An outstanding Russian commander during the Northern War, diplomat, the first Russian Field Marshal (1701). In 1706 he was also the first to be elevated to count Russian Empire dignity.
In the people's memory, Sheremetev remained one of the main heroes of that era.
Soldiers' songs, where he appears exclusively as a positive character, can serve as evidence.

Battles and victories

One of the creators of the Russian fleet, an associate of Peter I, Admiral General, the first president of the Admiralty College.
On land, Apraksin defended St. Petersburg from the Swedish army, which the Swedes were going to raze to the ground, and at sea inflicted a decisive defeat on them in the skerries at Gangut.

Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin belonged to an old boyar family. His sister Marfa Matveevna married the tsar's elder (half-brother) Fyodor Alekseevich (1676-1682). Thus, he was the uncle of the future Russian emperor. He began his service as a steward at the court of Peter I in 1683. He was enrolled in the amusing Semyonovsky regiment, participated in all the activities of the young tsar, including the construction of an amusing flotilla on Lake Pereyaslavsky. Accompanied Peter on his first trip to Arkhangelsk in 1692.

Battles and victories

Russian military leader of Swedish origin, native of Holstein, one of the outstanding associates of Peter the Great, hero of Poltava, cavalry general (1717)
In the Battle of Lesnaya, he was seriously wounded: a Swedish bullet entered his mouth and exited through his neck from the back of his head. But already in the Poltava battle, Bour commanded the right flank of the Russian cavalry!

Rodion Khristianovich Bour (Bauer, Baur) was born in the vicinity of the town of Husum (Gusum) in the duchy of Holstein-Gottorp, in northern Germany, into the family of a small estate nobleman. My military service began as a drabant (bodyguard) of the corps of life drabants of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. Bour then served the Austrian Emperor and Elector of Saxony for 15 years. In 1694 he entered the Swedish service with the rank of cornet. He served in Livonia in the Ingermanland recruited dragoon regiment of Otto Weling.

Battles and victories

"IBryus, and Bour, and Repnin ...". Prince Nikita (Anikita) Ivanovich - an associate of Peter I, the hero of Poltava.
Russian Field Marshal during the Great Northern War. He was responsible for the capture of Riga in 1710, was the governor of the Riga province from 1719 until his death.

The figure of this military commander and administrator always appears behind him during the consideration of various aspects of his reign. Among the "chicks of Petrov's nest" Prince Anikita Ivanovich Repnin occupies a special place. This is due to the fact that throughout the reign of Peter I, the prince more than once had to both distinguish himself and arouse the wrath of the sovereign.

Battles and victories

Russian statesman and military figure, engineer and scientist, count (1721), one of the closest associates of Peter I. Feldzeugmeister General (1711), Field Marshal General (1726), reformer of Russian artillery.
This mysterious man, even after his death, left many secrets. But his role in the key battles of the Petrine era is undeniable.

“Honest, most learned man,” was the description given to this associate by the British ambassador to the Russian court, Sir Charles Whitworth. Indeed, the figure of Yakov Vilimovich Bruce occupies a special place among the outstanding figures of the reign of Peter the Great.
The characteristics given to Bruce by the authors who wrote about him are often polar.

Russian commander, field marshal general, comrade-in-arms of Peter I, participant and hero of the Northern War. Perhaps the best Russian military leader of the Petrine era.
“The winners are not judged,” Peter said of him after Golitsyn disobeyed his order to retreat and took impregnable Noteburg. “I, as I began to serve, such fire and decent action from our soldiers have not heard or seen,” the king said about his other battle. ..Aza awarded the naval victory at Grengam with a sword studded with diamonds.

Peter the Great and his generals

While Peter I was on the throne, the Russian army fought almost continuously. In fact, all resources, financial, material and human, were focused on achieving the next military tasks. The army needed not only guns, cannons, ships, food and much more. The army needed good soldiers and good commanders.

Franz Yakovlevich Lefort. Engraving

In any case, no worse than the Swedish, French, Polish, Turkish and other armies.

At first, the tsar invited foreigners to Russian service, but the payment for the services of mercenaries cost the treasury a pretty penny.

Under Peter I, the formation of the Russian military school, Russian military art, and the traditions of the regular Russian army began.

Admiral F. A. Golovin. vintage portrait

One of the leading commanders of the Russian army during the Northern War was Boris Petrovich Sheremetev(1652-1719). A representative of an ancient and noble family at the age of 13 became a room attendant, and at 30 he received the rank of boyar. He began military service in Belgorod and Sevsk, where the troops under his leadership blocked the way for the Crimeans to the southern Russian districts. During the Azov campaigns (1695-1696), Sheremetev's troops operated in the lower reaches of the Dnieper.

Near Narva, Sheremetev, together with everyone else, drank the bitter cup of defeat. On a sad day on November 19, 1700, the Swedes beat the Russians in parts. During the retreat across the Narva River, more than a thousand people from the noble cavalry under the command of Sheremetev simply drowned, and the commander himself fled from the battlefield.

Charles XII believed that the Muscovites were finished, and he redeployed the main forces to Poland to fight the army of the Polish and Saxon king Augustus II. A “small war” began in the Baltic theater, in which the Russians gradually began to gain the upper hand. Already on December 27, 1701, a little over a year after the defeat near Narva, 17 thousand people under the command of Sheremetev unexpectedly attacked the Swedes who were celebrating Christmas. Half of Schlippenbach's 7,000th corps remained. In Moscow, bells rang for joy, cannons were fired, everyone was treated to wine, beer and honey. Swedish banners and standards were posted on the towers of the Kremlin. For the victory at Erestfer, B.P. Sheremetev received the rank of field marshal and the Order of St. Apostle Andrew the First-Called, which had just been established.

