Kuban scouts in the Caucasian army in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878
Cossacks - participants in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878
BALKAN KNOT
More than 130 years ago, the battles of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 died down, which arose as a result of the rise of the liberation movement in the Balkans and the aggravation of international contradictions in the Middle East. Russia supported the liberation movement of the Balkan peoples, and also sought to restore its prestige and influence, undermined by the Crimean War of 1853-1856.
By the beginning of the war, Russia deployed two armies: the Danubian (185 thousand people, 810 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich and the Caucasian (75 thousand people, 276 guns) under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich.
Both armies included cavalry Cossack regiments of the Kuban Cossack Army (KKV) and battalions of Kuban scouts, which, as in previous years, made a worthy contribution to the Russian victories. The sabotage and reconnaissance parties of the scouts courageously and skillfully acted in both theaters of military operations. However, if much is known about the military exploits of the Cossacks in the Balkans, then, according to the author, not enough has been said about the combat work of the scouts in the Caucasus.
The mobilization of the Caucasian army was preceded by a preparatory period (September 1 - November 11, 1876) and the actual mobilization period (November 11, 1876 - April 12, 1877). Simultaneously with the mobilization of infantry, artillery and cavalry units of the Russian army, by order of the Minister of War, the following units of the Kuban Cossack army were subject to mobilization: 10 cavalry regiments, a squadron of His Own Imperial Majesty's convoy and 20 plastun hundreds. In November, five four-hundred battalions (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th battalions) were formed from the scout hundreds, the regiments were given the name of the second.
The formation of the Cossack units was complicated by the fact that by the beginning of the mobilization of firearms for arming the Cossacks was not enough. Alas, the insufficient preparedness of the army for war was characteristic of both the Russian-Japanese and the First World War. As of September 1876, there were 6454 rifles of the Berdan system in the KKV, 2086 were missing. At the end of October, a transport with 10,387 rifles arrived from St. Tanner. Some plastun battalions were armed with Carley guns. At the subsequent stages of mobilization, the foot battalions of the Scouts were armed with the dragoon guns of the Krnka system. In general, the Cossack units were armed with firearms of different systems, which created difficulties in providing ammunition.
Soon, the aggravation of the political situation, the military preparations of the Turks and the mood of the highlanders required additional mobilization in early April 1877, including the call for the third stage of the KKV. Additionally, five prefabricated cavalry Cossack regiments and five foot battalions of the KKV (8, 9, 10, 11 and 12th) were formed. In total, the KKV fielded 21,600 Cossacks, who took part in the defense of the Bayazet fortress, the capture of Kars and Erzerum, in the battles on Shipka and on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.
WAR
In the Caucasus-Asia Minor theater, after the declaration of war on April 12, 1877, the troops of the Active Corps and its detachments under the command of Adjutant General Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov (the future Minister of Internal Affairs) crossed the border and deepened into enemy territory as part of several columns. Information about successful actions during this period, the scouts of the 2nd foot scout battalion and two hundred of the Poltava cavalry regiment of the KKV, who were instructed to remove the Turkish border posts and ensure the unimpeded passage of the main forces of the detachment of Colonel Komarov in the area of the village of Vale. Scouts and horse Cossack hundreds were actively involved in the flying and reconnaissance detachments to collect data on the enemy's fortifications, the strength of the garrisons, the nature of the terrain, damage to telegraph communication lines. Information was collected both through personal observation and by interviewing local residents, capturing prisoners.
So, for example, in May 1877, a hunting team consisting of 11 scouts and Cossacks of the Poltava cavalry regiment was tasked with reconnaissance of the heights of Gelaverda (near Ardagan), determining the paths for the approach of the main forces and getting the language. To scatter the attention of the Turks, distracting actions of other plastun groups were simultaneously carried out. The hunting team, led by the centurion Kamensky, successfully passed three enemy chains, reconnoitered the fortifications and "captured a sentry with a gun, whom they delivered to the camp as proof of their feat." In July, during the reconnaissance of the Turkish forces near Dagor, a detachment of 20 Cossack scouts and 20 Chechens from the Chechen irregular cavalry regiment under the command of the General Staff of Colonel Malama crossed the Arpachay River at night, conducted a successful reconnaissance of the area and safely returned to its territory.
