Borodino battle year. Battle of Borodino between Russia and France

battle of Borodino - the main battle of the Patriotic War of 1812, which took place on September 7 (August 26, old style) 1812.

Russian Imperial Army

Commander-in-Chief - Infantry General, Prince Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov. The main forces of the Russian army were regular troops, consolidated into the 1st Western Army under the command of a general from infantry M. B. Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Western Army under the command of Infantry General P.I. Bagration.

Grand Army

Commander-in-Chief - French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. In addition to the French troops, the Grand Army included contingents from the states of the Confederation of the Rhine, Westphalia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Cleve, Berg, Prussia, Saxony, the Netherlands, Nassau, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Spain, the Kingdom of Naples, the Swiss Confederation, Portugal, Neuchâtel and others European states that were dependent on the French Empire.

The number of warring parties

There are two main versions of the count of the number of French troops participating in the battle. According to the so-called "Gzhatsk account", the Great Army before the battle consisted of 135,000 people with 900 guns. However, according to the second version, the number of French troops was approaching 185,000 people. with 1200 guns, these data are indicated on the Central Monument on the Borodino field. Such a difference in numbers is explained by the fact that on the transition from Gzhatsk to the Kolotsk Monastery, the Great Army was overtaken by reserve units, which gradually joined the army and were not taken into account during the roll call in Gzhatsk.

The number of Russian troops who took part in the battle is less controversial and amounts to 118,000 people. with 600 guns, including 10,000 warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias. It is impossible to consider the militias as full-fledged fighters, since they were practically unarmed and untrained, and were used as auxiliary personnel in the construction of fortifications and to collect and carry out the wounded from the battlefield.

Reasons for the fight

During the campaign of 1812 Napoleon Bonaparte planned to draw the Russian army into a general battle, during which, using a significant superiority in numbers, defeat the enemy and force Emperor Alexander I to surrender. But the Russian army systematically retreated deep into its territory, avoiding a decisive battle. However, the lack of serious fighting had a detrimental effect on the morale of both soldiers and officers, so the infantry general Kutuzov, recently appointed commander in chief, decided to give Bonaparte a general battle. He took into account that the French troops were forced to disperse their forces, and therefore the Grand Army was seriously reduced in numbers. At the same time, he had no illusions about the enemy’s forces and his capabilities and understood that Bonaparte, as a commander, was extremely dangerous, and his soldiers had great combat experience and were eager to fight. However, he also could not avoid a general battle, since a further retreat to Moscow without a serious battle would undermine the morale of the troops and cause distrust in the army in society. Considering all these factors, Kutuzov had no right to make a mistake and could not lose the upcoming battle, and the choice of the battle site was predetermined by these conditions.

Battlefield

The place of the upcoming battle was not chosen by the Russian quartermasters by chance. Their task was to choose a position that would neutralize the superiority of the Great Army in numbers, especially in the amount of artillery, while allowing covert maneuvering of reserves. The flanks of the position were supposed to exclude the possibility of deep detours, it was also important, if possible, to cover all the most important roads leading to Moscow through Mozhaisk, that is, the Old and New Smolensk roads, as well as the Gzhatsky tract. The battlefield can be considered an area stretching from north to south from Novy Selo to the village of Artemki and from west to east from Fomkino to Novaya village. The terrain distinguishes a large number of streams, rivers and ravines crossing the battlefield from south to north. The Russian position was located in such a way that the attacking enemy, before reaching the distance of a rifle shot, was forced to force the ravines of the Kamenka River and the Semenovsky Creek on the left flank and in the center, as well as the valley of the Koloch River on the right flank, which were under fire from Russian artillery. This allowed the Russian troops to prevent the enemy from conducting coordinated attacks and slowed down his advance to the key points of the position.

Engineering equipment positions. Fortification

The very nature of the area suggested the use of various fortifications to enhance its defensive potential. During August 23-25 ​​(September 4-6), 1812, Russian engineers carried out a huge amount of work. On a hill near the village of Shevardino, a redoubt for 5 guns was built, intended to cover the main Russian position and to divert the attention of the enemy from preparing the Russian army for a decisive battle. On August 24, French troops attempted to capture this fortification, this event went down in history as the Battle for the Shevardinsky Redoubt. The extreme right flank of the Russian position was covered by flashes near the village of Maslovo, the crossing over the Koloch River near the village of Borodino was covered by earth batteries near the village of Gorki. In the center of the position, at Kurgan height, a fortification was erected, known as the Rayevsky Battery. Further south, in the village of Semyonovskoye, an earthen fortification was also built. In the space between the Semenovsky ravine, the Utitsky forest and the ravine of the Kamenka river, several lunettes were erected, which became famous as Bagration's flushes. A system of notches was organized in the Utitsky forest, making it difficult for the enemy to move through the forest. Russian fortifications were distinguished by the use of the principle of crossfire, as well as the widespread use of wolf pits on the outskirts of them. Another feature of the Russian fortifications was the impossibility of using them by the enemy for their own purposes.

Side Plans

The battle of Borodino against the background of most other battles of that era is distinguished by the extreme bitterness of the combatants, largely due to the tasks of the warring parties. The defeat was unacceptable for both Kutuzov and Bonaparte. The defeat of the Russian army meant defeat in the war, since Kutuzov did not have any reserves capable of making up for losses and was not expected in the near future. Bonaparte also believed that in the event of a defeat, he had no chance of an early victory in the war, in order to fulfill his plan and capture Moscow, from which he intended to dictate peace terms, it was absolutely necessary for him to defeat the Russian army. Both commanders also understood that they were confronted by a strong, stubborn and dangerous enemy, and it would not be easy to achieve victory in the upcoming battle. The Russian commander-in-chief hoped to wear down the enemy, who was forced to attack a heavily fortified position, relying on a powerful system of fortifications. Drawn into the assault on the Russian fortifications, the enemy troops were vulnerable to counterattacks by both infantry and cavalry. An important condition for success was the preservation of the combat capability of the Russian army after the battle.

Bonaparte, on the contrary, intended to break through the Russian positions, capture its key points, and thereby, by disorganizing the Russian battle formations, achieve victory. Maintaining the combat capability of the Great Army was also a prerequisite for him, since it was almost impossible to count on replenishing losses and the ability to restore the combat capability of his troops in the depths of hostile territory. He also realized that without replenishment of provisions, fodder and ammunition, he would not be able to campaign for a long time. He did not know what reserves Kutuzov had, and how soon he would be able to make up for his losses, so that victory in the battle, and not just a victory, but the defeat of the Russian army, was the only possible way out of this situation for him.

Comparison of the warring parties

For more than a decade, Russian troops had periodically encountered the French on the battlefields, so that the Russian command was familiar with the tactics of the enemy, as well as with the fighting qualities of the French soldiers. The Russian infantry, hardened in wars with the Turks and the French, was a formidable force. Despite the fact that the Russian infantry battalions were inferior in number to the French, they were distinguished by greater mobility and maneuverability. The traditional qualities of a Russian soldier - steadfastness, perseverance and courage - were noted even by opponents. The Russian cavalry was distinguished by a good horse composition, well-trained horsemen, as well as a large number of courageous and enterprising commanders. Artillery equipped with last word technology of that time, had good tactical flexibility due to a convenient organizational structure and good training of commanders. The great advantage of the Russian troops was the high morale and moral unity of the personnel. The absence of language barriers and national contradictions, a single organizational structure simplified the leadership of the troops, which was also a considerable advantage compared to the enemy.

The Great Army, unlike the Russian Imperial Army, presented a very mixed picture. In addition to the French units, it also included the troops of Bonaparte's satellite countries, often not at all burning with the desire to fight for completely alien interests, and often experiencing mutual hostility towards the French or their other allies. The French units were for the most part made up of veterans who had gone through many previous campaigns and had vast combat experience. The French soldiers, unlike their allies, idolized Bonaparte and were ready to carry out any of his orders. The French infantry traditionally operated in dense battle formations in large masses, which, coupled with the offensive impulse and high morale, made it an extremely dangerous enemy. However, the quality of the French cavalry left much to be desired, both in terms of the training of the cavalrymen themselves and the unsatisfactory condition of the horse composition, so Bonaparte relied more on the German and Polish cavalry. The national diversity of the Great Army could not but be reflected in the artillery, represented by many different systems and calibers. The great disadvantage of the Great Army was also the fact that the allied contingents were organized according to their own traditions and ideas about the military structure, which complicated their mixing into divisions and corps, as well as their management due to linguistic and national differences.

The course of the battle

The battle of Borodino began in the early morning of August 26 (September 7), 1812 at about 6 am. The French artillery opened fire on almost the entire front, shelling the Russian positions. Almost simultaneously with the opening of fire, the French columns began to move, advancing to the starting lines for the attack.

The first to be attacked by the Life Guards was the Jaeger Regiment, which occupied the village of Borodino. The division of General Delzon, consisting of the 84th, 92nd and 106th regiments of line infantry, taking advantage of the morning fog, made an attempt to dislodge the guards rangers from their positions, but ran into stubborn resistance. However, as a result of a flank attack by the 106th line regiment, the rangers were forced to leave Borodino and retreat across the Koloch River. The French tried to cross after them, but came under counterattack by the 1st, 19th and 40th Chasseurs and the Guards crew and, having suffered significant losses, were forced to retreat. The bridge across the Koloch was burned by the sailors of the Guards crew, and until the end of the battle, the French did not attempt to advance in this area.

Bagration's flashes on the left flank of the Russian position were occupied by the troops of the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division of Major General Vorontsov, as well as the artillery of the 32nd and 11th battery companies. In front of the flushes along the Kamenka River there were chains of Russian rangers. In the Utitsky forest, three regiments of chasseurs under the command of Prince I.A. covered the flush from the flank. Shakhovsky. Behind the fleches was Major General Neverovsky's 27th Infantry Division. The Semyonov heights were occupied by the 2nd Grenadier Division of Major General Duke Karl of Mecklenburg, as well as the 2nd Cuirassier Division of Major General Duka. They were opposed by the corps of Marshals Davout and Ney, General Junot, as well as the cavalry of Marshal Murat, supported by significant artillery forces. Thus, the number of enemy troops intended for operations against the Bagration Flushes reached 115,000 people.

At about 6 o'clock in the morning, the divisions of Generals Desse and Kompan from the corps of Marshal Davout began to advance to their original positions for the attack. However, the French infantry faced the devastating fire of Russian artillery and the counterattack of the rangers, and was forced to abandon the development of the attack.

Regrouping, around 7 am, the French launched a second attack. During this attack, the enemy again encountered fierce resistance from the defenders of the flushes. Despite considerable losses, the infantrymen from the Kompan division managed to break into one of the flushes, but as a result of a well-coordinated attack by Russian infantry and cavalry of the Akhtyrsky Hussar and Novorossiysk Dragoon regiments, the French were forced to roll back again. The intensity of the battle is evidenced by the fact that by this moment Generals Rapp, Desse, Kompan and others were wounded, Marshal Davout himself was shell-shocked.

Bagration, seeing that the enemy was concentrating forces for a third, even more powerful attack, pulled the 3rd Infantry Division of Major General Konovnitsyn to the flushes, and Kutuzov allocated several battalions of the 1st Combined Grenadier Division, the Life Guards Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments, as well as the 3rd cavalry corps and the 1st cuirassier division. Meanwhile, Bonaparte had already concentrated more than 160 guns against the flushes, as well as three infantry divisions from the corps of Marshal Ney and several cavalry formations of Marshal Murat.

At about 8 o'clock in the morning, the third attack of the flushes began. Russian artillery, firing buckshot from short distances, despite enemy fire, inflicted huge losses on the French columns. Despite this, the French infantry from the divisions of Compan and Ledru managed to break through into the left flech and into the intervals between other fortifications. However, the counterattack of the 27th Infantry and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions, supported by the cavalry of the 4th Cavalry Corps, forced the French to hastily retreat to their original positions.

Around 9 o'clock in the morning, Bonaparte launched a fourth flush attack. By this time, the space in front of the flashes, dug up by cannonballs and littered with dead and dying people and horses, was already a terrible sight. Thick columns of French infantry again rushed to attack the Russian fortifications. The battle for the flashes turned into hand-to-hand combat on parapets, Neverovsky's infantrymen and Vorontsov's grenadiers fought with amazing tenacity, noted even by the enemy. Any improvised means, bayonets, cleavers, artillery accessories, rifle ramrods were used. Nevertheless, despite all the efforts of the defenders, by 10 o'clock in the morning the enemy managed to capture the flushes. However, Bagration introduces the 2nd Grenadier Division of Major General, Duke Karl of Mecklenburg and the 2nd Cuirassier Division of Major General Duki into battle. The remnants of Vorontsov's grenadiers and Neverovsky's infantry also joined the counterattack. The French, who suffered severely from the fire of Russian artillery, unable to use the captured fortifications, could not withstand the organized strike of the Russian units and left the flashes. The attack of the Russian cuirassiers was so swift that Marshal Murat himself barely escaped capture, having managed to hide in a square of light infantry.

At about 11 o'clock in the morning, the next, fifth flush attack begins. With powerful artillery support, the French infantry again managed to occupy the flashes, but then the 3rd Infantry Division of Major General Konovnitsyn entered the battle. During this counterattack, Major General Tuchkov 4th heroically died, with a banner in his hands, who led the attack of the Revel and Murom infantry regiments. The French are once again forced to abandon the flushes.

Bonaparte, seeing that the next attack again ended in failure, brought into battle the corps of General Junot, which included Westphalian units. Poniatowski's corps, which, according to Napoleon's plan, was supposed to bypass the flashes from the rear, got bogged down in battles near the village of Utitsa on the Old Smolensk road, and did not complete its task, the infantry of Davout and Ney suffered heavy losses and was exhausted, just like supporting their actions were Murat's cavalry, but their target - Bagration's flashes - still remained in the hands of the Russians. The sixth attack of the flushes began with the advance of Junot's Westphalians through the Utitsky forest to the flank and rear of the Russian fortifications. Despite the fierce resistance of the Russian rangers, the German infantrymen, pushing their way through the notches, still managed to complete their task. However, as soon as they emerged from the forest, the Westphalians were met by fire from the horse artillery battery of Captain Zakharov. Not having time to reorganize for the attack, the Westphalian infantry suffered heavy losses from canister shots and was immediately subjected to a counterattack by the Russian cavalry. The approaching 2nd Corps of Lieutenant General Baggovut stabilized the situation. The infantry attack of Ney and Davout, which was developing in the meantime, was repulsed again.

The seventh attack of the flushes was carried out by Bonaparte according to the same plan. The attack of Ney and Davout from the front and Junot from the flank again ran into fierce resistance. At the edge of the Utitsky forest, the Brest and Ryazan infantry regiments switched to the bayonet, disrupting another Westphalian attack. The losses of the Grand Army became heavier, attacks followed attacks, but the flushes were never taken.

At 12 noon, the eighth flush attack begins. About 45,000 infantry and cavalry, supported by fire from up to 400 artillery pieces, take part in it from the French side, the Russian troops concentrated in this sector hardly reached half of this number. The French infantry rushed into the frontal attack of the Russian fortifications, the numerical superiority allows it to ignore the artillery fire. Then Bagration, seeing that the situation was becoming critical, personally led the counterattack of the Russian infantry, during which he was wounded in the thigh and dropped out of the battle. The 2nd Western Army was led by General Konovnitsyn. Realizing that further retention of the half-ruined and littered with the bodies of the killed flushes is inexpedient, Konovnitsyn withdraws the surviving troops behind the Semenovsky ravine. An attempt by the French on the shoulders of the retreating Russian troops to break into Semenovskoye was repelled by dagger fire from Russian artillery stationed on the hills near the village.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning, at a time when the battle for Bagration's flushes was already in full swing, Bonaparte launched an attack on the center of the Russian position - Kurgan Height, on which there was a fortification that went down in history as Raevsky's Battery. The battery had 18 guns, as well as infantry from Major General Paskevich's 26th Infantry Division. The remaining formations of the 7th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Raevsky covered the battery from the flanks. According to the plan of Bonaparte, the 4th (Italian) corps of his stepson, Prince Eugene Beauharnais, was to act against the battery.