Other battles followed. In some (the capture of Noteburg on October 11, 1702, the fall of Nienschanz on April 22, 1703), Peter I himself took command of Sheremetev's troops.

B. P. Sheremetev

In 1706, Boris Petrovich crushed the uprising in Astrakhan, receiving two thousand peasant households from the tsar.

In 1707-1709. he participated in the strategic encirclement of Charles XII in the Ukraine. During the Battle of Poltava, Sheremetev was considered the commander-in-chief, and the tsar, in the event of his death, placed on him all responsibility for the outcome of the battle. In the list of those awarded for the Poltava victory, the name of Sheremetev was first. In 1708, Riga and the fortress of Dinamunde surrendered to Sheremetev. By the end of 1710, troops led by Sheremetev and Apraksin liberated the coast from Narva to Riga and the Karelian Isthmus from the Swedes. After the unsuccessful Prut campaign in the summer of 1711, the field marshal stood with the army in Ukraine. In 1714, Sheremetev's troops took part in a campaign in Pomerania to help the Danish and Polish troops.

The tsar often expressed dissatisfaction with the slowness of Sheremetev, called him the Kunktator. One of the Roman consuls Fabius Maximus received such a nickname (it can be translated from Latin as “delayer acting slowly”) during the war with Hannibal. He evaded the decisive battle in every possible way and was criticized in the Roman Senate. The cunctator was replaced by the resolute Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gaius Terentius Varro, who were determined to wage war decisively. As soon as the Romans decided to give the Carthaginians a decisive battle, they were defeated at the Battle of Cannae (216 BC). And the experienced Sheremetev strove to prepare thoroughly for any business, preferring calculation to luck.

His trophy after the capture of the city of Marienburg was Marta Skavronskaya. The washerwoman Sheremetev later became Menshikov's concubine and the legal wife of Peter I, the Russian Empress Catherine I.

The life of a military man is hard. The field marshal was ill and even asked the tsar to let him go to the monastery. But instead, Peter ordered him at the age of 50 to marry the widow of his uncle Lev Naryshkin, Anna Petrovna. The wife was young and beautiful. The marriage produced four children.

B.P. Sheremetev died on February 17, 1719 in Moscow, but he was buried only on April 10, 1719. And not in the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, where his son Mikhail was buried, but in the Alexander Nevsky Lavra at the behest of Peter. Field Marshal Sheremetev became one of the first figures of the new Russian pantheon. In 1800, he will rest here great Alexander Vasilievich Suvorov.

Prince H. V. Repnin

Destiny is indicative Nikita Ivanovich Repnin(1668-1726), a representative of the ancient princely Obolensky family. The son of a boyar and a butler, he entered the retinue in the rank of a sleeping bag young Peter. At the age of 17 he became a lieutenant of an amusing company. Participated in the Azov campaign and the suppression of the performances of archers.

In 1699-1700. he formed regiments of soldiers, served as governor of Novgorod, and was engaged in putting in order the fortifications of Novgorod, Pskov, Pechora and Gdov. The troops under the leadership of Repnin participated in the "small war" on the territory of Ingermanland and the Baltic states. Since 1705, Repnin's troops were based in Grodno, Kovno, Vilna.

In December 1707, Charles XII launched an offensive against Grodno and Novogrudok. Repnin was instructed to hold back the onslaught of the Swedish troops. The position taken on the Babich River was unsuccessful, and the troops were poorly prepared for battle. On the morning of July 3, 1708, the Swedes crossed the river, bypassed Repnin's troops, in which panic began. Losses: 100 killed, 600 wounded, 10 guns and various equipment. The Russian army had even worse failures, but the tsar became angry at the "irregularity" in the conduct of battle, at the "old custom", at "bezstroitsa, barbaric vile cry and Cossack customs." Repnin's regiments were included in different divisions, and he himself was demoted to the soldiers (instead of execution). "Golovchinskaya opportunity" almost crossed out the life of the general.

But Peter had not so many experienced military leaders. Already under Lesnaya (September 1708), Repnin commanded a regiment, in October - a division. During the Battle of Poltava for the command of infantry regiments, the prince received the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and lands with villages. In 1710, Repnin was the first to enter Riga and became governor-general here. Repnin's army did not reach Prut in 1711. In 1713 Repnin took Friedrichstadt and Stettin in Pomerania.

The representative of another noble princely family, descending from the Grand Duke of Lithuania Gediminas, was Mikhail Mikhailovich Golitsyn(1675-1730). He was 20 years younger than Sheremetev and was distinguished by his determination, initiative and personal courage.

For Misha Golitsyn, military service began at the age of 12, when he became a drummer in the Semyonovsky regiment among the “funny little girls”. In 1694 he was an ensign. A year later, for the courage shown in the first Azov campaign, he became a lieutenant. Participated in the battle with the archery regiments near the Novorusalimsky monastery.

Prince M. M. Golitsyn. Unknown artist of the 18th century.

In 1700, Golitsyn, in the rank of captain of the guard, was wounded through the leg near Narva. In 1701 he received the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel. During the assault on Noteburg on October 12, 1702, Peter ordered the assault columns to retreat. Then Golitsyn ordered the boats to be pushed away from the banks of the Neva, so that the soldiers would not think of retreating. And he answered the tsar’s messenger: “Tell the sovereign that now I do not belong to Peter, but to God.” After a thirteen-hour battle, Noteburg was taken. Prince Golitsyn received the rank of Colonel of the Life Guards, 300 souls of peasants and 3 thousand rubles. And he went down in history as a model of fearlessness!

