After the encirclement of the Paulus group and its dismemberment, the success at Stalingrad was deafening. After February 2, a number of offensive operations were carried out. In particular, the Kharkov offensive operation, as a result of which the Soviet troops captured a significant territory. But then the situation changed dramatically. In the Kramatorsk area, a group of tank divisions, some of which were transferred from France, including two SS divisions - Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich - the Germans launched a crushing counterattack. That is, the Kharkov offensive operation turned into a defensive one. I must say that this battle came at a high cost to us.

After the German troops occupied Kharkov, Belgorod and adjacent territories, the well-known Kursk ledge was formed in the south. Around March 25, 1943, the front line finally stabilized in this sector. Stabilization occurred due to the introduction of two tank corps: the 2nd Guards and the 3rd "Stalingrad", as well as the operational transfer at the request of Zhukov from the Stalingrad of the 21st Army of General Chistyakov and the 64th Army of General Shumilov (hereinafter it is 6 -I and 7th Guards armies). In addition, by the end of March, mud had set in, which, of course, helped our troops to hold the line at that moment, because the equipment was very bogged down and it was simply impossible to continue the offensive.

Thus, given that Operation Citadel began on July 5, then from March 25 to July 5, that is, for three and a half months, preparations were underway for summer operations. The front stabilized, and in fact a certain balance was maintained, balance, without sharp, as they say, movements on both sides.

The defeat of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad

Germany suffered a colossal defeat at Stalingrad, and most importantly, the first such deafening defeat, so the political leadership had an important task to consolidate its bloc, because Germany's allies began to think that Germany was not so invincible; and what will happen if suddenly another Stalingrad? Therefore, Hitler needed after a rather victorious offensive in Ukraine in March 1943, when Kharkov was recaptured, Belgorod was taken, the territory was captured, another, perhaps small, but impressive victory.

No, it's not small though. If Operation Citadel were successful, which the German command naturally expected, then two fronts would be in the ring - Central and Voronezh.

Operation Citadel

Many German military leaders took part in the development and implementation of Operation Citadel. In particular, General Manstein, who initially proposed a completely different plan: to cede the Donbass to the advancing Soviet troops so that they go there, and then, with a blow from above, from the north, press them, throw them into the sea (there were the Azov and Black Seas in the lower part).

But Hitler did not accept this plan for two reasons. First, he said that Germany could not make territorial concessions now, after Stalingrad. And, secondly, the Donetsk basin, which the Germans needed not so much from a psychological point of view, but from a raw material point of view, as an energy base. Manstein's plan was rejected, and the forces of the German General Staff concentrated on the development of Operation Citadel to eliminate the Kursk salient.

The fact is that from the Kursk ledge it was convenient to deliver flank strikes to our troops, so the area for the start of the main summer offensive was precisely determined. However, the task formation process and the preparation process took a long time because there were disputes. For example, Model spoke and persuaded Hitler not to start this operation because of the understaffing of both manpower and technical. And, by the way, the second date of the Citadel was set for June 10 (the first date was for May 3-5). And already from June 10, it was moved even further - to July 5.

Colonel General Hermann Goth and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. (wikipedia.org)

Here, again, we must return to the myth that only "Tigers" and "Panthers" were involved. In fact, this was not the case, because these machines began to be produced in a relatively large series precisely in 1943, and Hitler insisted that about 200 Tigers and 200 Panthers be sent to the Kursk direction. However, this entire 400-machine grouping was not involved, because, like any new technology, both those and other tanks suffered from “childhood illnesses”. As Manstein and Guderian noted, the Tigers quite often caught fire in their carburetors, the Panthers had problems with the transmission, and therefore no more than 50 vehicles of both types were actually used in the fighting during the Kursk operation. God forbid, the remaining 150 of each type would have been brought into battle - the consequences could have been much more deplorable.

It is important to understand here that the German command initially planned the Belgorod grouping, that is, Army Group South, which was headed by Manstein, as the main one - it was supposed to solve the main task. The blow of the 9th Army of the Model was, as it were, auxiliary. Manstein had to go 147 kilometers before joining the troops of the Model, so the main forces, including tank and motorized divisions, were concentrated near Belgorod.

The first offensive in May - Manstein saw (reconnaissance reports, photography) how quickly the Red Army, the Voronezh Front, in particular, was strengthening its positions, and understood that his troops would not be able to reach Kursk. With these thoughts, he first arrived at Bogodukhov, at the command post of the 4th Panzer Army near Goth. What for? The fact is that Goth wrote a letter - there was still an attempt to develop the operation "Panther" (as a continuation in case of success of the "Citadel"). So, in particular, Goth opposed this operation. He believed that the main thing was not to rush to Kursk, but to destroy, as he assumed, about 10 tank mechanized corps, which the Russians had already prepared. That is, destroy mobile reserves.

If all this colossus moves on the Army Group "South", then, as they say, it will not show enough. That's it for this it was necessary to plan at least the first stage of the "Citadel". On May 9-11 Goth and Manstein discussed this plan. And it was precisely at this meeting that the tasks of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force were clearly defined, and the plan for the Prokhorov battle was also developed here.

It was near Prokhorovka that Manstein planned a tank battle, that is, the destruction of these mobile reserves. And after they are defeated, when an assessment of the state of the German troops is carried out, it will be possible to talk about an offensive.

In the area of ​​the Kursk ledge, both in the north and in the south, the Germans concentrated up to 70% of the armored vehicles available to them on the Eastern Front for Operation Citadel. It was assumed that it was these forces that would be able to ram the three most fortified lines of the Soviet defense and destroy, given the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles at that time over our tanks, mobile reserves. After that, with a favorable set of circumstances, they will also be able to advance in the direction of Kursk.

Battle of Prokhorovka

For the battles near Prokhorovka, the SS corps, partly the 48th corps and part of the forces of the 3rd Panzer Corps, were planned. These three corps were supposed to crush the mobile reserves, which were supposed to approach the Prokhorovka area. Why in the Prokhorovka area? Because the area was favorable there. In other places it was simply impossible to deploy a significant number of tanks. This plan was largely implemented by the enemy. The only thing is that our defense forces did not calculate.

A few more words about the Germans. The fact is that they already had a seam situation in Africa. After the loss of Africa, it automatically followed that the British establish complete control over the Mediterranean Sea. Malta is an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which they hammer Sardinia first, Sicily, and thus prepare the possibility of landing in Italy, which was eventually carried out. That is, the Germans in other areas, too, everything was not thank God. Plus the vacillation of Hungary, Romania and other allies...

German tank column, June 1943. (wikipedia.org)

The planning of the summer military operations of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht began approximately at the same time: for the Germans - in February, for us - at the end of March, after the stabilization of the front line. The fact is that the holding of the enemy, who was advancing from Kharkov in the Belgorod region, and the organization of the defense were controlled by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Zhukov. And after the stabilization of the front line, he was here, in the Belgorod region; together with Vasilevsky they discussed further plans. After that, he prepared a note in which he stated the point of view, which was developed jointly with the command of the Voronezh Front. (By the way, Vatutin became commander of the Voronezh Front on March 27, before that he commanded the South-Western Front. He replaced Golikov, who, by decision of the Headquarters, was removed from this post).

So, in early April, a note lay on Stalin's desk, which set out the basic principles for conducting hostilities in the south in the summer of 1943. On April 12, a meeting was held with the participation of Stalin, in which a proposal was approved to switch to a deliberate defense, to prepare troops and a defense in depth in case the enemy goes on the offensive. And the configuration of the front line in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge assumed a high probability of such a transition.

Here we should return to the system of engineering structures, because until 1943, before the Battle of Kursk, the creation of such powerful defensive lines by the Red Army was not carried out. After all, the depth of these three defense lines was about 300 kilometers. That is, the Germans had to plow, ram, drill 300 kilometers of fortified areas. And these are not just trenches dug to their full height and fortified with boards, these are anti-tank ditches, gouges, this is the most powerful system of minefields made during the war for the first time; and each, in fact, the settlement in this territory also turned into a mini-fortress.

Neither the German nor our side have ever erected such a strong and saturated defensive line with engineering barriers and fortifications on the Eastern Front. The first three lanes were the most fortified: the main army lane, the second army lane and the third rear army lane - approximately to a depth of 50 kilometers. The fortifications were so powerful that two large, strong enemy groupings could not break through them for two weeks, despite the fact that, in general, the Soviet command did not guess the main direction of the German attack.

The fact is that in May fairly accurate data were received about the enemy’s plans for the summer: periodically they came from illegal agents from England and Germany. The headquarters of the supreme command knew about the plans of the German command, but for some reason it was determined that the Germans would inflict the main blow on the Central Front, on Rokossovsky. Therefore, Rokossovsky was additionally transferred significant artillery forces, an entire artillery corps, which Vatutin did not have. And this miscalculation, of course, influenced how the fighting developed in the south. Vatutin was forced to repulse the attacks of the enemy's main tank grouping with tanks, not having sufficient artillery to fight; in the north there were also tank divisions that were directly involved in the attack on the Central Front, but they dealt with Soviet artillery, and numerous ones at that.

But let's move smoothly to July 5, when, in fact, the event began. The canonical version is Ozerov's film "Liberation": the defector says that the Germans are concentrated here and there, a colossal artillery raid is being carried out, almost all Germans are being killed, it is not clear who else is fighting there for a whole month. How was it really?

There really was a defector, and not one - there were several of them both in the north and in the south. In the south, in particular, on July 4, a soldier of the reconnaissance battalion from the 168th Infantry Division went over to our side. According to the plan of the command of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, in order to inflict maximum losses on the enemy prepared for the offensive, it was supposed to carry out two measures: firstly, to conduct a powerful artillery attack, and, secondly, to strike the aircraft of the 2nd, 16th and 17th air armies at the base airfield. Let's say about the air raid - it failed. And moreover, it had unfortunate consequences, since the time was not calculated.

As for the artillery attack, it was partially successful in the zone of the 6th Guards Army: the telephone communication lines were mostly disrupted. There were losses in both manpower and equipment, but insignificant.

Another thing is the 7th Guards Army, which took up defense along the eastern bank of the Donets. The Germans, respectively, on the right. Therefore, in order to launch an offensive, they needed to force the river. They pulled up significant forces and watercraft to certain settlements and sectors of the front, and previously built several crossings, hiding them under water. Soviet intelligence recorded this (engineer intelligence, by the way, worked very well), and artillery strikes were carried out precisely on these areas: on crossings and on settlements where these assault groups of the 3rd tank corps of Routh were concentrated. Therefore, the effectiveness of artillery preparation in the zone of the 7th Guards Army was much higher. Losses from it both in manpower and in technology, not to mention management and so on, were high. Several bridges were destroyed, which slowed down the pace of the offensive, and in some places paralyzed.

Already on July 5, Soviet troops began to split the enemy strike force, that is, they did not allow the 6th Panzer Division, Kempf's army group, to cover the right flank of Hausser's 2nd Panzer Corps. That is, the offensive of the main strike force and the auxiliary along divergent lines began. This forced the enemy to enlist additional forces to cover his flanks from the point of impact. Such a tactic was conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front and perfectly implemented.

Since we are talking about the Soviet command, many will agree that both Vatutin and Rokossovsky are famous people, but the latter has a reputation, perhaps, of a greater commander. Why? Some say that he fought better in the Battle of Kursk. But Vatutin, in general, did a lot, because he still fought with smaller forces, fewer numbers. Judging by the documents that are now open, it can be said with confidence that Nikolai Fedorovich very competently, very sensibly and skillfully planned his defensive operation, given that the main group, the most numerous, was advancing against his front (although it was expected from the north). And until the 9th, inclusive, when the situation turned around, when the Germans had already sent strike groups to the flanks to solve tactical problems, the troops of the Voronezh Front fought excellently, and management went, of course, very well. As for the next steps, the decisions of the front commander Vatutin were influenced by a number of subjective factors, including the role of the supreme commander.

Everyone remembers that Rotmistrov's tankers won a great victory on the tank field. However, before that, at the turn of the German attack, at the forefront, was the notorious Katukov, who, in general, took all the bitterness of the first blows upon himself. How did it happen? The fact is that the defense was built as follows: ahead, on the main line, were the troops of the 6th Guards Army, and it was assumed that the Germans, most likely, would strike along the Oboyan highway. And then they were supposed to be stopped by the tankers of the 1st Tank Army of Lieutenant General Mikhail Efimovich Katukov.

On the night of the 6th, they advanced to the second army line and almost in the morning took the main blow. By the middle of the day, Chistyakov's 6th Guards Army was divided into several parts, three divisions were dispersed, we suffered significant losses. And only thanks to the skill, skill and stamina of Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, the defense was held up to the 9th day inclusive.

Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army N. F. Vatutin. (wikipedia.org)

It is known that after Stalingrad our army suffered huge losses, including among the officers. I wonder how these losses were replenished in a fairly short period by the summer of 1943? Vatutin received the Voronezh Front in a very deplorable state. A number of divisions numbered two, three, four thousand. Replenishment was due to the call of the local population, which came out of the occupied territory, marching companies, as well as due to the replenishment arrived from the Central Asian republics.

As for the command staff, its shortage in the spring of 1942 was made up by officers from the academies, from the rear units, and so on. And after the battles near Stalingrad, the situation with the command staff of the tactical level, especially the commanders of battalions and regiments, was catastrophic. As a result, on October 9, the well-known order to abolish the commissars, and a significant part of the political staff was sent to the troops. That is, everything that can be done was done.

Battle of Kursk Results

The Battle of Kursk is considered by many to be the largest defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. Is it so? At the first stage, no doubt. No matter how we evaluate the battle in the Chernozem region now, it was after August 23, 1943, when it ended, that our enemy, the German army, was no longer able to conduct a single major strategic offensive operation within the army group. He simply had nothing to do with it. In the south, the situation was as follows: the Voronezh Front was given the task of exhausting the enemy forces and driving out his tanks. During the defensive period, until July 23, they could not do this completely. The Germans sent a significant part of the repair fund to repair bases, which were located not far from the front line. And after the troops of the Voronezh Front went on the offensive on August 3, all these bases were captured. In particular, in Borisovka there was a repair base of the 10th tank brigade. There, the Germans blew up part of the Panthers, up to forty units, we captured part. And at the end of August, Germany was no longer able to replenish all the tank divisions on the Eastern Front. And this task of the second stage of the Battle of Kursk during the counteroffensive - to knock out the tanks - was solved.

