Creation of GKO
Stalin's actions in the first days of the war can be described as hectic, erratic and reactive. Not in control of the situation, not knowing how to lead the troops, Stalin simply tried to do something, because it was impossible to do nothing. These were mostly desperate and inadequate attempts to launch a counterattack, which often, if not in most cases, worsened the situation and caused new casualties.
Stalin, apparently, was fully aware of how great was the threat hanging over the country. There is convincing evidence that already in the first days of the war, Stalin tried to negotiate with Hitler, ceding to him a number of Soviet territories in the west of the USSR in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. On behalf of Stalin, Beria organized a meeting of his representative with the envoy of the allied Germany of Bulgaria. The diplomat, with the hope of being handed over to Hitler, was asked about the terms of the peace: what territories does Germany claim? The fate of this initiative is unknown. Most likely, the Bulgarian envoy simply did not get involved in mediation. However, this probing of the soil speaks volumes. Even if this was a maneuver designed to dampen the German offensive, it is clear that Stalin was aware of the threat of defeat.
Other facts testified to the same. Along with extensive mobilization into the Red Army and the preparation of new lines of defense, mass evacuation began already in the first days of the war. Moreover, not only the population and material resources from the front-line areas were subject to export. A secret but very revealing evacuation of the capital was carried out, which was still at a considerable distance from the hostilities. On June 27, 1941, the Politburo approved a resolution on the urgent (within three days) removal from Moscow of state stocks of precious metals, precious stones, the USSR Diamond Fund and the values of the Kremlin Armory. On June 28, just as urgently, it was decided to evacuate banknotes from the Moscow vaults of the State Bank and Gosznak. On June 29, a decision was made to transfer to the rear the apparatuses of the people's commissariats and other leading institutions. On July 2, the Politburo decided to take the sarcophagus with the body of Lenin to Siberia, and on July 5, the archives, primarily the archives of the government and the Central Committee of the party.
One of the functionaries, called on the afternoon of June 26 to Stalin, recalled: “Stalin looked unusual. The view is not just tired. The appearance of a person who has suffered a strong internal shock. Before meeting him, I felt from all sorts of indirect facts that it was very difficult for us there, in the border battles. Perhaps destruction is brewing. When I saw Stalin, I realized that the worst had already happened.” The next few days brought no relief. Stalin became increasingly aware of the futility of his orders and the degree of uncontrollability of the army.
Just a week after the start of the war, disturbing news began to arrive in Moscow about the dire situation of the Western Front and the surrender of the capital of Belarus, Minsk. Communication with the troops was largely lost. There was a heavy pause in the Kremlin. On June 29, for the first time since the beginning of the war, no meetings were recorded in Stalin's Kremlin office. According to Mikoyan, in the evening Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan and Beria gathered at Stalin's. Most likely, the meeting took place either in Stalin's Kremlin apartment or at his dacha. Stalin called Timoshenko. Again to no avail. The military was out of control. Alarmed, Stalin broke the usual routine and invited the members of the Politburo to go to the People's Commissariat of Defense. Here he was once again convinced that the catastrophe had acquired enormous proportions. Stalin attacked the generals with reproaches and accusations. Unable to withstand the tension, Chief of the General Staff Zhukov burst into tears and ran into the next room. Molotov went to reassure him. This scene, apparently, sobered Stalin. He realized that it was useless to put pressure on the military. Leaving the building of the People's Commissariat of Defense, Stalin, according to Mikoyan and Molotov, said: "Lenin left us a great legacy, we - his heirs - pissed it all off."
Strong language and rudeness were not uncommon for Stalin. However, in this case, they reflected a really high degree of confusion. From the People's Commissariat of Defense, Stalin, apparently, went to the country.
The next day, June 30, Stalin did not appear not only in his Kremlin office, but in general in Moscow. In a situation of growing catastrophe, such self-isolation could have critical consequences. The huge administrative machine, built for Stalin, inevitably failed in his absence. Something had to be done. The initiative was taken by Molotov, senior in the informal hierarchy of Politburo members. According to Mikoyan, Molotov declared: "Stalin has such a prostration that he is not interested in anything, has lost the initiative, is in a bad state." Indirectly, this was confirmed many years later by Molotov himself in conversations with Chuev: “He didn’t show up for two or three days, he was at the dacha. He was worried, of course, was a little depressed. It is obvious that Molotov's memory betrayed the details: Stalin stayed at the dacha for a shorter period than two or three days. However, in the conditions of the catastrophic start of the war, even the short absence of the leader was naturally perceived as critical.
