island territories. But only in the autumn of 1944, all the "outer" ones again came under the control of the Soviet side: the enemy left the islands without a fight.
The military events that happened here are almost never remembered now. But the same Gogland was marked during the war by a unique battle: the Germans fought with the Finns. It happened during Operation Tanne Ost in the fall of 1944. A few days before, Finland announced its withdrawal from the war, and then the German command decided to capture Gogland, which was well fortified by the Finns, which was the most important point for monitoring the situation in the Gulf of Finland. The Germans continued to consider the army of the Suomi Country their ally and hoped that the northerners would simply surrender all the batteries and strongholds on the island to them without a fight. However, these hopes were not justified. When the German ships tried to land troops, the Finns, loyal to the obligations just given by the USSR, began to defend themselves fiercely. The forces, however, turned out to be unequal, and in order to avoid defeat, the Finns called in our aircraft to help. Several squadrons of attack aircraft and bombers made a vinaigrette out of the Germans on Gogland - the enemy landing was defeated, the Nazis lost about 2300 people. This is an unprecedented case of military cooperation between the warring countries: after all, although at that time there was a truce between Finland and the Soviet Union, formally we were still enemies with them!
According to historians, among the Red Army and Red Navy men who participated in military operations on the outer islands of the Gulf of Finland during the war years, the losses amounted to at least 1,500 people - killed, drowned, missing, died from wounds. Moreover, the bodies of most of these dead have not been found ... How many Germans and Finns died there during the same time - in general, no one among us counted.
After the end of the war, the islands fell into oblivion. The population of the Finnish villages that existed before did not return here, they did not build large defensive structures to replace the former ones ... Now the entire population of the “outer” ones is a few attendants of the lighthouses working here and several small military units: border guards, locators, sailors. It was the desertedness and inaccessibility that caused the islands to turn into a reserve of time.
Special trailer for anti-aircraft artillery fire control device. Photo by Artem Khutorskoy.
Infernal stuffing of Big Tyuters
“Since 1992, I have been engaged in search operations at battlefields,” says Artem Khutorskoy, Deputy Executive Director of the Expeditionary Center of the Russian Geographical Society for search activities. – In the summer of 2013, friends and colleagues from the Leningrad Regional Branch of the Russian Geographical Society invited me to visit Gogland Island, where students from several St. Petersburg universities had field practice. We arrived only for four days, but even this period was enough to fall in love with the local nature. And in the evening, by the fire, the “old-timers” said that the island of Bolshoy Tyuters is nearby, and since the Great Patriotic War everything has been literally crammed with abandoned military equipment ...
Frankly, I thought that these are classic stories that search engines often hear. However, with Bolshoy Tyuters it turned out to be completely different. The first factual information confirming that numerous artifacts of the past war are really still preserved on this island, I found on the Internet upon returning home. And already in the autumn of the same 2013, thanks to a happy coincidence, I managed to visit this reserved corner myself: I was offered to take part in a search expedition to Bolshoy Tyuters as a specialist in German military equipment and weapons.
What I saw there exceeded all my wildest expectations. "Iron" from the time of the war began to catch the eye literally from the first steps on the island. Anti-aircraft batteries, searchlights, field kitchens, pyramids of shells, mountains of some parts piled up in a heap, the remains of our and German fortifications ... However, you need to be careful when walking in this open-air military museum.
- What is the main danger?
- The Germans placed an impressive garrison on Bolshoi Tyuters - about 2000 people, installed several powerful batteries. They ruled the island for more than two years and all this time they lived there very freely: our air raids and shelling from the sea did not cause any significant damage. True, the Soviet command twice tried to take the island under its control. The first attempt to land troops dates back to April 1, 1942. The fighting went on for several days, but as a result, our detachment suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat. A few days later, on April 13, they launched another assault on Bolshoy Tyuters - and also unsuccessfully ...
The situation changed rapidly in 1944. By the beginning of September, our troops had advanced in all sectors of the front, and a serious danger hung over the garrisons of the outer islands occupied by the Germans. The Nazi command preferred in this situation, without waiting for the Soviet attacks, to give the order for evacuation.