Tank counterattack. A still from the movie Liberation: Arc of Fire. 1968

Silence over the Prokhorovsky field. Only from time to time a bell bell is heard, calling parishioners to worship in the church of Peter and Paul, which was built with public donations in memory of the soldiers who died on the Kursk Bulge.
Gertsovka, Cherkasskoye, Lukhanino, Luchki, Yakovlevo, Belenikhino, Mikhailovka, Melehovo… These names now hardly say anything to the younger generation. And 70 years ago, a terrible battle was in full swing here, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest oncoming tank battle unfolded. Everything that could burn was on fire, everything was covered with dust, fumes and smoke from burning tanks, villages, forests and grain fields. The earth was scorched to such an extent that not a single blade of grass remained on it. Here the Soviet guardsmen and the elite of the Wehrmacht, the SS Panzer Divisions, met head-on.
Before the Prokhorov tank battle, there were fierce clashes between the tank forces of both sides in the zone of the 13th Army of the Central Front, in which up to 1000 tanks took part in the most critical moments.
But tank battles in the Voronezh Front took on the largest scale. Here, in the first days of the battle, the forces of the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Tank Corps of the Germans clashed with three corps of the 1st Tank Army, the 2nd and 5th Guards separate tank corps.
"WE'LL HAVE LUNCH IN KURSK!"
The fighting on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge actually began on July 4, when the German units made an attempt to shoot down the outposts in the zone of the 6th Guards Army.
But the main events unfolded early in the morning on July 5, when the Germans delivered the first massive blow with their tank formations in the direction of Oboyan.
On the morning of July 5, the commander of the Adolf Hitler division, Obergruppenführer Josef Dietrich, drove up to his Tigers, and some officer shouted to him: “We will have lunch in Kursk!”
But the SS did not have to have lunch or dinner in Kursk. Only by the end of the day on July 5 did they manage to break through the defensive zone of the 6th Army. The exhausted soldiers of the German assault battalions took refuge in the captured trenches to refresh themselves with dry rations and get some sleep.
On the right flank of Army Group South, the Kempf task force crossed the river. Seversky Donets and struck at the 7th Guards Army.
Gunner "Tiger" of the 503rd battalion of heavy tanks of the 3rd tank corps Gerhard Niemann: "Another anti-tank gun is 40 meters ahead of us. The gun crew flees in panic, except for one person. He takes aim and fires. A terrible blow to the fighting compartment. The driver maneuvers, maneuver - and another gun is crushed by our tracks. And again a terrible blow, this time to the stern of the tank. Our engine sneezes, but nevertheless continues to work.
On July 6 and 7, the 1st Panzer Army took the main blow. In a few hours of battle, as they say, only numbers remained from its 538th and 1008th anti-tank regiments. On July 7, the Germans launched a concentric attack in the direction of Oboyan. Only in the sector between Syrtsev and Yakovlev on a five-six-kilometer front, the commander of the 4th German Panzer Army, Goth, deployed up to 400 tanks, supporting their offensive with a massive strike of aviation and artillery.
The commander of the troops of the 1st Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Mikhail Katukov: “We got out of the gap and climbed a small hillock, where a command post was equipped. It was half past three. But there seemed to be a solar eclipse. The sun was hidden behind clouds of dust. And ahead, in the twilight, bursts of shots could be seen, the earth took off and crumbled, engines roared and caterpillars clanged. As soon as enemy tanks approached our positions, they were met by dense artillery and tank fire. Leaving wrecked and burning vehicles on the battlefield, the enemy rolled back and again went on the attack.
By the end of July 8, the Soviet troops, after heavy defensive battles, withdrew to the second army line of defense.
300 KM MARCH
The decision to strengthen the Voronezh Front was made on July 6, despite stormy protests from the commander of the Steppe Front, I.S. Konev. Stalin ordered the advancement of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the rear of the troops of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies, as well as the strengthening of the Voronezh Front by the 2nd Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Tank Army had about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns, including T-34-501 medium tanks and T-70-261 light tanks. On the night of July 6-7, the army moved to the front line. The march was carried out around the clock under the cover of aviation of the 2nd Air Army.
Commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General of the Tank Troops Pavel Rotmistrov: “Already at 8 o’clock in the morning it became hot, and clouds of dust rose into the sky. By noon the dust had thickly covered the roadside bushes, the wheat fields, the tanks and trucks, and the dark red disk of the sun was barely visible through the gray dust curtain. Tanks, self-propelled guns and tractors (pulled guns), infantry armored vehicles and trucks moved forward in an endless stream. The faces of the soldiers were covered with dust and soot from the exhaust pipes. The heat was unbearable. The soldiers were tormented by thirst, and their tunics, soaked with sweat, stuck to their bodies. It was especially hard on the march for the driver-mechanics. The crews of the tanks tried to make their task as easy as possible. Every now and then someone replaced the drivers, and on short halts they were allowed to sleep.
Aviation of the 2nd Air Army covered the 5th Guards Tank Army on the march so reliably that German intelligence failed to detect its arrival. Having traveled 200 km, the army arrived in the area southwest of Stary Oskol on the morning of 8 July. Then, having put the materiel in order, the army corps again made a 100-kilometer throw and by the end of July 9, strictly at the appointed time, concentrated in the area of ​​​​Bobryshev, Vesely, Aleksandrovsky.
MANSTEIN CHANGES THE DIRECTION OF THE MAIN IMPACT
On the morning of July 8, an even more fierce struggle flared up in the Oboyan and Korochan directions. The main feature of the struggle that day was that the Soviet troops, repelling the massive attacks of the enemy, themselves began to deliver strong counterattacks on the flanks of the 4th German Panzer Army.
As in previous days, the fiercest fighting flared up in the area of ​​the Simferopol-Moscow highway, where units of the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland", 3rd and 11th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by separate companies and battalions of "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" advanced. Units of the 1st Panzer Army again took the brunt of the enemy's strikes. In this direction, the enemy simultaneously deployed up to 400 tanks, and fierce battles continued here all day.
Intense fighting also continued in the Korochansky direction, where by the end of the day the Kempf army group broke through in a narrow wedge in the Melekhov area.
The commander of the 19th German Panzer Division, Lieutenant-General Gustav Schmidt: “Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy, and the fact that entire sections of trenches and trenches were burned by flamethrower tanks, we were unable to dislodge the group that had settled there from the northern part of the defensive line enemy force up to a battalion. The Russians sat down in the trench system, knocked out our flamethrower tanks with anti-tank rifle fire and put up fanatical resistance.
On the morning of July 9, a German strike force of several hundred tanks, with massive air support, resumed the offensive on a 10-kilometer stretch. By the end of the day, she broke through to the third line of defense. And in the Korochan direction, the enemy broke into the second line of defense.
Nevertheless, the stubborn resistance of the troops of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies in the Oboyan direction forced the command of Army Group South to change the direction of the main attack, moving it from the Simferopol-Moscow highway east to the Prokhorovka area. This movement of the main attack, in addition to the fact that several days of fierce fighting on the highway did not give the Germans the desired results, was also determined by the nature of the terrain. From the Prokhorovka area, a wide strip of heights extends in a northwestern direction, which dominate the surrounding area and are convenient for the operations of large tank masses.
The general plan of the command of Army Group "South" was to deliver three strong strikes in a complex manner, which were supposed to lead to the encirclement and destruction of two groupings of Soviet troops and to the opening of offensive routes to Kursk.
To develop success, it was supposed to bring fresh forces into the battle - the 24th Panzer Corps as part of the SS Viking Division and the 17th Panzer Division, which on July 10 were urgently transferred from the Donbass to Kharkov. The start of the attack on Kursk from the north and from the south was scheduled by the German command for the morning of July 11.
In turn, the command of the Voronezh Front, having received the approval of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, decided to prepare and conduct a counteroffensive in order to encircle and defeat enemy groups advancing in the Oboyan and Prokhorov directions. Formations of the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army were concentrated against the main grouping of SS Panzer divisions in the Prokhorovka direction. The start of the general counter-offensive was scheduled for the morning of 12 July.
On July 11, all three German groups of E. Manstein went on the offensive, and later than all, clearly expecting the attention of the Soviet command to be diverted to other directions, the main group launched an offensive in the Prokhorovka direction - the tank divisions of the 2nd SS corps under the command of Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser, who was awarded the highest Award of the Third Reich "Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross".
By the end of the day, a large group of tanks of the SS division "Reich" managed to break into the village of Storozhevoye, threatening the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. To eliminate this threat, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was thrown. Fierce oncoming tank battles continued throughout the night. As a result, the main strike force of the German 4th Tank Army, having launched an offensive on a front of only about 8 km, reached the approaches to Prokhorovka in a narrow strip and was forced to suspend the offensive, occupying the line from which the 5th Guards Tank Army planned to launch its counteroffensive.
Even less success was achieved by the second strike group - the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland", 3 and 11 Panzer Divisions. Our troops successfully repelled their attacks.
However, north-east of Belgorod, where the Kempf army group was advancing, a threatening situation arose. The 6th and 7th tank divisions of the enemy broke through to the north in a narrow wedge. Their forward units were only 18 km from the main grouping of SS Panzer divisions, which were advancing southwest of Prokhorovka.
To eliminate the breakthrough of German tanks against the Kempf army group, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army was thrown: two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps and one brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
In addition, the Soviet command decided to launch the planned counteroffensive two hours earlier, although the preparations for the counteroffensive were not yet completed. However, the situation forced us to act immediately and decisively. Any delay was beneficial only to the enemy.
PROKHOROVKA
At 08:30 on July 12, Soviet strike groups launched a counteroffensive against the troops of the German 4th Panzer Army. However, due to the German breakthrough to Prokhorovka, the diversion of significant forces of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies to eliminate the threat to their rears and the postponement of the start of the counteroffensive, the Soviet troops went on the attack without artillery and air support. As the English historian Robin Cross writes: “The artillery preparation schedules were torn to shreds and rewritten again.”
Manstein threw all available forces to repulse the attacks of the Soviet troops, because he clearly understood that the success of the offensive of the Soviet troops could lead to the complete defeat of the entire strike force of the German Army Group South. A fierce struggle flared up on a huge front with a total length of more than 200 km.
The most fierce fighting during July 12 flared up on the so-called Prokhorov bridgehead. From the north it was limited by the river. Psel, and from the south - a railway embankment near the village of Belenikhino. This strip of terrain, up to 7 km along the front and up to 8 km in depth, was captured by the enemy as a result of a tense struggle during July 11. The main enemy grouping as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 320 tanks and assault guns, including several dozen vehicles of the Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand types, deployed and operated on the bridgehead. It was against this grouping that the Soviet command dealt its main blow with the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army.
The battlefield was clearly visible from Rotmistrov's observation post.
Pavel Rotmistrov: “A few minutes later, the tanks of the first echelon of our 29th and 18th corps, firing on the move, crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops with a head-on attack, literally piercing the enemy’s battle formation with a swift through attack. The Nazis obviously did not expect to meet such a large mass of our combat vehicles and their decisive attack. Management in the advanced units and subunits of the enemy was clearly violated. His "Tigers" and "Panthers", deprived of their fire advantage in close combat, which they used at the beginning of the offensive in a collision with our other tank formations, were now successfully hit by Soviet T-34 and even T-70 tanks from short distances. The battlefield was swirling with smoke and dust, the earth trembled from powerful explosions. The tanks jumped on each other and, having grappled, could no longer disperse, fought to the death until one of them flared up with a torch or stopped with broken tracks. But the wrecked tanks, if their weapons did not fail, continued to fire.
West of Prokhorovka along the left bank of the Psel River, units of the 18th Panzer Corps went on the offensive. His tank brigades upset the battle formations of the advancing enemy tank units, stopped them and began to move forward themselves.
Yevgeny Shkurdalov, deputy commander of the tank battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps: “I only saw what was, so to speak, within the limits of my tank battalion. Ahead of us was the 170th tank brigade. With great speed, she wedged into the location of German tanks, heavy ones, which were in the first wave, and the German tanks pierced our tanks. The tanks went very close to each other, and therefore they fired literally at point-blank range, they simply shot each other. This brigade burned down in just five minutes - sixty-five cars.
Wilhelm Res, radio operator of the commander's tank of the Adolf Hitler Panzer Division: “Russian tanks were rushing at full throttle. In our area, they were prevented by an anti-tank ditch. At full speed, they flew into this ditch, due to their speed overcame three or four meters in it, but then, as it were, froze in a slightly inclined position with a cannon pulled up. Literally for a moment! Taking advantage of this, many of our tank commanders fired directly at point-blank range.
Yevgeny Shkurdalov: “I knocked out the first tank when I was moving along the railroad landing, and literally at a distance of a hundred meters I saw the Tiger tank, which was standing sideways to me and firing at our tanks. Apparently, he knocked out quite a few of our cars, as the cars came sideways towards him, and he fired at the sides of our cars. I took aim with a sub-caliber projectile, fired. The tank caught fire. I fired another shot, the tank caught fire even more. The crew jumped out, but somehow I was not up to it. I bypassed this tank, then knocked out a T-III tank and a Panther. When I knocked out the Panther, there was some, you know, a feeling of delight that you see, I did such a heroic deed.
The 29th Tank Corps, with the support of units of the 9th Guards Airborne Division, launched a counteroffensive along the railway and highway southwest of Prokhorovka. As noted in the corps combat log, the attack began without artillery treatment of the line occupied by the enemy and without air cover. This made it possible for the enemy to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and bomb its tank and infantry units with impunity, which led to heavy losses and a decrease in the rate of attack, and this, in turn, made it possible for the enemy to conduct effective artillery and tank fire from a place.
Wilhelm Res: “Suddenly, one T-34 broke through and moved straight towards us. Our first radio operator began to give shells to me one by one, so that I would put them in the cannon. At this time, our commander upstairs kept shouting: “Shot! Shot!" - because the tank was moving closer. And only after the fourth - "Shot" I heard: "Thank God!"
Then, after some time, we determined that the T-34 had stopped just eight meters from us! At the top of the tower, he had, as if stamped, 5-centimeter holes, located at the same distance from each other, as if they were measured with a compass. The combat formations of the parties mixed up. Our tankers successfully hit the enemy at close range, but they themselves suffered heavy losses.
From the documents of the Central Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “The T-34 tank of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps, captain Skripkin, crashed into the Tigers and knocked out two enemy tanks before an 88-mm shell hit the tower of his T -34, and the other pierced the side armor. The Soviet tank caught fire, and the wounded Skripkin was pulled out of the wrecked car by his driver Sergeant Nikolaev and radio operator Zyryanov. They took cover in a funnel, but still one of the "Tigers" noticed them and moved towards them. Then Nikolaev and his loader Chernov again jumped into the burning car, started it and sent it straight at the Tiger. Both tanks exploded on impact.
The blow of Soviet armor, new tanks with a full set of ammunition thoroughly shook the exhausted Hauser divisions, and the German offensive stopped.
From the report of the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Vasilevsky to Stalin: “Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the RSs we have took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks for an hour.
As a result of the counteroffensive of the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army southwest of Prokhorovka, the offensive of the SS Panzer Divisions "Dead Head", "Adolf Hitler" to the northeast was thwarted, these divisions suffered such losses, after which they could no longer launch a serious offensive.
Parts of the SS Panzer Division "Reich" also suffered heavy losses from attacks by units of the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which launched a counteroffensive south of Prokhorovka.
In the breakthrough area of ​​the Kempf army group south and southeast of Prokhorovka, a fierce struggle also continued throughout the day on July 12, as a result of which the attack of the Kempf army group to the north was stopped by tankers of the 5th Guards Tank and units of the 69th Army .
LOSSES AND RESULTS
On the night of July 13, Rotmistrov took Marshal Georgy Zhukov, a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, to the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps. On the way, Zhukov stopped the car several times to personally inspect the sites of recent battles. In one place, he got out of the car and looked for a long time at the burned-out Panther, rammed by the T-70 tank. A few tens of meters away stood the Tiger and T-34 locked in a deadly embrace. “That's what a through tank attack means,” Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, taking off his cap.
Data on the losses of the parties, in particular tanks, differ radically in different sources. Manstein, in his book Lost Victories, writes that in total, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops lost 1,800 tanks. The collection “Secrecy Removed: Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Wars, Combat Operations and Military Conflicts” refers to 1,600 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns disabled during the defensive battle on the Kursk Bulge.
A very remarkable attempt to calculate German losses in tanks was made by the English historian Robin Cross in his book The Citadel. Battle of Kursk. If we shift its diagram into a table, we will get the following picture: (the number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German Panzer Army in the period July 4-17, 1943, see the table).
Kross' data differs from the data from Soviet sources, which can be quite understandable to a certain extent. So, it is known that on the evening of July 6, Vatutin reported to Stalin that during the fierce battles that lasted all day, 322 enemy tanks were destroyed (at Kross - 244).
But there are also quite incomprehensible discrepancies in the figures. For example, an aerial photograph taken on July 7 at 13.15, only in the area of ​​​​Syrtsev, Krasnaya Polyana along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway, where the SS Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" from the 48th Panzer Corps was advancing, recorded 200 burning enemy tanks. According to Kross, on July 7, 48 TC lost only three tanks (?!).
Or another fact. According to Soviet sources, as a result of bombing and assault attacks on the concentrated enemy troops (TD SS "Great Germany" and 11th TD), on the morning of July 9, many fires broke out throughout the area in the area of ​​the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. It was burning German tanks, self-propelled guns, cars, motorcycles, tanks, fuel and ammunition depots. According to Kross, there were no losses at all in the German 4th Panzer Army on July 9, although, as he himself writes, on July 9 it fought stubborn battles, overcoming fierce resistance from the Soviet troops. But it was precisely by the evening of July 9 that Manstein decided to abandon the offensive against Oboyan and began to look for other ways to break through to Kursk from the south.
The same can be said about the Kross data for 10 and 11 July, according to which there were no casualties in the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is also surprising, since it was during these days that the divisions of this corps delivered the main blow and, after fierce fighting, were able to break through to Prokhorovka. And it was on July 11 that the Hero of the Soviet Union Guards Sergeant M.F. Borisov, who destroyed seven German tanks.
After the archival documents were opened, it became possible to more accurately assess Soviet losses in the tank battle near Prokhorovka. According to the combat log of the 29th Panzer Corps for July 12, out of 212 tanks and self-propelled guns that entered the battle, 150 vehicles (more than 70%) were lost by the end of the day, of which 117 (55%) were irretrievably lost. According to combat report No. 38 of the commander of the 18th tank corps dated 07/13/43, the losses of the corps amounted to 55 tanks, or 30% of their initial strength. Thus, you can get a more or less accurate figure of the losses suffered by the 5th Guards Tank Army in the battle of Prokhorovka against the SS divisions "Adolf Hitler" and "Dead Head" - over 200 tanks and self-propelled guns.
As for German losses near Prokhorovka, there is an absolutely fantastic disparity in numbers.
According to Soviet sources, when the battles near Kursk died down and the broken military equipment began to be removed from the battlefields, more than 400 broken and burnt German tanks were counted in a small area of ​​the area southwest of Prokhorovka, where on July 12 an oncoming tank battle unfolded. Rotmistrov, in his memoirs, claimed that on July 12, in battles with the 5th Guards Tank Army, the enemy lost over 350 tanks and more than 10 thousand people were killed.
But in the late 1990s, the German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser published sensational data he obtained after studying German archives. According to these data, the Germans lost four tanks in the battle of Prokhorovka. After additional research, he came to the conclusion that in fact the losses were even less - three tanks.
Documentary evidence refutes these absurd conclusions. So, in the combat log of the 29th Panzer Corps, it is said that the losses of the enemy amounted to 68 tanks, among other things (it is interesting to note that this coincides with Kross's data). In a combat report from the headquarters of the 33rd Guards Corps to the commander of the 5th Guards Army dated July 13, 1943, it is said that the 97th Guards Rifle Division destroyed 47 tanks over the past day. Further, it is reported that during the night of July 12, the enemy took out his wrecked tanks, the number of which exceeds 200 vehicles. Several dozens of destroyed enemy tanks were chalked up to the 18th Panzer Corps.
We can agree with Kross's statement that the losses of tanks are generally difficult to calculate, since the disabled vehicles were repaired and again went into battle. In addition, enemy losses are usually always exaggerated. Nevertheless, with a high degree of probability it can be assumed that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps lost at least over 100 tanks in the battle near Prokhorovka (excluding the losses of the SS Panzer Division "Reich", operating south of Prokhorovka). In total, according to Kross, the losses of the 4th German Panzer Army from July 4 to 14 amounted to about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns out of 916, which were counted at the beginning of Operation Citadel. This almost coincides with the data of the German historian Engelmann, who, citing Manstein's report, claims that between July 5 and 13, the German 4th Panzer Army lost 612 armored vehicles. The losses of the 3rd German Panzer Corps by July 15 amounted to 240 tanks out of 310 available.
The total losses of the parties in the oncoming tank battle near Prokhorovka, taking into account the actions of the Soviet troops against the 4th German tank army and the Kempf army group, are estimated as follows. 500 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost on the Soviet side, and 300 on the German side. Kross claims that after the Battle of Prokhorov, Hauser's sappers blew up wrecked German equipment that could not be repaired and stood in no man's land. After August 1, so many faulty equipment accumulated in German repair shops in Kharkov and Bogodukhov that it had to be sent even to Kyiv for repairs.
Of course, the German Army Group South suffered the biggest losses in the first seven days of fighting, even before the battle of Prokhorovka. But the main significance of the Prokhorov battle lies not even in the damage that was inflicted on the German tank formations, but in the fact that the Soviet soldiers dealt a severe blow and managed to stop the SS tank divisions rushing to Kursk. This undermined the morale of the elite of the German tank forces, after which they finally lost faith in the victory of German weapons.