Alarmed, Molotov decided to act. He summoned Beria, Malenkov and Voroshilov to a meeting. This, of course, was not about the formal or actual ousting of Stalin from power. The comrades-in-arms puzzled over how to "lure" Stalin out of the dacha, to force him to return to business. The task was not easy. The established order did not involve visits to Stalin's dacha without an invitation. In an emergency, such an unauthorized visit could be perceived by Stalin with particular pain. It was no less difficult to formulate the reason for such a trip. To openly tell Stalin that his depression threatens the security of the state, no one would have dared. However, members of the Politburo, who had become adept at political intrigues, came up with a brilliant move. They decided all together (necessarily together!) To go to Stalin and propose to him a project for the creation of a supreme authority for the war period - the State Defense Committee, headed by Stalin himself. In addition to Stalin, it was proposed to include the four developers of the project in the State Defense Committee. Molotov was appointed first deputy chairman of the GKO.
Now everything worked out smoothly and convincingly. There was a good reason for visiting Stalin, which had nothing to do with the fact that he did not appear at the workplace. The proposal to create a State Defense Committee headed by Stalin demonstrated not only the determination to continue the struggle, but also the devotion of the comrades-in-arms to the leader. The collective trip made it possible to smooth out Stalin's possible indignation.
When the plan was agreed upon by Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Beria, Mikoyan and Voznesensky were called into Molotov's office. They were two members of the steering group whom the Quartet decided not to include in the GKO. However, Mikoyan and Voznesensky, demonstrating the unity of the ranks, had to go to Stalin's dacha.
The story of what happened at Stalin's dacha was left by Mikoyan. According to him, the delegation found Stalin in a small dining room, sitting in an armchair. He looked inquiringly at his companions and asked why they had come. “He looked calm, but somehow strange,” Mikoyan recalled. After listening to the proposal to create a GKO, Stalin agreed. A small altercation was caused by the Quartet's project on the personal composition of the State Defense Committee, voiced by Beria. Stalin suggested including Mikoyan and Voznesensky in the GKO as well. However, Beria, authorized by the "four", outlined the arguments "against" - someone should remain in leadership in the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin did not object.
The publication of Mikoyan's memoirs in 1999, prepared by his son S. A. Mikoyan, in this fragment contains numerous changes and inscriptions in the original text, preserved in the archive. S. A. Mikoyan was clearly trying to create the impression of Stalin's fear. For this purpose, the following phrases were inscribed in the original dictations of A. I. Mikoyan: “When he saw us, he (Stalin. - OH.) as if pressed into an armchair”; “I have (Mikoyan. - OH.) there was no doubt: he decided that we had come to arrest him. However, it is important to remember that these accents were added later and do not belong to Mikoyan.
Could Stalin be scared? How to interpret the meeting at the dacha on June 30? Undoubtedly, this was a moment of crisis in the development of Stalin's autocracy. No matter how carefully Stalin's comrades-in-arms behaved, they violated important rules of the political protocol of the dictatorship. The members of the Politburo came to see Stalin, having previously agreed among themselves and on their own initiative. They proposed to make an important decision and insisted on its adoption in the form in which they agreed among themselves. Of fundamental importance was the formal confirmation of the role of Molotov as a second person in the state and the non-inclusion of Voznesensky in the GKO, whom Stalin in May 1941 appointed instead of Molotov as his first deputy in the Council of People's Commissars. In fact, Stalin's comrades-in-arms made it clear to him that in the face of a mortal threat, it was necessary to consolidate the leadership that had developed after the Great Terror, that the new shake-ups at the top, which Stalin started on the eve of the war, should stop. It was a unique episode. It marked a temporary change in the nature of the dictatorship, the emergence of a military political compromise that was somewhere between pre-war tyranny and the Stalinist loyalty of the early 1930s. Forced for Stalin, the principle of compromise relations in the Politburo operated throughout almost the entire war.