Scouts were actively used in the coastal direction, where the actions of the Cossack cavalry regiments were hampered by mountainous and wooded areas. So, for example, in the summary of the military operations of the Sochi detachment from July 28 to August 28, 1877, it is said about the successful reconnaissance operation of hundreds of scouts under the command of the cornet Nikitin: “... a party of scouts in Sandripsha found enemy pickets, and near Gagra they noticed the movement of a significant mass of people, moreover, the passage was guarded by two Turkish battleships. The detachment commander reported that the enemy had taken all measures to prevent our troops from advancing to the Gagra fortification. The scouts were instructed to conduct reconnaissance of bypass mountain paths. In the future, the scouts were given the task of taking control of the largest possible area near Gagra, so that the enemy would not have time to occupy hard-to-reach approaches, which would then have to be taken from him with great sacrifices. Subsequently, together with the shooters, three hundred scouts also participated in the successful assault on the Gagra fortification.
Scouts-scouts sometimes obtained information that allowed some negligent officers to be brought to light. For example, on May 31, 1877, Lieutenant-General Geiman reported on command about the following fact, refuting the officer’s report about the incident at the Cossack picket: “Information was received from scouts that not 300 bashi-bazouks attacked our picket at Ardost, but only 30-40 people; there was a complete oversight at the post: half of the Cossacks were sleeping, while others ate sour milk, which is why they did not have time to collect the horses, which the enemies took all of them. This information was given by scouts, and it is completely different from the officer's report. It would be supposed to conduct an investigation and give the officer to the court, otherwise, with the carelessness of our Cossacks, such cases may be repeated.
The command of the Russian troops skillfully used the outstanding fighting qualities of the scouts in the pursuit of the retreating enemy. For example, by skillful maneuvers of our forces, detachments of the retreating Turkish troops were led out to the scouts in ambush and fell under their well-aimed gunfire. The effective actions of the scouts suggested to the command of the Russian troops the idea of forming prefabricated battalions of hunters, which, along with the scouts that formed their basis, included the most quick-witted and physically trained volunteers from the infantry regiments of the Russian army.
The Kuban scouts as part of the 7th scout battalion under the command of Yesaul Bashtannik, the hero of the defense of Sevastopol, were involved in the Danube army. From the coastal Sistov Heights, which the battalion captured from the enemy with extraordinary courage and courage, thereby ensuring the crossing of the Russian army across the Danube, under the leadership of General Gurko, the Kuban scouts began their glorious military path to the legendary Shipka. For the exploits shown on the battlefields in Bulgaria, many scouts were awarded the St. George Crosses, many lower ranks were awarded non-commissioned officers and officer ranks.
Interesting memories of the actions of scouts during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 were left by the famous journalist and writer Vladimir Gilyarovsky. During that war, he volunteered to serve in the army and, thanks to his restless and adventurous nature, found himself among the Kuban scout hunters who operated on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus.
LOST WORLD
One way or another, the war was won. However, the subsequent development of events makes us think about the questions of how justified the sacrifices made by Russia turned out to be and who is to blame for the lost results of the victories of Russian weapons.
Russia's successes in the war with Turkey alarmed the ruling circles of England and Austria-Hungary. The British government sent a squadron to the Sea of Marmara, which forced Russia to abandon the capture of Istanbul. In February, thanks to the efforts of Russian diplomacy, the San Stefano Treaty, which was beneficial for Russia, was signed, which, it would seem, changed the entire political picture of the Balkans (and not only) in favor of Russia's interests.
Serbia, Romania and Montenegro, previously vassal to Turkey, gained independence, Bulgaria acquired the status of a de facto independent principality, Turkey pledged to pay Russia an indemnity of 1,410 million rubles, and on account of this amount lost Kapc, Ardagan, Bayazet and Batum in the Caucasus and even Southern Bessarabia, torn away from Russia after Crimean War. Russian weapons triumphed. How did Russian diplomacy use the victorious results of the war?
The Scouts still continued skirmishes with bashi-bazouks, when the Berlin Congress began to review the results of the war on June 3, 1878, where the "big five" dominated: Germany, Russia, England, France and Austria-Hungary. Its final act was signed on July 1 (13), 1878. The 80-year-old Prince Gorchakov was formally considered the head of the Russian delegation, but he was already old and sick. In fact, the delegation was led by the former chief of the gendarmes, Count Shuvalov, who, judging by the results, turned out to be a diplomat, much worse than a gendarme.
During the congress, it became clear that Germany, worried about the excessive strengthening of Russia, did not want to support it. France, which had not yet recovered from the defeat of 1871, gravitated toward Russia, but was afraid of Germany and did not dare to actively support Russian demands. The current situation was skillfully used by England and Austria-Hungary, who imposed on the Congress the well-known decisions that changed the San Stefano Treaty to the detriment of Russia and the peoples of the Balkans.