The prince stormed Nyenschantz (1703), Narva (1704), Mitava (1705), participated in the defense of Grodno, became a major general (1706), defeated the Swedes near Dobry (August 1708). For participation in the Battle of Lesnaya (September 28, 1708), the brave Golitsyn received a royal portrait, showered with diamonds, the rank of lieutenant general and, interceding before the tsar for Repnin, who had recently been demoted to the soldiers, received another 800 peasant households. At the head of the guard, Golitsyn participated in the Battle of Poltava (1709), and in 1710 - in the capture of Vyborg.

Admiral General F. M. Apraksin. vintage portrait

In 1712-1713. Golitsyn was busy with the formation and supply of troops, was the right hand of Admiral General F. M. Apraksin. Together with other military leaders, he developed and implemented the rules of the marching service, the organization of camps, guard duty, sabotage, and the actions of the galley fleet.

In February 1714, at the head of 8,000 soldiers, he defeated the 8,000th corps of the Swedish general Armfeld near the village of Nappola near the city of Vaza. After skillful maneuvers and deadly Russian fire, more than 5 thousand Swedes and Finns fell in battle, more than 500 with banners and artillery were captured, the rest fled. The prince became general-in-chief. In July 1714, M. M. Golitsyn participated in the famous Gangut battle. On July 27, 1720, at the Battle of Grengam Island, he commanded a squadron of 61 galleys and 29 boats. With the help of military cunning, four frigates, 104 guns were captured, 37 officers and 500 sailors were taken prisoner. The winner received a sword and cane studded with diamonds.

On the territory of Finland, Prince Golitsyn resolutely suppressed the atrocities of the troops, did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Finns.

During Peter's campaign in Persia, Golitsyn remained on the appointment of the king for the chief commander in St. Petersburg, then commanded the Russian and Little Russian troops in Ukraine. Peter the Great called him "a direct son of the Fatherland."

After the death of the emperor, Catherine I promoted M. M. Golitsyn to field marshal general. Under Peter II, he became president of the Military Collegium (Minister of War), a senator and a member of the Supreme Privy Council. Together with the "supervisors" he tried to limit the autocratic power during the accession of Anna Ivanovna. For participation in the "invention of the leaders" he fell into disgrace and was removed from the court. He died only 55 years old on December 10, 1730. Brilliant military leaders rarely made successful politicians.

Introduction 2

Chapter 1. Childhood and youth of Peter I 5

Chapter 2. The appearance and personal qualities of the monarch 8

Chapter 3. Peter I as a commander and statesman 10

Chapter 4

Conclusion 17

List of used literature 18

Introduction

Changes in all sectors and spheres of the socio-economic and political life of the country, which gradually accumulated and matured in the 17th century, developed into a qualitative leap in the first quarter of the 18th century. Muscovite Rus turned into the Russian Empire. In its economy, the level and form of development of productive forces, the political system, the structure and functions of government, administration and courts, the organization of the army, the class and estate structure of the population, the culture of the country and the way of life of the people have undergone tremendous changes. The place and role of Russia in the international relations of that time changed radically.

All these changes took place on the basis of the feudal-serf system, which gradually became the main brake on the progressive development of the country, entered the stage of its decomposition. The symptoms of the birth and development of new capitalist relations were becoming more and more distinct in the country.

In this regard, already in the first quarter of the 18th century, the main contradiction characteristic of the period of late feudalism can be traced. The interests of the autocratic feudal state and the class of feudal lords as a whole, the national interests of the country required the development of productive forces, active assistance in the development of industry, trade, and the elimination of the technical and economic backwardness of the country. But to solve these problems, it was necessary to reduce the scope of serfdom, the formation of a free labor market, the restriction and elimination of class rights and privileges of the nobility. The exact opposite happened: the spread of serfdom in depth and breadth, the consolidation of the class of feudal lords, the consolidation, expansion and legislative registration of its rights and privileges. Therefore, the development of industry, commodity relations, the strengthening of the power of the state was accompanied by a sharp increase in feudal exploitation, landlord arbitrariness, the strengthening of the power of the nobles and the bureaucratic apparatus of the autocracy. This aggravated the main contradiction between the ruling class and the various categories of the serfs, who accounted for more than 90% of the country's population. The slow formation of the bourgeoisie and its transformation into a class opposed to the class of feudal feudal lords led to the fact that the merchants and factory owners were drawn into the sphere of feudal relations 2 .

The complexity and inconsistency of the historical development of the country at that time determined the extreme inconsistency of the activities of Peter I and the reforms he carried out. On the one hand, they were of great progressive importance, they met the general national interests and needs, contributed to a significant acceleration of the country's historical development and were aimed at eliminating its backwardness.

On the other hand, they were carried out by feudal lords, using feudal methods and were aimed at strengthening their dominance. Therefore, the progressive transformations of the time of Peter the Great from the very beginning carried conservative features, which, in the course of the further development of the country, came out more and more strongly and, instead of eliminating backwardness, conserved it. As a result of Peter's reforms, Russia quickly caught up with those European countries, where the dominance of feudal-serf relations was preserved, but it could not eliminate the backwardness from the countries that embarked on the capitalist path of development 3 .

This complexity and inconsistency manifested itself with all its force in the transformative activity of Peter I, which was distinguished by indomitable energy, unprecedented scope, courage in breaking obsolete institutions, laws, foundations and way of life and way of life. Perfectly understanding the importance of the development of trade and industry, Peter I carried out a number of measures that corresponded to the interests of the merchants. But he also strengthened the serfdom, substantiated the regime of autocratic despotism. The actions of Peter I were distinguished not only by the decisiveness, but also by the extreme cruelty of the "impatient autocratic landowner."

In preparation control work the works of such great historians as S.M. Solovyov, V.O. Klyuchevsky, S.F. Platonov. The modern point of view on the Petrine transformations was studied with the help of the work of M.T. Belyavsky.

