). Everything said in the video is true. I do not agree only with the fact that it was all a secret. Perhaps in the press, not all the facts of the investigation were covered in full ... and was it necessary for people far from aviation and navy? ... I think not ...
We, the military, were notified of the catastrophe immediately. Firstly, everyone, indeed, at the first moment thought that the war had begun ... almost the entire command staff of one of the most powerful in the world, at that time, the Pacific Fleet perished ... involuntarily such thoughts crept in ...
The course of the investigation, especially the conclusions of the commission, were also brought to us almost online. Of course, all this was classified as "secret", but nevertheless it was not a secret ... and no one lied to anyone ... The conclusions of the commission on the investigation of the plane crash were exactly as stated in this video ...
Of course, we all worried... such a tragedy could happen to each of us... and the dead, their families were sorry...
And it was like this...
Tu-104 aircraft of the commander of the Pacific Fleet Soviet Union Admiral Emil Spiridonov was returning from staff exercises, in which the leadership of all the fleets of the Soviet Union took part, and carried with him the most secret documents, nautical charts and other documentation. In addition to Spiridonov himself, there were 49 other people on board.
Among them are 16 admirals. (For comparison, during the battles of World War II, the Soviet fleet lost four admirals. And then immediately, in one terrible moment - 16!)
The instantly created state commission went through all the versions. They thought: “What if the plane is blown up? What if a potential adversary deliberately beheaded the Pacific Fleet? What if this is the beginning of a war?..” There was also an assumption that some loner could organize a terrorist act.
So what really happened on board the military plane? Why did the command of the Navy die? Members of the high command of the Pacific Fleet, relatives of the victims, eyewitnesses of the tragedy, who accidentally did not get on that ill-fated flight, take part in the film.
Events before the crash
In February 1981, an operational meeting of the highest command staff of all fleets of the USSR was appointed at the Leningrad Naval Academy. Sergei Gorshkov, Commander of the Soviet Navy, was personally at the head of the gathering. The purpose of the gathering was to conduct command and staff exercises without the use of real forces.
Among the officers of the fleet who arrived on January 30, 1981 at the military airfield in the city of Pushkin were the entire senior command staff of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR, who arrived on a Tu-104 plane from Vladivostok. During the week, exercises were held, then, on February 7, the results were summed up, according to which the leadership of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR was recognized as the best. The leadership of the Pacific Fleet began to gather home. On the morning of February 7, 1981, the leadership of the Northern Fleet of the USSR also went home. Among the passengers of this aircraft, the Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet flew to Severomorsk, who was allowed to visit his relatives who lived in Severomorsk. Miraculously escaped death and the commander of the Kamchatka naval flotilla, who took off on an Aeroflot flight.
plane crash
At 4 p.m. on February 7, 1981, the aircraft of the Pacific Fleet went to the executive start. During the takeoff, the Tu-104 separated from the runway with a large angle of attack. Having risen to a height of 45-50 meters, the aircraft with an intensively increasing roll fell on the right wing, hit the ground and exploded. Not far from the crash site, a senior lieutenant technician was found in the snow Zubarev, who accidentally ended up in the cockpit of the aircraft, and who was thrown out of the blow through the nose light. On the way to the hospital, he died. The rest of the people on board died in the explosion.
List of dead
Crew
Inyushin Anatoly Ivanovich. Commander of the Aviation Division of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, Lieutenant Colonel of Aviation.
Poslykhalin Vladimir Alexandrovich. Assistant ship commander - right pilot of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, senior lieutenant.
Subbotin Vitaly Alekseevich. Navigator of the Aviation Detachment of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Major.
Rupasov Mikhail Nikolaevich. Head of the technical and operational part of the detachment of the aviation regiment of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, captain.
Barsov Anatoly Vladimirovich. Technician of the service group of the RTO of the Air Force Pacific Fleet, senior lieutenant.
Vakhteev Anatoly Ivanovich. The commander of the firing installations of the Air Force Aviation Regiment of the Pacific Fleet, ensign.
Passengers
Spiridonov Emil Nikolaevich. Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral.
Belashev Victor Grigorievich. Commander of the 4th Submarine Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral.
Pavlov Georgy Vasilievich. Commander of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Lieutenant General of Aviation.
Sabaneev, Vladimir Dmitrievich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral.
Tikhonov Vasily Fyodorovich. Commander of the Primorsky Flotilla of the diverse forces of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral.
Danilko Stepan Georgievich. Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Major General of Aviation.
Konovalov Vladimir Kharitonovich. Head of the 3rd Directorate of the Navy of the Far East, Rear Admiral.
Korban Vladimir Yakovlevich. Deputy Commander for Combat Training - Head of the Combat Training Department of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Leonov Gennady Fedorovich. Head of Intelligence, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Makhlai Viktor Petrovich. Commander of the submarine squadron of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Mitrofanov Felix Alexandrovich. Head of Operations - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Nikolaev Victor Antonovich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Sakhalin Pacific Flotilla, Rear Admiral.
Pirozhkov Remir Ivanovich. Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 4th Submarine Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Postnikov Vasily Sergeevich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Primorsky Flotilla of the diverse forces of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Rykov Vladimir Vasilievich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Major General of Aviation.
Chulkov James Konstantinovich. Commander of the 10th OPESK Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Aseev Vladislav Petrovich. Captain 1st rank.
Berezhnoy Victor Karpovich. Head of the political department of the 10th OPESK Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank.
Wolf Saul Grigorievich. Head of the Operations Department of the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Captain 1st Rank.
Graph Evgeny Grigorievich. Deputy Head of the Operations Department of the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Captain 1st Rank.
Lobachev Yuri Grigorievich. Deputy Head of the Department of the Logistics Headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 1st Rank.
Morozov Vladislav Ignatievich. Head of the anti-submarine forces department of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank.
Pivoev Vladimir Ilyich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the 4th Submarine Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 1st Rank.
Pogosov Boris Pogosovich. Head of the intelligence information center of the Pacific Fleet, captain of the 1st rank.
Prokopchik Anatoly Vasilievich. Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Primorsky Flotilla of Diverse Forces of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 1st Rank.
Turobov Yuri Nikolaevich. Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 8th OPESK of the Navy, Captain 1st Rank.
Tsygankov Vladimir Dmitrievich. Senior officer of the department of operational management of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank.
Chekansky Kazimir Vladislavovich. Head of the Dental Department of the Naval Hospital - Chief Dentist of the Pacific Fleet, Colonel of the Medical Service.
Delibathanian Artur Arovich. Deputy chief navigator of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, lieutenant colonel of aviation.
Podgaetsky Georgy Vasilievich. Senior officer of the air defense department of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain of the 2nd rank.
Sorokatyuk Vladimir Dmitrievich. Head of the Operations Department - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel.
Babkin Anatoly Ivanovich. Senior officer of the logistics headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain of the 3rd rank.
Naumenko Sergei Ivanovich. Military fighter pilot from Novosibirsk, captain.
Akentiev Alexander Nikolaevich. Military fighter pilot from Novosibirsk, senior lieutenant.
Zubarev Valentin Iosifovich. Senior technician of the group of routine maintenance and repair of radio equipment of the 570th air regiment of the 143rd mrad of the Pacific Fleet Air Force from Sovetskaya Gavan, senior lieutenant.
Shevchenko Gennady Gennadievich. Adjutant commander of the Pacific Fleet, senior lieutenant.
Amelchenko Boris Ivanovich. The guarantor of the member of the Military Council - the head of the political department of the Pacific Fleet, midshipman.
Dvorsky Victor Stepanovich. The draftsman of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, senior sailor.
Lomakin Tamara Vasilievna. The wife of the first secretary of the Primorsky Regional Committee of the CPSU Lomakin V.P.
Spiridonova Valentina Pavlovna. The wife of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Spiridonov E.N.
Levkovich Anna A. Typist of the operational department of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet.
Moreva Ekaterina Aleksandrovna. Daughter of the head of communications of the Pacific Fleet A. Morev.
Makarenko B. N. The son of the head of supply of the Primorsky Regional Executive Committee N. Makarenko.
Makarenko E. N. Wife Makarenko B. N.
February 7 marks 37 years since the tragedy that occurred at the airport in the Leningrad region, near the city of Pushkin, on February 7, 1981. On this day, the TU-104 aircraft with the command of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR crashed. As a result of the crash, 50 people died, including 16 admirals and generals and 11 captains of the first rank of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR. As a result of this plane crash, the Pacific Fleet was left practically without leadership for a while. IA PrimaMedia offers to recall the details of the disaster.
At the beginning of February 1981, an operational mobilization meeting of the leadership of all fleets of the Navy was held at the Naval Academy in Leningrad. The top leadership of the fleets took part in command and staff exercises without the involvement of real forces.