The decision to create a State Defense Committee, agreed upon at Stalin's dacha, was published in the newspapers the next day. The inclusion of only Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov and Malenkov in the GKO did not mean at all that the other top leaders of the Politburo had lost their administrative influence. Mikoyan and Voznesensky performed the most important economic functions. Zhdanov concentrated entirely on the defense of Leningrad. Kaganovich, as People's Commissar of Railways, was engaged in railways, the importance of which in the conditions of war and evacuation was difficult to overestimate. In February 1942, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Kaganovich were included in the GKO.
The formation of the State Defense Committee gave impetus to the further concentration in the hands of Stalin of the formal attributes of supreme power. On July 10, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command, which was headed by People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko, was transformed into the Headquarters of the High Command under the leadership of Stalin. On July 19, by decision of the Politburo, Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense, on August 8 - Supreme Commander. Everything fell into place. Stalin returned to the people and the army in his usual image of an autocratic leader, resolute and confident in victory. The most important role in this “return of Stalin” was played by his well-known speech on the radio on July 3rd.
Unlike Molotov, who spoke on June 22 in the building of the Central Telegraph, located next to the Kremlin, Stalin demanded that the broadcast of his speech be organized directly from the Kremlin. The signalmen, overburdened with business, were forced to fulfill this senseless whim. Cables were urgently laid in the building of the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin, who was sitting at a table with microphones and a bottle of Borjomi, read out a speech. This address of Stalin to the people was unique in many respects. “Comrades! Citizens! Brothers and sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy! I turn to you, my friends!” - already this beginning of the speech was unusual and not at all in the Stalinist style. He was specially noted and remembered by many contemporaries of the events. Clinging to the receivers or reading the lines of a newspaper report, people were looking for the answer to the main question in Stalin's words: what will happen next, how soon will the war end? However, Stalin did not say anything encouraging. Significantly exaggerating the losses of the German army (“the best divisions of the enemy and the best parts of his aviation have already been defeated”), Stalin was forced to admit that “it is a matter […] of life and death of the Soviet state, of life and death of the peoples of the USSR.” Stalin's calls to the people to realize "the full depth of the danger that threatens our country", to organize partisan struggle in the rear of the Germans, to create detachments of the people's militia, to remove or destroy all material resources from the territories threatened by capture by the enemy sounded alarming. Stalin declared the outbreak of war national and national. From all this followed the obvious conclusion - the war will be hard and long.
In the meantime, the people and especially the army needed to somehow explain the causes of the disaster, point to the next "scapegoats". Didn't have to search long. Soon, the complete collapse of the Western Front and the mistakes of its leadership, headed by General D. G. Pavlov, were announced, which clearly indicated the direction of demonstrative repressions. Pavlov and a number of his subordinates were put on trial and shot. By orders signed by Stalin, the army was widely informed about this.
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State Defense Committee
GKO - created during the Great Patriotic War, an emergency governing body of the country. The need for creation was obvious, since in wartime it was necessary to concentrate all power in the country, both executive and legislative, in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. However, the adopted decisions formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In order to eliminate such a method of leadership, which is permissible in peacetime, but does not meet the requirements of the country's martial law, it was decided to create a State Defense Committee, which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Stalin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
The idea of creating a GKO was put forward by L.P. Beria at a meeting in the office of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov in the Kremlin, which was also attended by Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. Thus, the State Defense Committee was formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). The need to create a State Defense Committee, as the highest governing body, was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which required that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent. The aforementioned resolution states that all orders of the State Defense Committee must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.
It was decided to put Stalin at the head of the GKO, in view of his undeniable authority in the country. Having made this decision, Beria, Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky, on the afternoon of June 30, headed for the "Near Dacha".
Stalin did not make a speech on the radio in the first days of the war, as he understood that his speech could even more give rise to anxiety and panic among people. The fact is that he very rarely spoke publicly, on the radio. In the pre-war years, this happened only a few times: in 1936 - 1 time, in 1937 - 2 times, in 1938 - 1, in 1939 - 1, in 1940 - not a single one, until July 3, 1941 - not a single one. .
Until June 28 inclusive, Stalin worked intensively in his Kremlin office and daily received a large number of visitors; on the night of June 28-29, he had Beria and Mikoyan, who left the office at about 1 a.m. After that, the entries in the visit log cease and for June 29-30 are completely absent, which shows that Stalin did not receive anyone in his office in the Kremlin these days.