Sergei Mikhailovich Solovyov. In his readings, Solovyov deeply analyzes the activities of Peter I, its results, the views of Westerners and Slavophiles on the affairs of Peter the Great. He emphasizes the enormity of the transformation and the duration of the influence of Peter's works on historical development Russia. The famous historian condemns the views of both the Westerners and the Slavophiles, believing that they were unable to deeply study all the processes that took place during the reign of Peter. He condemns the reverent respect for the deeds of Peter by some and the sharp censure of others. Solovyov's merit lies in the fact that he is one of the first to see that all of Peter's activity was due to the previous development of Russia, he turns to pre-Petrine history in order to understand where this coup came from, why it was needed. During this period, the historian believes, in the life of the Russian people there was a transition from one age to another - from the age in which feeling prevails, to the age in which thought dominates. Solovyov carefully treats the legacy of Peter, highly appreciates his personality as a reformer. 4

The image of Peter I is formed by Klyuchevsky for a long time and in a complicated way. So in Historical Portraits, the famous historian develops Solovyov's idea about the historical conditionality of the activities of Peter I as a "leader" who felt the needs of the people and carried out his transformations together with the people. Klyuchevsky noted Peter's unrelenting sense of duty and thoughts about the public good and how they influenced those around him. However, he ambiguously considered the results of the transformations of Peter the Great, noticed a discrepancy between their intention and results.

Klyuchevsky wrote that bureaucratization led to massive embezzlement and other malfeasance. Later, at the beginning of the 20th century, Klyuchevsky's intimate position became more and more apparent. He reproaches Peter for tyranny, despotism, unwillingness to understand the people in order to achieve the goals set, etc. 5 .

The basis of all Platonov's life work is the desire to avoid tendentiousness, fitting facts to a preconceived scheme. It is from these positions that he approaches the assessment of Peter's reforms. Rejecting tendentious, commendable and dismissive interpretations of his personality and activities, praising the “wealth of Peter’s natural abilities” as a commander and civil administrator, Platonov does not strive for assessments, but draws a simple conclusion from the analysis of the facts that in Peter’s “state there was no neither privileged persons, nor privileged groups, and all of them were equalized in the same equality of lack of rights before the state” 6 .

CHAPTER 1. Childhood and youth of Peter I

Pyotr Alekseevich Romanov (Peter I, Peter the Great) - the first All-Russian Emperor, was born on May 30, 1672, from the second marriage of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich with Natalya Kirillovna Naryshkina, the tutor of the boyar A.S. Matveev. Peter was the fourteenth child of Tsar Alexei and the first from his second marriage. The first wife of the king, daughter of I.D. Miloslavsky Marya Ilyinichna, died, leaving him two sons, Fedor and Ivan, and many daughters. Thus, under Tsar Alexei, the royal family had two circles of relatives hostile to each other: the eldest children of the tsar with the Miloslavskys and Natalya Kirillovna with her son and relatives. The fact is that the princes Fedor and Ivan did not differ in physical strength and did not give hope for longevity, and the younger prince Peter flourished with health, therefore, despite the fact that he was the youngest of the brothers, it was he who was destined to become king. The Naryshkins hoped for this, but the Miloslavskys were very afraid of this, and only fear of Tsar Alexei restrained manifestations of family animosity. 7

With the death of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the dull struggle of the Miloslavskys and the Naryshkins turns into an open clash. Quarrels and intrigues began. Boyarin A.S. Matveev, who was then at the head of all affairs, was exiled north to Pustozersk. The position of Peter's mother became very difficult.

Peter's education went rather slowly. According to the old Russian custom, they began to teach him from the age of five. Peter's teacher was the clerk Nikita Moiseev, the son of Zotov, a learned man, but fond of drinking. Subsequently, Peter appointed him the prince-pope of the jester's college of drunkenness.

Zotov went through the alphabet with Peter, the book of hours, the psalter, the gospel and the apostle. Tsar Alexei and his elder sons began their teaching in the same way. Zotov also touched upon Russian antiquity, telling the prince about the affairs of his father, about Tsar Ivan the Terrible, about Dmitry Donskoy and Alexander Nevsky. Subsequently, Peter did not lose interest in history, attaching importance to it for public education.

Until the death of his father, Tsar Alexei, Peter lived as a darling in the royal family. He was only three and a half years old when his father died. Tsar Fedor was the godfather of his little brother and loved him very much. He kept Peter with him in the great Moscow palace and took care of his education. eight

Whether Peter learned anything else from Zotov remains unknown; there is a legend that Zotov showed the prince a lot of “amusing sheets”, that is, pictures of historical and everyday content, brought to Moscow from abroad. Zotov's training was to be followed by scholastic science, which was introduced to the older brothers and even sisters of Peter under the guidance of the Kyiv monks. Peter had to study grammar, pietics, rhetoric, dialectics and philosophy, Latin and Greek literacy and, probably, the Polish language. But before the start of this training, Tsar Fedor died and the turmoil of 1682 began. Because of this, Peter was left without a systematic education. Until the end of his life he ignored grammar and spelling 9 .

Tsar Fyodor Alekseevich dies, leaving no heirs to the throne. According to the general opinion, his brother Ivan should have inherited the throne. But 15-year-old Ivan was very sickly and half-witted and, of course, could not accept power. Knowing this, Tsar Fyodor's favorites (Yazykov, Likhachev, and others) arranged things in such a way that immediately after Fyodor's death, Patriarch Joachim and the boyars proclaimed the younger Tsarevich Peter as Tsar. However, the rights of Tsarevich Ivan were violated and his relatives could not come to terms with what had happened. The most intelligent and decisive among them were Princess Sofya Alekseevna and the boyar Ivan Mikhailovich Miloslavsky. Against their enemies (Yazykov and the Naryshkins), they raised an army of archers.