After a long artillery bombardment of the battery, the divisions of Generals Morand and Gerard moved on the attack, but their onslaught was repulsed by the hurricane fire of Russian guns. Around 10 am, Beauharnais brings Broussier's division into battle. During the attack, the 30th Line Regiment and the 2nd Baden Regiment managed to break into the battery. The Russian infantrymen began to roll back in confusion, but Major General Kutaisov, the chief of artillery of the 1st Western Army, who happened to be nearby, was able to inspire the soldiers by personally leading the counterattack of the Russian infantry. During a short but fierce bayonet battle, the fortification was cleared, and Brigadier General Bonami, who was at that moment on the battery, was captured. However, Kutaisov himself was killed in this battle.

To strengthen the defense of the battery, Barclay de Tolly sent the 24th Infantry Division of Major General Likhachev, to the right of the battery, the 7th Infantry Division of Major General Kaptsevich took up the defense. Beauharnais also regrouped his forces, but the planned third attack on Raevsky's battery was delayed for two hours due to Uvarov and Platov's cavalry suddenly appearing in the rear of the Great Army. Taking advantage of the moment, Kutuzov moves the 4th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy and the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Major General Korf, as well as the Life Guards Horse and Cavalier Guard regiments, to the battery area.

Convinced that the threat to his rear was over, Eugene de Beauharnais launched a third attack on the Raevsky Battery. The Italian Guard, supported by the cavalry of General Pear, takes part in it. At the same time, the cavalry of generals Caulaincourt and Latour-Maubourt rushed into the interval between the village of Semenovskoye and Kurgan height. Their task is to break through the Russian line, go to the flank of the battery and attack it from the rear. However, during this attack, General Caulaincourt dies, the attack of the French cuirassiers is repelled by Russian artillery fire. At the same moment, the Beauharnais infantry begins an assault on the fortification from the front. Infantrymen from the 24th Infantry Division of General Likhachev fought with unprecedented tenacity, however, by 4 pm the battery was taken, and Likhachev himself, wounded several times, was captured. A fierce cavalry battle broke out between the village of Semyonovskoye and Kurgan heights, the Saxon cuirassiers of Lorzh and the Polish uhlans of Rozhnetsky tried to break through the square of the Russian infantry. Cavalrymen from the 2nd and 3rd cavalry corps of the Russian army came to her aid. However, despite strong resistance, Lorge's cuirassiers managed to break through into the depths of the Russian troops. At that moment, the Life Guards Cavalry and Cavalier Guard regiments entered the battle. Despite the numerical superiority of the enemy, the Russian Horse Guards rushed into a decisive counterattack. After a bloody battle, the Russian guards forced the Saxons to retreat.

The 7th Infantry Division of General Kaptsevich at the same time withstood the attacks of French, Italian and German cavalrymen from the Pear corps. Surrounded on all sides, the Russian infantry fought back desperately until the cavalry guards and Horse Guards, as well as cavalrymen from the 2nd and 3rd cavalry corps, came to their aid. Unable to withstand a desperate counterattack, having suffered huge losses, the French light cavalry was forced to retire.

At the same time there was a battle for the Semenovsky ravine. Having captured the flushes, Bonaparte realized that he could not achieve anything by this - the Russian troops occupied a new line of defense along the steep and swampy Semenovsky ravine and were ready to continue the battle. To the right of the ruins of the village of Semenovskoye, the remnants of the 27th Infantry and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions were located, touching their right flank with the Tobolsk and Volynsky infantry regiments. On the site of the village, units of the 2nd Grenadier Division took up the defense, to the south of it the 3rd Infantry Division was located. Their left flank was covered by the still fresh Life Guards of the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments. These forces were commanded by Lieutenant-General Dokhturov, who succeeded Konovnitsyn, who took command of the 2nd Western Army in place of the badly wounded Bagration

Marshals Ney, Davout and Murat were well aware that their exhausted troops were not able to overcome this line and turned to Napoleon with a request to bring the last reserve into battle - the Old Guard. However, Bonaparte, rightly believing that such a risk was too great, refused, but transferred the guards artillery to their disposal.

At about one o'clock in the afternoon, Friant's division unsuccessfully attacked the village of Semenovskoye. The French infantry rolled back with heavy losses. At the same time, the heavy cavalry of General Nansouty entered the battle - in the space between the Utitsky forest and the village of Semenovskoye. However, they were blocked by the square of the Life Guards of the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments. Being under heavy fire from enemy artillery, the guards infantry withstood three attacks by French cuirassiers. The cuirassiers of General Duka came to the aid of the guards, with a decisive blow throwing off the French heavy cavalry. The breakthrough of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry in the center was also prevented, and the battle began to fade.

On the extreme left flank of the Russian position, on the Old Smolensk Road, a detachment under the command of Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1 operated as part of the 3 Infantry Corps, six Cossack regiments of Major General Karpov 2 and warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias. The task of the detachment was to cover the Old Smolensk road and prevent a possible deep bypass of the left flank of the Russian army. The detachment occupied positions on a hill near the village of Utitsy, later called the Utitsky mound.

At about 8 o'clock in the morning, the advanced detachments of the corps of Marshal Poniatovsky, consisting of Polish units and subunits, appeared on the Old Smolensk Road. Poniatowski's goal was a deep detour of the Russian left flank, and the Russian troops that unexpectedly appeared on his road prevented him from performing this maneuver. At that moment, Tuchkov 1st sent the 3rd Infantry Division of Major General Konovnitsyn to help the defenders of the fleches, weakening his forces. Poniatowski, with the support of artillery, tried to shoot down the detachment of Tuchkov 1st from his position on the move, but was unsuccessful. At about 11 o'clock in the morning, the Poles resumed their attacks, and achieved temporary success, capturing the Utitsky Kurgan. However, Tuchkov 1st, having led the attack of the Pavlovsk Grenadier and Belozersky and Wilmanstrand Infantry Regiments, forced the Poles to retreat to their original positions, while Tuchkov 1st himself was mortally wounded during this counterattack. Command over the troops of his detachment passed to Lieutenant General Baggovut.

Having regrouped, at about one o'clock in the afternoon, Poniatowski again tried to break the Russian detachment, bypassing it from the flank. However, the Tauride Grenadier and Minsk Infantry Regiments thwarted this maneuver with a desperate counterattack. The Poles did not leave attempts to defeat the enemy until dusk, but General Baggovut, Karl Fedorovich / Baggovut repelled all their attacks with bold and decisive actions, forcing them to retreat behind the village of Utitsy and go on the defensive.

On the extreme right flank of the Russian army, events developed less dramatically. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, when the onslaught of French troops along the entire line began to intensify, Kutuzov ordered Lieutenant General Uvarov and Ataman Platov to make a cavalry raid behind the lines of the Great Army in order to distract the enemy and ease his pressure on the Russian defenses. At about one o'clock in the afternoon, cavalrymen from Uvarov's 1st Cavalry Corps, much to the surprise of the French, suddenly appeared near the village of Bezzubovo. The cavalry division of General Ornano hurriedly retreated across the river Voina, but on the way of the Russian cavalry were the squares of the 84th linear regiment, which was in the area after the morning battle for the village of Borodino. Having withstood several unsuccessful attacks, under the fire of Russian horse artillery, the French infantrymen were forced to retreat. Meanwhile, Platov's Cossacks went deep into the rear of the Great Army along the forest roads, appearing near the village of Valuevo, where the main rear services of the French were located. Their appearance caused great concern to Bonaparte, who was forced to temporarily suspend active operations in the center. In order to eliminate the threat on his left flank, Napoleon decided to remove about 20,000 people from the direction of the main attack, thereby giving the Russian troops such a necessary respite.

End of the battle. Results

Around 6 pm the battle gradually ended. By 9 o'clock, the French made their last attempt to bypass the Russian positions through the Utitsky Forest, but were met with well-aimed fire from the riflemen of the Life Guards of the Finnish Regiment, and were forced to abandon their plans. Napoleon realized that even having captured the flushes and the Kurgan heights, he could not break the resistance of the Russian Imperial Army. The capture of these points did not change the situation in his favor, since the main line of Russian troops was not broken through, and the main forces of the Great Army were spent on their assault. Already at dusk, the French emperor gives the order to leave the captured Russian fortifications and retreat to their original positions. Costing such huge losses, Bagration's flushes and Raevsky's Battery turned out to be useless for the French. The losses of the Grand Army amounted to 58,000 soldiers, 1,600 officers and 47 generals killed, wounded and missing. The battle cost the Russian troops the loss of 38,000 soldiers, 1,500 officers and 29 generals killed, wounded and missing.

For Napoleon, the general battle ended in vain. He did not achieve any of his goals, the Russian army retained its combat capability, and Bonaparte could not call the battle a victory either. Most of the experienced, hardened soldiers were killed in the battle, and no reserves could make up for this loss. The future of the campaign was also in doubt. The morale of the army has fallen.

On the contrary, Kutuzov had every reason to consider the battle his success. Despite heavy losses, his army did not allow itself to be defeated and maintained a high morale until the end of the battle. The line of Russian troops was not broken, and the enemy was exhausted and bled. However, despite the general desire to continue the battle the next day, Kutuzov ordered a general retreat. He understood that without the approach of reserves and proper rest, the army was not able to continue the campaign and bring the war to a decisive victory, while Bonaparte's losses were irreparable, and every extra day of the war moved him more and more away from a successful outcome for him.

M.I. Kutuzov wrote about the results of the battle as follows: “The battle that took place on the 26th was the most bloody of all those that are known in modern times. The place of the battle was completely won by us, and the enemy then retreated to the position in which he came to attack us.

And here is Napoleon's assessment: “The Battle of the Moscow River was one of those battles where the greatest virtues were shown and the least results were achieved. The French in it showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians deserved the right to be invincible.

Battle of Borodino(in French history - the battle on the Moscow River, French Bataille de la Moskova) - the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian and French armies. It took place on August 26 (September 7), 1812 near the village of Borodino, 125 km west of Moscow.

During the 12-hour battle, the French army managed to capture the positions of the Russian army in the center and on the left wing, but after the cessation of hostilities, the French army withdrew to its original positions. The next day, the command of the Russian army began to withdraw troops.

It is considered the bloodiest one-day battle in history.

General description of the Battle of Borodino

The battle of Shevardino and the disposition of troops before the battle of Borodino are indicated on the diagram. Napoleon's initial plan, which consisted of bypassing the left flank of the 2nd Army along the Old Smolensk Road and pushing the Russian army to the confluence of the Moskva River and Kolocha, was thwarted, after which Napoleon launched a frontal attack on the 2nd Army with the forces of the corps of Davout, Ney, Junot and Murat's reserve cavalry in order to break through its defenses in the direction of vil. Semyonovskoye with an auxiliary attack by the forces of the 1st division on vil. Borodino. The French troops, having a 1.5 - 2-fold superiority in forces, several times thrown back and pursued to their positions by much smaller Russian forces, by noon, at the cost of huge losses, took the forward positions of the left wing of the Russian troops - flushes. The withdrawal of the main forces of the left wing to the main positions led to the retreat of the Russian troops on the Old Smolensk road in order to eliminate the gap in the front. The offensive of the French troops on the main positions of the left wing behind the ravine of the Semyonovsky stream was repulsed, and the reserves were pinned down by the maneuver of the light and Cossack cavalry, which went to the rear of Napoleon's army. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Napoleon transferred the main blow to the center of the Russian army, creating a decisive numerical superiority against him and concentrating here selected units of heavy cavalry (The Russians took part in repelling the third attack on the Raevsky battery from the Russians: 6th infantry corps D.S. Dokhturov as part of the 7th and 24th infantry divisions - a total of 8539 people; 4th infantry corps of A. I. Osterman-Tolstoy - 11th and 23rd infantry divisions, a total of 9950 people; 2nd ( F.K. Korf) and the 3rd cavalry corps (in his own subordination) - 2.5 thousand people each; part of the forces of the 5th infantry corps - 6 battalions and 8 squadrons. Total number of troops: about 21.5 thousand infantry and 5.6 thousand cavalry.Napoleon concentrated for the attack: 3 infantry divisions - Moran, Gerard, Broussier - about 19 thousand people; 3 cavalry corps - Latour-Maubourg, Caulaincourt (replacing Montbrun), Pears - about 10.5 thousand cavalry; the Italian Guard (about 7 thousand infantry and cavalry); part of the forces of the Young Guard (14 battalions). Total St. 40 thousand people. The number of units is indicated full-time. By the time the attack began, many units on both sides suffered significant losses . Borodino. ed. "Soviet Russia", 1975. p. 17 - 37). As a result, the French troops, at the cost of huge losses, especially in the cavalry, stormed the Rayevsky battery, but when they tried to develop an offensive against the center of the Russian troops, the latter were driven back by the forces of two cavalry corps.

“Kutuzov forced Napoleon to use the excellent French cavalry in frontal attacks in the conditions of terrible crowding of the battlefield. In this tightness, most of the French cavalry died under Russian grapeshot, under bullets and bayonets of the Russian infantry, under the blades of the Russian cavalry. The losses of the French cavalry were so great that The battle of Borodino in history is called the "grave of the French cavalry" (V.V. Pruntsov. Battle of Borodino. M, 1947) The reserves remaining with Napoleon were not brought into the battle because of the likely threat of their extermination, perceived by Napoleon. Thus, the French troops , advancing 0.5 - 1 km, were stopped by Russian troops in all directions."
V. V. Pruntsov. Battle of Borodino. M, 1947

The battle of Borodino, planned by Napoleon to a considerable depth with the important role of the flank bypass of the 2nd Army by Poniatovsky's corps, in reality was a set of bloody frontal battles, directly on the defense line of the left wing of the Russian troops, in which the main masses of the French troops were bled. During these battles, both sides alternately attacked and defended the fleches, and the French troops, capturing the fleches, defended them at a disadvantage, as they were subjected to counterattacks from the rear of the fleches, unprotected and vulnerable to gunfire. Napoleon's attempt to change the nature of the battle by defeating the Russian troops in the center had a similar result: a fierce battle for the Raevsky battery led to the mutual extermination of the forces of both sides. Occupied, due to numerical superiority, the Raevsky battery, the French troops were unable to develop the offensive.

The question of the exact course of the battle remains open due to the inconsistency of both domestic reports on the battle (the most famous discrepancies are in the reports of K. F. Toll, M. B. Barclay de Tolly, A. P. Yermolov), and because of inconsistencies between domestic and French evidence about the timing and number of French attacks. The most convincing version of the battle about the six-hour battle for the flushes is based on the chronology presented by K. Tol and confirmed by F. Segur from the French side (As reliable and independent evidence in favor of the long battles for the flushes, one can cite the testimony of the English general Robert Thomas Wilson (1777-1849 ), a participant in the Battle of Borodino, who was at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. Already in 1813, that is, before the formation of the domestic tradition of describing the battle, the first edition of his book “The Narrative of the Events that Happened During the Invasion of Napoleon Bonaparte into Russia and the Retreat of the French army in 1812". In this work, the decisive battle for the flashes and the wounding of Bagration are attributed to the 1st hour of the day. See Robert Thomas Wilson. UK op. M .: ROSSPEN - 2008, 494p. Art. 140).