January 30, 1981 at the military airfield in the city of Pushkin (Leningrad region) landed the Tu-104 aircraft of the control detachment of the 593rd separate transport aviation regiment of the 25th Marine Missile Aviation Division of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR (the place of deployment is the airfield "Knevichi", Vladivostok), on which the entire senior command staff of the Pacific Fleet arrived for the exercises. The exercises were held for a week, following which the actions of the Pacific Fleet command were recognized as the best. The next day, the high command of the fleets of the USSR Navy, which participated in the exercises, was supposed to depart back to the places of deployment of the fleets.
At 16.00 hours on February 7, 1981, the commander of the Tu-104 Pacific Fleet of the USSR Inyushin A.I. confirmed his readiness to take off and make a non-stop flight to Vladivostok, in connection with which the aircraft was refueled to the fullest extent possible. When taking off, the Tu-104 took off from the runway with a large angle of attack. Having reached a height of 50 meters, the plane began to roll on the right wing and after a few seconds went into a stall, hit the ground and exploded.
Almost everyone on the plane died at the time of the explosion. Senior lieutenant technician Zubarev was thrown out through the nose canopy during the impact of the plane on the ground, but on the way to the hospital he died from his injuries.
Tu-104SH Pacific Fleet of the USSR, tail number USSR-42330. Photo: Archive K.G. Udalova
The preliminary list of the dead, compiled immediately after the disaster, consisted of not 50, but 52 people. Subsequently, it turned out that Vice Admiral G.A. Khvatov, commander of the Kamchatka naval flotilla, and R.A. Golosov, chief of staff of the Pacific Fleet, took off on other flights, thereby miraculously avoiding death.
According to the official version, when placing cargo and passengers in the cabin, as well as when calculating the maximum allowable weight of the cargo, the crew made mistakes, which led to a centering shift to the prohibitively rear, which, in turn, led to the aircraft reaching a supercritical angle of attack immediately after separation, loss of stability and inability to control the aircraft. Also, one of the factors that influenced the incident was the lift-off of the aircraft at a speed less than the calculated one by 25 km / h, as a result of which the overloaded aircraft could not provide the necessary lift.
According to some versions, one of the causes of the disaster was the overload of the aircraft, including fuel. It was for this reason that the takeoff was made at a speed less than the calculated one, since the crew was simply not able to accelerate the overloaded aircraft to the calculated take-off speed. The official investigation does not confirm this version either.
Immediately after the disaster, information about the incident was classified. The only mention of the crash of the Tu-104 with the command of the Pacific Fleet was published in the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, the official press organ of the USSR armed forces:
"On February 7, 1981, a group of admirals, generals, officers, midshipmen, warrant officers, sailors and employees of the Pacific Fleet died in the line of duty in a plane crash. The USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate Soviet army and the Navy express their deep condolences to the families and friends of the fallen comrades."
The Tu-104 plane crash near Pushkin became the largest plane crash in which the high command of the USSR armed forces died. The death of the command of the Pacific Fleet actually left the fleet without leadership. Immediately after the disaster, the Pacific Fleet was put on full alert, since the primary version of the disaster was a terrorist act, but, later, this version was not confirmed. As a result of the disaster, the commander of the 25th Naval Missile Aviation Division, to which the Tu-104 belonged, Colonel A.I. Yakovlev was removed from his post. Although Tu-104 aircraft have not been used in civil aviation since 1979, they were operated by the Air Force. After the crash near Pushkino, the Tu-104 ceased to be operated in the armed forces of the USSR - all aircraft were decommissioned.
Almost all the dead were buried in Leningrad at the Serafimovsky cemetery. In 1983, by personal order of the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy S.G. Gorshkov's grave was erected a memorial. In 2000, the inscription was made on the monument:
"Dead in the line of duty on February 7, 1981."
Since 1991, every year on February 7, a memorial service for those who died in this plane crash has been served at the Nikolo-Bogoyavlensky Naval Cathedral in St. Petersburg. On June 15, 2000, a memorial plaque with the names of the dead was unveiled on the territory of the cathedral.
In 2017, a monument to fallen servicemen was opened in Vladivostok on Korabelnaya Embankment. It is a marble stele immortalized by a sailboat. The memorial is located at berth 33 on the territory of the Pacific Fleet.
Monument to the command of the Pacific Fleet, who died in a plane crash, Vladivostok, February 7, 2017. Photo: Alexander Ratnikov, IA PrimaMedia
List of dead
crew
- Inyushin Anatoly Ivanovich. Commander of the Aviation Division of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, Lieutenant Colonel of Aviation.
- Poslykhalin Vladimir Alexandrovich Assistant commander of the ship - the right pilot of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, senior lieutenant.
- Subbotin Vitaly Alekseevich. Navigator of the Aviation Detachment of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Major.
- Rupasov Mikhail Nikolaevich. Head of the technical and operational part of the detachment of the aviation regiment of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, captain.
- Barsov Anatoly Vladimirovich. Technician of the service group of the RTO of the Air Force Pacific Fleet, senior lieutenant.
- Vakhteev Anatoly Ivanovich. The commander of the firing installations of the Air Force Aviation Regiment of the Pacific Fleet, ensign.
Monument to the command of the Pacific Fleet who died in a plane crash. Photo: Alexander Ratnikov, IA PrimaMedia
passengers
- Spiridonov Emil Nikolaevich Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral.
- Belashev Viktor Grigorievich Commander of the 4th Submarine Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral.
- Pavlov Georgy Vasilievich. Commander of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Lieutenant General of Aviation.
- Sabaneev Vladimir Dmitrievich Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral.
- Tikhonov Vasily Fyodorovich Commander of the Primorsky Flotilla of the diverse forces of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral.
- Danilko Stepan Georgievich Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Major General of Aviation.
- Konovalov Vladimir Kharitonovich Head of the 3rd Directorate of the Navy of the Far East, Rear Admiral.
- Korban Vladimir Yakovlevich Deputy Commander for Combat Training - Head of the Combat Training Department of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
- Leonov Gennady Fedorovich. Head of Intelligence, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
- Makhlai Viktor Petrovich Commander of the submarine squadron of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
- Mitrofanov Felix Alexandrovich. Chief of Operations - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
- Nikolaev Viktor Antonovich Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Sakhalin Pacific Flotilla, Rear Admiral.
- Pirozhkov Remir Ivanovich Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 4th Submarine Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
- Postnikov Vasily Sergeevich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Primorsky Flotilla of the diverse forces of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
- Rykov Vladimir Vasilievich Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Major General of Aviation.
- Chulkov Dzhems Konstantinovich. Commander of the 10th OPESK Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
- Aseev Vladislav Petrovich Captain 1st rank.
- Berezhnoy Viktor Karpovich. Head of the political department of the 10th OPESK Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank.
- Volk Saul Grigorievich. Head of the Operations Department of the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Captain 1st Rank.
- Count Evgeny Grigorievich. Deputy Head of the Operations Department of the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Captain 1st Rank.
- Lobachev Yuri Grigorievich. Deputy Head of the Department of the Logistics Headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 1st Rank.
- Morozov Vladislav Ignatievich. Head of the anti-submarine forces department of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank.
- Pivoev Vladimir Ilyich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the 4th Submarine Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 1st Rank.
- Pogosov Boris Pogosovich. Head of the intelligence information center of the Pacific Fleet, captain of the 1st rank.
- Prokopchik Anatoly Vasilievich. Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Primorsky Flotilla of Diverse Forces of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 1st Rank.
- Turobov Yuri Nikolaevich. Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 8th OPESK of the Navy, Captain 1st Rank.
- Tsygankov Vladimir Dmitrievich Senior officer of the department of operational management of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank.
- Chekansky Kazimir Vladislavovich. Head of the Dental Department of the Naval Hospital - Chief Dentist of the Pacific Fleet, Colonel of the Medical Service.
- Delibatanyan Artur Arovich. Deputy chief navigator of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, lieutenant colonel of aviation.
Monument to the fallen command of the Pacific Fleet. Photo: Alexander Ratnikov, IA PrimaMedia
- Podgaetsky Georgy Vasilievich. Senior officer of the air defense department of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain of the 2nd rank.
- Sorokatyuk Vladimir Dmitrievich Head of the Operations Department - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel.
- Babkin Anatoly Ivanovich. Senior officer of the logistics headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain of the 3rd rank.
- Naumenko Sergey Ivanovich. Military fighter pilot from Novosibirsk, captain.
- Akentiev Alexander Nikolaevich. Military fighter pilot from Novosibirsk, senior lieutenant.
- Zubarev Valentin Iosifovich. Senior technician of the group of routine maintenance and repair of radio equipment of the 570th air regiment of the 143rd mrad of the Pacific Fleet Air Force from Sovetskaya Gavan, senior lieutenant.
- Shevchenko Gennady Gennadievich. Adjutant commander of the Pacific Fleet, senior lieutenant.
- Amelchenko Boris Ivanovich. Guarantor of a member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Directorate of the Pacific Fleet, midshipman.
- Dvorsky Viktor Stepanovich The draftsman of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, senior sailor.