The number and losses of tanks and self-propelled guns in the 4th German tank army on July 4-17, 1943
the date	The number of tanks in the 2nd SS TC	The number of tanks in the 48th TC	Total	Tank losses in the 2nd SS TC	Losses of tanks in the 48th TC	Total	Notes
04.07	470	446	916	39	–	39	48th shopping mall -?
05.07	431	453	884	21	–	21	48th shopping mall -?
06.07	410	455	865	110	134	244
07.07	300	321	621	2	3	5
08.07	308	318	626	30	95	125
09.07	278	223	501	–	–	–	?
10.07	292	227	519	–	6	6	2nd TC SS -?
11.07	309	221	530	–	33	33	2nd TC SS -?
12.07	320	188	508	68	–	68	48th shopping mall -?
13.07	252	253	505	–	36	36	2nd TC SS -?
14.07	271	217	488	11	9	20
15.07	260	206	466	–	–	–	?
16.07	298	232	530	–	–	?
17.07	312	279	591	no data	no data	–
Total tanks lost in the 4th Panzer Army			280	316	596

July forty-third ... These hot days and nights of the war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with the Nazi invaders. The front in its configuration in the area near Kursk, the front resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the Nazi command. The German command prepared the offensive operation as a revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort on developing the plan.

Hitler's operational order began with the words: "I have decided, as soon as weather conditions allow, to launch the Citadel offensive - the first offensive this year ... It must end with a quick and decisive success." Everything was gathered by the Nazis into a powerful fist. Swift tanks "Tigers" and "Panthers" super-heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinands", according to the plan of the Nazis, were to crush, disperse the Soviet troops, turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German operation "Citadel" would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle ... The most important decision was to be made by the Military Council of the front, and it was taken. On July 5, 1943, at two and twenty minutes, the silence exploded with the thunder of our guns ... The battle that began lasted until August 23.

As a result, the events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War turned into the defeat of the Nazi groups. The strategy of the operation "Citadel" of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead is crushing blows using surprise on the forces of the Soviet Army, encirclement and destruction of them. The triumph of the "Citadel" plan was to ensure the implementation of the further plans of the Wehrmacht. To disrupt the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

The course of the Battle of Kursk

The actions of the Army Grouping "Center" and the Operational Group "Kempf" of the armies "South", speaking from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. The repulse of the strike from the side of Orel was assigned to the formations of the Central Front. The formations of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from Belgorod.

The steppe front, consisting of rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, the Russian field near the Prokhorovka railway station saw the greatest through tank battle, noted by historians as unprecedented in the world, the largest through tank battle in terms of scale. Russian power on its own land withstood another test, turned the course of history to victory.

One day of the battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and nearly 10,000 casualties. Hitler's groupings were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovka field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, starting the implementation of Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat the enemy groupings in the Orel region. From July 16 to July 18, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts liquidated the Nazi groupings in the Kursk Triangle and began to pursue it with the support of the air forces. Together, the Nazi formations were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk

• Unprecedented strength, the most powerful tank battle in history, was the key to the development of further offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War;
• The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the plans of the 1943 campaign;
• As a result of the implementation of the Kutuzov plan and the Operation Commander Rumyantsev, parts of the Nazi troops were defeated in the area of ​​the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads were liquidated;
• The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance to the West, liberating cities and towns.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

• The failure of the Wehrmacht operation "Citadel" presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of the Nazi campaign against the Soviet Union;
• A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and throughout as a result of the "fiery" Battle of Kursk;
• The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious, there was no longer any confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.

The Battle of Kursk: the completion of the turning point in the Great Patriotic War, the plans of the parties, the significance of the battle and the loss

The Second World War consists of many battles, sometimes separate from each other, sometimes interconnected. All of them differ from each other both in scale and in strategic importance. One of the main battles that determined the final outcome of the global conflict, in which many countries of the world took part, was the Battle of Kursk, which took place in the summer of 1943 on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. It was here that the hopes of the Nazis for victory over the Red Army and the USSR were finally broken. Near Kursk, Hitler used his strongest and most effective weapons, tank and motorized formations, in the greatest concentration, but it turned out that the Soviet troops had learned to fight this once invincible enemy. The failure that befell the elite German divisions became the prologue to unconditional surrender, to which there were almost two years of fierce and bloody struggle.

Background of the battle

In the spring of 1943, deceptive calm was established on the Soviet-German front. At first glance, it might seem that the whole thing was just a muddy road - impassability interfered with any significant operations. But the real reasons for this unsettling lull ran much deeper. The war was entering its decisive phase, which was well understood by both sides.

For almost the entire duration of the previous two years of armed confrontation, the Wehrmacht had the strategic initiative. This provided him with a huge advantage - after all, it was the German command that chose in which places to deliver the strongest blows, where the most important battle should unfold. The only thing left for the Soviet commanders was to react to the circumstances arising independently of them.

The success of such response actions directly depended on whether the headquarters could unravel the enemy's plans in a timely manner. Unfortunately, this was not always possible, which led to the disasters of 1941 and 1942. Now a fundamentally different situation has developed - the balance of power has changed so much in favor of the Red Army that one could think about seizing the strategic initiative and imposing one's own will on the enemy.

At the same time, the Wehrmacht remained a powerful and extremely dangerous enemy, which did not at all intend to put up with the loss of its former advantages. The Soviet troops needed to complete the turning point that emerged in the Great Patriotic War after the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, to finally move from defensive actions and counterattacks to the offensive.

The state of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in the first half of 1943

In April 1943, the total number of Soviet troops located directly at the front or in the operational rear was 5 million 830 thousand people (including aviation and navy personnel). In addition, there was an impressive reserve of two tank and six combined arms armies.

The number of guns and mortars with a caliber of more than 76.2 mm increased markedly - by April there were more than 82,000 of them, not counting multiple rocket launchers. The tank armies at the front had about five thousand combat vehicles. The Red Army gradually became more and more powerful, it already had significant combat experience.

The total number of "the Wehrmacht proper" on the Soviet-German front in early April 1943 reached about 3 million 115 thousand people. Taking into account the armies of the satellite countries, SS units, personnel of the Luftwaffe and the fleet, the number of people who fought on the side of Germany increased to 5 million 133 thousand.

It must be borne in mind that during the Battle of Stalingrad, many Italian, Hungarian and Romanian units suffered such a heavy defeat that it was decided to completely remove them from the Soviet-German front.

One of the key features of the Wehrmacht in 1943 was the appearance in the ground forces of a significant number of new tanks and self-propelled guns. First of all, these were the Pz-V "Panther" and Pz-VI "Tiger". The German command had high hopes for the new combat vehicles. Indeed, this technique, in its main characteristics, noticeably surpassed all Soviet tanks.

Choosing a battle site

The place of the battle was mainly the flanks of the so-called "Kursk Bulge". This name was given to the intricately curved front line, which formed a ledge directed towards the German troops. The emergence of the Kursk Bulge was the result of the Soviet offensive in the winter of 1942-43 and the subsequent German counterattack, during which the Wehrmacht managed to capture Kharkov for the second time. Fortunately, the Germans failed to take revenge for Stalingrad here, but the Red Army nevertheless suffered quite significant losses.

It should be noted that Moscow in the spring of 1943 was still relatively close to the front line, which had a significant impact on military planning. The Soviet commanders were forced to take into account the fact that in the event of a major breakthrough, German troops might again try to capture the Soviet capital. Therefore, increased attention was paid to the entire central sector of the front, especially the Kursk Bulge.

The command of the Wehrmacht was also afraid of breaking through their defensive positions. After the Battle of Stalingrad, it was no longer possible to ignore such a possibility.

The German military leadership understood that the balance of power had changed in favor of the USSR, and this meant that the offensive of the Red Army would begin sooner or later. It will be almost impossible to contain it, since the front line is too long to provide reliable defense throughout its entire length.

Under these conditions, it seemed to several German commanders that the Kursk salient was a very convenient place to deliver a preemptive strike to the Red Army, prevent a future Soviet offensive and inflict new heavy losses on the Soviet troops. Apparently, Manstein was the first to express such an idea. As early as March 10, he suggested waiting for the end of the thaw and "cutting off" the Kursk Bulge with one swift flank blow.

General Zeitzler, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, gave this plan a much larger scale. His plan provided for the creation of a grandiose "boiler" for the Soviet troops in the Kursk region, reminiscent of the catastrophic encirclement of 1941 in its size. The success of such an operation would inevitably lead to a large-scale collapse of the entire central sector of the front, which promised the Wehrmacht a wide variety of prospects.

It should also be noted that Kursk itself was a tempting target for the Wehrmacht, since it was a major communication hub. After the capture of the city, the German troops had a rocade at their disposal, which made it possible to transfer formations from north to south and in the opposite direction in the shortest possible time. On the other hand, the huge size of the Kursk bridgehead (width - about two hundred, depth - up to 150 kilometers) allowed the Soviet command to concentrate large forces on it with the aim of subsequently striking the rear of the two largest German army groups - "Center" and "South". The only way to eliminate this threat was to "cut off" the ledge.

Thus, the Kursk Bulge was bound to become the site of a new general battle between the armies of the USSR and Germany.

Wehrmacht planning

As you know, in 1942, the Red Army made repeated attempts to encircle the German troops in the Rzhevsky salient. In the course of several offensives and a heavy bloody struggle, the Soviet troops failed to achieve their goal. The enemy was not surrounded and destroyed. True, formations from Army Group Center were forced out of the Rzhev salient, but this half-success had to be paid dearly.

In 1943, however, it turned out that the huge sacrifices were not in vain. The hard struggle for Rzhev bled not only the Soviet troops, but also the Army Group Center. Its divisions were so weakened that in the spring they would not have been able to take part in the attack on Kursk from the north. It remained only to rely on much more recent formations of Army Group South, which also suffered losses, albeit not so significant, during the German winter counterattack.

The "one-sided" offensive could bring only limited success, which did not suit the Wehrmacht command. Therefore, already at the very early stage of planning, it was decided to restore the combat capability of Army Group Center and only after that proceed with the operation to "cut off" the Kursk salient. Initially, it was assumed that the offensive could begin in mid-May 1943. The operation received the code designation "Citadel".

The decisive role in the further development of events was played by Walter Model, commander of the 9th Army, which was part of Army Group Center. Hitler highly valued the opinion of this commander, considering him the main character of the successful defense of Rzhev for the Wehrmacht. Model, having familiarized himself with the plan of the Citadel, prepared a report that contained very weighty objections to the very concept of this large-scale operation. Their consideration took place on May 3 and 4, 1943 in Munich, at a meeting of the German command, which was held by Hitler himself.

Model's objections were based on aerial reconnaissance data, which managed to detect a large-scale construction of Soviet defensive structures directly on the directions of the alleged strikes. In addition, the report noted that the mobile formations of the Red Army were withdrawn from the Kursk salient to the operational rear, while anti-tank artillery was sharply reinforced.

It should be noted that the plan of the offensive on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge provided that the German tanks would not go into battle immediately. They were supposed to enter the breakthroughs made by the infantry divisions. This was somewhat atypical - previously armored vehicles were used by the Wehrmacht, including at the stage of attacking defensive lines. Such tactics could bring success, but the infantry divisions of Army Group Center by the beginning of May were still experiencing a significant shortage of personnel.

The lack of artillery and vehicles further reduced the potential of the Model troops, and meanwhile the attack on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge was planned to be as deep as the offensive from the south side of the salient. It is clear that such an imbalance threatened to disrupt the operation.

Model's report greatly influenced both Hitler and his generals. Even Manstein, who until recently expressed considerable enthusiasm, now began to have strong doubts about success. The chief of staff of the ground forces was forced to admit that he had nothing to object to. True, Field Marshal von Kluge, Model's immediate superior and commander of Army Group Center, said that the discovered Soviet fortifications were fragile and could be quickly broken through, but Hitler did not listen to him. Ultimately, the offensive was postponed - first for a month, and then to the beginning of July.

There is a version according to which Walter Model intended with his report not to delay the Citadel, but to completely abandon this operation. Guderian's memoirs, in particular, even say that at some point Hitler almost made just such a decision. However, this generally plausible version is not documented.

In its final form, the German offensive plan looked like this:

1. On the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, the main blow is delivered from the area of ​​the city of Orel by the forces of one tank and two conventional armies. The main role here was assigned to the 9th Army under the command of Model;
2. On the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, a blow is delivered in the area of ​​the city of Belgorod by the forces of the 24th Panzer Corps and the 4th Panzer Army, which was the strongest formation. In addition, the Kempf task force delivers a "securing" strike to the northeast, thereby covering the right (eastern) flank of the offensive;
3. After breaking through the defenses, the main forces of both groups begin to move towards each other. Kursk becomes the main target at this stage of the operation;
4. Part of the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, namely the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, after overcoming the Soviet defenses, turns to the northeast and moves towards Prokhorovka. The task of this formation is to prevent Soviet flank counterattacks and to bind the reserve formations of the Red Army in battle.