It took place on September 18 and was so swift that the Germans did not even manage to take out almost a single gun from there. But at that time there was already a massive offensive of the Red Army troops on the Soviet-German front, our aviation was gaining overwhelming air superiority, so for the Wehrmacht every anti-aircraft, every anti-tank gun was literally worth its weight in gold! But those that stood on Tyuters, the Germans had to undermine. They rendered unusable not only guns, but also all mechanisms and devices. Even the field kitchens did not survive: the Nazis threw a grenade into the cauldron of each of them ...
During the occupation, the Germans managed to bring in a huge amount of ammunition. Leaving the island in a hurry, they were unable to evacuate this entire arsenal, however, they also did not dare to undermine it, fearing that a powerful explosion would cover the departing ships with the garrison. As a result, the enemy tried to mine the entire infernal stuffing of the Big Tyuters. This deadly surprise found the first victims among the paratroopers who landed on the island abandoned by the enemy two days later - September 20, 1944. Then the list of the dead kept growing. Even many years after the Victory, people who ended up there continued to die, undermined by Nazi ammunition. Not without reason, until recently, Bolshoi Tyuters was called the island of death ...
On such a seemingly small piece of land (about 8 square kilometers), mine clearance attempts were repeatedly made: sappers came here immediately after the war, and in the 1950s and 1960s, and there is evidence that many of them died here . Finally, in 2005, demining specialists from the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, together with their colleagues from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, carried out a large-scale cleansing of the island of death. They discovered more than 30,000 explosive objects from the war - shells, mines, bombs, cartridges ... Some of the ammunition was destroyed, some was neutralized by removing the fuses from them. So Big Tyuters parted with his former terrible nickname.
- Let's return from the "explosive" past to the present...
- Based on the results of our short-term exploration expedition, carried out on a grant allocated by the Russian Geographical Society, a report was prepared in the name of its president, Sergei Shoigu. We tried to make the situation as clear as possible: unique equipment from the Second World War has survived on the islands, it needs to be saved for the country's museum collections, and there is an opportunity to do this. Sergey Kuzhugetovich read such a summary and imposed a resolution: we must continue the work and expand the search. As a result, next year we received a new grant from the Russian Geographical Society. These funds were enough to explore almost all the islands in the summer of 2014 (we visited 13 of them, and only one, tiny, which is located in the distance, could not be reached: there was not enough time and diesel fuel for motors). As a result of the survey raid, it became obvious that the main repository of artifacts is still Big Tyuters. In the same summer, we were able to examine it very thoroughly: a special search expedition was organized. This is a unique island both in historical and military-technical terms. There are perhaps only two or three of them in the whole world.
Did you manage to make unusual finds?
“Almost all the finds there are unusual. But I'll start, perhaps, with hiding places. On the island we found two old caches. One of them is in a very convenient location. Imagine: a rock hangs from above, like the visor of a gigantic cap, and under the “visor” there is a narrow gap, so that you can crawl into it only by crawling. And this hole leads to a small cave ...
Until now, there are disputes to whom the caches could belong. In these secret shelters, makeshift beds are arranged, the remnants of firewood that were once stockpiled lie ...
Our search guys then, already on the mainland, began to study archival documents and found out: in 1943, two reconnaissance groups disappeared on the island. And about one of them in general, no details were found in our archives. And it is known about the second group that it consisted of two people - and both were called Ivans. These two, having landed safely, began to transmit radiograms with information, but then suddenly disappeared from the air. What trouble happened to them?
At first there was an assumption that the Ivans were killed or captured by the Nazis. However, from the materials that we managed to find in the German archives, it turned out that the enemy could not find the scouts. I have copies of documents: 800 people were sent to comb the island - with so many soldiers it was possible to search almost every centimeter! As a result, the Fritz found some traces of our reconnaissance group: bandaging equipment hidden in the wilderness, a supply of food, lamps for the transmitter ... Upon a thorough examination of the coastline of the island, we stumbled upon an inflatable boat disguised in stones. But the Germans themselves did not find the Ivanovs. Judging by the documents from the Soviet archives, according to the operation plan developed in advance, at the agreed time and place, our submarine approached the island behind the scouts. She waited for them for two nights, but to no avail. The two Ivanovs also did not get in touch anymore. The mystery of this disappearance has not yet been solved ...