- Lomakina Tamara Vasilievna The wife of the first secretary of the Primorsky Regional Committee of the CPSU Lomakin V.P.
- Spiridonova Valentina Pavlovna The wife of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Spiridonov E.N.
- Levkovich Anna P. Typist of the operational department of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet.
- Moreva Elena A. Daughter of the head of communications of the Pacific Fleet A. Morev.
- Makarenko B. N. The son of the head of supply of the Primorsky Territory Executive Committee N. Makarenko.
- Makarenko E. N. Wife of Makarenko B. N.
World history knows many major aviation accidents. But among them there is no equal to the one that occurred at the military airfield in the city of Pushkin near Leningrad. February 7, 1981 The Tu-104 plane died on takeoff. Almost nothing is known about that tragedy.
The reason for this is simple - the accident was instantly classified, and until now its true causes are very reluctantly called. But as a result of that long-standing catastrophe, the entire huge and strongest Pacific Fleet of the Soviet Union at that time was left without leadership.
The Tu-104 aircraft of the commander of the Pacific Fleet of the Soviet Union, Admiral Emil Spiridonov, was returning from a staff exercise in which the leadership of all the fleets of the Soviet Union took part, and carried with it the most secret documents, nautical charts and other documentation. In addition to Spiridonov himself, there were 49 other people on board.
Among them are 16 admirals. (For comparison, during the battles of World War II, the Soviet fleet lost four admirals. And then immediately, in one terrible moment - 16!)
The instantly created state commission went through all the versions. They thought: “What if the plane is blown up? What if a potential adversary deliberately beheaded the Pacific Fleet? What if this is the beginning of a war?..” There was also an assumption that some loner could organize a terrorist act.
So what really happened on board the military plane? Why did the command of the Navy die? Members of the high command of the Pacific Fleet, relatives of the victims, eyewitnesses of the tragedy, who accidentally did not get on that ill-fated flight, take part in the film.
Events before the crash
In February 1981, an operational meeting of the highest command staff of all fleets of the USSR was appointed at the Leningrad Naval Academy. Sergei Gorshkov, Commander of the Soviet Navy, was personally at the head of the gathering. The purpose of the gathering was to conduct command and staff exercises without the use of real forces.
Among the officers of the fleet who arrived on January 30, 1981 at the military airfield in the city of Pushkin were the entire senior command staff of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR, who arrived on a Tu-104 plane from Vladivostok. During the week, exercises were held, then, on February 7, the results were summed up, according to which the leadership of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR was recognized as the best. The leadership of the Pacific Fleet began to gather home. On the morning of February 7, 1981, the leadership of the Northern Fleet of the USSR also went home. Among the passengers of this aircraft, the Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet flew to Severomorsk, who was allowed to visit his relatives who lived in Severomorsk. Miraculously escaped death and the commander of the Kamchatka naval flotilla, who took off on an Aeroflot flight.
plane crash
At 4 p.m. on February 7, 1981, the aircraft of the Pacific Fleet went to the executive start. During the takeoff, the Tu-104 separated from the runway with a large angle of attack. Having risen to a height of 45-50 meters, the aircraft with an intensively increasing roll fell on the right wing, hit the ground and exploded. Not far from the crash site, Senior Lieutenant Technician Zubarev was found in the snow. On the way to the hospital, he died. The rest of the people on board died in the explosion.
List of dead
Crew
Inyushin Anatoly Ivanovich. Commander of the Aviation Division of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, Lieutenant Colonel of Aviation.
Poslykhalin Vladimir Alexandrovich Assistant ship commander - right pilot of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, senior lieutenant.
Subbotin Vitaly Alekseevich. Navigator of the Aviation Detachment of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Major.
Rupasov Mikhail Nikolaevich. Head of the technical and operational part of the detachment of the aviation regiment of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, captain.
Barsov Anatoly Vladimirovich. Technician of the service group of the RTO of the Air Force Pacific Fleet, senior lieutenant.
Vakhteev Anatoly Ivanovich. The commander of the firing installations of the Air Force Aviation Regiment of the Pacific Fleet, ensign.
Passengers
Spiridonov Emil Nikolaevich Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral.
Belashev Viktor Grigorievich Commander of the 4th Submarine Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral.
Pavlov Georgy Vasilievich. Commander of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Lieutenant General of Aviation.
Sabaneev, Vladimir Dmitrievich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral.
Tikhonov Vasily Fyodorovich Commander of the Primorsky Flotilla of the diverse forces of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral.
Danilko Stepan Georgievich Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Major General of Aviation.
Konovalov Vladimir Kharitonovich Head of the 3rd Directorate of the Navy of the Far East, Rear Admiral.
Korban Vladimir Yakovlevich Deputy Commander for Combat Training - Head of the Combat Training Department of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Leonov Gennady Fedorovich. Head of Intelligence, Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Makhlai Viktor Petrovich Commander of the submarine squadron of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Mitrofanov Felix Alexandrovich. Head of Operations - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Nikolaev Viktor Antonovich Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Sakhalin Pacific Flotilla, Rear Admiral.
Pirozhkov Remir Ivanovich Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 4th Submarine Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Postnikov Vasily Sergeevich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Primorsky Flotilla of the diverse forces of the Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Rykov Vladimir Vasilievich Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Major General of Aviation.
Chulkov, James Konstantinovich. Commander of the 10th OPESK Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral.
Aseev Vladislav Petrovich Captain 1st rank.
Berezhnoy Viktor Karpovich. Head of the political department of the 10th OPESK Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank.
Volk Saul Grigorievich. Head of the Operations Department of the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Captain 1st Rank.
Count Evgeny Grigorievich. Deputy Head of the Operations Department of the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Captain 1st Rank.
Lobachev Yuri Grigorievich. Deputy Head of the Department of the Logistics Headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 1st Rank.
Morozov Vladislav Ignatievich. Head of the anti-submarine forces department of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank.
Pivoev Vladimir Ilyich. Member of the Military Council - Head of the Political Department of the 4th Submarine Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 1st Rank.
Pogosov Boris Pogosovich. Head of the intelligence information center of the Pacific Fleet, captain of the 1st rank.
Prokopchik Anatoly Vasilievich. Chief of Staff - First Deputy Commander of the Primorsky Flotilla of Diverse Forces of the Pacific Fleet, Captain 1st Rank.
Turobov Yuri Nikolaevich. Chief of Staff - Deputy Commander of the 8th OPESK of the Navy, Captain 1st Rank.
Tsygankov Vladimir Dmitrievich Senior officer of the department of operational management of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain 1st rank.
Chekansky Kazimir Vladislavovich. Head of the Dental Department of the Naval Hospital - Chief Dentist of the Pacific Fleet, Colonel of the Medical Service.
Delibatanyan Artur Arovich. Deputy chief navigator of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, lieutenant colonel of aviation.
Podgaetsky Georgy Vasilievich. Senior officer of the air defense department of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain of the 2nd rank.
Sorokatyuk Vladimir Dmitrievich Head of the Operations Department - Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, Lieutenant Colonel.
Babkin Anatoly Ivanovich. Senior officer of the logistics headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, captain of the 3rd rank.
Naumenko Sergey Ivanovich. Military fighter pilot from Novosibirsk, captain.
Akentiev Alexander Nikolaevich. Military fighter pilot from Novosibirsk, senior lieutenant.
Zubarev Valentin Iosifovich. Senior technician of the group of routine maintenance and repair of radio equipment of the 570th air regiment of the 143rd mrad of the Pacific Fleet Air Force from Sovetskaya Gavan, senior lieutenant.
Shevchenko Gennady Gennadievich. Adjutant commander of the Pacific Fleet, senior lieutenant.
Amelchenko Boris Ivanovich. The guarantor of the member of the Military Council - the head of the political department of the Pacific Fleet, midshipman.
Dvorsky Viktor Stepanovich The draftsman of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet, senior sailor.
Lomakina Tamara Vasilievna The wife of the first secretary of the Primorsky Regional Committee of the CPSU Lomakin V.P.
Spiridonova Valentina Pavlovna The wife of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Spiridonov E.N.
Levkovich Anna A. Typist of the operational department of the Pacific Fleet headquarters.
Moreva Ekaterina Alexandrovna Daughter of the head of communications of the Pacific Fleet A. Morev.
Makarenko B. N. The son of the head of supply of the Primorsky Territory Executive Committee N. Makarenko.
Makarenko E. N. Wife of Makarenko B. N.
Vice Admiral Yu.A. PANTELEEV
The name of Vice Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov is inextricably linked with the history of the development of the Russian fleet. S.O. Makarov was the most talented representative of the Russian navy of the second half of XIX and the beginning of the 20th century. His combat activities and theoretical work in the field of naval affairs had a significant impact on the development of domestic and foreign naval thought. S.O. Makarov was born on December 27, 1848 in Nikolaev, in the family of an ensign. In 1858 Makarov's father moved with his family to Nikolaevsk-on-Amur. In the same year, his 10-year-old son was admitted to the lower department of the Nikolaev maritime school, which trained officers of the naval navigator corps; with good abilities and exceptionally exemplary behavior, young Makarov attracted the attention of his direct superiors and teachers. Since 1861, while still a cadet, he began sailing on the warships of the Siberian Flotilla, and then on the ships of the Pacific Ocean squadron - the Abrek clipper and the Bogatyr corvette. This was Makarov's first maritime school, which had a great influence on the formation of his personality.