Despite the advantage in the defensive battle near Borodino, the Russian army was forced to resume the retreat. The reasons for leaving were:

• In significant losses, which, with a significant numerical superiority of the enemy (who suffered no less losses) at the beginning of the battle, determined the balance of forces that remained unfavorable for the Russian army by the end of the battle. This point of view is widespread, however, there is evidence that Kutuzov, already after the news of the losses, intended to continue the battle and canceled the decision only in connection with the approach of reinforcements to Napoleon, which changed the balance of power: "The commander-in-chief of all armies saw that the enemy in today's battle weakened no less than us and ordered the armies to line up and resume the battle with the enemy tomorrow ... "(" Note by M. B. Barclay de Tolly to K. F. Baggovut of August 26 ")
• In the fundamental impossibility for the Russian army to make up for losses at the expense of trained replacements, which opportunity, which created a fundamentally unequal balance of forces, was possessed by the enemy. Already on August 27 (September 8), 6 thousand soldiers joined the main forces of Napoleon. the division of Pino, and on September 11 - the division of Delaborde (in total, in two divisions - 11 thousand people);); The total number of divisions and reserve battalions that were on the way to Napoleon was about 40 thousand people. (“Borodino”, Art. 108. M., Soviet Russia, 1975).
• In the strategic plan of the war, M. I. Kutuzov, who was not going to defend Moscow and considered unnecessary a general battle for Moscow. The corresponding defensive tactics of Kutuzov in the battle of Borodino were subordinated to this plan and had the goal of preserving the army in the general battle, to which Kutuzov went as a result of the demand of all layers Russian society. /Cm. below/

The result of the battle of Borodino

The result of the Battle of Borodino is a combination of two facts, the reliability of which is beyond doubt:

1) Tactical acquisitions of the French army, due to the actions of Napoleon, who concentrated a powerful group in the direction of attack.

2) Demonstration by the Russian troops of unconditional superiority over the French troops in terms of overall combat capability, incl. in steadfastness and military skill ("moral victory"), emanating from the failure of Napoleon's intentions to decisively defeat the Russian army by forces that actually had a superiority in numbers over the Russian troops by 2 times or more. Attributing this fact to the result of the battle is due to the fact that it was the indicated superiority of the Russian troops, according to Leo Tolstoy, that led to victory in the war:

A direct consequence of the battle of Borodino was the causeless flight of Napoleon from Moscow, the return along the old Smolensk road, the death of the five hundred thousandth invasion and the death of Napoleonic France, which for the first time near Borodino was laid down by the strongest enemy in spirit

tactical victory

The material results of the battle (without taking into account the moral victory of the Russian army) - greater losses of the French troops and the reflection of their offensive with significantly smaller forces, the fire advantage of the Russian artillery, which developed in the afternoon, futility territorial acquisitions of the French, a self-destructive frontal attack of the French cavalry on the barrow heights - a kind of "Napoleon's gesture of despair" - denotes a tactical victory for the Russian army in the Battle of Borodino.

The battle of Borodino, like the battle of Novi for the French army, had a pronounced defensive character on the part of the Russians. With a significant numerical superiority of the French army at the beginning of the battle (by more than 20 thousand) / cm. lower /, the faster consumption of French troops led to the fact that by the end of the battle the difference in the number of fresh troops was reduced to 10 thousand (According to the encyclopedia "Patriotic War of 1812", the Old and most of the forces of the Young Guard remained in Napoleon's reserve - approx. 18 thousand people; in the reserve of Kutuzov - Guards Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments, as well as 4, 30, 48 Chasseur regiments - up to 9 thousand people in total.). However, neither the numerical superiority of the attackers, nor the more intensive deployment of reserves by them into battle, turned the tide of the battle. The French army, attacking with far superior forces, was stopped, advancing 0.5 - 1 km. In this new position, the French troops were subjected to devastating bombardment and, by evening, were for the most part withdrawn from their captured positions.

Not only Kutuzov, but also Barclay de Tolly, who criticized Kutuzov for miscalculations in the battle of Borodino, was categorically convinced that the battle of Borodino was not only a moral and strategic, but also a tactical victory for the Russians. As for the question of the importance of the positions of the Russian army, Barclay believed that it was at the end of the battle that the Russian army retreated to the most advantageous positions in which it should have fought the battle. This view was shared by many other generals.

"Military history is part of historical science, because it considers one of the aspects of the history of human society; at the same time, it is part of military science, because it studies and generalizes the experience of preparing and waging past wars."

At the end of the 20th century, some Russian civilian historians who do not have special military knowledge (N. Troitsky, V. Zemtsov and others) take it without hesitation to judge the tactical victory in the battle of Borodino, which is seen as the French army. General wording: the French have seized all supposedly key positions. Without following the example of these amateurs in the field of military tactics, we state the facts:

1) Arguments about military tactics and the concept of "tactical victory" belong to the sphere of military thought. The historian cannot afford this without falling into bias. In contact with the special aspects of an event (in particular, a military one), the historian's mind is manifested in the fact that, having illuminated them, he can refrain from controversial judgments. An example is Karamzin's description of Timur's actions in the battle with Tokhtamysh on the Terek.

2) The barrow height, taken by the French troops, dominated the surrounding area. However, the conclusion from this about its "key role" is an alogism. Indeed, the fortress of Novi can be cited as a key position in the center: its capture by the Russians led to the immediate defeat of the French army in the battle of Novi. The capture of Kurgan height did not lead to a decrease in the stability of the Russian center. The same applies to the flushes, which were only defensive structures of the position of the left flank of the Russian army. A military historian, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, I.P. Liprandi, who defended Raevsky’s battery throughout the entire battle, criticized the opinion of Raevsky’s battery as a “key position” (“I.P. Liprandi.” Notes on “Description of the Patriotic War of 1812 » Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky"")

On October 3, 1812, the English newspapers The Courier and The Times published a report from the English ambassador Katkar from St. Petersburg, in which he said that his army imperial majesty Alexander I won the most stubborn battle of Borodino. During October, The Times wrote about the Battle of Borodino 8 times, calling the day of the battle "a grandiose memorable day in Russian history" and "the fatal battle of Bonaparte." The British ambassador and the press did not consider the retreat after the battle and the abandonment of Moscow as a result of the battle, understanding the impact on these events of a strategic situation unfavorable for Russia. war of 1812. Abstracts of a scientific conference, 1992. pp. 24 - 27) The same opinion was shared by Soviet historiography, which developed the study of the Battle of Borodino through the efforts of qualified historians with special knowledge in the field of military affairs. Their insight and research qualities are lacking for a number of modern Russian historians who publish low-skilled, often Russophobic studies under the pretext of reviving a “critical point of view”.

Napoleon's goal in the Battle of Borodino

Napoleon, having missed the opportunity to defeat the 1st and 2nd armies separately, sought to defeat the main forces of the Russian army in a pitched battle. Considering options for an offensive in the battle of Borodino, he rejected the option of bypassing the southern flank of the Russian army for fear that a detour would force Kutuzov to continue his retreat. Napoleon's plan, worked out on August 25 after the reconnaissance, was as follows: to transfer troops to the right bank of the Kolocha and, relying on Borodino, which became, as it were, the axis of entry, bring down the main forces on the 2nd Army and defeat it; then, directing all forces against the 1st Army, push it to the corner of the confluence of the Moscow River and Kolocha and destroy it. In accordance with this plan, up to 115 thousand people were concentrated on the right bank of the Kolocha from the evening of August 25 to August 26 and a huge superiority was created over the 2nd Army, which, together with the Cossacks, numbered up to 34 thousand people. Thus, Napoleon's plan pursued the decisive goal of destroying the entire Russian army in a pitched battle. Napoleon had no doubts about victory, the confidence in which, at sunrise on August 26, he expressed the words "this is the sun of Austerlitz!"

However, after the battle for the fleches, Napoleon's goal changed radically. The refusal to introduce the last reserves into battle, according to Napoleon's explanation, in quoting the military historian General G. Jomini, looked like this: "" as soon as we captured the position of the left flank, I was already sure that the enemy would retreat during the night. Why was it voluntary to undergo the dangerous consequences of the new Poltava?"

It can be seen from this that 1) the assumption that Napoleon was saving the guard for a new battle near Moscow is untenable - Napoleon was afraid of being subjected to the ""consequences of the new Poltava"" precisely on the Borodino field. 2) if, before the battle of Borodino, Napoleon was waiting for an opportunity to destroy the Russian army, not content with capturing space (which corresponded to the strategic views of Napoleon), then after capturing the flushes, he wanted the outcome of the battle in the form of a voluntary retreat of the Russian army, which took place from the very beginning of the war and could not be goal of a general battle.

The goal of M. I. Kutuzov in the battle of Borodino

In the strategic plan for the conduct of the war, M.I. Kutuzov, the general battle with Napoleon was unnecessary, and was accepted by him under the pressure of circumstances (“Kutuzov knew that they would not allow him to give up Moscow without a general battle, and he, despite his Russian surname, was not allowed to do this is Barclay. And he decided to give this battle, unnecessary, according to his deepest conviction... Unnecessary strategically, it was morally and politically necessary". Tarle E. "Napoleon". M .: Nauka, 1991, p.266). Kutuzov told the emperor about holding Moscow when he left St. Petersburg (When leaving St. Petersburg, Kutuzov made a promise to Alexander I that he would “rather lay down the bones than allow the enemy to Moscow.” But at the same time he writes a letter Miloradovich - the head of the reserve troops about the need for reserves, without which the 1st and 2nd armies could not withstand the onslaught of the enemy) ... it was set in view of the troops to have a secondary wall against enemy forces on Moscow along the road from Dorogobuzh in the hope that our enemy would find others barriers on the road to Moscow, when, more than aspirations, the forces of the 1st and 2nd Western armies were insufficient to resist him. "Upon arrival at the Kutuzov army, entering into circumstances and making sure of the numerical superiority of the enemy and the lack of trained reserves among the Russians, continued to express confidence in the defense of Moscow and victory.But at the same time, he set the condition for success to have trained reserves, which at that time were not.Instead of the expected 60 thousand trained soldiers near Gzhatsk, about 15.5 thousand joined the Russian army, instead of the promised 80 thousand trained Moscow militia F. Rastopchin gathered about 7 thousand poorly trained and almost unarmed militia. Kutuzov focused the emperor's attention on the absence of serious reserves and the losses that the army suffered in a collision with the enemy's vanguard. Kutuzov’s personal correspondence by this time contains a clear doubt about the possibility of defending Moscow (Letter from Kutuzov to his daughter dated August 19 demanding to leave the Moscow region for Nizhny Novgorod: “I must say frankly that I don’t like your stay near Tarusa at all ... so I want you left away from the theater of war ... But I demand that everything I said be kept in the deepest secrecy, because if it gets publicized, you will do me great harm ... leave, by all means."). In the conditions of the continued numerical superiority of the enemy, Kutuzov retreated from Tsarevo-Zaimishche on August 19. In letters to N. I. Saltykov, P. H. Wittgenstein, F. F. Rostopchin August 19 - 21, Kutuzov writes about the need for a general battle to "save Moscow", which he is going to give in the Mozhaisk region. It can be seen from this that, not being sure that it will be possible to stop the enemy, Kutuzov does not disclose his uncertainty in order to avoid undermining the morale of the army before the general battle, which he had no way to avoid in any case. On August 22, Kutuzov made a reconnaissance of the Borodino field.

On August 22, after the reconnaissance, Kutuzov wrote in a letter to Rastopchin: “I hope to fight in the current position ... and if I am defeated, then I will go to Moscow and there I will defend the capital” (M. I. Kutuzov. Documents. vol. 4, part 1). 1, document No. 157, p.129). From these words, it is quite clear that Kutuzov's intention is not only not to run the risk of defeating his troops, but also to be able, if necessary, to retreat in an organized manner in the face of persecution by the enemy. It should be noted that the actual withdrawal of the Russian army from the Borodino field was carried out by Kutuzov in the consciousness of his victory over the enemy.

In general, Kutuzov's lack of desire to defend Moscow at any cost was well known to many participants in the Battle of Borodino, some of whom became its historians. Clausewitz wrote: “Kutuzov probably would not have given the Battle of Borodino, in which he did not expect to win, if the voice of the court, the army and all of Russia had not forced him to do so. It must be assumed that he viewed this battle as a necessary evil. Doubts about the purpose of the Battle of Borodino as the salvation of Moscow from Kutuzov were expressed by I.P. Liprandi. The extremely negative reaction of P. Bagration to the appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief is known: "this goose of the enemy will lead to Moscow." The best way Kutuzov’s strategic mind is characterized by the phrase attributed to him: “I’m not thinking about how to defeat Napoleon, but about how to deceive him.”

Thus, the salvation of Moscow is a false goal of Kutuzov in the Battle of Borodino, which in reality did not take place, and the abandonment of Moscow by the Russian army is a false result of the Battle of Borodino, which is resorted to by French historians and some Russian historians of modern times. The goal of Kutuzov in the battle was to preserve the army, and the only material result of the Battle of Borodino was the successful repulsion of the attacks of the French troops by half the forces of the Russian troops with insignificant acquisitions of the French on the battlefield - the batteries of Raevsky and Bagration's flashes - which were not key to the defense system of the Russian army.

Some questions of the battle of Borodino

Side losses

The losses of the parties on August 24 - 26 amounted to: the Russian army, including the Cossack troops and the militia - about 40 thousand people; Napoleon's army according to reasonable scientific estimates - from 50 to 60 thousand people. The losses of the officers of the parties are precisely determined. They amounted to: in the Russian army - 1487 people (maximum estimate); in the army of Napoleon - 1928 people. The battle of Borodino was and still remains one of the bloodiest one-day battles in the history of wars.

Losses of the Russian army

A common estimate of the losses of the Russian army is up to 15,000 killed and up to 30,000 wounded. (At the first time after the battle, A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danielevsky's losses were circulated at 59,000 people - of which the losses in the 1st Army, according to the report of the general on duty of the 1st Army, were about 39,000, and the losses of the 2nd Army were arbitrary estimated at 20,000. These data were no longer considered reliable even when the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary was created, which indicates the number of losses “up to 40,000.” Modern historians believe that the December summary of the 1st Army also applied to the 2nd army, so the latter was disbanded in September, its units and subunits became part of the 1st (Main) Army and Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky losses were summarized due to a misunderstanding.) In total, up to 45,000 with possible errors (ignoring a number of individual units) and losses of the Cossacks and militias. This figure, however, should be regarded as exaggerated, since the estimated losses of the Cossacks (not reflected in the documents) are several hundred people, and the estimated losses of the militia are up to 1 thousand. On August 24-26, regular troops lost approx. 39 200 - 21766 in the 1st Army and 17445 in the 2nd):

Below are the losses according to the corps records, which contain information about the maximum possible losses of the Russian army from August 24 to 26 (S. V. Lvov. "On the losses of the Russian army in the battle of Borodino)

• 2nd infantry. bldg. (Lieutenant General K. F. Baggovut) - 3,017 (out of 11,452)
• 3rd infantry. bldg. (Lieutenant General N. A. Tuchkov - 1) - 3,626 (out of 12,211)
• 4th infantry. bldg. (Lieutenant General A. I. Osterman - Tolstoy) - 4001 (out of 9950)
• 5th infantry. bldg. (Lieutenant General N.I. Lavrov) - 5704 (out of 17,255)
• 6th infantry. bldg. (General of Infantry D.S. Dokhturov) - 3875 (out of 8539)
• 1st cav. bldg. (Lieutenant General F. P. Uvarov) - 137 (out of 2440)
• 2nd cav. bldg. (Major General F.K. Korf) - 587 (out of 2505)
• 3rd cav. bldg. (subordinate to Major General F.K. Korf) - 819 (out of 2505) Total in the 1st Western Army 21,766 people killed, wounded, missing

• 7th infantry. bldg. (Lieutenant General N. N. Raevsky) - 6278 (out of 11,853)
• 8th infantry. bldg. (Lieutenant General M. M. Borozdin - 1) - 9473 (out of 14,504)
• 4th cav. bldg. (Major General K. K. Sievers) - 874 (out of 2256)
• 2nd kir. div. (Major General I. M. Duka) - 920 (out of 2044) Total in the 2nd Western Army 17,445 people killed, wounded, missing

In total, there are 39,211 men in both armies. Of this number: 14,361 killed; 14,701 wounded; missing 10,249 people.

A number of units on both sides lost most of their composition. The 2nd consolidated grenadier division of M. S. Vorontsov, which participated in the Shevardino battle and withstood the 3rd attack on the flushes, retained about 300 people in its composition (it should be noted that this consolidated division was small and consisted of 11 consolidated battalions of 3- x-company staff with a total number of up to 4 thousand people). The French infantry regiment of Bonami was subjected to a similar extermination, retaining 300 out of 4100 people in its ranks after the battle for the Raevsky battery.