The archers were given to know that Tsarevich Ivan had been strangled, and a list of “traitor-boyars” was given into the hands of the archers. The archers believed and began an open rebellion. On May 15, 1682, armed, they came to the Kremlin. Tsarina Natalya Kirillovna led Tsar Peter and Tsarevich Ivan to the Red Porch of the Palace and showed them to the archers. However, the archers did not calm down, broke into the royal palace and, in front of the members of the royal family, brutally killed the boyar Matveev and many relatives of Queen Natalya. Peter, who was an eyewitness to the bloody scenes of the streltsy rebellion, was surprised by the firmness that he retained at the same time: standing on the Red Porch, he did not change his face when the archers picked up Matveev and his supporters on spears. But the May horrors are indelibly engraved in the memory of Peter, probably from here both the well-known nervousness and his hatred of the archers originate. A year later, 11-year-old Peter, in terms of development, seemed to the foreign ambassador a 16-year-old youth 10 .

A week after the start of the rebellion (May 23), the victors demanded from the government that both brothers be appointed kings; a week later (on the 29th), at the new demand of the archers, for the youth of the kings, the reign was handed over to Princess Sophia. Peter's party was excluded from any participation in public affairs. This board, according to B. I. Kurakin, was “very dishonorable; great bribery and state theft” 11 .

During the entire time of Sophia's regency, Natalya Kirillovna came to Moscow only for a few winter months, spending the rest of the time in the village of Preobrazhensky near Moscow. A significant part of the noble families, who did not dare to link their fate with the provisional government of Sophia, were grouped around the young court. Left to himself, Peter forgot how to endure some kind of constraint, to deny himself the fulfillment of any desire. Tsaritsa Natalya, a woman of "mindless", in the words of her relative Prince Kurakin, apparently cared exclusively about the physical side of her son's upbringing. We see Peter surrounded by “young children of the common people” and “young people of the first houses”; the first eventually prevailed, and the "noble persons" were distant. It is very likely that both simple and noble friends of Peter's childhood games equally deserved the nickname "mischievous" given to them by Sophia.

A fiery, brilliant child cannot sit idle in a room; he rushes from the sad, disgraced house into the street, gathers around him a crowd of young people from court servants: he amuses himself, plays with them: like all living children, he loves to play war, soldiers. On the bank of the Yauza, near the village of Preobrazhensky, he built himself a “funny” fortress - Pressburg, and gathered a dozen “funny” warriors around it. At first it was a solid rabble of "Preobrazhensky grooms," as Sophia put it. Then Peter gave this company the form of two soldier regiments (Preobrazhensky - in the village of Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky - in the neighboring village of Semenovsky), and little by little from the “amusing” regiments, real regiments formed at Peter, which later laid the foundation for the guard. Peter's field fun gained wide dimensions and serious significance. Peter understood the importance of military affairs and began to study engineering and artillery. According to V. O. Klyuchevsky, “being kind by nature as a person, Peter was rude as a king” 12 .

Peter's foreign policy, as noted in the "History of the Russian Army", except for the rejection of Turkish proposals in the Prut campaign, is impeccable. The advantage of Russia is the only criterion that guided the first Russian emperor in his relations with foreign powers.

Peter shows himself throughout the war as a loyal ally. He does not like to bind himself in advance with promises and agreements, but once he has given his word, he keeps it holy.

The allies were rescued by the Russians more than once during various periods of the war, however, as soon as the tsar saw that they did not reciprocate at all and really only wanted to exploit Russia, he immediately broke off all relations with them and subsequently waged war completely separately.

The genius of Peter was fully reflected in military affairs, in the organization of the armed forces and in their leadership. A brilliant organizer and a major commander, according to Kersnovsky, Peter was far ahead of his era in all respects.

In the reorganization of the army, Peter gave the main place to the element of quality, which he achieved by the greatest involvement in the guards of the estate that best preserved military traditions and was destined for military service from ancient times.

This applies to the Petrine decree, which introduces compulsory, personal and lifelong service for the nobles. Having established personal military service for the nobility, Peter I gave the recruitment service of other classes a communal character. Each community, rural or petty-bourgeois, was obliged to appoint one recruit from a certain number of households, deciding by their sentence who to go to the service.

The recruit had to be between 20 and 35 years old, nothing else was required of him: military receivers had to accept "whom the payers would announce and put in return."

The community collected money for the recruit, usually 50-200 rubles, which at that time was a large amount, five times more than the bonuses of Western European mercenaries.

The service delivered from slavery, and under Peter there were many hunters to serve from fugitive serfs. Under Queen Elizabeth, the fugitives were no longer accepted, and those who appeared were flogged and sent back to the landowners, which, according to the author of the History of the Russian Army, was a huge psychological mistake.

So, Peter retained the basic principle of the structure of the Russian armed force - the compulsory nature of compulsory military service, which sharply differed at all times from the mercenary-recruitment system of Western countries. Moreover, this principle was even more clearly shaded by Peter: the service was declared lifelong and permanent (whereas in Moscow Russia it was only temporary).

The recruitment system was definitely territorial in nature. In 1711, the regiments were assigned to the provinces and maintained at the expense of these provinces. Each regiment had its own recruiting district - a province that gave the regiment its name. The Pskovites served in the Pskov regiment, and the soldiers' children of the Butyrskaya Sloboda served in the Butyrsky regiment. In Ingermanlapdsky - residents of the northern Novgorod possessions.