Not only the "Tigers" and "Panthers" were preparing for the offensive, but also the already outdated Pz-III tanks, the armor of which was strengthened with the help of special screens

In the event of the successful implementation of the German plan, a significant part of the armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts would have been surrounded. After the destruction of these troops, the mobile formations of the Wehrmacht were supposed to be used for further advancement to the southeast (Operation Panther).

The commander of Army Group South, Manstein, wrote after the war that he considered one of his goals to be the destruction of Soviet reserves. This is precisely what he explains the noticeable complication of the offensive plan on the southern face of the Kursk salient. At first glance, this decision looks justified, but for its implementation, Manstein had to use almost all the forces he had. There were no reserves left, which made the operation, if not completely adventurous, then extremely risky.

Army Group Center's action plan looks more "conservative" and generally uncomplicated. But it was his "obviousness" that greatly simplified the task of the defending Soviet troops. However, such planning in this case can be considered forced - after all, von Kluge had much fewer mobile units at his disposal than on the southern face of the Kursk salient.

The main mistake on the part of the Wehrmacht command was probably the postponement of the offensive until mid-summer. The quite understandable desire to replenish and strengthen the troops in this case was not justified, since the size of the Soviet grouping and the level of its saturation with military equipment grew much faster. This, of course, became clear after the war, and in the spring of 1943, many German military leaders believed that time was on Germany's side.

Planning for the Red Army

The German winter counterattack showed the Soviet command that even after the defeat at Stalingrad, the Wehrmacht remains an extremely dangerous enemy. The re-capture of Kharkov dispelled hopes for a quick victorious offensive by the Red Army. Moreover, a lot of efforts had to be made in order to stop the advance of the German troops, and for a long time the situation looked extremely unstable.

Subsequently, after the end of the war, the thesis of deliberate defense on the Kursk Bulge as the main strategic idea of ​​​​military planning on the central sector of the front firmly entered Soviet historiography. This is true, however, it must be borne in mind that throughout March and part of April 1943, the Red Army was on the defensive not intentionally, but forcedly.

G.K. Zhukov, who at that time had already received the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union and held the post of representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, arrived in the Kursk Bulge region on March 17, 1943, at a time when its outlines had not yet been “fixed”. In the early days of the next month, assessing the situation at the front, he suggested that the Germans would try to "cut off" the resulting ledge, using their tank divisions as a battering ram. As subsequent events showed, Zhukov actually foresaw both the Wehrmacht's offensive plan as a whole and the main directions of strikes (though only at the operational, and not at the tactical level).

The marshal proposed to oppose the German tanks with strong artillery, minefields and a system of fortifications in depth. With the help of all these means, it would be possible to knock out most of the enemy’s equipment, weaken it, and then go on the counteroffensive.

In general, Zhukov’s plan is very similar to a kind of “draft” of the future plan of that very deliberate defense, but there is one very important detail here: it was assumed that the Wehrmacht’s strike would follow immediately after the end of the thaw, that is, at the latest in May.

During such a period of time, the Red Army could not accumulate enough forces and means for its own offensive, which means that Zhukov's proposal also implied forced rather than deliberate defense. In addition, it was about a plan of action for several weeks, maximum - for a month. No one yet imagined that the pause would drag on until the second half of the year.

Soviet intelligence played a decisive role in further planning. The fact that the Nazis were accumulating forces for delivering a powerful blow on the central sector of the front was reported by several different sources at once. The most valuable information was received not from the German rear, but from London.

On April 25, 1943, an intercepted radiogram was read at the British Government School of Codes and Ciphers, which contained information that revealed a significant part of the plan for Operation Citadel. The sender of the message was Field Marshal von Weichs, and the recipient was the operations department of the OKW headquarters. The British authorities and its military command would never share this information with the USSR, but one of the decoders was John Cairncross, a member of the Cambridge Five, who made sure that the entire text of the German radio message was at the disposal of Soviet intelligence.

The message came just in time - on May 7, in the days when the situation became more and more uncertain - the Wehrmacht was clearly in no hurry to deliver the blow expected by Zhukov, and the idea of ​​the Red Army's transition to offensive operations became more and more relevant.

"Revealed" agents from the "Cambridge Five". Most likely, other high-ranking Britons also worked for Soviet intelligence, whose names are still unknown.

The intelligence report put an end to these hesitation - the command came to the conclusion that the concept of deliberate defense was even more justified than in April. Now the preparation for the “summer season” has gone in three main directions:

1. Building three lines of defense in the areas of the future German offensive, strengthening the troops with all types of anti-tank weapons, creating a large number of minefields in various directions;
2. Accumulation and preparation of reserves intended for counteroffensive. This work began in early April, and in May its intensity increased;
3. Development of plans for operations "Commander Rumyantsev" and "Kutuzov", which were supposed to start immediately after repelling the German offensive.

In addition, there was an active accumulation of all types of ammunition - the experience of two years of war showed that this was of great, sometimes decisive importance for achieving ultimate success. It can also be noted that over the course of several calm months, quite a few fighters and commanders who had already been fired upon returned to the active army from hospitals, which greatly strengthened the Red Army.

Unfortunately, the Soviet command still made several significant mistakes in planning. Firstly, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assumed that the main forces of the Wehrmacht were concentrated on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, while in fact the largest number of German tanks were concentrated in the south. Secondly, at the tactical level, it was still not possible to accurately determine the places and directions of the main German strikes. Both led to serious consequences and significantly increased the losses of the Red Army in the subsequent battle.

A special part of the defense plan on the Kursk Bulge was the so-called counter-preparation - a preemptive strike by artillery against enemy troops. It was necessary to apply it even before the German guns and mortars opened fire, but at the same time, not too early. In order for the counter-preparation to be successful, it was necessary to have the most accurate information about the location of the areas of concentration of German formations and the date the operation began. Unfortunately, the information obtained by the scouts was incomplete. In particular, it was possible to establish the time of the Wehrmacht's transition to the offensive just a few hours before the start of the battle.

When planning counter-preparation, the command of the Central Front made the main bet on the suppression of Wehrmacht artillery, while on the Voronezh Front they hoped to inflict losses on enemy moving units as soon as possible. Looking ahead, we have to state that in both cases the set goals were not achieved.

Number of troops and weapons

There are several different ways to assess the forces of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht concentrated in the Kursk Bulge region. The battle lasted 50 days and troops were gradually drawn into it, which initially did not take part in the battle. Perhaps the most correct would be the "conservative" assessment used in the official Soviet historiography. In accordance with this methodology, the Wehrmacht intended to use the following forces against the Soviet Central Front, which was defending the northern side of the Kursk Bulge:

1. the 9th Army, consisting of six armored, one motorized and fifteen infantry divisions;
2. Four infantry divisions from the 2nd Army;
3. Seven divisions of assault guns and a separate battalion of heavy tanks.

To break through the Soviet defenses, the following formations were concentrated on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge:

1. Operational Group "Kempf" and the 4th Panzer Army, which included 8 tank, one motorized and 15 infantry divisions;
2. Five infantry divisions from the 2nd Army;
3. An assault gun battalion and two separate heavy tank battalions.

You can more accurately imagine the balance of forces from the following table:

The number of personnel of the Red Army is given taking into account the Air Force and air defense formations. The number of aircraft was somewhat higher than indicated in the table, since the Po-2 night bombers were not counted in this case.

As you can easily see, the Soviet troops had a tangible overall superiority of forces both on the northern and southern faces of the “arc of fire”. Many modern works devoted to the Battle of Kursk, especially by foreign authors, provide information pointing to an even more significant superiority of the Red Army. In particular, the number of Soviet troops is estimated at two million people, and German - only 750 thousand or even less.

To obtain such results, the following main "methods" are used:

1. Only those formations of the Wehrmacht that were directly involved in attempts to break through the Soviet defense are taken into account. This immediately reduces the number of personnel of the German troops to the already mentioned value of 750 thousand;
2. On the northern face of the Kursk Bulge, only the 9th Army of the Model is taken into account. This immediately reduces the number of not only soldiers, but also tanks, and quite significantly;
3. When calculating the number of Soviet troops, the Steppe Front is additionally taken into account, and in full force;
4. The "neighboring" Soviet fronts that took part in the operations "Kutuzov" and "Commander Rumyantsev" are added.

Of all these "adjustments", only the addition of the Steppe Front (until July 11, 1943 it was called the Steppe Military District) can be considered partly correct, since some of its formations were really used to repel the offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. The rest belongs more to the field of manipulation, due to the significant scale of the battle.

The most significant in terms of numbers and strength of the formations of the Red Army that took part in the battle were commanded by quite experienced and skillful commanders. These were, in particular:

1. K.K. Rokossovsky, army general, commander of the Central Front during the Battle of Kursk;
2. N.F. Vatutin, Army General, Commander of the Voronezh Front;
3. I.S. Konev, Colonel General, Commander of the Steppe Front.

Marshal of the USSR, representative of the Headquarters G.K. coordinated the actions of all Soviet troops. Zhukov.

Defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk

The official start date of the Battle of Kursk is July 5, 1943. But on the southern face of the "arc of fire" the fighting actually began a little earlier, on July 4th. Given this, it makes sense to start the story about the defensive stage of the battle with a description of what happened on the Voronezh Front.

Defensive actions on the southern front

On July 4, units of the 48th Panzer Corps (part of the 4th Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht) launched a small-scale attack, trying to capture part of the neutral space that separated them from the first line of Soviet defense. The main goal of this maneuver was to capture the positions where Soviet observation posts and military outposts were located.

The task set looked simple, but the fighting dragged on until late in the evening, and in some places until the early morning of the next day, which no longer fully corresponded to the original German plan. Nevertheless, this blow to some extent contributed to the upcoming offensive. A private attack, as it seemed to the command of the Voronezh Front, clearly indicated that Cherkasskoye would become the first direct enemy target on the first day, and this was not entirely true - the attack was planned not only in this direction.

In the second half of the night, in the defense zone of three armies at once (7th Guards, 6th and 40th), artillery counter-preparation was carried out at positions where Wehrmacht units were supposed to be concentrated. Nothing definite can be said about the results of this preemptive strike even today - there is simply no information.

Closer to dawn, about 250 aircraft took off, which were part of the 2nd and 17th air armies. It was assumed that they would be able to inflict heavy losses on the German air force concentrated on the airfields. Unfortunately, the result turned out to be just the opposite - the Luftwaffe bombers were already flying to their designated targets, parking lots and runways were empty. But even on the distant approaches to the airfields, Soviet strike groups encountered numerous German fighters. A large number of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft were shot down during this extremely unsuccessful air battle.

But one should not think that mistakes were made only by the command of the Voronezh Front. In particular, the very first actions of the 48th Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht were not well organized. After the Nazis managed to shoot down and take over the positions in the neutral zone, they began to push their artillery forward, but did not succeed very much in this, since the protracted battle did not allow for a full demining of the area. When the German guns, having overcome the numerous traffic jams that instantly formed on the roads, reached the planned firing positions, they did not have time to reconnoiter the targets and determine their coordinates.

Thus, although the two-hour artillery preparation was ultimately carried out, its effectiveness was not high. In many cases, strikes were delivered on decoys, or even into the void.

The first day of the attack on Kursk (the main direction)

The offensive expected in the Soviet headquarters in the direction of Cherkasskoye began at about six in the morning. The forces of two divisions (11th Panzer and Great Germany) took part in it.

Soon these formations came under heavy artillery strikes. The terrain was also not conducive to rapid advance - rather soon the tanks moving forward ran into a vast anti-tank ditch, the approaches to which were carefully mined. One of the "Tigers" fell down and got stuck thoroughly. The speed of armored vehicles has noticeably decreased, which the Soviet attack aircraft quite competently took advantage of.

Apparently, it was on the outskirts of Cherkassky that the most effective Soviet aviation anti-tank weapon, the PTAB cumulative bombs, was first used. Each Il-2 attack aircraft could use up to 280 such ammunition, covering a fairly large area during the strike, which greatly increased the likelihood of hitting a target.

The Germans had to spend a lot of time clearing the area and building a bridge across the moat. By five o'clock in the evening on July 5, only 45 of the 350 tanks that were part of the strike group managed to cross. The infantry, which had gone forward, was forced to fight without the support of armored vehicles, while suffering significant losses.

The situation on the right flank of the 48th Panzer Corps turned out to be somewhat more favorable for the Wehrmacht, where the 167th Infantry and 11th Panzer divisions were advancing. These formations managed to advance about 8 kilometers deep into the Soviet defenses and bypass Cherkasskoe.

Meanwhile, the Grossdeutschland Division came under flanking fire from the hastily advanced 27th Anti-Tank Brigade. This again slowed down the pace of the offensive, and only at nine o'clock in the evening the German troops finally reached Cherkassky, entering it from two directions.

Meanwhile, the plan provided that by this time "Grossdeutschland" should already be in Oboyan. In addition, the Germans had to fight new battles in Cherkassky, so they managed to completely master this settlement only by the morning of July 6th.

To the east of the 48th Panzer Corps, on July 5, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser went on the offensive. On this sector of the front, the Soviet defense was less dense, but the hopes that the first fortification line would not withstand the strike of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions did not materialize. The SS men also had to introduce the "Dead Head" into battle, which was originally supposed to be used to develop success.

And yet it is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that the 2nd SS Panzer Corps spent only 17 hours to overcome the first line of Soviet defense. The reason for this was the inequality of forces - the command of the Voronezh Front was unable to foresee the appearance of such a significant enemy tank grouping in this direction. Moreover, already during the fighting on July 5, reserves were sent mainly to the Cherkassky area, which only contributed to the success of Hausser. Soviet "anti-tankers" suffered heavy losses that day. For example, in the 1008th anti-tank regiment, by the evening of the first day of the German offensive, only three guns out of 24 had survived.

Following the results of the first day of fighting, the Wehrmacht and the SS troops managed to reach the second lane of the Soviet defense in the direction of the main attack on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, which was under serious threat.

Task Force Kempf and its actions on the 5th of July

Unlike the 48th Panzer Corps and the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, the troops of the Kempf task force were not intended to carry out a throw on Kursk. They were supposed to provide cover for the main strike force from the side of its right (eastern) flank. This operation began with a frank failure, due at first to the need to ferry tanks across the Seversky Donets.

On the eastern bank of this river, in the region of Belgorod, the Germans had a small bridgehead. On the morning of July 5, it was used for the advance of the 6th Panzer Division. Very soon, the Wehrmacht troops moving forward came across vast minefields, stopped and came under fire from Soviet artillery. The Sturmgeshütz self-propelled guns were supposed to support the attackers, but when they advanced onto the bridge, it turned out that its design was not strong enough. The whole flight collapsed into the water. Thus, further advancement became impossible.

The 19th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht did not have a bridgehead in its sector of the offensive. Therefore, the Germans sent troops to the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets in rubber boats, a significant part of which were sappers. They had to build a bridge that could bear the weight of the Tiger tank. The work was carried out under continuous Soviet shelling and was accompanied by heavy losses.

In the end, the bridge was still built, but out of the fourteen Tigers that went on the attack, 13 failed by the end of the day on July 5. Nine of them were blown up by mines laid by German sappers on the east bank of the river in order to protect against the alleged Soviet counterattack.

Unfortunately, other units of the Wehrmacht still managed to cross the Seversky Donets and capture bridgeheads. On this sector of the front, the 7th Guards Army was defending, the strength of which did not allow creating a sufficient density of troops in each of the potentially dangerous directions. The greatest success was achieved on the first day of the offensive by the 7th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, which was able to build a solid bridge and transport the Tigers. These vehicles made it relatively easy to repulse the counterattack of the Soviet 167th tank regiment, which followed on the evening of July 5th. The Germans knocked out twenty "thirty-fours" and four T-70 light tanks. This meant that the 167th regiment lost 75% of all its equipment in a couple of hours.

The actions of the 11th Army Corps under the command of E. Raus were also quite successful. By the end of the first day of the battle, these German troops were even able to encircle and block the Soviet garrisons of several villages located on the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets.

Reacting to these events, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Vatutin, reinforced the 7th Guards Army with four rifle divisions. The battle was just beginning, and there was still a largely justified hope of stopping the advance of German troops in the second line of defense.