The 6th Infantry Corps of D.S. Dokhturov, according to the research of V.S. Lvov, lost a total of 3875 people out of 8539. Of this number, 2578 people were killed, wounded and missing, the 24th Infantry Division, reflecting the 3rd attack on Raevsky's battery.

French army losses

With the losses of the French army, the situation is less certain, since most of the archives of the Grand Army shared its fate in 1812. There is a widespread estimate of losses of about 30 thousand, the source of which is the data on the report of the inspector at the General Staff of Napoleon Denier about 28,000 killed and wounded. Denier's data on total losses cannot be verified by other documents, however, the implausible ratio in the report of those killed and the total number of wounded - 1: 3.27 (6550 and 21 450, respectively) in relation to that ratio in the Russian army (1: 0 .6-1:1.7)

The part of the information in the Denier report (regarding officer losses) that has been verified is all the more evidence that the report does not reflect the losses of the French army. This was established in 1899 by the French historian A. Martinien, who discovered a huge discrepancy between the number of killed officers given by Denier - 269 and the result of his own research - 460. Later studies increased the number of killed officers, known by surname, to 480 - that is, by almost 80% . French historians admit that "since the information given in the statement about the generals and colonels who were out of action under Borodino is inaccurate and underestimated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier's figures are based on incomplete data." A.Lashuk. "Napoleon. Campaigns and battles 1796-1815. F. Segur estimates the losses of the Great Army at Borodino at 40 thousand people.

At present, the following losses of the officers of the Great Army at Borodino are considered to be established: 480 killed and 1448 wounded.
The loss of officers of the Russian army is significantly lower: 237 killed and missing and about 1250 wounded, according to the maximum estimate / cm. article by V. Lvov/. There is a lower estimate of Russian losses: 211 killed and about 1,180 wounded. (Vdovin. Borodino. M, Sputnik +, - 2008. 321 p.)

In restoring the picture of the losses of the French troops, the testimonies of individual participants in the battle play a role. These include K. Clausewitz's data on Junot's 8th corps, which numbered 5,700 people after the battle (the number at the beginning of the battle was 9,656 people). At the same time, Junot's corps, which, according to this evidence, lost up to 4 thousand people, that is, about 40% of the composition, did not belong to the corps that suffered the greatest losses, since it did not storm the fortifications from the front and did not participate in the Shevardinsky battle.

An important source that can shed light on the total losses of the French is information about the number of those buried in the Borodino field. Russian historians, and, in particular, the employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino field, estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48 - 50 thousand people (according to the director of the museum A. Sukhanov, the number of those buried on the Borodino field without including burials in the surrounding villages and in the Kolotsk Monastery, as well as burials of the Great Patriotic War, - 49887 ("Motherland", No. 2 for 2005. According to A. Sukhanov, 39201 horses were also buried on the Borodino field).A rough estimate of the number of buried Russians (including the militia and the Cossacks ) does not exceed 25,000: no more than 15,000 dead and no more than 10,000 dead on the battlefield (minus 700 prisoners from the 10,149 missing and taking into account the losses of the militia).
The corresponding number of French dead or wounded and dying in the near future is 25,000.

An estimate of the ratio of those killed and those who died from wounds to the total losses in the Russian army - 39.2 / 25 for the French army gives a similar loss of ~ 39,200.

However, the actual number of buried Frenchmen was significantly higher, since, unlike 25,000 Russian burials (their total number, since the wounded Russians (over 14 thousand), taken to the rear, for the most part did not have serious injuries and did not die from wounds (As is known, more than 20,000 wounded Russian soldiers and officers, including those wounded in the battle of Borodino, were taken to Moscow.) The 25,000 French burials do not include thousands of burials in the Kolotsky Monastery, where the main hospital of the Great Army was located, in which, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th line regiment Charles Francois, 3/4 of all the wounded who were in it died in the 10 days following the battle.In other words, if 25 thousand Russians buried on the Borodino field are killed and seriously wounded, who died later, then 25 thousand Frenchmen buried on the field were mostly killed in the battle, as the seriously wounded were brought to the vicinity of the Kolotsk monastery (F. Segur. "Campaign to Russia" "" The rest of it (Napoleon's army - author) scattered across the battlefield to raise the wounded, who numbered 20,000. They were taken 2 miles back to the Kolochsky Monastery"), where they died. Accordingly, the total losses of the French army in the Battle of Borodino were significantly higher than the figure of 39 thousand.

The estimate of the losses of the French troops at 30 thousand (the fallacy of which for many French historians is undeniable) and so (for example, the estimate of losses of 35 thousand proposed by A. Lashuk and J. Blond) is in conflict with both the ratio of the losses of the officers of both armies, and with the results of research by Russian scientists on the Borodino field.

According to the totality of studies of losses, scientific domestic historiography adheres to the estimate of the losses of the French army from 50 to 60 thousand people with a priority of 58 - 60 thousand people, including by type of troops: 44% of the infantry and 58% of the cavalry of their total number.

Methodology for assessing losses by analogy with other battles

Historian A. Vasilyev, in defense of Denier's data, offers a method for indirectly assessing the losses of the French, based on a comparison of the battle of Borodino with the battle of Wagram on July 5-6, 1809, "similar in scale" (A. Vasilyev's expression - author). Since the losses of the French in the latter are accepted by A. Vasiliev as exactly known - 33,854 people, including 1862 - command personnel, then, according to A. Vasiliev, the losses of the French at Borodino (with approximately equal loss of command personnel) should be about 30 thousand pers.

This reasoning, although it mentions the "similar scale" of the battles (which is not entirely true: 170 thousand French and 110 thousand Austrians took part in the Wagram battle. The front of the Austrian army was stretched for more than 20 km. A specific feature of the battle is the prolonged forcing by the French troops of the Danube under heavy fire from the Austrians), in essence, proceeds from the ratio of losses of general and command personnel. In addition, the difference in the nature of battles, which significantly determines losses, is fundamentally set aside. Since this method is empirical, its result must be confirmed by as many examples as possible. As such, it is convenient to take the battle of Trebbia, in which the losses of the French are also exactly known. In this battle, the French army, which consisted of 6 divisions, identical to the divisions of the Grand Army, was defeated. The loss of prisoners amounted to more than a third of the strength of the entire army, and thus can reliably reflect the desired ratio. For 12,280 prisoners, there were 514 commanding officers (including 4 generals, 8 colonels, 502 officers). The ratio 1/23.9 gives the number of total losses of the French army at Borodino 46 thousand people - 50% higher than the result of A. Vasiliev. Therefore, this technique leads to conflicting results. It is based on a comparison of two different battles (in relation to which the author, however, is trying to make an attempt at unification), while a more reliable method for comparing the losses of command personnel of the Russian and French armies in the Battle of Borodino does not require dubious theorizing

Methodology for assessing losses by analyzing the balance of the size of the army

This method of assessing losses is capable of clarifying the issue of losses, but only on condition that all losses and replenishments of the army are taken into account. A. Vasiliev, using this technique, among the reinforcements that arrived to the French army from September 7 to 20 calls
2 divisions of 11 thousand people and 4 cavalry regiments (2 thousand people). Battalions of marching reinforcements remain without attention (the total number of battalions on the way to the French army is about 30 thousand people (see the section “ general description Battle of Borodino). For example, the 30th line regiment, reduced as a result of the battle from 3 thousand to 268 people, a week later, according to C. Francois, already had 900 people. The regiment owed this profit precisely to the parts of the marching replenishment; profit could not have been caused by the return to service of such a significant number of wounded who recovered so quickly, since most of the wounded in the battle of Borodino did not survive at all. By ignoring the issue of marching reinforcements, A. Vasiliev determines the losses of the French army on August 24-26 at 34 thousand people.

Number of parties

The issue of the absolute number of parties, but not the relative one, is debatable: the French army had a significant numerical superiority - 130-135 thousand against 103 thousand in the Russian regular troops (97,510 people consisting of 7 infantry and 5 cavalry corps and 1 cuirassier division, as well as 2644 - a reserve of artillery and 2.5 thousand at the Main Apartment.In total - 71,297 in the 1st Army, 31,357 in the 2nd Army), to which Cossack troops are usually added - about 8.2 thousand people (respectively 5,500 and 2,700 in the 1st and 2nd armies).

The number of military branches:

Infantry: from 86 to 90 thousand (without non-combat units) - French; OK. 72 thousand (without militia) - Russians

Cavalry: from 28 to 29 thousand - French; 17 thousand (without Cossacks) - Russians

Artillery, engineering troops etc.: 16 thousand - the French; 14 thousand - Russians
Total: 130 - 135 thousand - French; 103 thousand - Russians

The numerical superiority of the French army in regular cavalry was especially pronounced, and the share of heavy cavalry in it exceeded that of the Russian army. The Russian army had an insignificant superiority in artillery, but the proportion of heavy guns in it exceeded that of the enemy. (see below)

In addition to regular troops, there were irregulars on both sides - from 10 to 20 thousand Russian militia (the number of 10 thousand is strictly proven) and about 15 thousand non-combatant soldiers in Napoleon's army, and the latter fact is silent by N. Troitsky and some other modern historians , to which both B. Abalikhin and S. Lvov pay attention (Abalikhin B.S. On the issue of the size of the Russian army in the battle of Borodino). The material is available on the website of the Borodino Museum-Reserve). In addition, the use of an uncritical approach to sources gives them reason to overestimate the size of the Russian army from 154 to 157 thousand people ("see ibid., Abalikhin B.S."). Kutuzov poorly trained militia, armed for the most part with axes and pikes, was not considered a significant military force.

"The militias of Smolensk and Moscow, whose regiments had not yet all joined the army, had almost no firearms. In general, they barely had a semblance of a military device. For a month, taken from the plow ... although they were burning with zeal to fight, it was still impossible to fight them into the right battle with the experienced regiments of Napoleon. (A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky) ".

The militia performed auxiliary functions and took a limited part in the battles on the Old Smolensk road, where they showed high moral qualities.
The only direct evidence of the participation of the militias in the battle is the rapport of K. F. Baggovud about the support of five hundred warriors of the Moscow militia for the attack of the Ryazan and Vilmanstrand regiments. The militia did not suffer significant losses in the Battle of Borodino. (V. Khlestkin. Moscow and Smolensk militia under Borodino. Moscow magazine, 1.09.2001)

Artillery action on both sides

The actions of the artillery of both sides received a high mutual assessment. There is a significant amount of evidence from the participants in the battle on both sides of the significant losses inflicted by their artillery on the enemy and the detrimental effect of enemy artillery fire. The number of shots fired by French artillery - about 60 thousand - exceeded the number of Russian shots, since the French artillery, which was smaller in mass, had a higher combat rate of fire (French artillery included, for the most part, 3 and 4 pounders cannons, while the composition of Russian artillery - only 12-pounder and 6-pounder guns, as well as unicorns.) (A. Nilus. History of the material part of artillery). The shorter recoil length of light guns and the lower efforts of the cannon servants to roll the cannons, the lower weight of the cannonballs led to a higher rate of fire of French artillery during periods of greatest activity - that is, relatively short periods of fire training that preceded the attacks of the French troops. In the course of counter-battery firing and long-term methodical shelling of positions that took place in the last phase of the battle, this advantage of light artillery lost its significance. At the same time, the average destructive power of the shot was on the side of the Russian artillery, both due to the larger average caliber, and due to the unicorns, which fired explosive grenades at a long range, significantly superior to cannonballs in terms of damaging effect.) 12-pound guns and half-poods unicorns accounted for up to 1/4 of the Russian artillery, while only 10% of the French artillery was represented by 12 and 8 pounder guns. The range of actual firing of 12-pounder Russian guns was 1200 m, French - no more than 1000 m. The French side carried out more intensive maneuvering of artillery. In the final phase of the battle of Borodino, with the troops in a basically established position, the Russian artillery won counter-battery fire and inflicted huge losses on the French troops, including those who occupied Kurgan heights, as a result of which the French artillery fell silent and the French troops retreated along the front, leaving the Borodino field.

The course of the battle of Borodino

A number of historians, who prefer the testimonies of the participants in the battle, who adhered to the view of the more fleeting course of the battle on the left wing, attempts are being made to reconstruct the corresponding consistent course of the battle. These attempts are based on individual erroneous testimonies of the participants in the battle and the falsified assertion that the version of the battle for flushes before noon is based solely on the words of Toll, while already in 1813 the English general T. Wilson, an eyewitness of the battle, wrote about the same duration of these battles . Such a reconstruction is presented, in particular, in the work of L. Ivchenko “The Battle of Borodino. The history of the Russian version of events. In accordance with this reconstruction, the French carried out 3 attacks on the flushes: the first - by the forces of Davout's corps - at 6 o'clock in the morning; the second attack - by the corps of Davout and Ney began at 8 in the morning. It was during this attack that Bagration carried out the famous bayonet counterattack. The French were driven back, about 9 o'clock, Bagration was wounded, after which the French captured the flushes a second time; shortly after this, Konovnitsyn's division, which was going to help Bagration, again threw the French from the flushes, after which Konovnitsyn withdrew the troops of the left wing to the Semyonov Heights. The French troops, who occupied the flushes for the third time, at about 10 in the morning launched an attack on the main positions of the left wing behind the Semyonov ravine, but were not successful. In this reconstruction, the movement of Junot's corps through the Utitsky forest is explained by Ney's desire to fill the gap between Davout's corps, which advanced a kilometer ahead, and Poniatowski's corps. There were two attacks on the Raevsky battery - the first at 8 in the morning, simultaneously with the main attack on the flashes, which was repelled at about 9 in the morning and the second, which began at about 14.00

Problems of the alternative chronology of the battle

The point of view of Leo Tolstoy on the chronology of the battle

One of the problems with the alternative chronology is the fact that Leo Tolstoy stuck to the first option - defending the flushes before noon. The attitude of historians towards Tolstoy is well known: since Tolstoy was far from commendable about the activities of historians, candidates and doctors of historical sciences prefer to pretend that Tolstoy never wrote about any Battle of Borodino. Meanwhile, Tolstoy was not only a great thinker who comprehended the events of 1812, having rich personal military experience, but also a scrupulous researcher of actual events. It is known that only in the Yasnaya Polyana library he collected more than 2 thousand works devoted to the Patriotic War, which were studied by Tolstoy from a critical position. Tolstoy adhered to the version about 6-hour attacks on flushes.

The main battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian army under the command of General M. I. Kutuzov and the French army of Napoleon I Bonaparte took place on August 26 (September 7) near the village of Borodino near Mozhaisk, 125 km west of Moscow.

It is considered the bloodiest one-day battle in history.

About 300 thousand people participated in this grandiose battle on both sides with 1200 artillery pieces. At the same time, the French army had a significant numerical superiority - 130-135 thousand people against 103 thousand people in the Russian regular troops.

Prehistory

“In five years I will be master of the world. There is only Russia left, but I will crush it.”- with these words, Napoleon and his 600,000th army crossed the Russian border.

Since the beginning of the invasion of the French army into the territory Russian Empire in June 1812, the Russian troops were constantly retreating. The rapid advance and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the French made it impossible for the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, to prepare the troops for battle. The protracted retreat caused public discontent, so Emperor Alexander I removed Barclay de Tolly and appointed General of Infantry Kutuzov as commander-in-chief.

However, the new commander-in-chief chose the path of retreat. The strategy chosen by Kutuzov was based, on the one hand, on exhausting the enemy, on the other hand, on waiting for reinforcements sufficient for a decisive battle with Napoleon's army.

On August 22 (September 3), the Russian army, retreating from Smolensk, settled down near the village of Borodino, 125 km from Moscow, where Kutuzov decided to give a general battle; it was impossible to postpone it further, since Emperor Alexander demanded that Kutuzov stop the advance of Emperor Napoleon towards Moscow.

The idea of ​​​​the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, was to inflict as many losses as possible on the French troops through active defense, change the balance of forces, save Russian troops for further battles and for the complete defeat of the French army. In accordance with this plan, a battle order was built Russian troops.