Having received on June 29 the first and still vague information about the fall of Minsk that had taken place the day before, he visited the People's Commissariat of Defense, where he had a difficult scene with G.K. Zhukov. After that, Stalin went to the "Near Dacha" and locked himself there, not receiving anyone and not answering the phone. In this state, he remained until the evening of June 30, when (at about 5 p.m.) a delegation (Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky) came to him.
These leaders informed Stalin about the created government body and offered him to become chairman of the State Defense Committee, to which Stalin gave his consent. There, on the spot, powers were distributed among the members of the State Defense Committee.
The composition of the GKO was as follows: Chairman of the GKO - I. V. Stalin; Deputy Chairman of the GKO - V. M. Molotov. Members of the GKO: L.P. Beria (since May 16, 1944 - Deputy Chairman of the GKO); K. E. Voroshilov; G. M. MALENKOV.
The composition of the GKO was changed three times (the changes were legally formalized by the decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Council):
- On February 3, 1942, N. A. Voznesensky (at that time Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR) and A. I. Mikoyan became members of the State Defense Committee;
- On November 22, 1944, N.A. Bulganin became a new member of the GKO, and K.E. Voroshilov was removed from the GKO.
The vast majority of GKO resolutions dealt with topics related to the war:
- evacuation of the population and industry (during the first period of the Great Patriotic War);
- mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;
– handling captured weapons and ammunition;
- study and export to the USSR of captured samples of equipment, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);
- organization of hostilities, distribution of weapons, etc.;
– appointment of authorized GKOs;
- the beginning of "works on uranium" (the creation of nuclear weapons);
- Structural changes in the GKO itself.
The vast majority of GKO resolutions were classified as "Secret", "Top Secret" or "Top Secret/Special Importance".
Some decisions were open and published in the press - GKO Decree No. 813 of 10/19/41 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow.
The State Defense Committee supervised all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the fighting was carried out through the Headquarters.
On September 4, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
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State Defense Committee
GKO - created during the Great Patriotic War, an emergency governing body of the country. The need for creation was obvious, since in wartime it was necessary to concentrate all power in the country, both executive and legislative, in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. However, the adopted decisions formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In order to eliminate such a method of leadership, which is permissible in peacetime, but does not meet the requirements of the country's martial law, it was decided to create a State Defense Committee, which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Stalin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
The idea of creating a GKO was put forward by L.P. Beria at a meeting in the office of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov in the Kremlin, which was also attended by Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. Thus, the State Defense Committee was formed on June 30, 1941 by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). The need to create a State Defense Committee, as the highest governing body, was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which required that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent. The aforementioned resolution states that all orders of the State Defense Committee must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.
It was decided to put Stalin at the head of the GKO, in view of his undeniable authority in the country. Having made this decision, Beria, Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky, on the afternoon of June 30, headed for the "Near Dacha".
Stalin did not make a speech on the radio in the first days of the war, as he understood that his speech could even more give rise to anxiety and panic among people. The fact is that he very rarely spoke publicly, on the radio. In the pre-war years, this happened only a few times: in 1936 - 1 time, in 1937 - 2 times, in 1938 - 1, in 1939 - 1, in 1940 - not a single one, until July 3, 1941 - not a single one. .
Until June 28 inclusive, Stalin worked intensively in his Kremlin office and daily received a large number of visitors; on the night of June 28-29, he had Beria and Mikoyan, who left the office at about 1 a.m. After that, the entries in the visit log cease and for June 29-30 are completely absent, which shows that Stalin did not receive anyone in his office in the Kremlin these days.
Having received on June 29 the first and still vague information about the fall of Minsk that had taken place the day before, he visited the People's Commissariat of Defense, where he had a difficult scene with G.K. Zhukov. After that, Stalin went to the "Near Dacha" and locked himself there, not receiving anyone and not answering the phone. In this state, he remained until the evening of June 30, when (at about 5 p.m.) a delegation (Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky) came to him.
These leaders informed Stalin about the created government body and offered him to become chairman of the State Defense Committee, to which Stalin gave his consent. There, on the spot, powers were distributed among the members of the State Defense Committee.