Defense of the southern front from July 6 to 12, 1943

By the morning of July 6, the weakest point of the Soviet defense on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge was the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division, which was part of the 6th Army. This formation occupied a section of the front with a length of 18 kilometers, which did not allow us to count on the creation of a sufficiently dense formation of troops. It was here that the point of impact of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was aimed.

The 5th Guards Tank Corps (also called "Stalingrad") was supposed to strengthen the defense. At about 6 o'clock in the morning, Soviet tankers managed to reach the given concentration area. True, the motorized rifles that were part of the corps lagged behind. In addition, from the very beginning it was decided not to engage in battle directly from the march, but to prepare for the upcoming counterattack.

This became a fatal mistake. At 11 a.m., a German artillery strike hit the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division. Then the fascist bombers arrived, which, without any opposition from the Soviet fighters, "processed" the defensive positions of the guards. Immediately after that, more than a hundred tanks of the Das Reich motorized division went on the attack, among which there were Pz-VIs.

The 51st Guards Rifle Division lost over 5,000 men (out of 8,400) within two and a half hours, lost its combat effectiveness and was dispersed. Only the artillery regiment survived, continuing the resistance and subsequently managing to retreat more or less successfully. The 5th Guards Tank Corps, unable to prevent this defeat, immediately found itself in an extremely disadvantageous position. True, in terms of the number of armored vehicles, this formation was not inferior to the SS division, however, Das Reich had much more powerful artillery, and in terms of the number of personnel, the superiority of the Germans was more than twofold.

By seven o'clock in the evening, the 5th Guards Tank Corps, having suffered losses, was surrounded. It was possible to break out of the ring only at night, at the cost of losing more than half of all combat vehicles. Meanwhile, the SS, continuing the offensive, went to the third line of defense and in some places wedged into it.

The right flank of the attacking Das Reich division was covered by the Totenkopf division, which was counterattacked by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. The balance of power here was also in favor of the SS, but they were assigned defensive tasks. Therefore, the losses of Soviet tankers on this sector of the front turned out to be insignificant. True, the counterattack did not achieve its goal, but nevertheless it slowed down the pace of the German advance.

The 48th tank corps of the Wehrmacht on July 6 also went on the offensive. By noon, the Germans managed to surround three Soviet rifle regiments located between the first and second lines of defense. Previously N.F. Vatutin ordered a counterattack on the flank of the advancing German troops by the forces of the 1st Panzer Army, but its commander, Katukov, refused to carry out this order, considering it meaningless. This opinion was supported by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin. As a result, Katukov's tanks remained motionless all day on July 6th. They entered the battle only at about six o'clock in the evening, when the main forces of the 48th Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht tried to break through the second line of defense.

On a narrow section of the front, moving along the Oboyan highway, the Germans used at least two hundred tanks, including Panthers. The advance was slow - there were still minefields and various obstacles everywhere. The Germans failed to break through the defense that day. To assess the losses they suffered in this case, it can be noted that out of 160 Panther Pz.V tanks available on the morning of July 6, only 40 vehicles remained in service by night. Many other types of armored vehicles were knocked out, including, in particular, the Tigers.

On July 7, the advance of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps actually stopped. This was due to the continued lag of the 48th Panzer Corps, as well as due to the need to ensure the flanks of the breakthrough, which became more and more stretched. Meanwhile, the commander of the 4th Panzer Army of the Wehrmacht, Hermann Goth, set his subordinates the task of encircling the main forces of the 1st Panzer Army and the 6th Guards Army. To do this, the 48th Panzer Corps had to not only "catch up" with the SS, but also connect with them, closing the flanks of the offensive.

On the morning of July 7, the 11th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht and the division "Grossdeutschland", reinforced by the remaining Panthers, launched a new blow, the main force of which fell on the 3rd mechanized brigade. By noon, this Soviet formation had lost two-thirds of its armored vehicles (17 T-34s and 3 T-70s). By evening, only 6 tanks remained in service. Nevertheless, Katukov managed to localize the breakthrough, using the reserve and, in part, forces from non-attacked areas. The 48th Panzer Corps managed to advance about 6 kilometers.

Meanwhile, Task Force Kempf continued its slow advance to the northeast. At the same time, the Germans failed to provide an elbow connection with the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which to a large extent undermined all its successes. Nevertheless, the position of the Soviet 7th Guards Army became more and more difficult. The command of the Voronezh Front was forced to transfer to its disposal most of its only reserve rifle corps. Thus, the situation became more and more threatening.

On July 8, the Voronezh Front received strong reinforcements. These were 2 tank corps - one from the South-Western Front, and the other from the Steppe District. Fresh forces, which had not yet suffered losses, made it possible to count on delivering new counterattacks against the advancing Germans. In addition, the 1st Tank Army, which suffered significant losses during the battles of July 6-7, was replenished with a tank brigade, a separate tank regiment, a rifle division, and anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery.

By the morning of July 8, the German strike force had largely lost its penetrating power. Of the 350 tanks of "Grossdeutschland", only 80 remained in service. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps remained a fairly powerful formation, however, it also lost more than 270 tanks and self-propelled guns. With all this, the Nazis still counted on the fact that they would be able to surround the main forces of the defending Soviet troops.

The new SS offensive, which began on July 8, developed successfully at first, but then fresh Soviet tank corps launched a series of counterattacks that forced the Germans to stop. Once again, they failed to complete the task. Unfortunately, the leading Soviet tank brigades suffered heavy losses in the process.

The greatest progress these days was achieved by the troops of the Kempf task force. They were able to make a deep coverage of the Belgorod defense center. As a result, the Soviet command was forced to order the immediate withdrawal of the three rifle divisions located there. Thus, the Kempf group was finally able to achieve the establishment of a permanent elbow connection with the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. In addition, two Soviet rifle divisions lost a significant part of their personnel and almost all of their artillery during the retreat.

The 69th Army and part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which arrived from the Steppe District, were supposed to hold back the further advance of the Kempf task force. The same fresh unit was assigned the main role in the already planned large-scale counteroffensive, which, as Vatutin believed, could push back the still strong SS divisions. But even before the reserves had time to reach Prokhorovka, the Germans managed to deliver two more powerful blows.

Part of the forces of Katukov's 1st Panzer Army fell under the first of them. These troops, located in the bend of the Pena River, had long interfered with the advance of the 48th Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht, since they were able to attack it from the flank. Therefore, it was decided to temporarily forget about the attack on Oboyan and defeat the units located to the west of the German "wedge" driven into the Soviet defenses.

On July 10, the 48th Panzer Corps launched an offensive in two directions - to the north and to the west. The Soviet command failed to understand the meaning of this maneuver, believing that the enemy was continuing to move towards Oboyan, trying at the same time to bypass the main strongholds of the defense. In reality, the main thrust was to the west, and the advance to the north was carried out for the sole purpose of securing the flank. By the end of the day, more than seven and a half thousand Soviet soldiers were in a semi-encirclement, but there was no order to withdraw.

On July 11, the Germans suddenly turned south. By noon, the encirclement closed. The order to leave was late. As a result, more than four thousand Red Army soldiers were captured (according to German data). In addition, a lot of military equipment was lost.

The second blow was delivered by the forces of the 2nd SS TC. In this case, the German troops also stopped advancing north and turned to the east, pushing the Red Army back. Several times the SS carried out a breakthrough of defensive positions in narrow areas, creating for this local numerical superiority.

It should be borne in mind that by July 11, the failure of the German offensive on the northern face had become quite obvious. This meant only one thing - the meeting of the two shock groups of the Wehrmacht in Kursk would have to be forgotten. The implementation of the original plan of the "Citadel" became impossible. Apparently, under the influence of this factor, the command of the Army Group "South" intended to achieve at least partial success in its own sector of the front.

After the war, Manstein explained his actions by the desire to destroy the Soviet reserves, but it is possible that this is just an excuse. Perhaps the real plan of the field marshal was more ambitious and involved the implementation of the spring plan for cutting off the Kursk ledge by the forces of the southern Wehrmacht group alone.

One way or another, the German troops managed to break through to Prokhorovka and capture several bridgeheads on the banks of the Psyol River. Worst of all, the Nazis managed to capture just those areas of the terrain that were supposed to be used for the deployment of Soviet formations before launching a counterattack by the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Completion of the defense on the southern front

On July 12, the most “mythologized” event of the entire time of the Battle of Kursk took place - the battle on the field near Prokhorovka. Both in literature and in cinema, this battle was often presented as a head-on battle between two huge tank avalanches.

The reality was much more prosaic: the Soviet tank corps, which were part of the 5th Guards Tank Army, tried to launch a counterattack on the German troops (in this case, defending), but did not achieve any significant result, at the same time suffering truly monstrous losses.

This happened due to the fact that the starting positions for the counterattack were previously captured by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. As a result, Soviet tankers had to engage in battle under obviously unfavorable conditions. Their only advantage was surprise - the plans for the counteroffensive were kept secret. Unfortunately, this was clearly not enough. During about two and a half hours of battle, the 5th Guards Tank Army lost more than 230 combat vehicles. Subdivisions of the 1st Panzer Army, which also took part in the attack, also suffered heavy losses.

The losses of the Wehrmacht and SS units in this bloody battle are estimated differently. Some modern historians claim that no more than five German tanks were knocked out and burned down on July 12. Such statements do not differ in objectivity, however, in any case, it is clear that the tank units of the Wehrmacht and the SS did not lose their combat effectiveness following the battles of July 12. They could still fight and even attack. But there was no attack. True, the Nazis in the following days managed to surround part of the 48th Rifle Corps, but this did not lead to significant losses of the Red Army personnel - the "ring" was not strong enough.

The uncertain situation on the southern front continued until July 16, after which all those forces that had previously been used for the German offensive began an organized withdrawal to their original positions.

Quite often one hears that the reason for such a decision was the landing of the allies in Sicily. Despite the fact that the absurdity of such a version is quite obvious, it is reproduced in various kinds of historical books to this day, it also penetrated Wikipedia.

The landing in Sicily was indeed mentioned by Hitler during his meeting with representatives of the military command on July 13, but this event had no real impact on the situation in the Kursk region. No one thought to send the German mobile formations withdrawn from the battle to Italy - they were transferred to the disposal of the Army Group Center and were used mainly to repel the Soviet counteroffensive that had already begun. It was this that was the real reason for the final failure of the Citadel.

Manstein wrote in his memoirs that the cessation of the offensive on the southern front was a mistake. In his opinion, the fighting should have continued, but the orders that he managed to give to his troops on July 16 no longer assumed the capture of the Kursk salient, but the turn of strike groups to the southeast. In other words, the implementation of the main goals of the Citadel, even in this case, was out of the question.

An additional factor that prompted the German command to abandon attempts to build on the success achieved by the 4th Panzer Army was the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya operation. It was launched on July 17 by the troops of the Southwestern Front. To stop their advance, Manstein had to transfer five armored and one motorized divisions to a dangerous area.

Defense on the northern face

On the night of July 5, 1943, Soviet intelligence officers from the Central Front managed to capture several German sappers who were clearing mines, preparing passages for tanks. During the operational interrogation, it was possible to establish that the Wehrmacht strike force, concentrated on the northern side of the Kursk ledge, would go on the offensive at two in the morning CET.

Since K.K. Rokossovsky no longer had time to coordinate his actions with the Headquarters (about an hour remained at his disposal), he made the decision to conduct counter-training on his own. Soviet artillery was ahead of the German by only 10 minutes. Unfortunately, the counter-preparation had no significant effect. This was primarily due to the wrong choice of targets. Rokossovsky expected to destroy enemy artillery in its firing positions, but information about them was not complete. Perhaps it would be more correct to strike at the German infantry formations, already prepared for the attack.

An indirect confirmation of this failure was the extremely powerful fire of the German artillery, which followed shortly after the end of the counter-training. It was quite obvious that the counter-training could neither destroy nor suppress the enemy batteries. Following the shells, aerial bombs fell on the defensive positions of the Central Front - unfortunately, the Soviet fighters failed to cover their troops from the air.

The main blow of the 9th Wehrmacht Army, which went on the offensive, inflicted at the “junction” of the 13th and 70th Soviet armies, fell on the 15th rifle division. The 47th Panzer Corps acted against it - a formation that had previously been repeatedly used not only in the military, but also in punitive "counter-guerrilla" operations, accompanied by mass massacres of civilians. A battalion of heavy tanks "Tiger" and the 6th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht advanced at the forefront.

In the afternoon, the 15th Infantry Division was forced to retreat from its positions. One of her regiments was briefly surrounded, but on the same day broke out of the ring. The total losses of the division amounted to about two thousand people (out of 7500). The retreat of this formation led to the fact that the troops located to the left of it (that is, to the west), which were part of the 70th Army, were pushed back.

On the eastern flank of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, the offensive was carried out with the support of Ferdinand self-propelled guns, which subsequently received the widest fame, which, however, can hardly be considered deserved. The total number of these machines was very small (90 units), and this fact alone did not allow them to become truly effective weapons. However, they still played a certain role in the German offensive. "Ferdinand" was the result of alteration of a heavy tank, which in the memoirs of Guderian is called the "Tiger Porsche". The design of this combat vehicle turned out to be overly complex. Therefore, instead of a rotating turret, a massive heavily armored cabin with a powerful 88-mm gun was installed on the tank chassis.

"Ferdinand" differed from all other self-propelled guns primarily in a truly unprecedented level of security for its time. The thickness of its frontal armor reached 200 millimeters. The German command believed that thanks to this feature, the Ferdinands would be able to easily overcome anti-tank defenses.

New self-propelled guns advanced in the defense zone occupied by the 81st Infantry Division. Her positions were protected by thick minefields. At the same time, the work of German sappers, who were trying to make passes, was constantly hampered by intense artillery fire. Borgvart radio-controlled tankettes were used here for demining, but they did not cope with the assigned tasks, showing themselves not to be the best means to overcome the defense. As a result, by the evening of July 5, more than half of the Ferdinands entered into battle were put out of action as a result of mine explosions. For example, the 653rd German battalion lost 33 of its 45 vehicles.

The surviving Ferdinands, however, eventually managed to provide significant assistance to the advancing German infantry. Even a small number of these self-propelled guns, breaking through the minefields, were able to conduct aimed fire at Soviet strongholds for a long time, while remaining invulnerable - thick armor really saved them.

At the end of the day, the first line of defense in the zone occupied by the 13th Army was basically broken through. To the north of Olkhovatka, in a section with a total length of about 15 kilometers, German troops came close to the second defensive line. Their advance ranged from 8 kilometers in the center of the offensive to 5 kilometers on the right (western) flank.

The success of the Nazis was generally insignificant, but after the war Rokossovsky was forced to admit that he made a mistake in planning the defense, failing to determine the direction of the main attack of the German group, which led, in particular, to the forced retreat of several rifle divisions.

Such mistakes in 1941 led to disasters, but the situation has changed significantly since then. Nevertheless, Rokossovsky had to take emergency measures so that the German formations could not complete the job. Usually, in such cases, flank counterattacks were launched against the attackers, but the Soviet command did not have time to carry out the necessary regrouping. It was decided to try to push back the German troops, attacking them almost head-on with the forces of several tank corps from the 2nd tank army, located behind the second line of defense.

Initially, Rokossovsky planned to launch this counterattack on the evening of July 5, but he failed to prepare for the appointed time. Moreover, on the morning of the next day, it turned out that it would not be possible to organize a simultaneous attack by the forces of the 16th and 19th tank corps. Since the counterattacks were delivered in places not envisaged by the defense plan, they faced their own minefields. It took a long time to create the necessary passages. As a result, the 16th Panzer Corps went into battle at 6 o'clock in the morning, and the 19th - after five in the evening.

Soviet counterattacks were accompanied by significant losses. So, out of 54 combat vehicles of the 107th tank brigade, only four survived by the evening. The total losses of the 16th and 19th corps amounted to at least 120 tanks. The reasons for such deplorable results of the counterattacks were both the poor organization of the battle and the superiority of German technology, especially the Tigers. The enemy lost at least 23 tanks that day, mostly from the 20th Panzer Division. It was not possible to push back the German troops, but the pace of their offensive slowed down significantly. During the 6th of July they advanced no more than two kilometers.

On the evening of the same day, the plan for the further offensive of the 9th Army was changed by its commander. The model considered that it would be most expedient to move in two main directions - to Ponyri on the eastern flank and to Olkhovatka on the western.