In 1865, Makarov, having passed the final exams at the school with excellent results, was assigned to the steamship America. Before becoming an officer, after graduating from college, he completed the difficult service of a midshipman for four years, sailing on various warships. And only in 1869, while serving on the frigate "Dmitry Donskoy", Makarov was promoted to midshipman - the first officer rank.
Midshipman Makarov began officer service on the armored boat "Rusalka" as part of the squadron of the outstanding Russian admiral G.I. Butakov. In one of the campaigns, this ship received a hole in the skerries from hitting a rock. A relatively small accident almost led to the death of the ship due to the lack of the necessary drainage facilities and the proper organization of the struggle for the ship's survivability. Makarov immediately drew attention to the discrepancy between the ship's ability to deal with accidents, in particular, with holes in the hull of its combat power. Makarov studied the causes of accidents of a number of other ships, both domestic and foreign, made the necessary calculations himself and published the results of his research in 1870 in the journal "Sea Collection", where he made a number of valuable proposals for creating a system of unsinkability of ships, proposed a number of new technical devices, including a special patch for sealing holes ("Makarov patch").
Admiral Butakov supported the reasonable proposals of the young midshipman and appreciated their importance for the fleet. "Part of Makarov's proposals," writes Academician Krylov, "was accepted and implemented, but the most important of them - leveling the ship by flooding intact compartments - seemed to the Marine Technical Committee such a great heresy that it took 35 years, the death of Makarov, Tsushima ... to convince of justice practical importance and the feasibility of the ideas of the 22-year-old midshipman Makarov.
With his research, Makarov, for the first time in history, laid the foundation for the scientific substantiation and practical organization of the struggle for the survivability of the ship, which were later developed by the great Russian shipbuilder Academician A.N. Krylov. Soon these ideas of Makarov penetrated abroad and were used in the English and other fleets.
In 1872, Admiral Popov, under whose command Makarov made his first voyages, developed ship designs. By that time, Makarov's work had become known in St. Petersburg. Admiral Popov summoned Makarov, now a lieutenant, at his disposal. Makarov was involved in the further development of issues of unsinkability of ships and, having worked under the leadership of Admiral Popov for four years, proved to be a talented innovator.
During this period, Lieutenant Makarov made a number of valuable proposals to ensure the unsinkability of ships, he himself monitored their implementation, taught the personnel of the ships to use means of combating ship damage, gave lectures, and wrote articles for magazines. "It is necessary that people see what a hole is, how water beats through a bad closed doors why it is necessary to properly seal the necks, etc. Until now, we teach bilge business by story; it’s time, however, to start teaching by display,” wrote Makarov. Several accidents that occurred in those years confirmed the correctness of Makarov’s ideas and specific proposals. But all this could not overcome the spirit of routine and inertia of the top leadership of the fleet, merits of domestic scientists, innovators and inventors.
At first Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 Makarov's energy, ingenuity and perseverance found new uses. As you know, by virtue of the Paris Treaty of 1856, Russia was deprived of the right to have a combat fleet in the Black Sea, and although this treaty was annulled in 1871, nevertheless, to create a strong military fleet on the Black Sea by the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war did not have time and, apart from floating batteries, wooden corvettes and several schooners, had nothing there. Turkey, by this time, had a large fleet with strong artillery. On the Black Sea, she could use 15 battleships, 5 screw frigates, 13 screw corvettes, 8 monitors, 7 armored gunboats and a large number of small vessels.
The balance of power in the Black Sea was far from in favor of Russia. It was necessary, given the small number of naval forces, to find effective methods of dealing with the strong fleet of Turkey. The solution to this problem was found by Makarov. He proposed the use of high-speed steamers equipped with lifting mine boats, which can be quickly lowered into the water in the area of detection of the enemy, after which the boats, under the cover of darkness, could independently attack enemy ships with pole or towing mines. After the attack, the boats had to retreat to the steamer, they were raised on deck, and the steamer quickly left. A specific plan of action against the Turkish fleet was also proposed.
However, despite the obvious importance of Makarov's proposal, which he defended with extreme persistence, he had to endure a stubborn struggle with the officials of the Naval Ministry before the project was approved. After his approval, Makarov in December 1876 was appointed commander of the Konstantin steamer and, with his characteristic energy, quickly armed the steamer with artillery and four mine boats. In the process of arming the ship, Makarov implemented a number of new technical proposals and developed the tactical principles for the use of mine weapons.
After the declaration of war, Makarov, having achieved the "highest" permission from St. Petersburg, was able to go to sea to implement his plan. Combat success did not come to Makarov immediately. The first attack, carried out on April 30, 1877 on the Batumi raid, was unsuccessful. The mine, well brought to the Turkish patrol vessel, did not explode due to a malfunction of the fuse. On the other hand, a new attack, carried out on May 29 at the mouth of the Danube, brought a serious success - the Turkish patrol ship Idzhalie was blown up. No less brilliant was the attack by boats of a Turkish battleship on the Sukhumi roadstead on August 12; the battleship "Assari Shevket" received a hole from the explosion of three mines and a number of other damages, sat on the ground and then was hardly delivered by the Turks to Batum.
In addition, as a result of mine attacks carried out by Makarov during the cruising of the steamer "Konstantin" near the Anatolian and Caucasian coasts, a large number of merchant ships were burned. The active actions of Makarov and his boats against combat and merchant ships caused alarm among the enemy. The Turks no longer risked staying on the Russian coast for the night, although their fleet was still stronger than the Russian. The heroic actions, initiative and energy of Makarov received universal recognition. In September 1877, Makarov was promoted to captain-lieutenant, and three months later - to captain of the 2nd rank.
In December 1877 and January 1878, under the leadership and with the personal participation of Makarov, self-propelled mines were used for the first time in combat operations against Turkish ships in Batum. Only the signing of a truce limited the possibility of further intensifying the combat use of these new types of weapons. But even what was achieved characterized Makarov as a talented officer.
The merits of Makarov in the Russian-Turkish war are primarily in the introduction of new methods of naval combat. The idea proposed by him of mine boats transported on a high-speed steamer was first implemented in the Russian fleet. The steamer "Konstantin" was the prototype of floating bases for torpedo boats and small submarines. Makarov was the first to use the mine as a formidable offensive weapon. He outlined the right ways to develop mine tactics, carry out an attack in the dark with several boats, increase the speed and seaworthiness of the boats. For the first time in the world, a self-propelled mine was tested in combat conditions in the Russian fleet. All this created the prerequisites for the further development of mine boats, which were the forerunners of modern torpedo boats, as well as destroyers.
After the end of the Russian-Turkish war, Makarov's scientific searches took on an even wider scope. Having been appointed to the post of commander of the Taman steamer, which was in Constantinople at the disposal of the Russian ambassador, Makarov, on his own initiative, took up work on the study of currents in the Bosphorus. Having built a number of instruments he needed according to his drawings, he carried out a lot of research work and, after processing all the observations, wrote a scientific work "On the exchange of waters of the Black and Mediterranean Seas." This work was of great scientific and military importance, because it proved the possibility of using underwater weapons (at that time mines, and later submarines). The above work received an award from the Academy of Sciences. Before Makarov, neither Russians nor foreigners knew about the existence of a reverse undercurrent from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea - this was only a belief among local residents. The merit of Makarov is not only that he proved the existence of such an undercurrent, but also explained the cause of this phenomenon, determined the speed of the current at different depths, the temperature and density of the water.
All Makarov's service activities in the Navy were inextricably linked with his scientific work. He did not leave her even while sailing in the Baltic as flag captain of a skerry detachment, flag captain of the practical squadron commander, commander of the Pozharsky armored frigate, and then commander of the Vityaz corvette, which circumnavigated the world. The original, bold proposals Makarov made during this period covered the most diverse branches of maritime affairs. He was involved in the development of a project for shallow-water vessels for navigation on Aral Sea and the Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers. He proposed a method for the accelerated rise of steam on the ships of the skerry detachment, which made it possible to launch not after a few hours, as it was before, but after 7.5 minutes. In 1883, Makarov took part in the organization of the first transportation in the history of the steam fleet in the Baltic from learning goals an entire division on warships. This transportation gave grounds for the calculation of landings. Based on this experience, Makarov developed a large number of devices for lifting weights and horses, as well as for towing boats, etc., and compiled a technically detailed specification of sloop beams for various ships. Commanding the Vityaz corvette in 1885, Makarov managed to combine military tasks with great and important scientific work.