Entrance to the concrete bunker. Photo by Artem Khutorskoy.
Cannon-"defector"
- What other reminders of that war were found on Bolshoi Tyuters?
- There are several German guns on the island - and they are completely unique. There is, for example, an anti-tank gun, which, according to experts, is now preserved all over the world in a single copy. So, it turns out that one more such rarity has survived on Bolshoi Tyuters.
What is this marvel of technology?
“This and the guns of the same type have an interesting biography. Even before the war, many units of the Red Army were equipped with regimental cannons of 76-millimeter caliber according to the state - they were produced by factories in droves. In the first months of the Great Patriotic War, a large number of such guns went to the enemy - the Germans and Finns, who included trophies in their artillery. And if in the army of the Land of Suomi our "colonels" were used without any alterations, then in the parts of the Wehrmacht the Russian 76-graph papers were modernized. They put, for example, more advanced aiming systems, a muzzle was attached to the barrel ... The ex-Soviet guns were very useful to the Nazis for organizing anti-tank defense. (It should be noted that the Germans in the initial period of the war against the USSR experienced an acute shortage of anti-tank weapons. After all, before the attack on our country, the Nazi generals planned a completely different tactics of military operations - they did not assume that during the war they would have to repel more and more massive tank attacks units of the Red Army, and therefore did not care too much at first about the massive supply of anti-tank defense guns to the front line. And when they realized it, it was already very difficult to fill this gap: the industry of the Third Reich could not provide such a number of anti-tank guns.)
During the victorious end of the war on the Eastern Front, some of the "Soviet-German" anti-tank guns were destroyed, while others that survived and were taken back by us as trophies were soon sent for melting down - so that even such a "disguised" memory of Nazism would not be preserved. I have already mentioned the result of such a global cleansing: before our expedition, only the only surviving cannon was known, and even then, according to available information, it is located overseas - there are no such samples in European museums. (In general, specimens of captured military equipment are probably the rarest topic of museum collecting, since such specimens are usually not preserved, they tend to be disposed of “in hot pursuit”.) And now another “defector” gun has been discovered.
Among other rarities of the "treasure island" was a whole collection of German searchlight technology. In the same place, we found six pieces of anti-aircraft automatic installations - and "in assortment", of different calibers: 20 mm, 40 mm ...
And more about the "gifts" of the Big Tyuters. Only a single copy of the 88-mm German anti-aircraft gun is now stored in Russia, which was recognized by experts as the best anti-aircraft gun of the Second World War (but the Wehrmacht had to spend a lot of money on this technical excellence: the miracle anti-aircraft gun cost almost 35,000 Reichsmarks, despite the fact that a simple Mercedes cost the buyer 4000). Not so long ago, such an 88-graph paper was purchased in France and taken to our country by the owner of one of the private museums of technology. And at Bolshoy Tyuters we counted as many as five of them!
In Russian museum expositions, you can find only a couple of copies of the German mobile anti-aircraft searchlight. And on this island, eight pieces were found at once. A similar situation is with the German wheeled gasoline generator. It is believed that we have preserved one such sample in Russia, and while rummaging through the wilderness of Bolshoi Tyuters, we stumbled upon a whole “deposit” of such technical rarities ...
In general, almost all the old German technology that has survived on this island is unique to our country. Indeed, in the post-war USSR, its then leaders made a lot of efforts to destroy everything connected with the accursed enemy - the German army, its weapons. Therefore, enemy tanks, aircraft, artillery mounts were completely liquidated, sent for scrap metal ... Even those specimens that were exhibited at grandiose exhibitions of captured military equipment (the most famous of them were organized during the war years on the territory of the Central Park of Culture and Recreation in Moscow) were subsequently sent for recycling.
- But why did this “iron” survive to this day at Bolshoi Tyuters?