Peter appreciated the importance of the sense of fellowship developed in the Russian people. Unfortunately, after the death of Peter, due attention was not paid to the preservation of the territorial system. The regiments constantly changed their quarters and their recruitment districts, going from one end of Russia to the other.

By the middle of the 18th century, this system had completely died out, and as a result, Russia, the only country that had a territorial system at the beginning of the 18th century, in the 20th century was the only country that did not have this system.

The advantages of Peter I, as the organizer of the Russian armed forces, Anton Kersnovsky refers to the fact that the ground forces in the Peter's army were divided into the active army and local troops - garrison troops, land militia and Cossacks.

Landmilitsia was formed from the remnants of the former military estates (gunners, soldiers, reiters) in 1709 and settled in Ukraine to protect the southern borders. After the rebellion of Bulavin, Peter did not particularly trust the Cossacks, but, understanding great importance Cossacks in the life of the state, settled the Cossacks on the outskirts.

Buchholz's unsuccessful campaign Central Asia the result was the establishment of the Siberian Cossack army, and the result of the Persian campaign was the resettlement of part of the Don Cossacks to the Terek, where the Terek army was subsequently formed.

General Leer claimed that Peter was "a great commander who knew how to do everything, could do everything and wanted to do everything." Peter's military talent was only one of the sides of his multifaceted genius.

Anton Kersnovsky does not question the presence of Peter's mind on a national scale. The tsar, in his opinion, combined in himself a politician, a strategist and a tactician - a great politician, a great strategist, a great tactician. This combination, rare in history, was found after him only by two great commanders - Frederick II and Napoleon.

Charles XII was in this respect the exact opposite of Peter. Karl was a brilliant tactician, a leader who dragged his subordinates with him, but he was neither a strategist nor a politician. The Swedish king waged war only out of love for war, and this "physical" love for war, due to the complete absence of a statesman's mind, eventually led his army to death, and his country to decline.

In 1706, Karl had every opportunity to end the war with an honorable peace for Sweden, but did not want to use it, and eight years later, after Poltava, when the situation in Sweden became desperate, its unbridled

stubbornness set against himself a new enemy - Prussia.

Analyzing the policy of the Swedish king, A. Kersnovsky finds that he lacks a strategic eye.

For four consecutive years, the Swedish king wandered in Poland, driving Augustus II from place to place (and giving a valuable rest to the Russian army, which in the meantime was learning to fight at the expense of the ill-fated Schlippenbach), instead of immediately disarming his enemy with a blow to Saxony.

The young king had no organizational skills, the concept of an organized base was absent. He did not know how to keep the conquered territory for himself, and therefore all his victories turned out to be fruitless.

As soon as he leaves any locality in Poland, the enemy immediately occupies it, or rather, it again plunges into anarchy, the elements of which immediately begin outside the Swedish camp.

Having received from his father a small but wonderfully organized and trained army of veterans, Charles XII brilliantly uses it, but does not spare it at all.

In the winter of 1707-1708. with a poorly dressed and poorly supplied army, Karl rushes into the dense Lithuanian forests and starts a completely senseless guerrilla war with the population, solely to satisfy their thirst for adventure and absolutely not sparing the army.

At the beginning of the war, Karl was 19 years old, he was an ardent young man, stubborn and unrestrained, possessing extraordinary abilities and not accepting advice from anyone. The role model for the young Swedish king was Alexander the Great.

However, Voltaire noted that Charles "was not Alexander, but was worthy to be the first soldier of Alexander."

If Charles wages war "for the sake of war", then with Peter the conduct of war is entirely subordinated to his policy. He does nothing for nothing, always guided only by the interests of "the state entrusted to Peter."

Charles XII received his army ready-made from his father, Peter I created his own. Knowing how to demand from the troops, when necessary, superhuman efforts (up to the transfer of ships on his hands for hundreds of miles), Peter never wastes their strength in vain. The aspirations of the commander, in his own words, should be directed towards winning a victory "with little bloodshed."

As a talented tactician, Peter is far ahead of his time. He starts horse artillery 100 years before Napoleon and half a century before Frederick. In all his instructions to the troops, the idea of ​​​​mutual assistance and support of units - "seconding the one to the other" - and the coordination of the actions of various types of weapons are a red thread.

During the first period of the war, Peter acted with the utmost discretion. The quality of the Swedish army was still too high, and Peter understood the main reason for the tactical superiority of the Swedes over the Russians - their "closeness". Peter, not without success, opposes the Swedes with his field fortification, which ensured the success of the Poltava battle.

Anton Kersnovsky also draws attention to the device of Peter's cavalry. Under Peter, all of it was exclusively of the dragoon type and superbly trained both on horseback and on foot. Dragoons were the favorite branch of Peter's troops. In general, the element of active defense prevailed in Peter's tactics, which corresponded to the circumstances of that era. A purely offensive principle was introduced into Russian tactics only in the Seven Years' War by Rumyantsev.

Peter the Great
as a commander and naval commander

MILITARY AND NAVY ART OF PETER I

Peter I was not only the organizer of the Russian regular army and fleet, but also an outstanding commander and naval commander. He is one of the founders of advanced Russian military and naval art. His name is associated with the development of new strategic and tactical forms of armed struggle.

Strategy of Peter I that followed from his policy had a historically progressive character and was highly active. Peter I correctly believed that the achievement of the strategic goals of the war is possible only as a result of the defeat of the armed forces of the enemy. To this goal, he went gradually and consistently. At every stage of the war he set quite achievable tasks for the troops, taking into account the real balance of forces of the parties. In an unfavorable military-political situation, with the superiority of the enemy in forces, Peter I sought to use his military establishment so to change strategic environment in his own favor and thereby prepare favorable conditions for a general battle, to which he attached decisive importance for the outcome of the entire war. When developing strategic plans he sought to separate the enemy forces and defeat him piece by piece. In order to subdue the enemy to his will and impose on him a battle in unfavorable conditions for him, Peter with great skill applied wide strategic maneuvers.