The Vityaz visited a number of ports in Europe, America and Japan, and on June 8, 1887, arrived in Vladivostok. Having sailed 1887-1888. in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, the corvette returned to Kronstadt on May 20, 1889. The entire voyage lasted 993 days. During this time, the corvette has covered 33,412 miles under steam and 25,856 under sail. During the voyage, valuable hydrological observations were made on the temperature and specific gravity of water, over currents and soils. At the same time, Makarov made many improvements in the use of weapons, in the organization of service on the ship, and so on. As a result of his voyage, Makarov presented "Remarks of the commander of the corvette adjutant wing Makarov in all parts, at the end circumnavigation 1886-1889. "This work reflected the most diverse issues of ship life: it included proposals on the introduction of the numbering of guns, boilers, compartments, frames; on laying mines and firing self-propelled mines; on the rapid distribution of steam; on preparing the ship for battle on issues of unsinkability.On his return from circumnavigation, Makarov wrote a new major work - "Vityaz" and "Pacific Ocean", which was also awarded the Academy of Sciences Prize and the gold medal of the Geographical Society.
In 1890, Makarov, along with being promoted to rear admiral, was appointed junior flagship of the Baltic Fleet, and then served as chief inspector of naval artillery. Although it was a purely administrative, technical position, Makarov quickly got used to the new coastal situation. Soon, Makarov's work as chief inspector of naval artillery was crowned with success and brought him wide fame as an artilleryman. He invented for armor-piercing shells named after him "Makarov caps" made of mild steel, which greatly increased the penetrating power of the shells. The secret of this important invention was not kept, and "Makarov's caps" very soon appeared in all foreign fleets and still belong to the armor-piercing projectile to this day. Makarov did not take any patent for his invention. In addition to "caps", he developed the rules for equipment, painting and storage of ammunition. The solution of all these technical questions in those days was of great importance.
In November 1894, Makarov was appointed commander of the Mediterranean squadron stationed in Piraeus, but due to the deterioration of relations with Japan, the squadron was sent to the Far East, came to Nagasaki and, having joined with a detachment of ships from the Pacific Ocean, became subordinate to Vice Admiral Tyrtova.
Makarov's squadron arrived in the Far East at the most critical period of negotiations with Japan. The tsarist government, fearing the strengthening of Japan in the East, sent its fleet there in order to influence diplomatic negotiations with Japan and China. England and Germany did the same.
There were no combat regulations or developed tactical provisions on the conduct of naval combat in those days in the fleet. The question arose before the commander of the combined naval forces in the Pacific, how to conduct a naval battle? And despite the fact that Tyrtov was older than Makarov in position, he, without hesitation, instructed Makarov to write an order on how ships should be prepared for battle and how to fight. Order No. 21 drawn up by Makarov contained exhaustive instructions on the merits of the issue and was signed by Vice Admiral Tyrtov without changes.
The fulfillment of this task led Makarov to the idea that the tactics of naval combat had not been developed at all in the fleet. With his usual energy, he wrote the work "Reasonings on Questions of Naval Tactics", which, after its publication, was translated and published abroad.
By 1896, the tense military-political situation in Far East discharged. The united squadrons were disbanded, one Pacific squadron was created, and Makarov returned to Kronstadt, where he was appointed senior flagship of the 1st Naval Division.
This period includes the implementation of Makarov's idea of building a powerful icebreaker "Ermak". Before that, there were no powerful icebreakers either in Russia or in other countries. Makarov developed an icebreaker project and, having achieved its construction, created the most powerful icebreaker in the world, ensuring the priority of Russian scientific thought in this area as well. But it was not so easy for Makarov to accomplish this.
The idea of conquering the polar ice with a powerful icebreaker in order to reach the North Pole, free the coast and mouths of Siberian rivers from eternal ice, in order to give access to the rivers in a cheap and short way, originated with Makarov as early as 1892 during the period when Nansen organized his expedition to the North Pole. Makarov did not agree with Nansen's plan and sought to find a solution to the problem in a different way, but, loaded with other things, he was able to deal with this issue in earnest only in 1897.
Makarov intended to reach the North Pole on a powerful icebreaker, while all foreign researchers tried to solve this problem using the natural drift of ice and currents in the Arctic. Of all the ideas proposed by Makarov, the idea of building an icebreaker caused, perhaps, the greatest opposition from the most diverse. leading circles of tsarist Russia, both military and financial, and partly scientific, and only the persistence and convincing arguments of Makarov forced government circles to pay attention to this proposal. He was supported by the famous Russian scientist Mendeleev, after which a special report was drawn up for the Minister of Finance. But before agreeing to the construction of the icebreaker, it was decided to instruct Makarov to conduct a personal reconnaissance of the Kara and other polar seas, and only after his trip, convinced of the economic feasibility of building an icebreaker, the government approved Makarov's project, and in early December 1897 with a shipbuilding plant an agreement was signed to build an icebreaker. Makarov personally oversaw the construction of the ship and made a number of valuable suggestions and improvements to the design of the icebreaker, which once again testified to his deep knowledge in the field of shipbuilding.
In the spring of 1899, the icebreaker arrived in Kronstadt, having freely crossed all heavy spring ice Gulf of Finland. Since April, the preparation of the icebreaker for the Arctic voyages began.
During the first exit to the Arctic, which took place on May 29, 1899, the icebreaker gave a small leak in the hull, which required the production of hull reinforcements. During the second exit on July 14, the icebreaker received a small hole while crossing the ice and was forced to enter England for repairs. These two failures, inevitable in any new business, were enough for Makarov's ill-wishers to raise their voice again, proving the impracticability of his ideas. A government commission was organized to study all the causes of icebreaker accidents and determine its suitability for navigation in the Arctic. Makarov was not included in the commission.
The commission, which consisted of opponents of Makarov's idea, came to the conclusion that the icebreaker was ready to sail in polar ice unsuitable and can. be used only for merchant shipping in the Gulf of Finland. Disagreeing with the conclusions of the commission, Makarov continued to seek to send an icebreaker to the Arctic, this time to Novaya Zemlya in order to bypass it from the north and come to the mouth of the Yenisei. He was again allowed to lead this expedition, and at the beginning of May 1901, Yermak left Kronstadt, but bypassed Novaya Zemlya from the north due to heavy ice he failed. Gathering the rich scientific material, Makarov returned to Kronstadt in September of the same year.
This last failure served as the final reason for the decision in government circles to leave the Yermak in the Baltic Sea for escorting ships, and Makarov to be relieved of further duties in experimental navigation in ice. The icebreaker was handed over to the Merchant Shipping Department. This was the end of all attempts to master the Northern Sea Route. One of Makarov's contemporaries, sharing his views, wrote prophetic words: "It seems to me that when, in the near future, a renewed Russia will deploy in all its might the inexhaustible forces of its people, it will use its unfinished treasures natural resources, then the bold idea of the Russian hero Makarov will be realized. Icebreakers will be built capable of passing through the ice of the Arctic Sea as freely as the Yermak passes through the ice of the Gulf of Finland, which were also impassable before it. The Arctic Ocean washing our shores will be explored far and wide by Russian sailors, on Russian icebreakers, for the benefit of science and the glory of Russia.
The creation of an icebreaker fleet was beyond the power of a technically backward Russia. Only under the Soviet regime was its own powerful icebreaker fleet created, the ice of the Arctic was defeated and the Northern Sea Route was mastered. Speaking about the naval activities of Vice Admiral Makarov, one cannot help but dwell on his military-theoretical work in the field of naval affairs, tactics of naval combat, and his views on the education of fleet officers and sailors. The largest scientific works of Makarov on naval issues are: "Analysis of the elements that make up the combat strength of ships" (1894) and "Discourses on naval tactics" (1897). Makarov's work "Reasoning on naval tactics" was a major work on the naval tactics of the steam fleet, which brought the author the well-deserved fame of a scientist. Makarov put all his rich experience and knowledge into this work.
Makarov was the first to define that "naval tactics is the science of naval combat. It explores the elements that make up the combat strength of ships and the ways of their most advantageous use in various cases in war."
Makarov's idea about the influence of the nature of a ship's combat maneuvering on the penetration of its side and deck is very interesting. This idea, developed for the first time by Makarov, made it possible to further develop the construction of penetration diagrams for the side and deck of the ship at different heading angles and distances.
A large place in the work under consideration is given to the analysis of the moral element, to which Makarov always attached particular importance. "... Cheerfulness of spirit on ships is mainly in the hands of combatant ranks, and therefore the study of ways to achieve success in this direction is their direct responsibility." Makarov further wrote: "... people are so different in their mindset and character that the same advice is not suitable for two different people. One should be kept, the other should be encouraged, and only both should not be interfered with."