So, the territory of the Bulgarian principality was limited only to the northern half, and southern Bulgaria became an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire called Eastern Rumelia. Serbia was given part of Bulgaria, which for a long time quarreled the two Slavic peoples. Russia returned Bayazet to Turkey, and collected not 1410 million, but only 300 million rubles as an indemnity. Finally, Austria-Hungary negotiated for itself the "right" to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As a result, the Russian-Turkish war turned out to be for Russia, although won, but unsuccessful. Chancellor Gorchakov, in a note to the tsar on the results of the Congress, admitted: "The Berlin Congress is the blackest page in my official career." Emperor Alexander II added: "And in mine, too."
Shortly after the end of the Russo-Turkish War, the chief of the Russian General Staff, General Nikolai Obruchev, wrote in a memo to the emperor: “If Russia is poor and weak, if it is far behind Europe, then this is primarily because very often it incorrectly solved the most fundamental political issues : where it should and where it should not sacrifice its property. If you go the same way, you can completely perish and quickly complete your cycle of a great Power ... "
Even taking into account the changes in the geopolitical situation that have occurred over the past more than 100 years, the words of General Obruchev have not lost their relevance today.
It would seem that in that grandiose battle that took place on the outskirts of the capital in the winter of 1941, every detail was investigated, and everything has long been known, however ...
Few people know that in one of the sectors of the front, Russian cannons, made at the Imperial Gun Factory in Perm as early as 1877, played a decisive role. And it was on the defense sector Solnechnogorsk - Krasnaya Polyana, where the 16th Army, bled bloodless by long battles, under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky, fought.
K.K. Rokossovsky turned to G.K. Zhukov with a request for urgent help with anti-tank artillery. However, the front commander no longer had it in reserve. The request reached the Supreme Commander. Stalin's reaction was immediate: "I don't have reserves of anti-tank artillery either. But in Moscow there is the F. E. Dzerzhinsky Military Artillery Academy. There are many experienced gunners. Let them think and report within a day on a possible solution to the problem."
Indeed, back in 1938, the artillery academy, founded in 1820, was transferred from Leningrad to Moscow. But in October 1941 she was evacuated to Samarkand. Only about a hundred officers and servants remained in Moscow. Training artillery was also taken to Samarkand. But the order had to be obeyed.
A lucky break helped. An elderly man worked at the academy, who knew well the location of artillery arsenals in Moscow and in the near Moscow region, where worn-out and very old artillery systems, shells and equipment for them were mothballed. One can only regret that time did not preserve the name of this man and the names of all other employees of the academy, who carried out the order within 24 hours and formed several high-capacity anti-tank defense firing batteries.
To fight the German medium tanks, they picked up old 6-inch siege guns, which were used even during the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke, and later in Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 After the end of it, due to the severe wear of the barrels of the guns, these were delivered to the Mytishchi arsenal, where they were stored in mothballed form. Shooting from them was unsafe, but they could still withstand 5-7 shots.
As for the shells, the Sokolnichesky artillery depot had in large numbers captured English Vickers high-explosive fragmentation shells of 6-inch caliber and weighing 100 pounds, that is, a little over 40 kilograms. There were also capsules and powder charges, beaten off in civil war at the Americans. Since 1919, all this property has been kept so carefully that it could well be used for its intended purpose.
Several firing batteries of heavy anti-tank artillery were soon formed. The commanders were students of the academy and officers sent from the military registration and enlistment offices, and the servants were Red Army soldiers and students of grades 8-10 of Moscow special artillery schools. The guns did not have sights, so it was decided to shoot only direct fire, pointing them at the target through the barrel. For the convenience of firing, the guns were dug into the ground along the hubs of wooden wheels.
German tanks appeared suddenly. The first shots were fired by gun crews from a distance of 500-600 m. German tankers at first took the explosions of shells for the action of anti-tank mines. Apparently, the "mines" had a very great power. In the event of a 40-kilogram shell burst near the tank, the latter turned over on its side or stood on its priest. But it soon became clear that guns were being fired point-blank. A projectile hitting the turret tore it off and threw it tens of meters to the side. And if a 6-inch siege gun projectile hit the forehead of the hull, then it went right through the tank, destroying everything in its path.
The German tankers were horrified - they did not expect this. Having lost a company, the tank battalion retreated. The German command considered the incident an accident and sent another battalion in a different way, where it also ran into an anti-tank ambush. The Germans decided that the Russians were using some new anti-tank weapon of unprecedented power. The enemy offensive was suspended, probably to clarify the situation.
In the end, Rokossovsky's army won several days on this sector of the front, during which reinforcements arrived and the front stabilized. On December 5, 1941, our troops launched a counteroffensive and drove the Nazis to the West. It turns out that the Victory of the 45th year, at least to a small extent, was forged by Russian gunsmiths back in the 19th century.