The order of battle of the Russian army was composed of three lines: the first was for the infantry corps, the second for the cavalry, and the third for the reserves. The artillery of the army was evenly distributed throughout the position.

The position of the Russian army on the Borodino field was about 8 km long and looked like a straight line running from the Shevardinsky redoubt on the left flank through a large battery on Red Hill, later called the Raevsky battery, the village of Borodino in the center, to the village of Maslovo on the right flank.

The right flank formed 1st Army of General Barclay de Tolly consisting of 3 infantry, 3 cavalry corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), the front of his position was covered by the Kolocha River. The left flank was formed by the smaller 2nd Army of General Bagration (34 thousand people, 156 guns). In addition, the left flank did not have such strong natural obstacles in front of the front as the right. The center (the height near the village of Gorki and the space up to the Rayevsky battery) was occupied by the VI Infantry and III Cavalry Corps under the general command Dokhturova. A total of 13,600 men and 86 guns.

Shevardino fight

The prologue of the Battle of Borodino was battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt on August 24 (September 5).

Here, the day before, a pentagonal redoubt was erected, which at first served as part of the position of the Russian left flank, and after the left flank was pushed back, became a separate advanced position. Napoleon ordered to attack the Shevardinsky position - the redoubt prevented the French army from turning around.

To gain time for engineering work, Kutuzov ordered the enemy to be detained near the village of Shevardino.

The redoubt and the approaches to it were defended by the legendary 27th division of Neverovsky. Shevardino was defended by Russian troops consisting of 8,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry with 36 guns.

The French infantry and cavalry, totaling over 40,000 men, attacked the defenders of Shevardin.

On the morning of August 24, when the Russian position on the left was not yet equipped, the French approached it. No sooner had the French forward units reached the village of Valuevo than the Russian chasseurs opened fire on them.

A fierce battle broke out near the village of Shevardino. During it, it became clear that the enemy was going to deliver the main blow to the left flank of the Russian troops, which was defended by the 2nd Army under the command of Bagration.

During the stubborn battle, the Shevardinsky redoubt was almost completely destroyed.

The great army of Napoleon lost about 5,000 people in the battle of Shevardino, the Russian army suffered approximately the same losses.

The battle at the Shevardino redoubt delayed the French troops and gave the Russian troops the opportunity to gain time to complete the defensive work and build fortifications on the main positions. The Shevardinsky battle also made it possible to clarify the grouping of French troops and the direction of their main attack.

It was established that the main enemy forces were concentrated in the Shevardin area against the center and left flank of the Russian army. On the same day, Kutuzov sent Tuchkov's 3rd Corps to the left flank, secretly placing it in the Utitsa area. And in the area of ​​​​the Bagration Flushes, a reliable defense was created. The 2nd Free Grenadier Division of General M.S. Vorontsov occupied the fortifications directly, and the 27th Infantry Division of General D.P. Neverovsky stood in the second line behind the fortifications.

Battle of Borodino

Before the great battle

25-th of August in the area of ​​the Borodino field, active hostilities were not conducted. Both armies were preparing for a decisive, general battle, conducting reconnaissance and erecting field fortifications. Three fortifications were built on a small hill to the south-west of the village of Semenovskoye, called the "Bagration Flushes".

According to ancient tradition, the Russian army prepared for the decisive battle as if it were a holiday. The soldiers washed, shaved, put on clean linen, confessed, etc.

On August 25 (September 6), Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte personally reconnoitered the area of ​​the future battle and, having discovered the weakness of the left flank of the Russian army, decided to strike at it the main blow. Accordingly, he developed a battle plan. First of all, the task was to capture the left bank of the Kolocha River, for which it was necessary to capture Borodino. This maneuver, according to Napoleon, was supposed to divert the attention of the Russians from the direction of the main attack. Then transfer the main forces of the French army to the right bank of the Kolocha and, relying on Borodino, which has become, as it were, the axis of entry, push the Kutuzov army with the right wing into the corner formed by the confluence of the Kolocha with the Moscow River, and destroy it.

To accomplish the task, Napoleon on the evening of August 25 (September 6) began to concentrate the main forces (up to 95 thousand) in the area of ​​​​the Shevardinsky redoubt. The total number of French troops in front of the front of the 2nd Army reached 115 thousand.

Thus, Napoleon's plan pursued the decisive goal of destroying the entire Russian army in a pitched battle. Napoleon did not doubt the victory, the confidence in which, at sunrise on August 26, he expressed the words """This is the sun of Austerlitz""!".

On the eve of the battle, the famous order of Napoleon was read to the French soldiers: "Warriors! Here is the battle you have been longing for. Victory is up to you. We need it; she will give us everything we need, comfortable apartments and a speedy return to the fatherland. Act as you did at Austerlitz, Friedland, Vitebsk and Smolensk. May later posterity proudly remember your exploits in this day. Let them say about each of you: he was in the great battle near Moscow!

The beginning of the great battle

M.I. Kutuzov at the command post on the day of the Battle of Borodino

The battle of Borodino began at 5 o'clock in the morning, on the day of the Vladimir Icon of the Mother of God, on the day when Russia celebrates the salvation of Moscow from the invasion of Tamerlane in 1395.

Decisive battles unfolded for Bagration's flashes and Raevsky's battery, which the French managed to capture at the cost of heavy losses.

Battle scheme

Bagration flushes

At 5:30 am August 26 (September 7), 1812 more than 100 French guns began to bombard the positions of the left flank. Napoleon unleashed the main blow on the left flank, trying from the very beginning of the battle to turn its course in his favor.

At 6 o'clock in the morning after a short cannonade, the French attack on Bagration's flushes began ( flushes called field fortifications, which consisted of two faces 20–30 m long each at an acute angle, the corner with the top facing the enemy). But they came under shotgun fire and were driven back by a flank attack by rangers.

Averyanov. Battle for Bagration's flashes

At 8 o'clock in the morning the French repeated the attack and captured the southern flush.
For the 3rd attack, Napoleon reinforced the attacking forces with 3 more infantry divisions, 3 cavalry corps (up to 35,000 people) and artillery, bringing its strength to 160 guns. They were opposed by about 20,000 Russian troops with 108 guns.

Evgeny Korneev. Cuirassiers of His Majesty. The battle of the brigade of Major General N. M. Borozdin

After heavy artillery preparation, the French managed to break into the southern flush and into the gaps between the flushes. Around 10 am the fleches were captured by the French.

Then Bagration led a general counterattack, as a result of which the flushes were repulsed, and the French were thrown back to the starting line.

By 10 o'clock in the morning, the entire field over Borodino was already covered with thick smoke.

IN 11 o'clock in the morning Napoleon threw in a new 4th attack against the flushes about 45 thousand infantry and cavalry, and almost 400 guns. The Russian troops had about 300 guns, and were inferior in number to the enemy by 2 times. As a result of this attack, the 2nd combined-grenadier division of M.S. Vorontsov, which participated in the Shevardino battle and withstood the 3rd attack on flushes, retained about 300 people out of 4,000 in its composition.

Then, within an hour, 3 more attacks from the French troops followed, which were repulsed.

At 12 noon , during the 8th attack, Bagration, seeing that the artillery of the flashes could not stop the movement of the French columns, led a general counterattack of the left wing, the total number of troops of which was approximately only 20 thousand people against 40 thousand from the enemy. A fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued, which lasted for about an hour. During this time, the masses of French troops were driven back to the Utitsky forest and were on the verge of defeat. The advantage leaned towards the Russian troops, but during the transition to the counterattack, Bagration, wounded by a fragment of the cannonball in the thigh, fell off his horse and was taken out of the battlefield. The news of the wounding of Bagration instantly swept through the ranks of the Russian troops and undermined the morale of the Russian soldiers. Russian troops began to retreat. ( Note. Bagration died of blood poisoning on September 12 (25), 1812)

After that, General D.S. took command of the left flank. Dokhturov. The French troops were bled dry and unable to attack. The Russian troops were greatly weakened, but they retained their combat effectiveness, which was revealed during the repulse of the attack of fresh French forces on Semyonovskoye.

In total, about 60,000 French troops took part in the battles for the flushes, of which about 30,000 were lost, about half in the 8th attack.

The French fought fiercely in the battles for the flushes, but all but the last of their attacks were repulsed by the much smaller Russian forces. By concentrating forces on the right flank, Napoleon ensured a 2-3-fold numerical superiority in the battles for flushes, thanks to which, as well as due to the wounding of Bagration, the French still managed to push the left wing of the Russian army to a distance of about 1 km. This success did not lead to the decisive result that Napoleon had hoped for.

The direction of the main attack of the "Great Army" shifted from the left flank to the center of the Russian line, to the Kurgan Battery.

Raevsky battery

The last skirmishes of the Battle of Borodino in the evening took place at the battery of Raevsky and Utitsky Kurgan.

A high mound, located in the center of the Russian position, dominated the surrounding area. A battery was installed on it, which had 18 guns by the beginning of the battle. The defense of the battery was assigned to the 7th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General N.N. Raevsky, which consisted of 11 thousand bayonets.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning, in the midst of the battle for Bagration's fleches, the French launched the first attack on the Raevsky battery.A bloody battle took place on the battery.

Losses on both sides were huge. A number of units on both sides lost most of their composition. The corps of General Raevsky lost more than 6 thousand people. And, for example, the French infantry regiment Bonami retained 300 out of 4100 people in its ranks after the battle for Raevsky’s battery. Raevsky’s battery received the nickname “grave of the French cavalry” from the French for these losses. At the cost of huge losses (the general commander of the French cavalry and his comrades-in-arms fell at Kurgan height), the French troops stormed Raevsky's battery at 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

However, the capture of Kurgan height did not lead to a decrease in the stability of the Russian center. The same applies to the flushes, which were only defensive structures of the position of the left flank of the Russian army.

End of the battle

Vereshchagin. End of the Battle of Borodino

After the Raevsky battery was occupied by the French troops, the battle began to subside. On the left flank, the French carried out unsuccessful attacks against Dokhturov's 2nd Army. In the center and on the right flank, the matter was limited to artillery fire until 7 pm.

V. V. Vereshchagin. End of the Battle of Borodino

On the evening of August 26, by 18 o'clock, the battle of Borodino was over. Attacks stopped along the entire front. Until the very night, only artillery skirmishes and rifle fire continued in the advanced jaeger chains.

The results of the battle of Borodino

What were the results of this most bloody of battles? Very sad for Napoleon, because there was no victory here, which all those close to him had been waiting in vain for a whole day. Napoleon was disappointed with the results of the battle: the "Great Army" was able to force the Russian troops on the left flank and center to retreat only 1-1.5 km. The Russian army retained the integrity of the position and its communications, repelled many French attacks, while counterattacking itself. The artillery duel, for all its duration and fierceness, did not give advantages to either the French or the Russians. French troops captured the main strongholds of the Russian army - the Raevsky battery and the Semyonovsky flashes. But the fortifications on them were almost completely destroyed, and by the end of the battle, Napoleon ordered them to leave and withdraw the troops to their original positions. Few prisoners were captured (as well as guns), Russian soldiers took with them most of the wounded comrades. The general battle turned out not to be a new Austerlitz, but a bloody battle with unclear results.

Perhaps, in tactical terms, the Battle of Borodino was another victory for Napoleon - he forced the Russian army to retreat and give up Moscow. However, in strategic terms, it was a victory for Kutuzov and the Russian army. In the campaign of 1812 there was a radical change. The Russian army withstood the battle with the strongest enemy and its morale only got stronger. Soon its numbers and material resources will be restored. Napoleon's army lost heart, lost the ability to win, the halo of invincibility. Further events will only confirm the correctness of the words of the military theorist Karl Clausewitz, who noted that "victory lies not just in capturing the battlefield, but in the physical and moral defeat of the enemy forces."

Later, while in exile, the defeated French emperor Napoleon admitted: “Of all my battles, the most terrible is what I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory in it, and the Russians - to be called invincible.

The number of losses of the Russian army in the Battle of Borodino amounted to 44-45 thousand people. The French, according to some estimates, lost about 40-60 thousand people. The losses in the command staff were especially heavy: in the Russian army 4 were killed and mortally wounded, 23 generals were wounded and shell-shocked; in the Grand Army, 12 generals were killed and died of wounds, one marshal and 38 generals were wounded.

The battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century and the bloodiest of all that came before it. According to the most conservative estimates of cumulative losses, 2,500 people died on the field every hour. It is no coincidence that Napoleon called the battle of Borodino his greatest battle, although its results are more than modest for a great commander accustomed to victories.

The main achievement of the general battle at Borodino was that Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army. But first of all, the Borodino field became the cemetery of the French dream, that selfless faith of the French people in the star of their emperor, in his personal genius, which underlay all the achievements of the French Empire.

On October 3, 1812, the English newspapers The Courier and The Times published a report from the English ambassador Katkar from St. Petersburg, in which he reported that the armies of His Imperial Majesty Alexander I had won the most stubborn battle of Borodino. During October, The Times wrote about the Battle of Borodino 8 times, calling the day of the battle "a grandiose memorable day in Russian history" and "the fatal battle of Bonaparte." The British ambassador and the press did not consider the retreat after the battle and the abandonment of Moscow as a result of the battle, realizing the impact on these events of a strategic situation unfavorable for Russia.

For Borodino, Kutuzov received the rank of Field Marshal and 100 thousand rubles. The tsar granted Bagration 50 thousand rubles. For participation in the Battle of Borodino, each soldier was given 5 silver rubles.

The meaning of the Battle of Borodino in the minds of the Russian people

The Battle of Borodino continues to occupy an important place in the historical consciousness of very broad sections of Russian society. Today it, along with similar great pages of Russian history, is being falsified by the camp of Russophobic-minded figures who position themselves as "historians". By distorting reality and forgery in custom publications, at any cost, regardless of reality, they are trying to bring to wide circles the idea of ​​a tactical victory for the French with fewer losses and that the battle of Borodino was not a triumph of Russian weapons.This is because the Battle of Borodino, as an event in which the strength of the spirit of the Russian people was manifested, is one of the cornerstones that build Russia in the minds modern society just like a great power. Loosening these bricks throughout recent history Russia is engaged in Russophobic propaganda.

Material prepared by Sergey Shulyak

	The village of Borodino, west of the Moscow region
	Uncertain
Opponents
	Russian empire
Duchy of Warsaw
Kingdom of Italy
Confederation of the Rhine
Commanders
Napoleon I Bonaparte	M. I. Kutuzov
Side forces
135 thousand regular troops, 587 guns	113 thousand regular troops, about 7 thousand Cossacks, 10 thousand (according to other sources - more than 20 thousand) militia, 624 guns
Military casualties
According to various estimates, from 30 to 58 thousand people were killed and wounded	From 40 to 45 thousand killed, wounded and missing

(in French history - Battle of the Moscow River, fr. Bataille de la Moscow) - the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian army under the command of General M. I. Kutuzov and the French army of Napoleon I Bonaparte. It took place on August 26 (September 7), 1812 near the village of Borodino, 125 km west of Moscow.

During the 12-hour battle, the French army managed to capture the positions of the Russian army in the center and on the left wing, but after the cessation of hostilities, the French army withdrew to its original positions. Thus, in Russian historiography, it is believed that the Russian troops won, but the next day, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, M.I. army.

Russian historian Mikhnevich reported the following review of Emperor Napoleon about the battle:

According to the memoirs of the French General Pele, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon often repeated a similar phrase: “ The battle of Borodino was the most beautiful and most formidable, the French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians deserved to be invincible».

It is considered the bloodiest in history among one-day battles.

background

Since the beginning of the invasion of the French army into the territory of the Russian Empire in June 1812, Russian troops have constantly retreated. The rapid advance and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the French made it impossible for the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, to prepare the troops for battle. The protracted retreat caused public discontent, so Emperor Alexander I removed Barclay de Tolly and appointed General of Infantry Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. However, the new commander-in-chief chose the path of retreat. The strategy chosen by Kutuzov was based, on the one hand, on exhausting the enemy, on the other hand, on waiting for reinforcements sufficient for a decisive battle with Napoleon's army.