On defense Peter I looked at it as an active form of struggle, as a means of preparing an offensive. Skillful organization of active defense in 1707-1709. Peter exhausted and weakened the enemy, bought time to prepare and deploy his forces and created the conditions for the decisive defeat of the Swedish army in the general battle near Poltava.

Lots of original Peter contributed to tactical art . He regarded the battle as the most decisive means of achieving success and required careful preparation for it, as to "very dangerous business" . Peter abandoned the templates of linear tactics , which adhered to Western European mercenary armies. He correctly believed that the linear formation of troops does not oblige either to an even distribution of forces or to rectilinear motion on the enemy. He demanded to line up the troops in such a battle formation that was most expedient in a given situation. That's why in a number of battles of the Northern War the order of battle of the Russian army was approaching deep formation.

Peter understood that the success of the battle depends, first of all, on decisive and coordinated actions of all branches of the armed forces . Therefore, his attention was turned not only to the development of the infantry, but also to improvement of the organization and combat use of cavalry and artillery . In the organization and combat use of the cavalry, he was ahead of Western Europe by a century. Russian cavalry was converted to dragoon-type cavalry , capable of fighting both on foot and on horseback. She had her own artillery and in battle acted with fire and edged weapons. Her actions in battle and during deep raids behind enemy lines were distinguished by great determination and maneuverability.

Peter I was an innovator and in the field of organization and combat use of artillery . She was divided according to its special purpose into siege, field and regimental artillery. Field artillery appeared in the Russian army earlier than other countries. The introduction by Peter horse artillery attached to the cavalry regiments. Under Peter for the first time occurs separation of naval artillery from land artillery . In the tactical use of artillery, great attention was paid to its massing and maneuvering on the battlefield, together with infantry and cavalry, which was not yet the case in foreign armies.

Innovation was of great importance for the development of military art. Petra in area field fortification . Battlefield engineering preparation near Poltava is the most striking example of a coup perpetrated by the Russians in the use of field fortifications. After the Battle of Poltava, such fortifications began to be used by all foreign armies.

Thus, tactical art of Peter characterized by careful preparation for battle, a combination of determination and caution, great skill in assessing the situation, the ability to quickly and correctly make decisions, perseverance in achieving the goal of the battle, skillful organization of interaction between all branches of the military.

For Peter I as an outstanding military reformer, commander and naval commander characterized by a deep understanding of the role of the army and navy in the struggle to achieve the political and strategic goals facing Russia. He correctly believed that in solving the problem of access to the sea and holding the sea coast, the decisive role should have been played by ground forces , and therefore the main efforts of the country were first directed to the creation of a large combat-ready regular army.

In the same time Peter I correctly believed that in achieving the strategic goals facing Russia, an important role should have been played by Navy , which he considered as an integral part of the country's armed forces. Placed in the preface to Naval charter of 1720 proverb Petra that “every potentate who has a single army on land has one hand, and who has a fleet has both hands” , is the brightest and short expression his understanding of the place and role of the fleet in the system of the armed forces of the state. Therefore, simultaneously with the creation of a strong regular army, on the basis of a developing domestic shipbuilding industry during the war deployed and construction of the Russian regular military fleet.

In determining the nature of the construction of naval forces Peter I proceeded from a correct understanding of the tasks of the fleet on various stages wars and features of the theater of operations. It was first deployed construction of a rowing fleet , which corresponded to the task of assisting the army in its advance along the coast. Then, to defend the conquered coast from attacks by the Swedish fleet, to operate on enemy sea communications in the open areas of the Baltic Sea and to ensure the raiding operations of the rowing fleet on the coast of Sweden, a combat-ready naval fleet was created.

One of the strongest features of the military and naval art of Peter I was his ability to skillfully organize the strategic and tactical interaction between the army and navy, correctly determine the tasks of the fleet and methods of using it to support the actions of the ground forces. This a feature of the military and naval art of Peter I followed from the general foundations of advanced Russian military art, which saw the key to any military success primarily in the skillful interaction of all branches of the armed forces and, in addition, was determined by the uniqueness of the strategic tasks facing Russia at the beginning of the 18th century.

At each stage of the war, based on the set strategic goal, Peter I chose such a main direction of offensive operations in which it was possible to organize the closest interaction between the army and the navy and in this way achieve the greatest strategic success.

When planning military operations at sea Peter I always proceeded from the real capabilities of the fleet and the characteristics of the theater of operations. Given the superiority of the Swedish linear fleet, Peter I did not seek to destroy it in a pitched battle, but used his weaker ship fleet and numerous rowing fleet primarily to directly assist the ground forces. Having shown high examples of military and naval art in joint actions, the Russian army and navy, in front of the numerous Swedish battle fleet, captured Vyborg, Helsingfors, all of Finland, the Aland Islands, drove the enemy out of the Gulf of Finland and transferred military operations to the territory of Sweden.

In time Finnish campaign 1712-1714 and in actions against the coast of Sweden at the final stage of the war, the Russian army and navy provided a brilliant example of the organization of offensive operations in the island region of the maritime theater. These actions were distinguished by courage and speed of maneuver, the desire to bypass the strong frontal positions and secondary island fortifications of the enemy, the decisiveness of attacks on the most important enemy targets, the capture of which ensured the subsequent offensive of the Russian army and navy. The experience of joint operations of the Russian army and navy in the island region, acquired during the Great Northern War , subsequently received further development in the fighting of the Russian fleet under the command of Admirals Spiridov, Ushakov, Senyavin.