Fight for Ponyri

At dawn on July 7, the German 41st Panzer Corps resumed the offensive. He was moving in the direction of Ponyri station. The enemy did not know that long before the start of the Battle of Kursk, a rather powerful defensive center had been built in this area. The first five attacks on Ponyri completely failed. Only the sixth strike allowed the Nazis to reach the outskirts of the settlement from the northwest. It happened at about ten o'clock in the morning. A Soviet counterattack followed, driving the Germans back.

The next blow came from a different direction. This time the German tanks were moving towards Ponyry from the northeast. Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, the Nazis came close to the station, but still could not capture it. In the evening, the most powerful attack began. One tank and two infantry divisions of the Germans broke into Ponyri from the west, east and north. The battle for the station lasted all night, and in its southern part by the morning there were still defenders.

At dawn on July 8, a Soviet counterattack followed. It involved two divisions (one rifle and one airborne), as well as three tank corps. The Germans were driven out of Ponyri, but they managed to "catch" on the outskirts of the station. In the afternoon, the situation turned upside down again - Ponyri were captured by the Wehrmacht during a new attack. By evening, the 307th Rifle Division launched a second counterattack and again drove the Germans out of the station.

Seeing that frontal attacks were not successful, the enemy command decided to change tactics. On July 9, a blow was delivered around the Ponyri. At the same time, the Germans took advantage of heavy armored vehicles, including the surviving Ferdinands. They managed to advance quite deep into the Soviet rear, but not far from the village of Goreloye, the attackers came across another minefield and numerous guns of anti-tank regiments. The breakthrough was localized. True, the Germans managed to surround Ponyri, but in the evening the station was released by a counterattack of the Guards Airborne Division, which almost completely restored its original position.

On July 10, the Nazis again tried to bypass Ponyri, but did not achieve significant success, despite the introduction of the 10th motorized division of the Wehrmacht into the battle. Thus, for several days the enemy in this area actually marked time and suffered senseless losses.

Fight for Olkhovatka

On the right flank of the 9th German Army, the offensive was carried out mainly by the forces of the 47th Panzer Corps. The commander of this unit, Lemelsen, brought all the tanks he had into a single brigade, called the Burmeister (after the name of the Wehrmacht major who formally headed it). All of these combat vehicles were used to deliver a concentrated strike in a southerly direction.

Lemelsen's plan did not justify itself - the Burmeister brigade ran into a solid defense of three Soviet rifle divisions and two tank corps. In addition, the terrain in the offensive zone was hilly, and there was a strong point on every significant elevation. On July 7, the battles for height 257.0 were especially difficult. The Germans failed to capture it that day.

Somewhat more successful was the offensive of the 4th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, which captured the village of Teploe, pushing the 140th Infantry Division. However, this partial success required fourteen attacks in a row, and did not lead to a breakthrough of the second defensive line.

The next day did not bring the expected victory to the Nazis. Most of their blows were deflected. True, the height of 257.0 was still captured, but another barrier had already been created behind it, which the German tanks could not overcome.

The obvious crisis of the offensive forced the command of Army Group Center to reconsider their plans. It was decided to stop at the occupied positions and prepare for a new strike, scheduled for July 10, more carefully.

On the eve of this day, I.V. Stalin called G.K. Zhukov and asked him if it was time to start Operation Kutuzov. After a short exchange of views, the Soviet offensive on the so-called "Oryol Bulge" was scheduled for 12 July. This blow was extremely dangerous for Army Group Center, whose entire attention was still focused on Operation Citadel.

Model, of course, did not know about this call, but many modern historians believe that he guessed about the upcoming Soviet offensive and therefore, starting from July 9, he did not so much continue the attacks as he was engaged in some kind of "imitation", not wanting to clearly violate Hitler's orders.

Indeed, in the future, the 9th Army, and the Army Group Center as a whole, managed to quickly switch to its own defense. However, the attacks on the northern face of the Kursk salient, undertaken on July 10, were exceptionally strong. K.K. Rokossovsky had to use all the reserves he had to defend Olkhovatka.

On July 11-12, the advance of the German troops of Army Group Center practically stopped. From that time on, the Nazis allowed themselves only minor attacks. After the already mentioned meeting with the participation of Hitler (held on July 13), the implementation of Operation Citadel was completely stopped. True, the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) still retained hopes of resuming the advance towards Kursk. It was not until July 19 that an entry appeared in the “military diary”, indicating that the OKW had come to terms with the failure of the offensive that had been preparing for so long.

On July 11, 1943, Soviet troops from the Western and Bryansk Fronts, located north of the Kursk Bulge, conducted a large-scale reconnaissance in force. As a result, it was possible to open the Wehrmacht defense structure in all areas of the general offensive planned for the next day. This operation, called "Kutuzov", was supposed to lead to the liberation of Orel and the defeat of the main forces of Army Group Center.

The planning of the Soviet counter-offensive began in March, when its very possibility was temporarily absent. The main feature of the operation "Kutuzov" was the rejection of the attempt to carry out the "classic Cannes" by the forces of the Central and Western fronts.

Such a decision seemed to suggest itself already when looking at the map, but the Soviet command understood that it would be no less obvious for the Germans. In addition, the Red Army already had the tragic experience of trying to encircle Army Group Center in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky ledge, and did not want to repeat the previous mistakes.

It was decided to carry out the operation differently - to cut the German grouping into pieces with several strong blows. The entry into battle of the Central Front was to take place only at the final stage - the Soviet command took into account that after a defensive battle, these troops would still need to put themselves in order. The main calculation was based on the speed of action - a few days were allotted to achieve the final goals of the offensive. The delay threatened to significantly increase the resistance of the enemy, who still had reserves at his disposal.

Unfortunately, already at the very beginning of the operation, it became clear that it would not be possible to quickly carry it out. This happened for the following main reasons:

1. The Soviet command underestimated the strength of the enemy's defensive fortifications. The construction of strongholds in this area continued since 1941, which directly affected the pace of the offensive;
2. The advance of Soviet tanks was intensively hampered by German air strikes, which managed to maintain its air supremacy;
3. The command of Army Group Center retained a fairly significant amount of reserves. This was largely facilitated by the "conservative" plan of Model's attack on Kursk - as already noted, the breakthrough of the Soviet fortifications was entrusted to the infantry, and not to the tanks.

Ultimately, instead of dissecting and defeating Army Group Center, Operation Kutuzov was reduced to ousting German troops from the Oryol Bulge. This was also a success, but it cost the Red Army quite dearly. True, it took only two days to break through the Wehrmacht's tactical defense line, but the subsequent offensive cannot be called fast. It was possible to release Oryol only on August 5th.

It should be noted that the disruption of the planned pace of the offensive allowed the enemy to reinforce his troops with mobile formations deployed from Army Group South. In particular, the "Grossdeutschland" division, which had recently tried to break through to Kursk from the south, was on the way to the Western Front.

Beginning on July 15, the troops of the Central Front launched a counteroffensive. Their first task was to reach the positions that they occupied before the start of the Battle of Kursk. It was possible to achieve the set goal within three days, however, even in this sector, the formations of the 9th Army of the Model retreated systematically, from one defensive line to another. The Soviet tank corps, which delivered the main blows, lost more than 150 combat vehicles here.

The next target of the offensive of the Central Front was the settlement of Kromy. Unfortunately, the pace of advancement of the Soviet troops in this case also left much to be desired. This was largely due to the fact that the Central Front ran into a well-prepared defense. Slow progress inevitably led to an increase in losses. Kromy was liberated on August 6th.

After that, Rokossovsky, using Rybalko's 3rd Panzer Army transferred to him, tried to prevent the continued systematic withdrawal of German troops to the Hagen defensive position prepared in advance, but this was not achieved. Moreover, the losses of the 3rd Panzer Army turned out to be so significant that it had to be withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters for subsequent restoration.

On August 18, the Nazis fortified themselves in the Hagen position. The counteroffensive of the troops of the Central, Bryansk and Western Fronts was completed. It cannot be called a failure, however, it was not possible to achieve all the goals set by the Red Army here.

The troops of the Voronezh Front, repelling the German offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge, suffered significant losses. Steppe District, turned into the Steppe Front under the command of I.S. Konev, also significantly weakened during defensive battles. Therefore, the counteroffensive against Army Group South in the first days after the termination of Operation Citadel was reduced to the systematic displacement of German troops to their original positions. The persecution of the retreating, in essence, was not organized.

This state of affairs did not suit the Headquarters. Stalin insisted on the immediate transition of Vatutin and Konev to the general offensive, but the commander-in-chief was eventually convinced that haste in this case would only lead to unnecessary losses. Excessive slowness, however, could also be the cause of failure, since the enemy had already begun to repair their wrecked tanks, trying to restore the combat capability of their bloodless mobile formations.

The plan for the Soviet counter-offensive against Army Group South was developed starting on July 22. Of course, Vatutin had previously had ideas about how to conduct this operation, but after heavy defensive battles, the situation changed significantly. It would not have been possible to carry out the large-scale encirclement of German troops in the Kharkov region, conceived by the command of the Voronezh Front, without a long and complex regrouping of tank units - this was the only way to create powerful “fists” on the flanks.

In order not to lose time and go on the offensive already in the first days of August, it was decided to deliver the main blow directly from the position occupied by the main forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts. It was supposed to go around Kharkov from the west and meet with the troops of the Southwestern Front, who were supposed to carry out an offensive with the forces of the 57th Army. Such a decision made it possible to save a lot of time on the preparation of the operation, which was called "Commander Rumyantsev".

The offensive began in the early morning of August 3rd. Exactly at 5 o'clock, a short but powerful fire raid on German fortifications was made, and then, after a half-hour pause, the main phase of artillery preparation began, which lasted almost three hours. At the same time, Soviet troops began to advance towards the advanced positions of the enemy even before the artillery pieces and mortars fell silent. This type of offensive (“behind the barrage”) made it possible to break through the defenses with minimal own losses.

At 1 p.m. on August 3, two Soviet tank armies (the 5th Guards and the 1st) entered the battle. They helped rifle formations complete the tactical defense breakthrough. At the same time, the 5th Guards Tank Army, which received replenishment after heavy losses, managed to advance 25 kilometers deep into the German positions.

The offensive of the Steppe Front was not so successful at first, but the active use of aviation, and then the entry into battle of the 1st mechanized corps, made it possible to break the resistance of the Germans. The advance in this section reached approximately eight kilometers in depth.

It should be noted that for all the success of the actions of the Soviet troops, the pace of the offensive still lagged far behind those that were envisaged by the operation plan. On August 4, the situation became somewhat more complicated: firstly, the activity of German aviation increased sharply, and secondly, well-fortified strongholds of the German defense turned out to be in front of the attackers. As a result, the 5th Guards Tank Army was able to advance only 10 kilometers, and the 1st - 20.

The most significant event of the third day of the operation was the liberation of Belgorod by the forces of the Steppe Front. For this, on the eve of I.S. Konev sent the 53rd Army around the heavily fortified city. Two other armies took part directly in the battles for Belgorod - the 7th Guards and the 69th. They managed to knock out the enemy from all the fortifications by six o'clock in the evening on August 5th.

At the same time, the pace of advance of the two tank armies of the Voronezh Front slowed down. The offensive of the 5th Guards Tank Army was especially slow. Vatutin even threatened its commander, Rotmistrov, with a military court. The 40th and 27th armies operated more successfully, breaking through the German defenses on a wide front and moving forward 20 kilometers. As a result, the enemy was forced to hastily withdraw his formations from heavily fortified positions in the Tomarovka area.

Reacting to the current situation, the German command sent its reserves to the scene of events - the 3rd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, and three SS divisions (Viking, Das Reich and Dead Head). Already on August 6, Rotmistrov's army, trying to capture the city of Zolochev, collided with part of these forces. As a result, the battles for Zolochev lasted until August 9th. The losses of the 5th Guards Tank Army by this time had increased so much that it had to be withdrawn from the battle. In just three days, Rostmistrov's tankers lost at least 167 combat vehicles (including self-propelled guns).

On August 6, the same day that the fighting with German mobile reserves began, the 27th and 5th Guards armies of the Steppe Front managed to surround a small grouping of enemy troops in the Borisovka area. Unfortunately, the "ring" was not strong enough, and a significant part of the Germans managed to break through - only 450 people were captured. More important was the capture of enemy repair shops in this settlement. As a result, the Soviet troops got a lot of damaged German tanks. There were 75 Panthers alone here.

Meanwhile, the 1st Panzer Army of the Voronezh Front continued its successful advance. On the evening of August 7, Katukov's fighters managed to free Bogodukhov, where the German rear units were located, who were unable to organize resistance. The next day, Soviet tankers encountered the SS division Das Reich, which arrived in time, which led to a decrease in the pace of the offensive. Part of the forces of the 1st Panzer Army was forced to go on the defensive.

It should be noted that at this stage of the operation, the main goal of Katukov was the railway leading from Poltava to Kharkov.

By cutting this highway, it was possible to speed up the liberation of Kharkov. Unfortunately, by this time the German command had managed to assemble its battle-worn units into a single and rather impressive force, which managed to prevent the advance of the troops of the Voronezh Front.

At first, the Nazis limited themselves to private counterattacks, which, nevertheless, brought a lot of trouble to the 1st Panzer Army and did not allow it to gain a foothold at the Kovyagi station captured on August 11th. On August 12, after the German grouping was reinforced by a relatively fresh SS Viking division, a much larger counterattack took place.

The units of the 97th and 13th Guards Rifle Divisions that were in the way of the German tanks were immediately thrown back, after which the Das Reich and the Dead Head collided with the 5th Guards Tank Army, returned from the reserve and located near Bogodukhov . During the ensuing battles, the Tigers once again demonstrated their superiority over the T-34, destroying Soviet combat vehicles at long distances. It was possible to restrain the advance of German heavy tanks and somewhat reduce the overall tension of the situation thanks to the active actions of anti-tank artillery regiments.

All these events forced Konev and Vatutin to order the transition of their most advanced units to the defense on the occupied lines. The Germans, in turn, changed the direction of their counterattack, redirecting their heavy tanks to Vysokopolye. Having surrounded this settlement, the SS men blocked part of the forces of the 6th Panzer Corps in it. On August 16, the city was abandoned by the Soviet troops, who managed to break out of the ring.

The next counterattack was delivered by German tank formations from the Akhtyrka area along the weakly covered flank of the 27th Army, which was advancing towards Poltava. It happened on August 18th. If successful, this maneuver could lead to the encirclement of two Soviet tank corps and two rifle divisions. Unfortunately, on August 20, the ring really closed. Even a successful breakthrough of the flank positions of the German grouping by the forces of the 47th Army did not stop this counterattack.

Still, the SS divisions failed to create a solid encirclement front. The active actions of the 1st Panzer Army made it possible for the blockaded Soviet troops to break out of the cauldron. Nevertheless, the 4th and 5th Guards Tank Corps suffered heavy and unjustified losses.

On August 12, the Steppe Front managed to reach the outskirts of Kharkov, but the developed system of defensive structures on the outer contours of the city prevented further advancement. On August 18, Konev's troops launched an offensive on the flanks, bypassing Kharkov from the southeast and west. Two days later, Zhukov gave the order to use part of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army to liberate the city of Korotich, located on the railroad connecting Kharkov and Poltava. This task was completed on the evening of August 22. The next day, the Das Reich division launched a counterattack and recaptured Korotich, having managed to encircle part of the Soviet troops in this settlement.

Subsequently, evaluating the results of the battles for Korotich, the commander of the 11th Panzer Corps, Erhard Raus, claimed that his subordinates were able to destroy 420 Soviet tanks - about 10 times more than Rotmistrov had at his disposal in this sector. The scope of the fantasy of the German military leaders, therefore, turned out to be very impressive.

Having re-captured Korotich, the SS managed to ensure the evacuation of a significant part of the forces that were still defending Kharkov. The withdrawal of troops began on August 22, and the next day, without giving the enemy the opportunity to complete an organized retreat, the Red Army broke into the city. By noon, the first capital of Soviet Ukraine was completely cleared of invaders. August 23 was the date of the final end of the Battle of Kursk. And although not all the plans of the Soviet command had been realized by that moment, the overall success was obvious - the Red Army not only thwarted the general summer offensive of the Wehrmacht, but also successfully liberated a significant part of the country's territory from the enemy, defeating the most powerful German formations.