On August 22 (September 3), the Russian army, retreating from Smolensk, settled down near the village of Borodino, 125 km from Moscow, where Kutuzov decided to give a general battle; it was impossible to postpone it further, since Emperor Alexander demanded that Kutuzov stop the advance of Emperor Napoleon towards Moscow.

On August 24 (September 5), the battle took place at the Shevardinsky redoubt, which delayed the French troops and made it possible for the Russians to build fortifications on the main positions.

The alignment of forces at the beginning of the battle

Estimated number of troops, thousand people
Source	Napoleon's troops	Russian troops	Year of evaluation
Buturlin
Clausewitz
Mikhailovsky - Danilevsky
Bogdanovich
Grunwald
Bloodless
Nicholson
Trinity
Vasiliev
bezotosny

The total number of the Russian army is determined at 112-120 thousand people:

• historian Bogdanovich: 103 thousand regular troops (72 thousand infantry, 17 thousand cavalry, 14 thousand artillerymen), 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors, 640 guns. Total 120 thousand people.
• from the memoirs of General Tolya: 95 thousand regular troops, 7 thousand Cossacks and 10 thousand militia warriors. In total, 112 thousand people are under arms, "with this army there are 640 artillery pieces."

The number of the French army is estimated at about 136 thousand soldiers and 587 guns:

• According to the data of the Marquis of Chambray, the roll call held on August 21 (September 2) showed the presence of 133,815 combat ranks in the French army (their comrades responded “in absentia” for some of the lagging soldiers, hoping that they would catch up with the army). However, this number does not take into account 1,500 sabers of the cavalry brigade of the division general Pajol, who came up later, and 3 thousand combat ranks of the main apartment.

In addition, the registration of the militias in the Russian army implies the addition to the regular French army of numerous non-combatants (15 thousand) who were present in the French camp and corresponded to the Russian militias in terms of combat effectiveness. That is, the size of the French army is also increasing. Like the Russian militias, the French non-combatants performed auxiliary functions - carried out the wounded, carried water, and so on.

It is important for military history to distinguish between the total strength of the army on the battlefield and the troops that were committed to battle. However, according to the balance of forces that took a direct part in the battle on August 26 (September 7), 1812, the French army also had a numerical superiority. According to the encyclopedia "Patriotic War of 1812", at the end of the battle, Napoleon had 18 thousand in reserve, and Kutuzov had 8-9 thousand regular troops (in particular, the Guards Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments). At the same time, Kutuzov said that the Russians had brought into battle " everything to the last reserve, even in the evening and the guard», « all reserves are already in use».

If we evaluate the qualitative composition of the two armies, then we can refer to the opinion of the participant in the events of the Marquis of Chambray, who noted that the French army had superiority, since its infantry consisted mainly of experienced soldiers, while the Russians had many recruits. In addition, the advantage of the French gave a significant superiority in heavy cavalry.

Battle for the Shevardino Redoubt

The idea of ​​​​the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, was to inflict as many losses as possible on the French troops through active defense, change the balance of forces, save the Russian troops for further battles and for the complete defeat of the French army. In accordance with this plan, the battle order of the Russian troops was built.

The position chosen by Kutuzov looked like a straight line running from the Shevardinsky redoubt on the left flank through the large battery on Red Hill, later called the Raevsky battery, the village of Borodino in the center, to the village of Maslovo on the right flank.

On the eve of the main battle, in the early morning of August 24 (September 5), the Russian rearguard under the command of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, located at the Kolotsky Monastery, 8 km west of the location of the main forces, was attacked by the enemy's vanguard. A fierce battle ensued, lasting several hours. After the news was received about the enemy's bypass movement, Konovnitsyn withdrew troops across the Kolocha River and joined the corps that occupied a position near the village of Shevardino.

A detachment of Lieutenant General Gorchakov was stationed near the Shevardino redoubt. In total, under the command of Gorchakov there were 11 thousand troops and 46 guns. To cover the Old Smolensk road, 6 Cossack regiments of Major General Karpov 2nd remained.

The great army of Napoleon approached Borodino in three columns. The main forces: 3 cavalry corps of Marshal Murat, infantry corps of marshals Davout, Ney, division general Junot and guards - moved along the New Smolensk road. To the north of them, the infantry corps of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, and the cavalry corps of divisional general Pear advanced. The corps of divisional general Poniatovsky was approaching along the Old Smolensk road. 35 thousand infantry and cavalry, 180 guns were sent against the defenders of the fortification.

The enemy, covering the Shevardinsky redoubt from the north and south, tried to encircle the troops of Lieutenant General Gorchakov.

The French twice broke into the redoubt, and each time the infantry of Lieutenant General Neverovsky knocked them out. Twilight was descending on the Borodino field, when the enemy once again managed to seize the redoubt and break into the village of Shevardino, but the Russian reserves approaching from the 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions recaptured the redoubt.

The battle gradually weakened and finally stopped. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, ordered Lieutenant General Gorchakov to withdraw troops to the main forces behind the Semyonovsky ravine.

Starting position

All day on August 25 (September 6), the troops of both sides were preparing for the upcoming battle. The Shevardinsky battle gave the Russian troops the opportunity to gain time to complete the defensive work at the Borodino position, made it possible to clarify the grouping of the French forces and the direction of their main attack. Leaving the Shevardinsky redoubt, the 2nd Army pushed back its left flank across the Kamenka River, and the army's battle formation took the form obtuse angle. Both flanks of the Russian position occupied 4 km each, but were unequal. The right flank was formed by the 1st Army of Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, consisting of 3 infantry, 3 cavalry corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), the front of his position was covered by the river Kolocha. The left flank was formed by the smaller 2nd Army of Infantry General Bagration (34,000 men, 156 guns). In addition, the left flank did not have such strong natural obstacles in front of the front as the right.

After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt on August 24 (September 5), the position of the left flank became even more vulnerable and relied only on 3 unfinished flushes.

Thus, in the center and on the right wing of the Russian position, Kutuzov placed 4 out of 7 infantry corps, as well as 3 cavalry corps and Platov's Cossack corps. According to Kutuzov's plan, such a powerful grouping of troops reliably covered the Moscow direction and at the same time made it possible, if necessary, to strike at the flank and rear of the French troops. The battle order of the Russian army was deep and allowed for wide maneuvers of forces on the battlefield. The first line of battle formation of the Russian troops was made up of infantry corps, the second line - cavalry corps, and the third - reserves. Kutuzov highly appreciated the role of the reserves, pointing out the battle in the disposition: “ The reserves must be kept as long as possible, for the general who still retains the reserve is not defeated.».

Emperor Napoleon, having discovered on reconnaissance on August 25 (September 6) the weakness of the left flank of the Russian army, decided to deliver the main blow to it. Accordingly, he developed a battle plan. First of all, the task was to capture the left bank of the Kolocha River, for which it was necessary to capture the village of Borodino in the center of the Russian position. This maneuver, according to Napoleon, was supposed to divert the attention of the Russians from the direction of the main attack. Then transfer the main forces of the French army to the right bank of the Kolocha and, relying on Borodino, which has become, as it were, the axis of entry, push the Kutuzov army with the right wing into the corner formed by the confluence of the Kolocha with the Moscow River, and destroy it.

To accomplish the task, Napoleon on the evening of August 25 (September 6) began to concentrate the main forces (up to 95 thousand) in the area of ​​​​the Shevardinsky redoubt. The total number of French troops in front of the front of the 2nd Army reached 115 thousand. For distracting actions during the battle in the center and against the right flank, Napoleon allocated no more than 20 thousand soldiers.

Napoleon understood that it was difficult to cover the Russian troops from the flanks, so he was forced to resort to a frontal attack in order to break through the defenses of the Russian army in a relatively narrow area near the Bagration Flushes, go to the rear of the Russian troops, press them to the Moscow River, destroy them and discover way to Moscow. In the direction of the main attack in the area from the Raevsky battery to the Bagration flushes, which had a length of 2.5 kilometers, the bulk of the French troops were concentrated: the corps of marshals Davout, Ney, Murat, division general Junot, and also the guard. To divert the attention of the Russian troops, the French planned to carry out auxiliary attacks on Utitsa and Borodino. The French army had a deep formation of its battle formation, which allowed it to build up its strike force from the depths.

Sources point to a special plan of Kutuzov, which forced Napoleon to attack precisely the left flank. Kutuzov's task was to determine for the left flank the necessary number of troops that would prevent a breakthrough of his positions. The historian Tarle quotes Kutuzov's exact words: “When the enemy ... uses his last reserves on the left flank of Bagration, then I will send him a hidden army on the flank and rear”.

On the night of August 26 (September 7), 1812, based on the data obtained during the Shevardinsky battle, Kutuzov decided to strengthen the left flank of the Russian troops, for which he ordered the 3rd Infantry Corps to be transferred from the reserve and transferred to the commander of the 2nd Army Bagration Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st, as well as an artillery reserve of 168 guns, placing it near Psarev. As conceived by Kutuzov, the 3rd Corps was to be ready to act on the flank and rear of the French troops. However, Kutuzov's chief of staff, General Bennigsen, led the 3rd Corps out of the ambush and placed it in front of the French troops, which did not correspond to Kutuzov's plan. Bennigsen's actions are justified by his intention to follow a formal battle plan.

The regrouping of part of the Russian forces on the left flank reduced the disproportion of forces and turned the frontal attack, leading, according to Napoleon's plan, to the rapid defeat of the Russian army, into a bloody frontal battle.

The course of the battle

Beginning of the battle

At 5:30 am on August 26 (September 7), 1812, more than 100 French guns began an artillery shelling of the positions of the left flank. Simultaneously with the beginning of the shelling on the center of the Russian position, the village of Borodino, under the cover of morning fog, the division of General Delzon from the corps of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, moved in a distracting attack. The village was defended by the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment under the command of Colonel Bistrom. For about an hour, the rangers fought off a four-fold superior enemy, but under the threat of a bypass from the flank, they were forced to retreat across the bridge across the Kolocha River. The 106th line regiment of the French, encouraged by the occupation of the village of Borodino, followed the rangers across the river. But the guards chasseurs, having received reinforcements, repelled all the enemy’s attempts to break through the Russian defenses here:

“The French, encouraged by the occupation of Borodin, rushed after the chasseurs and almost crossed the river with them, but the guard chasseurs, reinforced by the regiments that had come with Colonel Manakhtin and the chasseur brigade of the 24th division under the command of Colonel Vuich, suddenly turned to the enemy and joined with those who came to they were hit with bayonets to help them, and all the French who were on our shore were the victims of their daring undertaking. The bridge on the Kolocha River was completely destroyed, despite strong enemy fire, and the French did not dare to make attempts at the crossing for a whole day and were content with a shootout with our rangers ".

Bagration flushes

Fleches on the eve of the battle were occupied by the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division under the command of General Vorontsov. At 6 o'clock in the morning, after a short cannonade, the French attack on Bagration's flushes began. In the first attack, the French divisions of Generals Desse and Kompan, overcoming the resistance of the chasseurs, made their way through the Utitsky forest, but, having barely begun to build on the edge opposite the southernmost flush, they came under shotgun fire and were overturned by the flank attack of the chasseurs.

At 8 o'clock in the morning the French repeated the attack and captured the southern flush. Bagration, to help the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division, sent the 27th Infantry Division of General Neverovsky, as well as the Akhtyrsky Hussars and the Novorossiysk Dragoons to strike on the flank. The French left the flushes, suffering heavy losses in the process. Both divisional generals Desse and Kompan were wounded, while falling from a dead horse, the corps commander Marshal Davout was shell-shocked, almost all brigade commanders were wounded.

For the 3rd attack, Napoleon reinforced the attacking forces with 3 more infantry divisions from the corps of Marshal Ney, 3 cavalry corps of Marshal Murat and artillery, bringing its strength to 160 guns.

Bagration, having determined the direction of the main attack chosen by Napoleon, ordered General Raevsky, who occupied the central battery, to immediately move the entire second line of troops of his 7th Infantry Corps to the flashes, and General Tuchkov 1st - to send the 3rd Infantry Division of General Konovnitsyn to the defenders of the flashes. At the same time, in response to the demand for reinforcements, Kutuzov sent the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments, the 1st consolidated grenadier division, 7 regiments of the 3rd cavalry corps and the 1st cuirassier division to Bagration from the reserve of the Life Guards. Additionally, Lieutenant General Baggovut's 2nd Infantry Corps began to move from the far right to the left flag.

After heavy artillery preparation, the French managed to break into the southern flush and into the gaps between the flushes. In a bayonet battle, the division commanders, Generals Neverovsky (27th Infantry) and Vorontsov (2nd Grenadier), were seriously wounded and carried away from the battlefield.

The French were counterattacked by 3 cuirassier regiments, and Marshal Murat almost got captured by the Russian cuirassiers, barely managing to hide in the ranks of the Württemberg infantry. Separate parts of the French were forced to retreat, but the cuirassiers, not supported by the infantry, were counterattacked by the French cavalry and repulsed. After the wounding of Prince Bagration at about 10 o'clock in the morning, Lieutenant General P.P. took command of the troops. Konovnitsyn, who, having assessed the situation, gives the order to leave the flushes and withdraw their defenders behind the Semenovsky ravine to gentle heights.

The counterattack of the 3rd Infantry Division Konovnitsyn came to the rescue corrected the situation. In the battle, Major General Tuchkov 4th, who led the attack of the Revel and Murom regiments, died.

At about the same time, the French 8th Westphalian Corps of Divisional General Junot made its way through the Utitsky forest to the rear of the flushes. The situation was saved by the 1st cavalry battery of Captain Zakharov, which at that time was heading to the area of ​​the fleches. Zakharov, seeing the threat to the flashes from the rear, hastily deployed his guns and opened fire on the enemy, who was building up to attack. The 4 infantry regiments of the 2nd corps of Baggovut, who arrived in time, pushed Junot's corps into the Utitsky forest, inflicting significant losses on it. Russian historians claim that during the second offensive, Junot's corps was defeated in a bayonet counterattack, but Westphalian and French sources completely refute this. According to the memoirs of direct participants, Junot's 8th Corps participated in the battle until the very evening.

By the 4th attack at 11 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon concentrated about 45 thousand infantry and cavalry against the flushes, and almost 400 guns. Russian historiography calls this decisive attack the 8th, taking into account the attacks of Junot's corps on the flushes (6th and 7th). Bagration, seeing that the artillery of the fleches could not stop the movement of the French columns, led a general counterattack of the left wing, the total number of troops of which was approximately only 20 thousand people. The onslaught of the first ranks of the Russians was stopped and a fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued, lasting more than an hour. The advantage leaned towards the Russian troops, but during the transition to the counterattack, Bagration, wounded by a fragment of the cannonball in the thigh, fell off his horse and was taken out of the battlefield. The news of the wounding of Bagration instantly swept through the ranks of the Russian troops and had a huge impact on the Russian soldiers. Russian troops began to retreat.

General Konovnitsyn took command of the 2nd Army and was forced to finally leave the fleches behind the French. The remnants of the troops, who almost lost control, were assigned to a new defensive line behind the Semyonovsky ravine, along which the stream of the same name flowed. On the same side of the ravine were untouched reserves - the Life Guards of the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments. Russian batteries of 300 guns kept the entire Semyonovsky creek under fire. The French, seeing a solid wall of Russians, did not dare to attack on the move.

The direction of the main attack of the French shifted from the left flank to the center, to the Rayevsky battery. At the same time, Napoleon did not stop the attack on the left flank of the Russian army. To the south of the village of Semyonovsky, the cavalry corps of Nansouty advanced, north of Latour-Maubourg, while the infantry division of General Friant rushed from the front to Semenovsky. At this time, Kutuzov appointed the commander of the 6th Corps, Infantry General Dokhturov, as the head of the troops of the entire left flank instead of Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn. The Life Guards lined up in a square and for several hours repulsed the attacks of Napoleon's "iron horsemen". The cuirassier division of Duki was sent to help the guards in the south, the cuirassier brigade of Borozdin and the 4th cavalry corps of Sivers were sent in the north. The bloody battle ended with the defeat of the French troops, who were thrown back behind the ravine of the Semyonovsky stream.