The composition of the GKO was as follows: Chairman of the GKO - I. V. Stalin; Deputy Chairman of the GKO - V. M. Molotov. Members of the GKO: L.P. Beria (since May 16, 1944 - Deputy Chairman of the GKO); K. E. Voroshilov; G. M. MALENKOV.
The composition of the GKO was changed three times (the changes were legally formalized by the decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Council):
- On February 3, 1942, N. A. Voznesensky (at that time Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR) and A. I. Mikoyan became members of the State Defense Committee;
- On November 22, 1944, N.A. Bulganin became a new member of the GKO, and K.E. Voroshilov was removed from the GKO.
The vast majority of GKO resolutions dealt with topics related to the war:
- evacuation of the population and industry (during the first period of the Great Patriotic War);
- mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;
– handling captured weapons and ammunition;
- study and export to the USSR of captured samples of equipment, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);
- organization of hostilities, distribution of weapons, etc.;
– appointment of authorized GKOs;
- the beginning of "works on uranium" (the creation of nuclear weapons);
- Structural changes in the GKO itself.
The vast majority of GKO resolutions were classified as "Secret", "Top Secret" or "Top Secret/Special Importance".
Some decisions were open and published in the press - GKO Decree No. 813 of 10/19/41 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow.
The State Defense Committee supervised all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the fighting was carried out through the Headquarters.
On September 4, 1945, the State Defense Committee was abolished by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
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Introduction
State Defense Committee (abbreviated GKO) - an emergency governing body created during the Great Patriotic War, which had full power in the USSR. The need for creation was obvious, because. in wartime, it was required to concentrate all power in the country, both executive and legislative, in one governing body. Stalin and the Politburo actually headed the state and made all decisions. However, the adopted decisions formally came from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, etc. In order to eliminate such a method of leadership, which is permissible in peacetime, but does not meet the requirements of the military situation of the country, it was decided to create a State Defense Committee, which included some members of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Stalin himself, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
1. Formation of GKO
The State Defense Committee was formed on June 30, 1941, by a joint resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The need to create a State Defense Committee, as the highest governing body, was motivated by the difficult situation at the front, which required that the leadership of the country be centralized to the maximum extent. The aforementioned resolution states that all orders of the State Defense Committee must be unquestioningly carried out by citizens and any authorities.
The idea of creating a GKO was put forward by L.P. Beria at a meeting in Molotov's office in the Kremlin, which was also attended by Malenkov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and Voznesensky. need attribution It was decided to put Stalin at the head of the GKO, in view of his undeniable authority in the country. need attribution Having made this decision, the six in the afternoon (after 4 o’clock) went to the Middle Dacha, where they persuaded Stalin to again assume the functions of the head of state and distributed duties in the newly created committee need attribution. . (for details see: Stalin June 29-30, 1941).
2. Composition of GKO
Initially (on the basis of a joint Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 30, 1941, see below), the composition of the GKO was as follows:
Chairman of the GKO - I. V. Stalin.
Deputy Chairman of the GKO - V. M. Molotov.
GKO members:
K. E. Voroshilov.
On February 3, 1942, N. A. Voznesensky (at that time Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR) and A. I. Mikoyan became members of the GKO;
On November 22, 1944, N. A. Bulganin became a new member of the GKO, and K. E. Voroshilov was removed from the GKO.
3. GKO resolutions
The first GKO decree (“On the organization of the production of T-34 medium tanks at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant”) was issued on July 1, 1941, the last one (No. ”) - September 4, 1945. The numbering of the decisions was kept through.
Of the 9,971 resolutions and orders adopted by the State Defense Committee during its work, 98 documents remain completely classified and three more partially (they relate mainly to the production of chemical weapons and the atomic problem).
Most of the decisions of the GKO were signed by its chairman, Stalin, some also by deputy Molotov and GKO members Mikoyan and Beria.
The State Defense Committee did not have its own apparatus, its decisions were prepared in the relevant people's commissariats and departments, and office work was carried out by the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.
The vast majority of GKO resolutions were classified as “Secret”, “Top Secret” or “Top Secret / Special Importance” (the designation “s”, “ss” and “ss / s” after the number), but some resolutions were open and published in the press (an example of such a resolution is the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 813 of 10/19/41 on the introduction of a state of siege in Moscow).