A number of valuable advice was expressed by Makarov on issues of pedagogy, self-education, self-education and training of personnel in swimming. “If a young man, having received an order, begins to find difficulties,” writes Makarov, “it means that either he did not serve with a good commander, or, while serving with a good commander, did not try to learn anything. A person who, having received an order, speaks of difficulties, stands on the wrong path ... ". "Swimming in peacetime is a school for war," Makarov wrote and demanded that studies at sea be organized based on what and how the personnel would have to do in battle. Speaking about the adoption of this or that decision and about the meetings convened in these cases, Makarov wrote: "... gathering a large number of people does not bring any benefit, but talking with one sensible person is always useful ...", and further: "We know there are many examples of people who are very knowledgeable, who do not take the trouble to delve into what they are told, but are looking for an opportunity to express their thoughts, sometimes very bright, but completely irrelevant to the issue under consideration", therefore "in any solution of the issue, one must remember only about the case , boldly take responsibility for their actions and use their own common sense, taking into account the situation.
In a number of places in his book, Makarov cites the statements and opinions of Admiral Nakhimov and excerpts from Suvorov's "Science of Victory", in solidarity with them and developing their thoughts, which once again confirms the influence of these people on Makarov's judgments about tactics. So, about Suvorov, Makarov writes: "Suvorov is close to us because he understood the spirit of the Russian people and was able to create an army of heroes from this whole and rich nature, surprising all of Europe."
No less interesting are the thoughts of Admiral Makarov, expressed by him in the article "In Defense of Old Battleships and New Improvements", published in the journal "Sea Collection" No. 3, 1886. They also characterize Makarov as the bearer of the idea of active actions and one of the successors of the glorious traditions of Suvorov , Ushakov, Nakhimov. In the said article, Makarov wrote: "My rule is: if you meet the weakest ship - attack, if equal to yourself - attack, if stronger than yourself - also attack ... Do not chase the enemy, which is far away, if another one is close in front of you. " In his other article "Armored ships or armored ships?", Placed in No. 4 of the same journal for 1903, Makarov gave a remarkable forecast for the development of the submarine fleet, the combat capabilities of submarines up to their participation in sea battles and the creation of the so-called "transportable small submarines". “I believe,” Makarov wrote, “that it will not present great difficulties to develop a 12-ton boat that could rise to the Bokanets. Large ships can have two such boats, and, therefore, it must be foreseen that over time submarines can take part even in battles on the high seas." This was written when the first experiments with submarines were just beginning in Russia and they were considered only from the point of view of using them for the needs of coastal defense. Makarov's prediction was fully justified in the future. Of particular interest is Makarov's attitude to the question of "eternal" principles in warfare and to the theories of naval warfare by Mahan and Colomb. The thoughts expressed by him on these questions testify once again to the courage and independence of his judgments, to his outstanding ability for deep analysis and understanding of the sense of the new in military affairs.
Like most Russian officers late XIX century, Makarov knew the work of the American naval theorist Mahan and the English Admiral Colomb. Solidarity with the views of Mahan and Colomb of the majority of Russian admirals could not but influence Makarov: a number of his erroneous statements, undoubtedly, should be attributed to this "influence. However, Makarov did not remain captive to this metaphysical theory with its eternal principles. Arguing on the question of “principles” in warfare, he wrote: “Having spoken of principles in general, let me say once again that they must be treated with caution. Colomb and Mahan preach that before undertaking an amphibious expedition, it is necessary to destroy the enemy's navy. Guided by these principles, the Japanese Admiral Ito had to first destroy the Chinese fleet, and then begin to assist the army of Field Marshal Yamagato .., but circumstances forced Ito to do otherwise ... About general principles we can say that they need to be studied, but for war the most important thing is the eye, i.e. the ability to clearly imagine all the circumstances and, depending on them, choose the proper decision, guided by the main idea - to defeat the enemy and relying primarily on your own common sense.
On the same issue, in another place in his work, Admiral Makarov said: “I personally am not a supporter of servile worship of principles ... I advise you to study such respectable works as Mahana and Colomba, but not to assume that their conclusions, based on examples of the sailing era, certainly true in our age of machines and electricity." Makarov further explains these absolutely correct conclusions: “The reason why I preach such an extremely unpopular idea is that the material part of the fleet has completely changed. can't give..."
Makarov also spoke sharply about the theory of Mahan and Colomb about "ownership of the sea." He wrote about this: "Two authorities on strategy - Mahan and Colomb - say that the main goal of the fleet during the war should be command of the sea. Until now, this has been understood in such a way that the fleet commanding the sea is unhindered and completely open in it sails, while his defeated enemy dare not come out of their ports.Will this be so at present?The instructions available on this subject advise this victorious fleet to avoid meeting with the destroyers of its enemy at night and therefore carefully hide their lights and navigate a good move ... if all this were to be presented to an outsider, he would be amazed ... that a formidable fleet should hide from the remnants of the enemy he has defeated. There are many other inconsistencies ... now we just wanted to point out the precariousness in the most grounds".
This, of course, is still far from a thorough criticism of the theoretical concepts of Mahan and Colomb, but in those days the bold judgments of the Russian admiral drew the public's attention to the "shakiness in the very foundations" of the theory of Mahan and Colomb. However, it was a "lonely voice", and the theory of Mahan and Colomb continued to be propagated in all fleets, including the Russian one.
The great merit of Makarov lies in the fact that he pointed out the precariousness of the initial provisions of the theory of Mahan and Colomb. "There are many other inconsistencies, but we will talk about them later," Makarov wrote.
Makarov, being a comprehensively educated admiral, relied in his activities on the experience of the best admirals of that time, especially Butakov and Popov. He not only knew well all the basics of the tactics created by Butakov, but also directly participated in all the exercises and subsequently was a worthy successor scientific works Butakov in the field of tactics of the steam fleet. Makarov developed and supplemented Butakov's thoughts with a number of new concepts and published his remarkable work "Discourses on Issues of Naval Tactics", which is an example of the preservation and development of the best traditions of the Russian fleet in the field of active, bold actions and care for personnel, their training and education.
The last stage of the life and combat activity of Vice Admiral Makarov is associated with the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Even when Makarov was the chief commander of the Kronstadt port and did not directly participate in combat activities, he continued to work on tactical and operational issues, and also paid attention to general issues of state defense. In this regard, his note on the shipbuilding program for the twenty years (1903-1923) is of great interest, and especially given by him, in connection with the proposed program, an assessment of the military-political situation, in accordance with which he gives a remarkable forecast of the development of events in the Far East . Makarov believed that Russia should have three fleets: in the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Far East. The note considers possible actions in these theaters and outlines the necessary measures to ensure against surprise attacks. Speaking about the possible actions of Japan, Makarov wrote: "There will be misunderstandings with Japan because of Korea or China ... We must ... be ready for military operations at any moment. The gap will follow from Japan, and not from ours ..." . But these words did not reach the consciousness of the inert leaders of the tsarist government: the Russian fleet turned out to be poorly prepared for a war with a strong enemy at sea.
As events in the Far East matured, Makarov could not be satisfied with administrative activities as the governor-general of Kronstadt and the commander of the Kronstadt port. He believed that his place was there, in the East. "I will be sent there when our affairs become very bad, and our position there is unenviable," he said bitterly.
As a patriot of his homeland and a deeply principled person, he nevertheless decided before the war to apply to the naval ministry with a letter in which he wrote: “From conversations with people who have recently returned from the Far East, I realized that the fleet is supposed to be kept not in the inner basin Port Arthur, but in the outer roadstead ... The presence of ships in the open roadstead gives the enemy the opportunity to carry out night attacks. No vigilance can prevent an energetic enemy at night from attacking a fleet with a large number of destroyers and even steam launches. The result of such an attack will be for we are very heavy, because the net barrier does not cover the entire side, and besides, many of our ships have no nets at all ... The Japanese will not miss such an incomparable opportunity to harm us ... If we do not immediately put the fleet in the inner pool, then we we will be forced to do this after the first night attack, paying dearly for the mistake.
Makarov's letter was reported "up to the authorities", but the answer was the following: "Makarov is a well-known alarmist - there will be no war." But before the ink of this resolution had dried, the Japanese suddenly and treacherously attacked our country, attacked the squadron stationed on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur, and disabled two battleships and a cruiser.
The position of the Pacific Fleet immediately became difficult, and Makarov was indeed sent to the Far East. On February 1, 1904, he was appointed commander of the Pacific Fleet, on the same day he got an emergency meeting at the Naval Ministry to resolve a number of questions posed by him, and on February 4 he set off for Port Arthur.
It would seem that the Main Naval Staff should first of all acquaint the new commander of the fleet with the plan of military operations at sea, but such a plan did not turn out at all. The plan of military operations at sea in the event of a war with Japan was first developed in March 1901 at the headquarters of the chief of the Pacific squadron, later it underwent changes and was approved at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the armies and navies in the Far East without any influence on its content. from the Naval Headquarters. Moreover, in 1896, 1900 and 1902. in Maritime Academy strategic games were held on the theme of the war with Japan, but Makarov was not invited to any of them, although at that time he was in Kronstadt. The conclusions of these games were not known to him or to the officers assigned to his headquarters. There was also no developed unified action plan for land armies and navies.