Losses at the end of battles

The Battle of Kursk was one of the fiercest battles of World War II. It is not so easy to assess the losses of the parties even today. Thanks to the opening of the archives, a table was compiled reflecting the losses suffered by the Soviet troops. It looks like this:

In just 50 days of fighting, Soviet troops lost 6,064 tanks, 5,244 pieces of artillery and 1,626 aircraft.

It is much more difficult to reliably estimate the losses of the Wehrmacht and SS formations. This is due both to the peculiarities of German statistics and to the strong influence of the “propaganda factor”. In the post-war period, a number of "researchers" made a lot of efforts in order to underestimate the losses of the Nazis. It came to allegations that during the entire time of the Battle of Kursk only two German tanks were irretrievably lost. It is not clear, however, what then forced the Wehrmacht to retreat.

According to the Soviet official version, the total losses of German troops during the Battle of Kursk amounted to at least half a million people. At the same time, however, it was not indicated how many of them were killed, captured and wounded. It was also claimed that from July 5 to September 5, 1943, at least 420 thousand German soldiers and officers died on the Soviet-German front - this, apparently, is the maximum estimate.

The situation is much more complicated by the fact that each of the Western researchers sets the time frame for the Battle of Kursk at their own discretion. This allows for arbitrarily wide data manipulation.

In general, we can agree that the losses of the Red Army turned out to be much more severe. Most of them fell on the period of the counteroffensive, which indicates a number of miscalculations of the command, both at the operational and tactical levels - after all, there was quite enough time to plan operations. The most unsuccessful were offensive actions within the framework of Operation Kutuzov.

The temporary technical superiority of German tanks also had an effect - both the latest Panthers and Tigers, and the modernized Fours. However, with the loss of Wehrmacht equipment, much also remains unclear. For example, in the very first days of the counteroffensive, Rokossovsky's troops captured more than three hundred damaged German tanks, but these losses are not reflected in the documents of the Wehrmacht.

It remains to be hoped that in the future historians and researchers will become more objective, and the topic of the ratio of losses in the Battle of Kursk will cease to be the subject of near-political speculation.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk

The main result of the fierce fighting on the central sector of the Soviet-German front in July and August 1943 was the final loss of strategic initiative by the Wehrmacht. From now on, the lot of the German command was the reaction to certain actions of the Red Army. In other words, the complete defeat of the enemy was now only a matter of time. These events in Soviet textbooks were rightly called "radical turning point".

The most militant German generals, such as Manstein, still continued to dream of inflicting "unacceptable damage" on the USSR and achieving a "draw" result of the war, but their more sensible colleagues (for example, Guderian) already foresaw the final outcome.

At the same time, the failure of Operation Citadel and the subsequent Soviet counter-offensive allowed the Red Army to prevent the establishment of a solid German defense on the right bank of the Dnieper. The Wehrmacht simply did not have time to take up the existing defensive positions, which made it possible in the autumn of 1943 to liberate a significant part of Ukraine, including Kyiv.

The Soviet tank troops that fought on the Kursk salient, at the cost of heavy losses, gained vast experience and already in 1944 turned into a truly crushing force, which was already impossible to stop. Of course, this also brought victory closer and in many respects laid the foundation for the post-war power of the Soviet Army, not the Red Army.

Thus, the Battle of Kursk is rightfully considered one of the main events of the Great Patriotic War, and the Second World War as a whole. The strategic importance of the struggle on the "arc of fire" in the West is often underestimated, which is quite understandable, because history is also a battlefield. However, the efforts of propagandists often backfire. Most likely, in the future, when the events of the 20th century will be considered more objectively, the Battle of Kursk will take its rightful place not only in Russian, but also in foreign history textbooks.

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In July 1943, the German army launched Operation Citadel, a massive offensive on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge on the Eastern Front. But the Red Army was well prepared to crush the advancing German tanks at some point with thousands of Soviet T-34 tanks.

CHRONICLE OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK July 5-12

July 5 - 04:30 the Germans launch an artillery strike - this marked the beginning of the battle on the Kursk Bulge.

July 6 - over 2,000 tanks from both sides participated in the battle near the villages of Soborovka and Ponyri. German tanks were unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops.

July 10 - Model's 9th Army was unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops on the northern face of the arc and went on the defensive.

July 12 - Soviet tanks hold back the blow of German tanks in a grandiose battle near Prokhorovka.

Background. Decisive bet

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In the summer of 1943, Hitler sent the entire military might of Germany to the Eastern Front in order to achieve a decisive victory on the Kursk salient.

After the surrender of German troops in Stalingrad in February 1943, it seemed that the entire southern flank of the Wehrmacht should collapse. However, the Germans miraculously managed to hold on. They won the battle of Kharkov and stabilized the front line. With the beginning of the spring thaw, the Eastern Front froze, stretching from the suburbs of Leningrad in the north to the west of Rostov on the Black Sea.

In the spring, both sides summed up the results. The Soviet leadership wanted to resume the offensive. In the German command, in connection with the realization of the impossibility of making up for the horrendous losses of the last two years, an opinion arose about the transition to strategic defense. In the spring, only 600 vehicles remained in the German tank forces. The shortage of the German army as a whole was 700,000 people.

Hitler entrusted the revival of the tank units to Heinz Guderian, appointing him chief inspector of the armored forces. Guderian, one of the creators of the lightning victories at the beginning of the war in 1939-1941, did his best to increase the number and quality of tanks, and also helped to adopt new types of vehicles, such as the Pz.V "Panther".

Supply issues

The German command was in a difficult position. During 1943, Soviet power could only increase. The quality of Soviet troops and equipment also improved rapidly. Even for the transition of the German army to the defense of the reserves, there were clearly not enough. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that, given the superiority of the Germans in the ability to conduct a maneuver war, the problem would be solved by "elastic defense" with "delivering powerful local strikes of a limited nature to the enemy, gradually undermining his power to a decisive level."

Hitler tried to solve two problems. At first, he sought to achieve success in the East in order to encourage Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Axis. Secondly, the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa meant that the Allies would invade southern Europe in the summer. This will further weaken the Wehrmacht in the east due to the need to regroup troops to deal with the new threat. The result of all this was the decision of the German command to launch an offensive on the Kursk Bulge - the so-called ledge in the front line, which had 100 km across at its base. In the operation, which received the code designation "Citadel", the German tank armadas were to advance from the north and south. A victory would have thwarted the Red Army's plans for a summer offensive and shortened the front line.

The plans of the German command revealed

The German plans for the offensive on the Kursk Bulge became known to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command from the Soviet resident "Lucy" in Switzerland and from British codebreakers. At a meeting on April 12, 1943, Marshal Zhukov convincingly objected that instead of launching a preemptive offensive by the Soviet troops, “it would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping ". Stalin agreed. The Red Army began to create a powerful defense system on the ledge.

The Germans were going to strike in late spring or early summer, but they failed to concentrate strike groups. It was not until 1 July that Hitler informed his commanders that Operation Citadel would have to begin on 5 July. A day later, Stalin learned from "Lutsi" that the blow would be delivered in the period from 3 to 6 July.

The Germans planned to cut the salient under its base with powerful simultaneous blows from the north and south. In the north, the 9th Army (Colonel-General Walter Model) from Army Group Center was to fight its way straight to Kursk and east to Maloarkhangelsk. This grouping included 15 infantry divisions and seven armored and motorized divisions. In the south, the 4th Panzer Army of General Herman Goth from Army Group South was to break through the Soviet defenses between Belgorod and Gertsovka, occupy the city of Oboyan, and then advance on Kursk to link up with the 9th Army. The Kempf army group was supposed to cover the flank of the 4th Panzer Army. The shock fist of Army Group South consisted of nine tank and motorized divisions and eight infantry divisions.

The northern face of the arc was defended by the Central Front of General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky. In the south, the German offensive was supposed to reflect the Voronezh Front of Army General Nikolai Vatutin. In the depths of the ledge, powerful reserves were concentrated as part of the Steppe Front, Colonel General Ivan Konev. A reliable anti-tank defense was created. Up to 2,000 anti-tank mines were laid on the most tank-prone areas for every kilometer of the front.

Opposing sides. Great Confrontation

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In the Battle of Kursk, the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht faced a reorganized and well-equipped Red Army. On July 5, Operation Citadel began - an experienced and battle-hardened German army went on the offensive. Its main striking force was the tank divisions. Their staff at that time of the war was 15,600 people and 150-200 tanks each. In fact, these divisions included an average of 73 tanks. However, three SS Panzer divisions (as well as the "Grossdeutschland" division) had 130 (or more) combat-ready tanks each. In total, the Germans had 2,700 tanks and assault guns.

Basically, tanks of the Pz.III and Pz.IV types participated in the Battle of Kursk. The command of the German troops had high hopes for the strike power of the new Tiger I and Panther tanks and the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. The Tigers performed well, but the Panthers showed some shortcomings, in particular, those associated with an unreliable transmission and running gear, as Heinz Guderian had warned.

The battle involved 1800 Luftwaffe aircraft, which were especially active at the beginning of the offensive. Squadrons of Ju 87 bombers carried out the classic massive dive bombing strikes for the last time in this war.

The Germans during the Battle of Kursk faced reliable Soviet defensive lines of great depth. They could not break through or bypass them. Therefore, the German troops had to create a new tactical grouping for a breakthrough. The tank wedge - "Panzerkeil" - was supposed to become a "can opener" for opening Soviet anti-tank defense units. The strike force was led by heavy tanks "Tiger I" and tank destroyers "Ferdinand" with powerful anti-shell armor that could withstand the hit of Soviet anti-tank defense shells. They were followed by lighter Panthers, Pz.IV and Pz.HI, dispersed along the front at intervals of up to 100 m between tanks. To ensure interaction in the offensive, each tank wedge constantly maintained radio contact with strike aircraft and field artillery.

Red Army

In 1943, the combat power of the Wehrmacht was declining. But the Red Army was rapidly turning into a new, more effective formation. The uniform with epaulettes and unit badges was re-introduced. Many famous units have earned the title of "Guards", as in the tsarist army. The main tank of the Red Army was the T-34. But already in 1942, the modified German Pz.IV tanks were able to compare with this tank according to their data. With the advent of the Tiger I tanks in the German army, it became clear that the armor and armament of the T-34 needed to be strengthened. The most powerful combat vehicle in the Battle of Kursk was the SU-152 tank destroyer, which entered the troops in limited quantities. This self-propelled artillery mount was armed with a 152-mm howitzer, which was very effective against enemy armored vehicles.

The Soviet army had powerful artillery, which largely determined its success. Fighter anti-tank artillery batteries included 152-mm and 203-mm howitzers. Also actively used rocket artillery combat vehicles - "Katyusha".

The Red Army Air Force was also strengthened. The Yak-9D and La-5FN fighters nullified the technical superiority of the Germans. The Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft also proved to be effective.

Victory Tactics

Although the German army had superiority in tank prowess at the start of the war, by 1943 the difference had become almost imperceptible. The courage of the Soviet tankers and the courage of the infantry in defense also nullified the experience and tactical advantages of the Germans. The Red Army soldiers became masters of defense. Marshal Zhukov realized that in the Battle of Kursk it was worth using this skill in all its splendor. His tactics were simple: form a deep and developed defensive system and force the Germans to get bogged down in the labyrinths of trenches in vain attempts to break through. With the help of the local population, Soviet troops dug thousands of kilometers of trenches, trenches, anti-tank ditches, densely laid minefields, erected barbed wire, prepared firing positions for artillery and mortars, etc.

Villages were fortified and up to 300,000 civilians, mostly women and children, were involved in the construction of defense lines. During the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht was hopelessly stuck in the defense of the Red Army.

				Red Army
	Groupings of the Red Army: Central Front - 711,575 people, 11,076 guns and mortars, 246 rocket artillery vehicles, 1,785 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,000 aircraft; Steppe Front - 573195 soldiers, 8510 guns and mortars, 1639 tanks and self-propelled guns and 700 aircraft; Voronezh Front - 625591 soldiers, 8718 guns and mortars, 272 rocket artillery vehicles, 1704 tanks and self-propelled guns and 900 aircraft.
	Commander-in-Chief: Stalin Representatives of the Headquarters of the Knrkhovny High Command during the Battle of Kursk, Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Vasilevsky
	central front Army General Rokossovsky 48th Army 13th Army 70th Army 65th Army 60th Army 2nd Panzer Army 16th Air Army				Steppe (Reserve) Front Colonel General Konev 5th Guards Army 5th Guards Tank Army 27th Army 47th Army 53rd Army 5th Air Army	Voronezh Front Army General Vatutin 38th Army 40th Army 1st Panzer Army 6th Guards Army 7th Guards Army 2nd Air Army
			german army
	Grouping of German troops: 685,000 people, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft.
	Army Group Center: Field Marshal von Kluge e 9th Army: Colonel General Model
	20th Army Corps General von Roman 45th Infantry Division 72nd Infantry Division 137th Infantry Division 251st Infantry Division 6th Air Fleet Colonel General Greim 1st Air Division	46th Tank Corps General Zorn 7th Infantry Division 31st Infantry Division 102nd Infantry Division 258th Infantry Division 41st Tank Corps General Harpe 18th Panzer Division 86th Infantry Division 292nd Infantry Division							47th Tank Corps General Lemelsen 2nd Panzer Division 6th Infantry Division 9th Panzer Division 20th Panzer Division 23rd Army Corps General Frissner 78th Assault Division 216th Infantry Division 383rd Infantry Division
	Army Group South: Field Marshal von Manstein 4th Panzer Army: Colonel General Goth Army Task Force Kempf: General Kempf
	11th Army Corps General Routh 106th Infantry Division 320th Infantry Division 42nd Army Corps General Mattenclott 39th Infantry Division 161st Infantry Division 282nd Infantry Division	3rd Tank Corps General Bright 6th Panzer Division 7th Panzer Division 19th Panzer Division 168th Infantry Division 48th Tank Corps General Knobelsdorff 3rd Panzer Division 11th Panzer Division 167th Infantry Division Panzer Grenadier Division "Greater Germany"							2nd SS Panzer Corps General Hausser 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" 52nd Army Corps General Ott 57th Infantry Division 255th Infantry Division 332nd Infantry Division 4th Air Fleet General Dessloh
	army group	Frame							Tank Corps
	Army	Division							Panzer division
	Airborne Brigade

First stage. Strike from the North

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The tanks and infantry of Model's 9th Army launched an offensive against Ponyri, but ran into powerful Soviet defensive lines. On the evening of July 4, on the northern face of the arc, Rokossovsky's troops captured a team of German sappers. During interrogation, they testified that the offensive would begin in the morning at 03:30.

Taking into account these data, Rokossovsky ordered counter-barrage preparations to begin at 02:20 in the areas of concentration of German troops. This delayed the start of the German offensive, but nevertheless, at 05:00, intensive shelling of the forward units of the Red Army began.

The German infantry with great difficulty advanced through densely fired terrain, suffering serious losses from high-density anti-personnel mines. By the end of the first day, for example, two divisions, which were the main striking force of the grouping on the right flank of the German troops - the 258th Infantry, which had the task of breaking through along the Orel Kursk highway, and the 7th Infantry - were forced to lie down and dig in.

The advancing German tanks achieved more significant success. During the first day of the offensive, the 20th Panzer Division, at the cost of heavy losses, wedged in some places 6-8 km deep into the defense zone, occupying the village of Bobrik. On the night of July 5-6, Rokossovsky, having assessed the situation, calculated where the Germans would attack the next day, and quickly regrouped the units. Soviet sappers laid mines. The town of Maloarkhangelsk became the main center of defense.

On July 6, the Germans tried to capture the village of Ponyri, as well as Hill 274 near the village of Olkhovatka. But the Soviet command at the end of June appreciated the significance of this position. Therefore, Model's 9th Army stumbled upon the most fortified defense sector.

On July 6, German troops went on the offensive with Tiger I tanks in the forefront, but they had to not only break through the defensive lines of the Red Army, but also beat off counterattacks by Soviet tanks. On July 6, 1000 German tanks launched an attack on a 10 km front between the villages of Ponyri and Soborovka and suffered serious losses on the prepared defense lines. The infantry let the tanks pass and then set them on fire by throwing Molotov cocktails on the engine blinds. The dug-in T-34 tanks fired from short distances. The German infantry advanced with significant losses - the entire area was intensively fired upon by machine guns and artillery. Although the Soviet tanks suffered damage from the fire of the powerful 88-mm guns of the Tiger tanks, the German losses were very heavy.