The vast majority of GKO resolutions dealt with topics related to the war:
evacuation of the population and industry (during the first period of the Great Patriotic War);
mobilization of industry, production of weapons and ammunition;
handling captured weapons and ammunition;
study and export to the USSR of captured samples of equipment, industrial equipment, reparations (at the final stage of the war);
organization of hostilities, distribution of weapons, etc.;
appointment of authorized GKOs;
about the beginning of "works on uranium" (the creation of nuclear weapons);
structural changes in the GKO itself.
4. Structure of GKO
The GKO included several structural divisions. Over the period of its existence, the structure of the Committee has changed several times, with the aim of maximizing management efficiency and adapting to current conditions.
The most important subdivision was the Operations Bureau, created on December 8, 1942 by GKO resolution No. 2615s. The bureau included L.P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, A. I. Mikoyan and V. M. Molotov. The actual head of the Operational Bureau was Beria. The tasks of this unit initially included monitoring and monitoring the current work of all the people's commissariats of the defense industry, the people's commissariats of communications, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, power plants, the oil, coal and chemical industries, as well as the preparation and execution of plans for the production and supply of these industries and transport with everything you need. On May 19, 1944, Decree No. 5931 was adopted, by which the functions of the bureau were significantly expanded - now its tasks included monitoring and controlling the work of the people's commissariats of the defense industry, transport, metallurgy, people's commissariats of the most important areas of industry and power plants; from that moment on, the Operations Bureau was also responsible for supplying the army, and finally, it was entrusted with the duties of the abolished by the decision of the Transport Committee.
Other important divisions of the GKO were:
Trophy Commission (established in December 1941, and on April 5, 1943, by Decree No. 3123ss, it was transformed into the Trophy Committee);
Special Committee - established on August 20, 1945 (GKO Decree No. 9887ss / op). Engaged in the development of nuclear weapons.
Special Committee (dealt with issues of reparations).
Evacuation Committee (created on June 25, 1941 by GKO Decree No. 834, disbanded on December 25, 1941 by GKO Decree No. 1066ss). On September 26, 1941, by GKO Decree No. 715s, the Administration for the Evacuation of the Population was organized under this committee.
The Committee for Unloading Railways - was formed on December 25, 1941 by GKO Decree No. 1066ss, on September 14, 1942, by GKO Decree No. 1279, it was transformed into the Transport Committee under the State Defense Committee, which existed until May 19, 1944, after which, by GKO Decree No. 5931, the Transport Committee was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the GKO Operational Bureau;
Radar Council - established on July 4, 1943 by GKO Decree No. 3686ss, consisting of: Malenkov (chairman), Arkhipov, Berg, Golovanov, Gorokhov, Danilov, Kabanov, Kobzarev, Stogov, Terentyev, Ucher, Shakhurin, Shchukin.
A group of permanent commissioners of the GKO and permanent commissions of the GKO at the fronts.
5. GKO functions
The State Defense Committee supervised all military and economic issues during the war. The leadership of the fighting was carried out through the Headquarters.
6. Dissolution of GKO
The State Defense Committee was disbanded by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 4, 1945.
7. Additional information in Wikisource
Bibliography:
R. A. Medvedev. IV Stalin in the first days of the Great Patriotic War. New and Contemporary History, No. 2, 2002
Konstantin Pleshakov. Stalin's mistake. The first 10 days of the war. Per. from English. A. K. Efremova. M., "Eksmo", 2006 ISBN 5-699-11788-1 pp. 293-304
Guslyarov E. (ed.) Stalin in life. M., Olma-Press, 2003 ISBN 5-94850-034-9
1941 The documents. in 2 vols. M., Democracy, 1998 p.498 ISBN 5-89511-003-7
Kumanev G. Next to Stalin. Smolensk, Rusich, 2001, pp. 31-34. ISBN 5-8138-0191-X
Khrushchev N. S. Memoirs. Time, people, power. In 3 vols. M., Moscow news, 1999. T.1., p. 301
Jover W. Secrets of the life and death of Stalin. - "Le Nouvel Observateur": 2006-06-28. (Interview with English historian Simon Seabeg Montefiore)
Scientific conference "N.A.Voznesensky: his era and modernity". Archives of Russia