Vice Admiral Makarov took this into account. He knew that the fleet had already been greatly weakened from the first days of the war. He began his creative and organizational work, aimed at solving the problems that confronted him, while still on the road. All the officers of his headquarters accompanying the vice-admiral received assignments, duties between them were clearly distributed. In telegrams and reports, he posed a number of urgent questions to the Naval Ministry regarding the strengthening of the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. While on the road, Makarov outlined plans for military operations, drew up instructions and collected the necessary information.
However, already at the first stage of his activity, not receiving proper assistance in resolving the issues raised, he came into conflict with his superiors. Makarov demanded an urgent dispatch of destroyers from the Baltic to Port Arthur, insisted on sending them by rail in disassembled form, but this was refused "for technical reasons". Makarov continued to insist, but he was again refused. Then he asked to order and urgently deliver to the Far East 40 small destroyers of 20 tons each, but the solution of this issue was so delayed that the destroyers were ready only after the war. Finally, Makarov twice asked that a detachment of ships that left the Baltic for the Far East even before the start of the war as part of an armadillo, two cruisers and seven destroyers, did not return back, but went to reinforce the fleet in Port Arthur. This request of the fleet commander was also not granted.
February 24 Makarov arrived in Port Arthur. The name of Vice Admiral Makarov was so well known in the fleet that the very fact of his arrival gave the personnel hope that the fleet would get stronger and move on to active operations. The situation in Port Arthur by the time Makarov arrived there was extremely difficult. Some ships were already disabled. The local command from the first failures was clearly confused. Given this, Makarov visited all the ships in the very first days, talked with officers, sailors and port workers, trying in every possible way to instill in them good spirits and faith and the strength of his weapons and fleet.
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Preparing for the upcoming battles with the Japanese fleet, Makarov decided to go to sea with the entire squadron in order to use the exit to practice maneuvering the squadron, inspect the area closest to the fortress and, in the event of a meeting with the enemy, engage in battle. At the same time, he personally developed instructions for the simultaneous exit of the squadron from the harbor at high tide, which had never been done before. This exit helped to put together a squadron and raise the morale of its personnel.
In each case of the appearance of the enemy in the area of Port Arthur, Makarov immediately went to sea with his squadron, which had not been done before. Destroyers day and night were regularly sent out for reconnaissance. On the approaches to the base, a sentinel service was organized; special measures were taken to protect the raid from breaking through enemy destroyers in areas visited by the Japanese squadron; minefields were set up; the ships carried out practical firing; systematic trawling of fairways and raids was organized before the squadron left. Makarov's great merit was the organization of throwing fire from the inner roadstead across Cape Liaoteshan at Japanese ships as they approached the fortress, as well as the installation of additional coastal batteries at the entrance to the harbor. All these very important events were carried out under the personal supervision of Vice Admiral Makarov. He himself developed a table of single-flag combat signals, instructions for the actions of destroyers in reconnaissance, etc. in attack, instruction for squadron combat, instructions for fire control in combat on the move.
The measures taken had an immediate effect. So, already in early March, the Japanese squadron, which approached Port Arthur for its next bombardment, was met with well-aimed fire from Russian ships from the harbor, and after the squadron left, the Japanese were forced to withdraw.
In all combat activities, in the leadership of personnel, in the trust that Makarov won in the very first days, he found complete satisfaction. A different situation was created in Makarov's relations with the high command: these relations continued to remain abnormal until the last days. The official history of the Russo-Japanese War says: “It is impossible to pass over in silence the difficulties that the commander of the fleet had to fight in defending those measures that he found necessary for the good of the cause and service. The firmness of Admiral Makarov and this struggle reached the point that he even raised more than once the question of leaving him the post of commander of the fleet.
The first, rather large conflict with the Naval Ministry arose because of the refusal of Makarov's request to publish and send to Port Arthur his book "Reasoning on naval tactics" as soon as possible. Makarov's repeated requests for the publication of his book were refused by the Naval Ministry. Since in those days there was no combat manual or a textbook on tactics, Makarov's work was certainly necessary in the navy. On the hottest fighting days of the squadron, on March 18, Makarov sent a telegram in which he wrote: “I would ask you to print my book“ Reasoning on naval tactics right now. ”The book is needed now, and not next year; I do not admit the thought that the ministry I can now find 500 rubles, and I understand the refusal to publish it as a disapproval of my views on the conduct of the war, and therefore, if my book cannot be printed now, then I ask you to replace me with another admiral who enjoys the confidence of the highest authorities.
Makarov's relations with the commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces in the Far East, Admiral Alekseev, who was in Mukden, were no better. Makarov appreciated and encouraged efficient, courageous, energetic officers and resolutely did not tolerate lack of initiative, cowardly ones. After several trips to the sea, he removed some ship commanders from their posts, replacing them with more capable ones. The commander-in-chief did not agree with this decision and insisted on its cancellation or on the replacement of some commanders by officers on his recommendation. Makarov "again did not agree and asked to be released in this case from command of the fleet. Only after that the commander-in-chief approved all Makarov's requirements, but nevertheless raised the issue in the ministry about limiting the rights of the fleet commander. So the high command, who never loved Makarov, interfered with him in on March 30, 1904, Vice-Admiral Makarov sent destroyers on a night search to Elliot Island with the task of attacking the discovered enemy ships. in Port Arthur, the destroyers did not approach the fortress in the dark, but entered the harbor only at dawn.According to the plan, to ensure their return, the cruiser "Bayan" was supposed to leave Port Arthur at dawn to meet the destroyers. sea, on the night of March 31, Makarov transferred to the duty cruiser Diana, which was stationed in the outer roadstead. warning of the Japanese attempts to clog the entrance to the port with firewalls and, following the example of many past nights, decided to personally be in the center of repelling a possible attack. The night was alarming, from the cruiser and coastal posts more than once some silhouettes of ships and lights were observed, keeping almost in one place. When Makarov was asked permission to open fire, he categorically forbade it, suggesting that it was the fire of Russian destroyers returning to Port Arthur due to bad weather. At 4 hours 30 min. Makarov switched to Petropavlovsk. As it was established later, the silhouettes discovered that night belonged to enemy ships, which laid mines on the paths of the usual movement of the Russian squadron at its exits. When the cruiser "Bayan" left Port Arthur at dawn and the fleet commander received information about the approach of the enemy squadron, he ordered three cruisers to leave to support the destroyers, and at 7 o'clock in the morning he himself went out, as always, towards the enemy on the battleship "Petropavlovsk" with squadron. Having learned already on the raid that the destroyer "Terrible" had died in battle, and having found the entire Japanese squadron on the horizon, Makarov decided to withdraw to the outer raid, pull up all his battleships and, under the cover of batteries, engage in battle with the enemy. Trawling at the exits from the base and on the outer roadstead was not carried out.
During this maneuver on March 31 at 9 o'clock. 30 min. two miles from the lighthouse on the Tigriy Peninsula, the battleship "Petropavlovsk" was blown up by mines laid last night by Japanese ships and sank. Together with him and most of the crew, Vice Admiral Makarov also died.
The Russian fleet, represented by Makarov, suffered a heavy loss. In a short time (36 days) in command of the Pacific squadron, he managed to do a lot. First of all, he brought the squadron into proper combat condition, raised the morale of the personnel and prepared the fleet for active combat operations, organized regular reconnaissance. Makarov took active measures to accelerate the commissioning of damaged ships, strengthened the defense of the fortress from the sea, and created a defense system for the outer raid. He personally led the repulsion of the attacks of the Japanese destroyers, the exits of his squadron towards the enemy, did not allow the shelling of the fleet and the fortress with impunity, forced the Japanese to evade the battle with the Russian squadron every time.
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Vice Admiral Makarov went down in the history of the development of the navy primarily as an exponent of the progressive traditions of the Russian fleet at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, as a talented student of the tactical school of Admiral Butakov, who adopted the offensive tactics of naval combat from his teacher and developed it in his military-theoretical works.
Makarov was a man of great erudition. He showed himself to be a scientist-geographer, an innovator and inventor in artillery and mine-torpedo business and shipbuilding, the creator of the foundations of the theory of survivability and unsinkability of ships. Whatever Makarov started to do, he always brought it to the end, summarizing the experience gained and completing it all with the creation scientific papers, the main of which have become the property of the entire world scientific thought.
Makarov was a skilled educator of the high morale of the personnel. His favorite motto "Remember the war" is valuable precisely because Makarov understood it as the need to constantly teach personnel what would be needed in the war, insisted that ships be built and equipped based on the requirements of the war. Giving special meaning moral factor in the war, Makarov always, in his theoretical works and especially in practical activities, took care of raising the morale of the personnel. Being strict and demanding, he skillfully combined this with constant concern for the needs of sailors and officers, encouraged initiative and good service, intolerant of formalism and inactivity.