The German troops were stopped not only in the center, but also on the left flank, where reinforcements arrived in time in Maloarkhangelsk strengthened the defense.

The Wehrmacht was never able to overcome the resistance of the Red Army and crush Rokossovsky's troops. The Germans only penetrated to a shallow depth, but every time Model thought he had succeeded in breaking through, the Soviet troops withdrew, and the enemy ran into a new line of defense. Already on July 9, Zhukov gave a secret order to the northern grouping of troops to prepare for a counteroffensive.

Especially strong battles were fought for the village of Ponyri. As in Stalingrad, although not on such a scale, desperate battles flared up for the most important positions - the school, the water tower and the machine and tractor station. During fierce battles, they repeatedly passed from hand to hand. On July 9, the Germans threw Ferdinand assault guns into battle, but the resistance of the Soviet troops could not be broken.

Although the Germans still captured most of the village of Ponyri, they suffered serious losses: more than 400 tanks and up to 20,000 soldiers. The model managed to penetrate 15 km deep into the defensive lines of the Red Army. On July 10, Model threw his last reserves into a decisive assault on the heights at Olkhovatka, but failed.

The next strike was scheduled for July 11, but by that time the Germans had new reasons for concern. Soviet troops undertook reconnaissance in force in the northern sector, which was the beginning of Zhukov's counteroffensive against Orel in the rear of the 9th Army. Model had to withdraw tank units to deal with this new threat. Already by noon, Rokossovsky could report to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command that the 9th Army was reliably withdrawing its tanks from the battle. The battle on the northern face of the arc was won.

Map-scheme of the battle for the village of Ponyri

July 5-12, 1943. View from the southeast

Developments

1. On July 5, the German 292nd Infantry Division attacks the northern part of the village and the embankment.
2. This division is supported by the 86th and 78th Infantry Divisions, which attacked the Soviet positions in the village itself and near it.
3. On July 7, reinforced units of the 9th and 18th Panzer Divisions attack Ponyri, but run into Soviet minefields, artillery fire and dug-in tanks. Il-2 M-3 attack aircraft attack advancing tanks from the air.
4. Fierce hand-to-hand fights boil in the village itself. Especially hot battles took place at the water tower, school, machine and tractor and railway stations. German and Soviet troops struggled to capture these key points of defense. Because of these battles, Ponyri began to be called "Kursk Stalingrad".
5. On July 9, the 508th German Grenadier Regiment, supported by several Ferdinand self-propelled guns, finally occupies Hill 253.3.
6. Although by the evening of July 9, the German troops advanced, but at the cost of very heavy losses.
7. To complete the breakthrough in this area, Model on the night of July 10-11 throws his last reserve, the 10th Panzer Division, to assault. By this time, the 292nd Infantry Division was drained of blood. Although the Germans occupied most of the village of Ponyri on July 12, they did not manage to completely break through the Soviet defenses.

Second phase. Strike from the south

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Army Group "South" was the most powerful formation of German troops during the Battle of Kursk. Her offensive became a serious test for the Red Army. It was relatively easy to stop the advance of Model's 9th Army from the north for a number of reasons. The Soviet command expected that the Germans would strike a decisive blow in this direction. Therefore, a more powerful grouping was created on the Rokossovsky front. However, the Germans concentrated their best troops on the southern face of the arc. Vatutin's Voronezh Front had fewer tanks. Due to the greater length of the front, it was not possible to create a defense with a sufficiently high density of troops here. Already at the initial stage, the German advanced units were able to quickly break through the Soviet defenses in the south.

Vatutin became aware of the exact date of the start of the German offensive, as well as in the north, on the evening of July 4, and he was able to organize counter-barrage preparations for the German strike forces. The Germans began shelling at 03:30. In their reports, they indicated that more shells were used in this artillery preparation than in general during the entire period of the war with Poland and France in 1939 and 1940.

The main force on the left flank of the German strike force was the 48th Panzer Corps. His first task was to break through the Soviet defense line and reach the Pena River. This corps had 535 tanks and 66 assault guns. The 48th Corps was able to occupy the village of Cherkasskoe only after fierce fighting, which greatly undermined the power of this formation.

2nd SS Panzer Corps

In the center of the German grouping, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of Paul Hausser was advancing (390 tanks and 104 assault guns, including 42 Tiger tanks out of 102 vehicles of this type in the South Army Group). This corps was also able to advance into the first day thanks to good cooperation with aviation. But on the right flank of the German troops, the Kempf army task force was hopelessly stuck not far from the crossings across the Donets River.

These first offensive actions of the German army disturbed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The Voronezh Front was reinforced with infantry and tanks.

Despite this, the next day the German SS Panzer divisions developed success. The powerful 100-mm frontal armor and 88-mm guns of the advancing Tiger 1 tanks made them almost invulnerable to the fire of Soviet guns and tanks. By the evening of July 6, the Germans broke through another Soviet defense line.

Resilience of the Red Army

However, the failure of Task Force Kempf on the right flank meant that II SS Panzer Corps would have to cover its right flank with its own established units, hindering the offensive. On July 7, the actions of German tanks were greatly hampered by massive raids by the Soviet Air Force. Nevertheless, on July 8 it seemed that the 48th Panzer Corps would be able to break through to Oboyan and attack the flanks of the Soviet defense. On that day, the Germans occupied Syrtsovo, despite the stubborn counterattacks of the Soviet tank units. The T-34s were met with dense fire from the Tiger tanks of the elite Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland" (104 tanks and 35 assault guns). Both sides suffered heavy losses.

During July 10, the 48th Panzer Corps continued to attack Oboyan, but by this time the German command decided only to simulate an attack in this direction. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was ordered to attack the Soviet tank units in the Prokhorovka area. By winning this battle, the Germans would be able to break through the defenses and enter the Soviet rear into operational space. Prokhorovka was to become the site of a tank battle that would decide the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk.

Map-scheme of the defense of Cherkassky

Impact of the 48th tank corps on July 5, 1943 - view from the south

Developments:

1. On the night of July 4-5, German sappers clear passages in Soviet minefields.
2. At 04:00, the Germans begin artillery preparation along the entire front of the 4th Panzer Army.
3. The new Panther tanks of the 10th Tank Brigade launch an offensive supported by the Fusilier Regiment of the Grossdeutschland Division. But almost immediately they stumble upon Soviet minefields. The infantry suffered heavy losses, the battle formations were mixed up, and the tanks stopped under the concentrated heavy fire of Soviet anti-tank and field artillery. Sappers came forward to remove the mines. Thus, the entire left flank of the offensive of the 48th Panzer Corps stood up. The Panthers were then deployed to support the main body of the Grossdeutschland division.
4. The offensive of the main forces of the division "Grossdeutschland" began at 05:00. At the head of the strike force, a company of Tiger tanks of this division, supported by Pz.IV, Panther tanks and assault guns, broke through the Soviet defense line in front of the village of Cherkasskoye. In fierce battles, this area was occupied by battalions of the grenadier regiment; by 09:15 the Germans reached the village.
5. To the right of the "Grossdeutschland" division, the 11th Panzer Division breaks through the Soviet line of defense.
6. Soviet troops put up stubborn resistance - the area in front of the village is filled with wrecked German tanks and anti-tank guns; A group of armored vehicles was withdrawn from the 11th Panzer Division to attack the eastern flank of the Soviet defense.
7. Lieutenant General Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army, reinforces the 67th Guards Rifle Division with two regiments of anti-tank guns to repel the German offensive. It did not help. By noon the Germans broke into the village. The Soviet troops were forced to retreat.
8. Powerful defense and the resistance of the Soviet troops stop the 11th Panzer Division in front of the bridge on the Psyol River, which they planned to capture on the first day of the offensive.

Third stage. Battle of Prokhovka

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On July 12, German and Soviet tanks collided in the battle near Prokhorovka, which decided the fate of the entire Battle of Kursk. On July 11, the German offensive on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge reached its climax. Three significant events took place that day. First, in the west, the 48th Panzer Corps reached the Pena River and prepared for a further advance to the west. In this direction, defensive lines remained through which the Germans still had to break through. Soviet troops constantly went over to counterattacks, restricting the freedom of action of the Germans. Since the German troops now had to advance further east, to Prokhorovka, the advance of the 48th Panzer Corps was suspended.

Also on 11 July, Army Task Force Kempf, on the extreme right flank of the German advance, finally began to move north. She broke through the defenses of the Red Army between Melehovo and the Sazhnoye station. Three tank divisions of the Kempf group could advance towards Prokhorovka. 300 units of German armored vehicles went to support an even larger group of 600 tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, approaching this city from the west. The Soviet command was preparing to meet their rapid advance to the east with an organized counterattack. This German maneuver was dangerous for the entire defense system of the Soviet army, and forces were drawn to this area to prepare for a decisive battle with a powerful German armored group.

July 12 - decisive day

Throughout the short summer night, Soviet and German tankers prepared their vehicles for the battle that was to take place the next day. Long before dawn, the rumble of tank engines warming up was heard in the night. Soon their deep rumble filled the whole neighborhood.

The SS Panzer Corps was opposed by Lieutenant General Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army (Steppe Front) with attached and supporting units. From his command post southwest of Prokhorovka, Rotmistrov observed the positions of the Soviet troops, which at that moment were bombarded by German aircraft. Three SS panzer divisions then went on the offensive: Totenkopf, Leibstandarte and Das Reich, with Tiger tanks in the forefront. At 08:30, Soviet artillery opened fire on the German troops. Following this, Soviet tanks entered the battle. Of the 900 Red Army tanks, only 500 were T-34s. They attacked the German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther" at maximum speeds in order to prevent the enemy from using the superiority of the guns and armor of his tanks at a long distance. As they got closer, the Soviet tanks were able to hit the German vehicles by firing at the weaker side armor.

The Soviet tanker recalled that first battle: “The sun helped us. It well illuminated the contours of German tanks and blinded the eyes of the enemy. The first echelon of attacking tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army crashed into the battle formations of the Nazi troops at full speed. The through tank attack was so swift that the front ranks of our tanks penetrated the entire formation, the entire battle formation of the enemy. The battle formations were mixed up. The appearance of such a large number of our tanks on the battlefield came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Management in its advanced units and subunits soon broke down. The German fascist Tiger tanks, deprived of the advantage of their armament in close combat, were successfully shot by our T-34 tanks from short distances, and especially when they hit the side. In essence, it was a tank melee. Russian tankers went to ram. Tanks flared up like candles, falling under direct shots, shattered into pieces from the explosion of ammunition, towers flew off.

Thick black oily smoke swirled over the entire battlefield. The Soviet troops failed to break through the German battle formations, but the Germans were not able to achieve success in the offensive either. This situation continued throughout the first half of the day. The attack of the divisions "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich" began successfully, but Rotmistrov brought in his last reserves and stopped them, albeit at the cost of sensitive losses. The Leibstandarte division, for example, reported having destroyed 192 Soviet tanks and 19 anti-tank guns, losing only 30 of their tanks. By evening, the 5th Guards Tank Army had lost up to 50 percent of its combat vehicles, but the Germans had also suffered losses in the amount of about 300 of the 600 tanks and assault guns that went on the attack in the morning.

Defeat of the German army

This colossal tank battle could have been won by the Germans if the 3rd Panzer Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) had come to the rescue from the south, but it did not succeed. The units of the Red Army that opposed him skillfully and staunchly defended themselves, so that the Kempf army group did not manage to break through to Rotmistrov’s positions until the evening.

From July 13 to July 15, the German units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel.

Map-scheme of the tank battle near Prokhorovka

The impact of the Hausser tanks on the morning of July 12, 1943, view from the southeast.

Developments:

1. Even before 08:30, Luftwaffe aircraft begin an intensive bombardment of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka. The 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" advance in a tight wedge with Tiger tanks at the head and lighter Pz.III and IV on the flanks.
2. At the same time, the first groups of Soviet tanks come out of camouflaged shelters and rush to the advancing enemy. Soviet tanks crash into the center of the German armored armada at high speed, thereby reducing the advantage of the Tigers' long-range guns.
3. The clash of armored "fists" turns into a fierce and chaotic battle, which broke up into many local actions and individual tank battles at a very close distance (the fire was fired almost at close range). Soviet tanks tend to cover the flanks of the heavier German vehicles, while the "Tigers" fire from a place. All day long, and even into the advancing twilight, the fierce battle continues.
4. Shortly before noon, two Soviet corps strike at the Totenkopf division. The Germans are forced to go on the defensive. In a fierce battle that lasted all day on July 12, this division suffers heavy losses in men and military equipment.
5. All day long the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" has been fighting very hard battles with the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Soviet tanks steadfastly hold back the advance of the German division. By the end of the day, the battle continues even after dark. The Soviet command presumably estimates the losses of both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka at 700 vehicles.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

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The result of the victory in the Battle of Kursk was the transfer of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. The outcome of the Battle of Kursk was influenced, among other things, by the fact that, a thousand kilometers to the west, the Allies carried out a landing in Sicily (Operation Husky). For the German command, this meant the need to withdraw troops from the Eastern Front. The results of the German general offensive near Kursk were deplorable. The courage and steadfastness of the Soviet troops, as well as selfless work in the construction of the most powerful field fortifications ever created, stopped the Wehrmacht's elite tank divisions.

As soon as the German offensive bogged down, the Red Army prepared its offensive. It started in the north. Having stopped Model's 9th Army, the Soviet troops immediately went over to the offensive on the Oryol ledge, which went deep into the Soviet front. It began on July 12 and became the main reason for the refusal of the Model on the northern front to continue the advance, which could affect the course of the battle near Prokhorovka. The model itself had to fight desperate defensive battles. The Soviet offensive on the Oryol ledge (Operation Kutuzov) failed to divert significant Wehrmacht forces, but the German troops suffered heavy losses. By mid-August, they retreated to the prepared line of defense (the Hagen line). In the battles since July 5, the Army Group Center lost up to 14 divisions, which have not yet been replenished.

On the southern front, the Red Army suffered serious losses, especially in the battle of Prokhorovka, but was able to pin down the German units that had penetrated the Kursk salient. On July 23, the Germans had to withdraw to the positions they occupied before the start of Operation Citadel. Now the Red Army was ready to liberate Kharkov and Belgorod. On August 3, Operation Rumyantsev began, and by August 22, the Germans were driven out of Kharkov. By September 15, von Manstein's Army Group South had withdrawn to the western bank of the Dnieper.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk are estimated differently. This is due to a number of reasons. For example, the defensive battles near Kursk from July 5 to 14 smoothly flowed into the phase of the Soviet counteroffensive. While Army Group South was still attempting to continue its offensive at Prokhorovka on 13 and 14 July, the Soviet offensive had already begun against Army Group Center in Operation Kutuzov, which is often considered separate from the Battle of Kursk. The German reports, hastily compiled during intense fighting and then rewritten retroactively, are extremely inaccurate and incomplete, while the advancing Red Army had no time to count their losses after the battle. The enormous significance that these data had from the point of view of propaganda on both sides also had an effect.

According to some studies, for example, by Colonel David Glantz, from July 5 to 20, the 9th Army of the Army Group Center lost 20,720 people, the formations of the Army Group South - 29,102 people. In total - 49 822 people. The losses of the Red Army, according to rather controversial data, which are used by Western analysts, for some reason turned out to be more than three times higher: 177,847 people. Of these, 33,897 people lost the Central Front and 73,892 people - the Voronezh Front. Another 70,058 people were the losses of the Steppe Front, which acted as the main reserve.

Losses of armored vehicles are also difficult to estimate. Often wrecked tanks were repaired or restored on the same or the next day, even under enemy fire. Taking into account the empirical law, which states that up to 20 percent of damaged tanks are usually completely written off, in the Battle of Kursk, German tank formations lost 1612 vehicles damaged, of which 323 units were irretrievable. The losses of Soviet tanks are estimated at 1600 vehicles. This is due to the fact that the Germans have more powerful tank guns.

During Operation Citadel, the Germans lost up to 150 aircraft, and up to 400 aircraft were lost during the ensuing offensive. The Red Army Air Force lost over 1,100 aircraft.

The Battle of Kursk was the turning point of the war on the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht was no longer able to conduct general offensives. The defeat of Germany was only a matter of time. That is why, since July 1943, many strategically minded German military leaders realized that the war was lost.