“Because after the war there was no military garrison there, the small island remained almost deserted for many years. It is also necessary to take into account the most important fact: this is a border zone, and access there is limited. However, to say that the technique is well preserved is still not entirely true. In fact, these retro specimens are fairly robbed, they show damage that was clearly inflicted at a later time. Here, most likely, collectors of non-ferrous metals, stray tourists, fishermen, "diggers" tried ...
- But how could they be in the "ban"?
- So, for some, getting permission to be in the border zone is a problem (I don’t even want to remember how many ordeals the organizers of our expedition had to overcome for this in 2013!), And someone manages to turn on the “green light” for themselves. The so-called black diggers, apparently, did not have such problems. I later found photos on the Internet in which people pose near these guns on Bolshoi Tyuters, read messages from illegal immigrants: they say that they managed to take something out ... And these are not empty boasts. At least two guns from the island were taken somewhere - that is, in other words, stolen! In the photo from the Internet, they are, and when we got to the place, these guns were not found.
In such barrels, the Germans stored fuel supplies. Photo by Artem Khutorskoy.
Save everything!
- Based on the results of our surveys of the island, a report was prepared for the Russian Geographical Society and the Ministry of Defense. Based on the data presented in it, Sergei Shoigu signed at the end of last December the plan of expeditionary work of his ministry for 2015. It includes, among other things, the following item: "The removal of military-historical equipment from the island of Bolshoy Tyuters and the islands surrounding it, which will be found during the spring expedition."
Such attention from high military authorities makes the search engines of the Expeditionary Center of the Russian Geographical Society work at maximum speed. During the three expedition weeks scheduled for May-June, we need to comb through all the nooks and crannies on the islands that we could not explore last year. There is a lot of work to be done!
- How realistic is it not only to take out the rarities you mentioned, but also to restore them in their original "conditional" form for display in museums? Still, for almost 70 years, this “iron” experienced the onslaught of rains, winds, salty sea spray ...
— The already existing experience of search engines and restorers proves that from the point of view of the conditions for the preservation of retro technology, the Baltic is unique! Nature there seems to be specially programmed for the preservation of human handicrafts. It comes to the point that even some fragile parts made of simple stamped steel - in addition, obviously experienced by an explosion or fire - are preserved here quite tolerably, although similar finds made in other places often simply crumble when touched.
Another thing is that the mentioned equipment was damaged, blown up by the Germans themselves in 1944, before they left the islands. However, skillful restorers will turn our finds into exhibition samples without any problems.
- According to the plan, will they take out everything interesting that the search expeditions managed to find?
- We will seek to send to the mainland all the military artifacts from the islands that have been preserved in a more or less transportable state. Here, after all, it must be taken into account that we are talking about a technique that is unique for our country during the Great Patriotic War. Of course, some of these copies can be purchased, say, at an auction in France and brought to Russia, but it costs a lot of money. Only a very rich collector-fan can afford such expenses.
— What fate awaits the said rarities? Where will they end up after being evacuated from the island?
- Further prospects for "Tyuter" retrotechnics largely depend on the joint decision of the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Geographical Society. For our part, we would propose to adhere to the principle of public and private partnership. That is, to transfer some of the finds for restoration and exhibiting in private museums of technology. After all, the amount of work to restore the rarities discovered at Tyuters is colossal. And in the current difficult time, the state does not have enough funds to do this on its own.
— Aren't you afraid to talk in detail about the unique military artifacts found on the islands like this? Suddenly, after reading about this in MK, one of the enterprising "searchers" decides to quickly pull something out of retrotechnics from there and get ahead of you in this? They themselves talked about the stolen guns ...
“Now we are no longer afraid of such incidents. And the publication in the newspaper will only contribute to the preservation of these relics of the war: I think that after this problem is made public, the leadership of the Baltic Fleet, the Western Military District, the border guards will take these places under even greater control and protection from the penetration of outsiders.
Photo by Artem Khutorskoy.