Russian troops were never completely driven out of Semyonovsky until the end of the battle.

Battle for the Utitsky Kurgan

On the eve of the battle on August 25 (September 6), on the orders of Kutuzov, the 3rd Infantry Corps of General Tuchkov 1st and up to 10 thousand warriors of the Moscow and Smolensk militias were sent to the area of ​​the Old Smolensk Road. On the same day, 2 more Cossack regiments of Karpov 2nd joined the troops. To communicate with the flashes in the Utitsky forest, the chasseur regiments of Major General Shakhovsky took up a position.

According to Kutuzov's plan, Tuchkov's corps was supposed to suddenly attack from an ambush the flank and rear of the enemy, who was fighting for Bagration's flushes. However, in the early morning, Chief of Staff Bennigsen pushed Tuchkov's detachment out of the ambush.

On August 26 (September 7), the 5th Corps of the French army, consisting of Poles under the command of General Poniatowski, moved around the left flank of the Russian position. The troops met in front of Utitsa at about 8 o'clock in the morning, at the moment when General Tuchkov 1st, on the orders of Bagration, had already sent the Konovnitsyn division at his disposal. The enemy, coming out of the forest and pushing the Russian rangers away from the village of Utitsy, found himself on the heights. Having installed 24 guns on them, the enemy opened heavy fire. Tuchkov 1st was forced to retreat to the Utitsky Kurgan - a more advantageous line for himself. Poniatowski's attempts to advance and capture the barrow were unsuccessful.

Around 11 a.m., Poniatowski, having received support from Junot's 8th Infantry Corps on the left, concentrated fire from 40 guns against the Utitsky Kurgan and captured it by storm. This gave him the opportunity to act around the Russian position.

Tuchkov 1st, in an effort to eliminate the danger, took drastic measures to return the mound. He personally organized a counterattack at the head of a regiment of Pavlovsk grenadiers. The mound was returned, but Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1 himself received a mortal wound. He was replaced by Lieutenant General Baggovut, commander of the 2nd Infantry Corps.

Baggovut left the Utitsky mound only after the defenders of the Bagration flushes withdrew behind the Semyonovsky ravine, which made his position vulnerable to flank attacks. He retreated to the new line of the 2nd Army.

Raid of the Cossacks Platov and Uvarov

At the critical moment of the battle, Kutuzov decided to raid the cavalry of the generals from the cavalry of Uvarov and Platov to the rear and flank of the enemy. By 12 noon, Uvarov's 1st Cavalry Corps (28 squadrons, 12 guns, a total of 2,500 horsemen) and Platov's Cossacks (8 regiments) crossed the Kolocha River near the village of Malaya. Uvarov's corps attacked the French infantry regiment and the Italian cavalry brigade of General Ornano in the area of ​​the crossing over the Voina River near the village of Bezzubovo. Platov crossed the Voina River to the north and, going to the rear, forced the enemy to change position.

The simultaneous blow of Uvarov and Platov caused confusion in the enemy camp and forced the troops to be pulled to the left flank, which stormed the Raevsky battery at Kurgan height. The Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, with the Italian Guard and the Pear Corps, were sent by Napoleon against the new threat. Uvarov and Platov returned to the Russian army by 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

The raid of Uvarov and Platov delayed the decisive attack of the enemy for 2 hours, which made it possible to regroup the Russian troops. It was because of this raid that Napoleon did not dare to send his guards into battle. Cavalry sabotage, although it did not cause much damage to the French, caused Napoleon to feel insecure in his own rear.

« Those who were in the battle of Borodino, of course, remember that moment when the stubbornness of attacks decreased along the entire line of the enemy, and we ... could breathe more freely", - wrote a military historian, General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky.

Raevsky battery

A high mound, located in the center of the Russian position, dominated the surrounding area. A battery was installed on it, which had 18 guns by the beginning of the battle. The defense of the battery was assigned to the 7th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Raevsky.

At about 9 o'clock in the morning, in the midst of the battle for Bagration's flushes, the French launched the first attack on the battery with the forces of the 4th Corps of Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, as well as the divisions of Generals Moran and Gerard from the 1st Corps of Marshal Davout. By influencing the center of the Russian army, Napoleon hoped to hinder the transfer of troops from the right wing of the Russian army to the Bagration fleches and thereby ensure his main forces a quick defeat of the left wing of the Russian army. By the time of the attack, the entire second line of troops of Lieutenant General Raevsky, on the orders of Infantry General Bagration, was withdrawn to defend the flashes. Despite this, the attack was repulsed by artillery fire.

Almost immediately, the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene de Beauharnais, attacked the mound again. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Kutuzov, at that moment brought into battle for the Raevsky battery the entire horse artillery reserve in the amount of 60 guns and part of the light artillery of the 1st Army. However, despite heavy artillery fire, the French of the 30th regiment of Brigadier General Bonami managed to break into the redoubt.

At that moment, the Chief of Staff of the 1st Army, Yermolov, and the Chief of Artillery Kutaisov, who followed Kutuzov's order to the left flank, were near Kurgan Heights. Having led the battalion of the Ufa Infantry Regiment and having attached the 18th Chasseur Regiment to it, Yermolov and Kutaisov hit with bayonets right on the redoubt. At the same time, the regiments of Major Generals Paskevich and Vasilchikov hit from the flanks. The redoubt was recaptured and Brigadier General Bonami was taken prisoner. Of the entire French regiment of 4,100 men under the command of Bonami, only about 300 soldiers remained in service. Major General of Artillery Kutaisov died in the battle for the battery.

Kutuzov, noticing the complete exhaustion of Raevsky's corps, withdrew his troops to the second line. Barclay de Tolly sent Major General Likhachev's 24th Infantry Division to defend the battery.

After the fall of the Bagration fleches, Napoleon abandoned the development of an offensive against the left wing of the Russian army. The original plan to break through the defenses on this wing in order to reach the rear of the main forces of the Russian army lost its meaning, since a significant part of these troops failed in the battles for the fleches themselves, while the defense on the left wing, despite the loss of the fleches, remained intact . Drawing attention to the fact that the situation in the center of the Russian troops had worsened, Napoleon decided to redirect his forces to the Raevsky battery. However, the next attack was delayed for 2 hours, since at that time Russian cavalry and Cossacks appeared in the rear of the French.

Taking advantage of the respite, Kutuzov moved from the right flank to the center the 4th Infantry Corps of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy and the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Major General Korf. Napoleon ordered to intensify the fire on the infantry of the 4th Corps. According to eyewitnesses, the Russians moved like machines, closing ranks as they went. The path of the 4th Corps could be traced on the trail of the bodies of the dead.

The troops of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy joined the left flank of the Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky Guards regiments, located south of the battery. Behind them were the cavalrymen of the 2nd corps and the approaching Cavalry and Horse Guards regiments.

At about 3 p.m., the French opened crossfire from the front and flashes of 150 guns at Raevsky's battery and launched an attack. For the attack against the 24th division, 34 cavalry regiments were concentrated. The first to attack was the 2nd Cavalry Corps under the command of Divisional General Auguste Caulaincourt (corps commander Divisional General Montbrun had been killed by this time). Caulaincourt broke through the hellish fire, bypassed the Kurgan height on the left and rushed to the Raevsky battery. Met from the front, flanks and rear by stubborn fire from the defenders, the cuirassiers were driven back with huge losses (Raevsky's battery received the nickname "grave of the French cavalry" from the French for these losses). General Auguste Caulaincourt, like many of his associates, found death on the slopes of the mound. Meanwhile, the troops of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, taking advantage of Caulaincourt's attack, which fettered the actions of the 24th division, broke into the battery from the front and flank. A bloody battle took place on the battery. The wounded General Likhachev was taken prisoner. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon Raevsky's battery fell.

Having received the news of the fall of Raevsky's battery, Napoleon moved to the center of the Russian army and came to the conclusion that its center, despite the retreat and contrary to the assurances of the retinue, was not shaken. After that, he refused requests to bring the guards into battle. The French attack on the center of the Russian army stopped.

As of 18:00, the Russian army was still firmly located in the Borodino position, and the French troops did not manage to achieve decisive success in any of the directions. Napoleon, who believed that a general who does not retain fresh troops by the day following the battle will almost always be beaten", and did not introduce his guard into the battle. Napoleon, as a rule, brought the guards into battle at the very last moment, when the victory was prepared by his other troops and when it was necessary to deliver the last decisive blow to the enemy. However, assessing the situation by the end of the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon saw no signs of victory, so he did not take the risk of bringing his last reserve into battle.

End of the battle

After the Raevsky battery was occupied by the French troops, the battle began to subside. On the left flank, Divisional General Poniatowski carried out unsuccessful attacks against the 2nd Army under the command of General Dokhturov (the commander of the 2nd Army, General Bagration, was seriously wounded by that time). In the center and on the right flank, the matter was limited to artillery fire until 7 pm. Following Kutuzov's report, they claimed that Napoleon had retreated, withdrawing troops from the captured positions. Having retreated to Gorki (where there was one more fortification), the Russians began to prepare for a new battle. However, at 12 o'clock at night, an order from Kutuzov arrived, canceling preparations for the battle scheduled for the next day. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army decided to withdraw the army beyond Mozhaisk in order to make up for human losses and better prepare for new battles. Napoleon, faced with the resistance of the enemy, was in a depressed and anxious mood, as evidenced by his adjutant Armand Caulaincourt (brother of the deceased general Auguste Caulaincourt):

Chronology of the battle

Chronology of the battle. Most significant fights

There is also an alternative point of view on the chronology of the Battle of Borodino.

The result of the battle

Russian casualty estimates

The number of losses of the Russian army has been repeatedly revised by historians. Different sources give different numbers:

• According to the 18th bulletin of the Great Army (dated September 10, 1812), 12-13 thousand were killed, 5 thousand prisoners, 40 generals were killed, wounded or captured, 60 captured guns. The total losses are estimated at approximately 40-50 thousand.
• F. Segur, who was at Napoleon's headquarters, gives completely different data on trophies: from 700 to 800 prisoners and about 20 guns.
• A document entitled "Description of the battle at the village of Borodino, which took place on August 26, 1812" (presumably compiled by K. F. Tol), which in many sources is called "Kutuzov's report to Alexander I" and dated August 1812, indicates 25,000 people in common losses, including 13 killed and wounded generals.
• 38-45 thousand people, including 23 generals. Inscription " 45 thousand” carved on the Main Monument on the Borodino field, erected in 1839, is also indicated on the 15th wall of the gallery of military glory of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.
• 58 thousand killed and wounded, up to 1000 prisoners, from 13 to 15 guns. The data on losses are given here on the basis of a summary of the duty general of the 1st Army immediately after the battle, the losses of the 2nd Army were estimated by historians of the 19th century quite arbitrarily at 20 thousand. These data were no longer considered reliable in late XIX century, they are not taken into account in the ESBE, which indicates the number of losses "up to 40 thousand." Modern historians believe that the report on the 1st Army also contained information about the losses of the 2nd Army, since there were no officers responsible for the reports in the 2nd Army.
• 42.5 thousand people - the losses of the Russian army in the book by S. P. Mikheev, published in 1911.

According to the surviving statements from the RGVIA archive, the Russian army lost 39,300 people killed, wounded and missing (21,766 in the 1st Army, 17,445 in the 2nd Army), but taking into account the fact that the data of the statements for various reasons is incomplete (does not include the loss of the militia and the Cossacks), historians usually increase this number to 44-45 thousand people. According to Troitsky, the data of the Military Registration Archive of the General Staff give the figure of 45.6 thousand people.

French casualty estimates

A significant part of the documentation of the Grand Army was lost during the retreat, so the assessment of French losses is extremely difficult. The question of the total losses of the French army remains open.

• According to the 18th bulletin of the Grand Army, the French lost 2,500 killed, about 7,500 wounded, 6 generals killed (2 divisional, 4 brigade) and 7-8 wounded. The total losses are estimated at approximately 10 thousand people. In the future, these data were repeatedly questioned, and at present, none of the researchers considers them to be reliable.
• “Description of the battle at the village of Borodino”, made on behalf of M.I. Kutuzov (presumably K.F. Tolem) and dated August 1812, indicates more than 40,000 total losses, including 42 killed and wounded generals .
• The most common in French historiography, the number of losses of the Napoleonic army of 30 thousand is based on the calculations of the French officer Denier, who served as an inspector at the General Staff of Napoleon, who determined the total losses of the French for 3 days of the battle of Borodino at 49 generals, 37 colonels and 28 thousand lower ranks, from of these, 6,550 were killed and 21,450 were wounded. These figures were classified by order of Marshal Berthier due to a discrepancy with the data of Napoleon's bulletin on losses of 8-10 thousand and were published for the first time in 1842. The figure cited in the literature of 30 thousand was obtained by rounding Denier's data (taking into account the fact that Denier did not take into account 1176 soldiers of the Great Army who were captured).

Later studies have shown that Denier's data are grossly underestimated. So, Denier gives the number of 269 killed officers of the Grand Army. However, in 1899, the French historian Martinien, on the basis of surviving documents, established that at least 460 officers known by surname were killed. Subsequent research increased this number to 480. Even French historians admit that " since the information given in the statement about the generals and colonels who were out of action at Borodino is inaccurate and underestimated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier's figures are based on incomplete data.».

• Retired Napoleonic General Segur determined the losses of the French at Borodino at 40,000 soldiers and officers. A. Vasiliev considers Segur's assessment tendentiously overestimated, pointing out that the general wrote during the reign of the Bourbons, while not denying her some objectivity.
• In Russian literature, the number of French casualties was often given as 58,478. This number is based on the false information of the defector Alexander Schmidt, who allegedly served in the office of Marshal Berthier. In the future, this figure was picked up by patriotic researchers, indicated on the Main Monument.

For modern French historiography, the traditional estimate of French losses is 30 thousand, with 9-10 thousand killed. The Russian historian A. Vasiliev points out, in particular, that the number of losses of 30 thousand is achieved by the following methods of calculation: losses in avant-garde affairs and the approximate number of sick and backward, and b) indirectly - by comparison with the Battle of Wagram, equal in number and in the approximate number of losses among the command staff, despite the fact that the total number of French losses in it, according to Vasiliev, is known exactly (33,854 people, including 42 generals and 1,820 officers; at Borodino, according to Vasilyev, 1,792 people are considered to have lost command personnel, of which 49 were generals).

The losses of the generals of the parties in killed and wounded amounted to the French - 49 generals, including 8 killed: 2 divisional (Auguste Caulaincourt and Montbrun) and 6 brigade. The Russians lost 26 generals, but it should be noted that only 73 active Russian generals participated in the battle, while in the French army there were 70 generals only in the cavalry. The French brigadier general was closer to the Russian colonel than to the major general.

However, V.N. Zemtsov showed that Vasiliev's calculations are unreliable, since they are based on inaccurate data. So, according to the lists compiled by Zemtsov, “ on September 5-7, 1928 officers and 49 generals were killed and wounded", that is, the total loss of command personnel amounted to 1,977 people, and not 1,792, as Vasiliev believed. The comparison of data on the personnel of the Great Army for September 2 and 20, carried out by Vasiliev, also, according to Zemtsov, gave incorrect results, since the wounded who returned to duty after the battle were not taken into account. In addition, Vasiliev did not take into account all parts of the French army. Zemtsov himself, using a technique similar to that used by Vasiliev, estimated the French losses for September 5-7 at 38.5 thousand people. Also controversial is the figure used by Vasilyev for the loss of French troops at Wagram 33,854 people - for example, the English researcher Chandler estimated them at 40 thousand people.

It should be noted that to the several thousand killed should be added those who died from wounds, and their number was enormous. In the Kolotsk monastery, where the main military hospital of the French army was located, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th line regiment C. Francois, 3/4 of the wounded died in the 10 days following the battle. French encyclopedias believe that among the 30 thousand victims of Borodin, 20.5 thousand died and died of wounds.