World history knows many major aviation accidents. But among them there is no equal to the one that occurred at the military airfield in the city of Pushkin near St. Petersburg on February 7, 1981. The Tu-104 plane died on takeoff. Almost nothing is known about that tragedy. The reason for this is simple - a nightmarish accident was instantly classified, and until now its true causes are very reluctantly called. But as a result of that long-standing catastrophe, the entire huge and strongest Pacific Fleet of the Soviet Union at that time was left without leadership. The Tu-104 aircraft of the commander of the Pacific Fleet of the Soviet Union, Admiral Emil Spiridonov, was returning from a staff exercise in which the leadership of all the fleets of the Soviet Union took part, and carried with it the most secret documents, nautical charts and other documentation. In addition to Spiridonov himself, there were 49 other people on board. Among them are 16 admirals. (For comparison, during the battles of the Second World War, the Soviet fleet lost 4 admirals. And then immediately, in one terrible moment - 16!) The instantly created state commission went through all the versions. They thought: “What if the plane was blown up? What if the potential enemy deliberately beheaded the Pacific Fleet? What if this is the beginning of a war? So what really happened on board the military plane? Why did the command of the Navy die? Members of the high command of the Pacific Fleet, relatives of the victims, eyewitnesses of the tragedy, who accidentally did not get on that ill-fated flight, take part in the film.
Even the admiral will not cancel the laws of aerodynamics
2008-04-11 / Viktor Nikolayevich Sokerin - lieutenant general, honored military pilot of Russia, former commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Baltic Fleet.
In January, the Rossiya TV channel showed the documentary film The Death of the Admirals. Secrets of a plane crash. This is a television investigation of the Tu-104 crash on February 7, 1981, when the entire command staff of the Pacific Fleet, including 16 admirals, died.
As they wrote in the announcements, "documentary filmmakers tried to consistently touch on all versions of what happened - from the terrorist attack to the alleged overload of the aircraft of the commander of the Pacific Fleet." The film is easy to find on the Internet, it continues to be watched, so it's hard to resist commenting.
The film was attended by relatives of the victims, eyewitnesses, sailors who did not get on that ill-fated flight. But there is not a single pilot or specialist in aviation epaulettes. I suppose that during the filming, there may have been interviews with pilots, but, probably, they simply did not “fit in” in the film, because they would not have left a stone unturned from the amateurish fabrications of the admirals.
For 16 years I flew the Tu-16, an analogue of the Tu-104. At 185 km / h (as it sounds in the movie), he, in principle, cannot fly. It has a landing speed of 235–270 km/h and a takeoff speed of 270–325 km/h, depending on weight. With weights close to the maximum, at 180–200 km/h, the front landing gear was unloaded with the aircraft at an angle of 4 degrees, the takeoff continued with this (constant) angle, and only when the takeoff speed was reached, very smooth movement of the steering wheel “towards itself” the aircraft was brought to an angle of 7–8 degrees, at the end of which the aircraft lifted off the runway. The thrust-to-weight ratio of the aircraft in the range of 0.3–0.35 did not allow anything else. After takeoff, the vertical rate of climb (before acceleration and flaps retraction) did not exceed 5 m/s (in summer, in the heat, generally 2–3 m/s).
Immediately after the disaster, there was talk that the mess when loading the board was incredible. A bunch of admirals, everyone is in command, the crew is trying to bring the loading order, but they are simply sent "to ...", boorishly pointing out to the pilots: your place is near ... the helms, and "everyone is here with" flies "on shoulder straps." The co-pilot and the commander again object, after which several admirals immediately “remove”, “fire” and simply “smear” them. Who is the second pilot for the “whole” admiral, and even some kind of crew commander, albeit a lieutenant colonel? Moreover, the “leaders” rarely flew away sober from the training camp.
Among other things, they said that the commander of the Pacific Fleet, who arrived "very out of sorts", wished to fly alone in his cabin (located in front of the aircraft), as a result of which a dozen more people were put out of the cabin "to the tail". Although it was necessary to do exactly the opposite: starting from the very back rows, stuff like “herring in a barrel” into the front of the cabin (standing, sitting on each other’s knees, as you like), freeing the back of the cabin to the maximum, and disperse back in places only after takeoff.
It is difficult to say what would have happened to the crew commander Inyushin if he had refused to fly. I suppose that in the best case, all crew members would become pensioners right on the plane.
There are no opinions of the pilots in the film, but any experienced pilot would say that during the takeoff run, due to the alignment exceeding the maximum rear, as the speed increased (you can’t argue against aerodynamics), the plane simply “sat on its tail” and took off on its own from the ground at a speed almost half the calculated lift-off speed. Or, more likely, the plane took off not at 185, but at 285 km / h. There were no boosters or hydraulic boosters on the Tu-16 (Tu-104), because the efforts of the pilots (returning the steering wheel “away from themselves” to prevent premature separation) could not be enough to fend off the aircraft’s most powerful desire to turn up its nose. Since the separation occurred at a speed less than the evolutionary (the lowest at which it is able to fly), and even with a prohibitive (and constantly spontaneously increasing) angle of attack, then (according to the same aerodynamics) it should have fallen. To be more precise, it was not a takeoff as such, but it was a catastrophe on takeoff due to premature, spontaneous separation of the aircraft from the runway due to the exorbitant rear centering.
I dare to assume that the crew commander expected that, having given the helm away from him before takeoff, he would be able to keep the aircraft on the takeoff run in a three-point position until the calculated take-off speed was reached (or even slightly higher than the calculated one), after which he very smoothly raise the nose of the aircraft and with a small angle tear off the car from the runway at a speed greater than the calculated one. The stock on the Tu-16 of permissible maximum rear centering from the rear-critical of 10% would allow him to “cheat” the wrong load with such a take-off technique, but, as I heard back in 1981, rolls of paper rolled down the aisle after the start of the takeoff run led to centering going beyond the limits of not only the maximum permissible, where the aircraft is still controllable, but also critical, where the machine is already uncontrollable.
For any aircraft, no more than 7-10% of the weight falls on the front landing gear. Only one thing could save the admirals. If they loaded a couple more rolls of paper or a couple of furniture sets, then the plane would “sat on its tail” right in the parking lot. Then, of course, as in the film, the unfortunate flight crew would be blamed for everything and “whipped”, but at least they would “drive in” that the plane is a “pharmaceutical scale”, the rocker of which lies on some conditional, very small bar in width. And it (the rocker) is parallel to the ground (and does not fall) only if there are approximately equal masses on both scales. The width of the bar in this example is the allowed "gap" between the maximum-front and maximum-rear centerings. If you overload the nose, you won't be able to lift the front landing gear off the ground on takeoff, there won't be enough runway length, the plane won't take off at any speed. If you overload the tail, you will repeat what was in the film, since the plane is uncontrollable outside the permissible center of gravity.
The position of the aircraft repeatedly mentioned in the film after the takeoff, which stood up as a “cross”, only once again convinces that the center of gravity exceeded the maximum rear. The crew is powerless.
52 passengers is 5200 kg. Up to 9000 kg (max. load) - 3800 kg. Ten tons of cargo, if not more, were stuffed into the plane. And in the film, everyone directly or allegorically asks: “Where did the crew look, why did they allow it?” And who asked the crew and who listened to him?
Chiefs of any rank, if they have not heard of such a science as aerodynamics, should at least familiarize themselves with the order of the Minister of Defense on the rules for carrying out air transportation in the aviation of the Armed Forces, which says: all passengers must unquestioningly comply with the requirements of crew members. And also that no one has the right to interfere with the actions of the crew in flight, including the persons at whose disposal the crew is allocated. How many disasters could have been avoided if the admirals and red-lamp generals had at least not only known these two points, but also observed them.
About 5-6 years ago, I don’t remember exactly, an order was issued by the Russian Ministry of Defense, which canceled a number of orders on the punishment of flight crews, mainly related to the flights of transport helicopters in Chechnya. Many of the generals received "wicks" from the Russian Defense Ministry in the same order. We are talking about the fact that the transport aviation crews were either assigned an illegal (impossible) task, or they were required to change the route in flight, perform unscheduled landings, etc. And when the crew dared to declare that, according to aviation laws, they were obliged to carry out only what they were preparing for, and what was “signed” for this flight, they accused him of cowardice, insubordination, and even, taking out pistols, threatened to give him to the tribunal “for failure to comply combat order." And after the flight, they were removed, fired, hung with penalties ... A lot of pilots suffered. The Minister of Defense himself was forced to intervene in order to protect the pilots and point out to the “combat” generals his own order on the rules of air transportation.
Try to "swing rights" in a civil aviation aircraft, they will quickly "calm down" there, despite any number of stars on shoulder straps. And what is the difference between the crew of a transport aircraft (helicopter) "in uniform"? Only by the fact that he is in these same uniforms, but “works” almost according to the same “rules” and even flies along the same air routes as GA aircraft. Do what the crew said (allowed) - you will be alive. You will "be smart", you run the risk of getting into an obituary.
About the departed, either - good, or - nothing. But I don't want a repeat of the tragedy.