Lost Graves
— In 2014, members of the expedition from the Russian Search Movement explored the territory of Gogland. But superficially: the island is still very large. So far, the remains of only one Red Army soldier have been found. And as for any “iron”, we were convinced that now nothing interesting has been preserved on Gogland. All Finnish equipment and weapons were taken out either for scrap or as trophies (it is known that some of the Finnish guns were used by the Red Army in the hostilities of 1944-1945).
Meanwhile, according to available information, somewhere on the island there should be a mass grave of those who died in 1941 from German shells, bombs and mines during the breakthrough of the infamous "Tallinn convoy" - a caravan of our combat and transport ships going to Leningrad from Estonia, which was under the threat of occupation. Accurate data on the place of burial of these people - mostly civilians - has not yet been found. And in one of the old Finnish cemeteries, several graves of Soviet military sailors survived. Among them, I remember the foreman of the 1st article Merinov and captain Rudy: judging by the inscription on the tombstone, the lives of both ended on May 10, 1945 - the day after the Victory ... What could happen to them? According to official data, the sailors were killed by an enemy mine.
On another island - Sommers - there should also be a mass grave. It was arranged by the Finns after the death of the Soviet landing force in the summer of 1942. Now little is remembered about this large-scale operation of the Baltic Fleet. But then, from July 8 to 12, ours lost over 300 paratroopers in fierce but unsuccessful battles - almost everyone who landed on this small, only 500x900 meters in size, island. Only a small part of the paratroopers was taken prisoner, and our boats managed to pick up a few. Last year, the members of our expedition searched for this mass grave, but, unfortunately, without success. Over the months that have passed since then, we have been able to study new archival materials, and now it is already clear to us where exactly we should search.
In the 2015 season, a joint expedition of the Russian Geographical Society, the Ministry of Defense and the Search Movement of Russia is planned. We will work on three islands at the same time - on Gogland, Sommers and Bolshoi Tyuters. With regard to this latter, our plans are not only to thoroughly comb the entire island, but to draw up a detailed diagram indicating all the equipment from the war era that has been preserved there, as well as to prepare a plan for its evacuation. By the way, the list of necessary technical means for such an evacuation of artifacts is already ready and sent to the Ministry of Defense.
— Are there any other places where you can find military equipment preserved from the times of the Second World War in our time?
- A very rich "deposit" - in the Kuril Islands. We already carried out reconnaissance expeditions there together with the Ministry of Defense last year - we discovered Japanese tanks, vehicles ... But there are also much closer geographically "deposits" of retro equipment. Crimea has now returned to us, and from documentary sources it is known that in its coastal waters there are two or three German transports sunk during the war, crammed full of self-propelled guns and anti-aircraft guns. At a time when the peninsula was part of independent Ukraine, several of these self-propelled guns and guns, according to my information, were raised with the connivance of the former authorities and disappeared in an unknown direction. But each such combat vehicle in a restored state is worth millions of dollars to collectors in the West!
When carrying out the evacuation of the “iron” found on the islands in the Gulf of Finland from the times of the Great Patriotic War, such “private entrepreneurial” initiatives are excluded: we organize the most severe control. All exported samples of equipment and even its fragments will be carefully described, photographed, sealed before being sent to the mainland so that nothing is lost or mixed up. We will draw up acts signed by representatives of all responsible parties: the Russian Geographical Society, the Ministry of Defense, authorized for the delivery and storage ...
By the way, there, on the outer islands, in this remote corner, which few people know about, in addition to military relics, there are other objects that require attention. For example, ancient lighthouses have survived (although often not in the best condition) there, and even the first cast-iron lighthouse in Russia, built in 1863, has been preserved on Seskar Island. On several of these pieces of land there are the ruins of Finnish villages, old cemeteries, preserved from the last and even the century before last. Now they are a depressing sight: everything is torn apart, stone monuments are overturned, broken, someone tried to dig up some graves (and, judging by the traces, not so long ago) ...
Of course, justifying such desolation and devastation, one can refer to the fact that, they say, this is all “enemy heritage”, remember that we fought against the Germans and Finns. However, this is not an argument. It is necessary to educate in people hatred for the enemy, but respect for the enemy and not take out your anger in his cemeteries. If this law had been observed in previous years, then, perhaps, the war would have gone differently.