Grand total

The battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century and the bloodiest of all that came before it. According to the most conservative estimates of cumulative losses, about 6,000 people died or were injured on the field every hour, the French army lost about 25% of its composition, the Russian - about 30%. From the French side, 60 thousand cannon shots were fired, from the Russian side - 50 thousand. It is no coincidence that Napoleon called the battle of Borodino his greatest battle, although its results are more than modest for a great commander accustomed to victories.

The death toll, counting those who died of wounds, was much higher than the official number killed on the battlefield; the victims of the battle should also include the wounded, who later died. In the autumn of 1812 - in the spring of 1813, the Russians burned and buried the bodies that remained unburied on the field. According to military historian General Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, a total of 58,521 dead bodies were buried and burned. Russian historians and, in particular, employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino field, estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48-50 thousand people. According to A. Sukhanov, 49,887 dead were buried on the Borodino field and in the surrounding villages (without including French burials in the Kolotsky Monastery).

Both commanders chalked up the victory. According to Napoleon's point of view, expressed in his memoirs:

The battle of Moscow is my greatest battle: it is a battle of giants. The Russians had 170,000 men under arms; they had all the advantages behind them: numerical superiority in infantry, cavalry, artillery, excellent position. They were defeated! Fearless heroes, Ney, Murat, Poniatowski - that's who belonged to the glory of this battle. How many great, how many wonderful historical deeds will be noted in it! She will tell how these brave cuirassiers captured the redoubts, hacking the gunners on their guns; she will tell of the heroic self-sacrifice of Montbrin and Caulaincourt, who found their death in the height of their glory; she will tell how our gunners, open on a level field, fired against more numerous and well-fortified batteries, and about these fearless infantrymen who, at the most critical moment, when the general who commanded them wanted to encourage them, shouted to him: “Calm down, all your soldiers have decided to win today, and they will win!”

This paragraph was dictated in 1816. A year later, in 1817, Napoleon described the Battle of Borodino as follows:

With an army of 80,000, I rushed at the Russians, who consisted of 250,000, armed to the teeth and defeated them ...

Kutuzov in his report to Emperor Alexander I wrote:

Emperor Alexander I was not deceived about the actual state of affairs, but in order to support the hopes of the people for a speedy end to the war, he announced the Battle of Borodino as a victory. Prince Kutuzov was promoted to field marshal general with an award of 100 thousand rubles. Barclay de Tolly received the Order of St. George of the 2nd degree, Prince Bagration - 50 thousand rubles. Fourteen generals received the Order of St. George, 3rd class. All the lower ranks who were in the battle were granted 5 rubles each.

Since then, in Russian, and after it in Soviet (except for the period of 1920-1930s) historiography, an attitude has been established towards the Battle of Borodino as an actual victory for the Russian army. In our time, a number of Russian historians also traditionally insist that the outcome of the Battle of Borodino was uncertain, and the Russian army won a "moral victory" in it.

Foreign historians, who in our time have been joined by a number of their Russian colleagues, regard Borodino as an undoubted victory for Napoleon. As a result of the battle, the French occupied some of the advanced positions and fortifications of the Russian army, while maintaining reserves, pushed the Russians back from the battlefield, and ultimately forced them to retreat and leave Moscow. At the same time, no one disputes that the Russian army retained its combat effectiveness and morale, that is, Napoleon never achieved his goal - the complete defeat of the Russian army.

The main achievement of the general battle at Borodino was that Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army, and in the objective conditions of the entire Russian campaign of 1812, the absence of a decisive victory predetermined the final defeat of Napoleon.

The battle of Borodino marked a crisis in the French strategy of a decisive general battle. During the battle, the French failed to destroy the Russian army, force Russia to capitulate and dictate peace terms. The Russian troops, on the other hand, inflicted significant damage on the enemy army and were able to save forces for the coming battles.

Memory

Borodino field

The widow of one of the generals who died in the battle founded a nunnery on the territory of the Bagration Flesh, in which the charter prescribed "to offer prayers ... for Orthodox leaders and soldiers who in these places for the faith, the sovereign and the fatherland laid their belly in battle in the summer of 1812" . On the eighth anniversary of the battle on August 26, 1820, the first temple of the monastery was consecrated. The temple was erected as a monument of military glory.

By 1839, the lands in the central part of the Borodino field were bought by Emperor Nicholas I. In 1839, at the Kurgan height, on the site of the Raevsky battery, a monument was solemnly opened, and the ashes of Bagration were reburied at its base. Opposite the Raevsky Battery, a gatehouse was built for veterans who were supposed to take care of the monument and the grave of Bagration, keep a book of visitors' records, show visitors the battle plan, finds from the battlefield.

In the year of the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the battle, the gatehouse was rebuilt, 33 monuments to corps, divisions, regiments of the Russian army were installed on the territory of the Borodino field.

On the territory of the modern museum-reserve with an area of ​​110 km² there are more than 200 monuments and memorable places. Every year on the first Sunday of September, more than a thousand participants recreate episodes of the Battle of Borodino in the course of a military-historical reenactment on the Borodino field.

Literature and art

The Battle of Borodino is devoted to a significant place in the works of literature and art. In 1829, D. Davydov wrote the poem "The Borodino Field". A. Pushkin dedicated the poem "Borodino Anniversary" (1831) to the memory of the battle. M. Lermontov published in 1837 the poem "Borodino". In the novel by L. Tolstoy "War and Peace", part of the 3rd volume is devoted to the description of the Battle of Borodino. P. Vyazemsky wrote in 1869 the poem "Commemoration for the Battle of Borodino."

Artists V. Vereshchagin, N. Samokish, F. Roubaud devoted cycles of their paintings to the Battle of Borodino.

100th anniversary of the battle

Borodino panorama

On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, by order of Emperor Nicholas II, the artist F. Roubaud painted the panorama "The Battle of Borodino". At first, the panorama was located in the pavilion at Chistye Prudy, in 1918 it was dismantled, and in the 1960s it was restored and reopened in the building of the Panorama Museum.

200th anniversary of the battle

On September 2, 2012, solemn events dedicated to the 200th anniversary of the historical battle took place on the Borodino field. They were attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin and former French President Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, as well as descendants of the participants in the battle and representatives of the Romanov dynasty. Several thousand people from more than 120 military historical clubs in Russia, Europe, the USA and Canada took part in the reenactment of the battle. The event was attended by over 150 thousand people.

• On the eve of the battle, a meteorite fell in the location of the Russian artillery battery, later named Borodino after the battle.

R. Volkov "Portrait of M.I. Kutuzov"

You will not see such battles! ..
Worn banners like shadows
Fire gleamed in the smoke
Damask steel sounded, buckshot screeched,
The hand of the fighters is tired of stabbing,
And prevented the nuclei from flying
A mountain of bloody bodies ... (M.Yu. Lermontov "Borodino")

background

After the invasion of the French army under the command of Napoleon into the territory of the Russian Empire (June 1812), Russian troops regularly retreated. The numerical superiority of the French contributed to the rapid advance into the depths of Russia, this deprived the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, of the opportunity to prepare troops for battle. The long retreat of the troops caused public indignation, in connection with this, Emperor Alexander I appointed General of Infantry Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. However, Kutuzov continued to retreat. Kutuzov's strategy was aimed at 1) exhausting the enemy, 2) waiting for reinforcements for a decisive battle with the Napoleonic army.

On September 5, the battle took place at the Shevardino redoubt, which delayed the French troops and made it possible for the Russians to build fortifications on the main positions.

V.V. Vereshchagin "Napoleon on the Borodino Heights"

The battle of Borodino began on September 7, 1812 at 5:30 and ended at 18:00. Fighting during the day took place in different parts of the position of the Russian troops: from the village of Maloye in the north to the village of Utitsy in the south. The most difficult battles took place for Bagration's flashes and on the Raevsky battery.

On the morning of September 3, 1812, having begun to concentrate in the area of ​​​​the village of Borodina, M.I. Kutuzov carefully examined the surrounding area and ordered the construction of fortifications to begin. concluded that this area was most suitable for a decisive battle - it was impossible to postpone it further, since Alexander I demanded that Kutuzov stop the French advance towards Moscow.

The village of Borodino was located 12 kilometers west of Mozhaisk, the terrain here was hilly and crossed by small rivers and streams that formed deep ravines. The eastern part of the field is elevated more than the western one. The Koloch River, which flowed through the village, had a high steep bank, which was a good cover for the right flank of the Russian army. The left flank, approaching the swampy forest, overgrown with bushes, was poorly accessible to cavalry and infantry. This position of the Russian army made it possible to cover the road to Moscow, and the wooded area made it possible to shelter reserves. It was impossible to find a better place for the decisive battle. Although Kutuzov himself was aware that the left flank was a weak point, he hoped to “correct the situation with art”.

Start of the fight

Kutuzov's idea was that, as a result of the active defense of the Russian troops, the French troops would suffer as many losses as possible in order to change the balance of forces and further defeat the French army. In accordance with this, the battle formation of the Russian troops was built.

In the village of Borodino there was one battalion of Russian guards rangers with four guns. To the west of the village there was a combat outpost of rangers of army regiments. East of Borodino, 30 sailors guarded the bridge over the Kolocha River. After the withdrawal of Russian troops to the eastern coast, they were supposed to destroy it.

The corps under the command of E. Beauharnais, Viceroy of Spain, sent one division from the north and another from the west to the battle near Borodino.

The French imperceptibly, under the cover of the morning fog, approached Borodino at 5 am, and at 5-30 they were noticed by the Russians, who opened artillery fire. The guards moved on the French with bayonets, but the forces were not equal - many of them died on the spot. The rest retreated behind Kolocha, but the French broke through the bridge and approached the village of Gorki, where Kutuzov's command post was.

But Barclay de Tolly, having sent three regiments of chasseurs, drove the French away, the bridge over the Kolocha was dismantled.

The French who survived and retreated to Borodino established an artillery battery here, from which they fired at the Raevsky battery and at the battery near the village of Gorki.

Battle for Bagration's flashes

J.Dow "Portrait of P.I. Bagration"

Bagration had at his disposal about 8,000 soldiers and 50 guns (the 27th infantry division of General Neverovsky and the consolidated grenadier division of General Vorontsov) to protect the flashes.

Napoleon had 43,000 men and more than 200 guns (seven infantry and eight cavalry divisions under the command of marshals Davout, Murat, Ney and General Junot) to strike at the flushes. But even these troops were not enough, additional reinforcements came, as a result, the Napoleonic army fought for the Bagration Flushes, consisting of 50 thousand soldiers and 400 guns. During the battle, the Russians also brought up reinforcements - 30 thousand soldiers and 300 guns made up the number of Russian troops.

For 6 hours of battle, the French made eight attacks: the first two were repulsed, then the French managed to temporarily capture three flushes, but they could not gain a foothold there and were driven back by Bagration. This defeat worried Napoleon and his marshals, as the French were clearly outnumbered. The French troops were losing confidence. And so the eighth attack of the flushes began, which ended with the capture of it by the French, then Bagration put forward all his available forces for a counterattack, but he himself was seriously wounded - Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn took command. He raised the spirit of the army, broken by the wound of Bagration, withdrew the troops from the fleches to the eastern bank of the Semenovsky ravine, quickly installed artillery, built infantry and cavalry, and delayed the further advance of the French.

Semenov position

10 thousand soldiers and artillery were concentrated here. The task of the Russians in this position was to delay the further advance of the French army and block the breakthrough, which was formed after the French occupied the Bagration fleches. This was a difficult task, since the bulk of the Russian troops were those who had already fought for several hours for Bagration's flushes, and only three guards regiments (Moscow, Izmailovsky and Finland) arrived from the reserve. They lined up in a square.

But the French did not have reinforcements, so the Napoleonic marshals decided to attack in such a way as to hit the Russians on both sides in the crossfire of artillery. The French attacked fiercely, but were constantly repulsed, most of them died from Russian bayonets. Nevertheless, the Russians were forced to retreat east of the village of Semenovskoye, but soon Kutuzov gave the order to attack the cavalry of the Cossack regiments of Platov and Uvarov, which diverted part of the French troops from the center. While Napoleon was regrouping his troops on the left wing, Kutuzov gained time and pulled his forces to the center of the position.

Raevsky battery

J. Dow "Portrait of General Raevsky"

The battery of Lieutenant General Raevsky had a strong position: it was located on a hill, where 18 guns were installed, there were 8 infantry battalions and three regiments of chasseurs in reserve. The French tried twice to attack the battery, but failed, but there were heavy losses on both sides. At three o'clock in the afternoon, the French again began to attack Raevsky's battery and two regiments managed to go around it from the north side and break in. A fierce hand-to-hand fight began, Raevsky's battery was finally taken by the French. Russian troops retreated in battle and organized defenses 1-1.5 kilometers east of the Raevsky battery.

Fights on the Old Smolensk road

After a long break, the battle began again on the Old Smolensk road. The regiments of the 17th division, the Vilmanstrad and Minsk regiments of the 4th division and 500 people of the Moscow militia participated in it. The French could not withstand the attacking actions of the Russian troops and retreated, but then Poniatowski's infantry and cavalry forces struck from the left flank and from the rear. Russian troops at first successfully resisted, but then retreated along the Old Smolensk road and settled east of the Utitsky mound, in the upper reaches of the Semenovsky stream, adjoining the left flank of the 2nd Army.

End of the Battle of Borodino

V.V. Vereshchagin "The End of the Battle of Borodino"

For 15 hours the French army fought with the Russian forces, but could not achieve success. Its physical and moral resources were undermined, and with the onset of darkness, the Napoleonic troops withdrew to their starting line, leaving Bagration's flashes and Raevsky's battery, for which there was a stubborn struggle. Only the forward detachments of the French remained on the right bank of the Kolocha, while the main forces retreated to the left bank of the river.

The Russian army firmly occupied positions. Despite significant losses, her morale did not drop. The soldiers were eager to fight and burned with the desire to finally defeat the enemy. Kutuzov was also preparing for the upcoming battle, but the information collected at night showed that half of the Russian army was defeated - it was impossible to continue the battle. And he decides to retreat and surrender Moscow to the French.

The meaning of the battle of Borodino

Under Borodino, the Russian army under the command of Kutuzov dealt a severe blow to the French army. Its losses were enormous: 58 thousand soldiers, 1600 officers and 47 generals. Napoleon called the battle of Borodino the most bloody and terrible of all the battles he had given (a total of 50). His troops, which won brilliant victories in Europe, were forced to retreat under the pressure of Russian soldiers. The French officer Laugier wrote in his diary: “What a sad sight the battlefield presented. No disaster, no lost battle can equal the horrors of the Borodino field. . . Everyone is shocked and crushed."

The Russian army also suffered heavy losses: 38 thousand soldiers, 1500 officers and 29 generals.

The battle of Borodino is an example of the military genius of M.I. Kutuzov. He took everything into account: he successfully chose positions, skillfully deployed troops, provided strong reserves, which gave him the opportunity to maneuver. The French army, on the other hand, conducted a mainly frontal offensive with limited maneuvers. In addition, Kutuzov always relied on the courage and stamina of Russian soldiers, soldiers and officers.

The battle of Borodino was a turning point in the Patriotic War of 1812, it was of great international importance, which influenced the fate European countries. Defeated near Borodino, Napoleon was never able to recover from the defeat in Russia, and later he was defeated in Europe.

V.V. Vereshchagin "On the high road - the retreat of the French"

Other assessments of the Battle of Borodino

Emperor Alexander I announced the battle of Borodino as victory.

A number of Russian historians insist that the outcome of the Battle of Borodino was indefinite, but the Russian army won a "moral victory" in it.

F. Roubaud "Borodino. Attack on the Raevsky Battery"

Foreign historians, as well as a number of Russian ones, consider Borodino as an undoubted Napoleon's victory.

However, everyone agrees that Napoleon failed crush the Russian army. French failed destroy the Russian army, force Russia to capitulate and dictate peace terms.

Russian troops inflicted significant damage on Napoleon's army and were able to save forces for future battles in Europe.