The main thing in the combat use of the fleet, Peter I considered active offensive operations based on the correct calculation. It required the drawing up of a well-thought-out battle plan and careful preparation for its implementation, the development and implementation of the necessary measures for combat support, the flexibility of tactical maneuvers, the delivery of concentrated strikes against part of the enemy’s battle formation, the provision of mutual assistance, the manifestation of personal initiative, perseverance and perseverance in achieving the goal.

A distinctive feature of the naval art of Peter I is his deep and comprehensive assessment of all elements of the sea and land situation, continuous consideration of their changes in the course of the battle and their masterful use to achieve the intended goal. Attaching great importance to the moral factor in achieving military success, Peter I constantly strove to maintain a high fighting spirit among the personnel of the army and navy.

Organizational principles of the Russian fleet , methods of training and education of its personnel, methods of conducting combat operations at sea developed and enriched on the basis of the combat experience of the Northern War. The result of the generalization, first of all, of this experience, exceptionally rich and instructive, as well as the positive experience of foreign fleets, was Russian Naval charter of 1720

The preface to the charter briefly defines the importance for Russia of the fleet as an integral part of the country's armed forces. The main text of the charter begins with an oath that required "any military rank" loyalty to the tsarist autocracy, everywhere and in all cases to protect the interests of the state, unquestioningly comply with the requirements of the charter and all orders of commanders, serve in the navy "with all zeal, with all his strength, not sparing his belly and property." Following the text of the oath, the five books of the statute set out the main the principles of the organization of the fleet, the daily and combat organization of service on the ship, the rights and obligations of all ranks of the fleet. The final part of the statute contains samples of ship logs and given instructions for their maintenance, as well as contains a detailed description of the signals of the Russian ship and galley fleet.

The commander-in-chief of the ship was the captain. He was responsible for the state of armament and supply of the ship, for the training of personnel, for the readiness of the ship for battle and its actions in battle. All personnel, before the ship entered the campaign, signed for combat posts: "to cannons, to small weapons, to sails, etc.," so that every person, when asked, could know his position and place.

The charter required thorough preparation for battle. The captain of the ship was obliged to assemble the officers and announce “everyone who should know about it, all the orders that he will be given from the chief commander, that is, about readiness for battle, how to find the enemy, how to go as soon as possible, how to support himself at sea and in what order to fight, so that everyone on the ship could know his place ... " The personnel of each specialty were entrusted with the duty to prepare their posts for battle. The gunners prepared for battle

artillery, sail control teams - spare sails and gear, carpenters and caulkers - material for sealing holes and replacing masts and yards knocked down in battle, etc.

Before entering the battle, the fleet had to line up in a certain order. order of battle and strive to occupy in relation to the enemy windward position. The main type of battle of sailing warships was an artillery battle, often ending in boarding. To achieve the decisive goals of the battle, the charter required to act offensively, to open artillery fire on the enemy only from a short distance, to provide assistance to each other. Upon achieving success in battle, which led to the disruption of the enemy’s battle order and his flight, each Russian ship was to “in every way, at the extreme possibility and strength of it, to drive and board and repair any possible damage ...”

The charter required the organization of reliable communication between ships and their continuous control in battle. In the event of serious damage to the admiral's ship, the flagship was obliged to move to another, undamaged ship.

All personnel were required to act courageously and bravely in battle. The officers of the ship, by their personal example, were supposed to encourage the entire crew to perseverance and heroism, to achieve the goal of the battle and "by no means, under the loss of the stomach and honor" , to prevent the surrender of the ship to the enemy. “All Russian military ships should not lower flags, pennants and topsails in front of anyone, under pain of losing their stomachs.” For failure to comply with the order, evading the battle, the manifestation of cowardice, the perpetrators were punished by death.

The charter required everyone to be faithful military oath , be vigilant and keep military secrets. Anyone who has a secret correspondence with the enemy and who, knowing about this criminal connection, will hide it, “He has, like a rogue and a traitor, honor, belongings and belly deprived of being quartered or wheeled.”

Naval charter of Peter I - one of the most remarkable monuments of Russian legislation of the early 18th century. He was imbued with the ideas of patriotism, military duty and strict military discipline, which formed the basis of the laid Peter I a new system of training and education of army and navy personnel. In terms of its completeness and clarity of presentation of the organization of the daily and combat service of the fleet, in terms of the perfection of the principles of the combat use of the fleet set out in it Naval charter of Peter I was the most advanced maritime charter of that era. At the same time, with all its content, it clearly reflected the class character of the Russian navy, designed primarily to protect the interests of the tsarist autocracy and the state of landlords and merchants.

Military and naval art of Peter I was fundamentally deeply creative and national. Peter I was full of patterns in tactics and strategy used by foreign armies and navies. He showed extraordinary creativity in the development of military and naval art based on the use of the historically established military traditions of the Russian people and the combat experience of the Russian army and navy in the Northern War. The creation of a remarkable school of Russian military and naval art is rightly associated with his name. Her advanced views were taken up and developed outstanding Russian commanders and naval commanders of the second half of the 18th and early XIX centuries - Rumyantsev and Sviridov, Suvorov and Ushakov, Kutuzov and Senyavin.

Basically, the original and independent Russian military and naval art in many ways outstripped the military art of foreign armies and navies. The leading role of Russian naval art manifested itself with particular force in the correct understanding of the role and place of the fleet in the system of the country's armed forces, in the large and versatile practice of interaction between the army and the navy, in its deep creative character and active offensive spirit. The outstanding victories of the young Baltic Fleet over the well-trained Swedish fleet during the Northern War are the most striking indicator of the high maturity of Russian naval art and its superiority over the naval art of foreign fleets.