One of the main battles of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. for the liberation of Slavic Orthodox Bulgaria from the centuries-old Ottoman yoke took place south of the Shipka Pass, famous in the history of that war, near the village of Sheinovo. Hence the name of the two-day battle, which took place on December 27-28, 1877 (January 8-9, 1878) between the Turkish army of Wessel Pasha (up to 35 thousand people, 108 guns) and the Russian Southern Detachment under the command of Lieutenant General F. F. Radetsky (about 54 thousand people with 83 guns).
The main forces of the Turkish army were located in a fortified camp near Sheinovo in front of the Shipka Pass, blocking here the enemy's convenient path to southern Bulgaria. It was commanded by Wessel Pasha, who was one of the most experienced commanders of the Sultan, but who, however, failed to capture the Shipka Pass.
The plan of the Russian command was to double the coverage of the army of Wessel Pasha with columns of lieutenant generals (16.5 thousand people) and (19 thousand people). They had to overcome the Balkan passes (Imitlisky and Travnensky), and then, reaching the Sheinovo region, deliver joint flank attacks on the Turkish army located in a fortified camp. The basis of Skobelev's column was his 16th Infantry Division (4 infantry regiments, an artillery brigade), reinforced by seven Bulgarian volunteer squads.
The commander of the Southern Detachment (the third shock column), who was on the Shipka Pass, with the rest of the forces, was supposed to deliver a distracting blow in order to prevent Wessel Pasha from pulling his entire army into a fortified camp.
Snow trenches (Russian positions on the Shipka Pass). 1878-1881, Artist V. Vereshchagin
The winter crossing through the snow-covered Balkans (sometimes we had to go through the belt in the snow) and the severe frost in the mountains were fraught with great risk for people and horses. However, Russian troops and Bulgarian volunteers managed to overcome icy steeps, gorges, and non-freezing mountain rivers. Often guns and ammunition had to be carried by hand. Many artillery and baggage horses were lost.
On December 27, the column (left) of General N.I. was the first to reach the distant approaches to the village of Sheinovo. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, overcoming the Travnensky pass. The Russian troops attacked the Turkish positions at the time strictly appointed by the plan of the offensive operation and took possession of the first line of enemy fortifications with a decisive onslaught.
The Skobelev column (right) was delayed in reaching their starting positions for the attack. The Imitli pass was in unexpectedly deep snow. The attackers had to overcome snow blockages in severe weather conditions, climb up the narrow mountain paths. "White" General M.D. Skobelev courageously showed his soldiers, officers and Bulgarian volunteers an example of personal fearlessness.
The delay in the descent from the mountains of this column gave the Turks the opportunity to recover from the first unexpected onslaught of the Russians who had descended from the mountains. Wessel Pasha organized a strong counterattack on the troops of the column of General N.I. Svyatopolk-Mirsky. But the attack of the Turks on the morning of December 28 was successfully repulsed.
The commander of the Southern Detachment, General F.F. Radetsky assisted the column of Svyatopolk-Mirsky. His detachment from the height of the Shipka Pass attacked the Turkish positions in the forehead. And although the enemy repulsed this bold onslaught from the heights, part of the Turkish army at Shipka turned out to be bound by battle.
In these morning hours, overcoming snowdrifts on the Imitliysky pass, a column of General M.D. Skobelev. It was the Skobelev column that had the honor of storming the main fortifications of the fortified camp of the Turks near Sheinovo. Rapidly advancing, the Russian infantry captured several redoubts, batteries and lines of trenches. The Uglitsky and Vladimirsky infantry regiments were especially distinguished.
The Shipko-Sheinovsky battle for the Skobelevites began at 10 o'clock in the morning under heavy artillery and rifle fire from the Turks. After a fierce battle, the Russian infantry captured the first line of enemy fortifications, but then the ever-increasing fire from the camp stopped further advance. The Turks responded with a strong infantry counterattack, but it was not successful.
At two o'clock in the afternoon the column of General M.D. Skoboleva resumed the offensive and managed to capture the second line of enemy fortifications. The Turks retreated from them to the army camp near the village of Sheinovo. Part of the column bypassed Sheinovo from the south and joined in the village of Kazanlak with the column of General N.I. Svyatopolk-Mirsky. So around the Sultan's army Wessel Pasha closed the encirclement. The Turks had no chance to break out of it in that situation. If they had, then the most ghostly.
Battle near Shipka-Sheinovo on December 28, 1877. 1894. Artist A. Kivshenko.
At about three o'clock in the afternoon, Wessel Pasha received an offer of surrender. In response to him, the commander of the Sultan, having asked the truce about the general rank of Skobelev (the pasha did not want to surrender to the junior rank), ordered at 3 o'clock in the afternoon at Sheinovo to throw out a conspicuous white flag from afar. Upon learning of this, those Turkish troops who were in positions in the mountains above Sheinovo, in front of the Shipka Pass, laid down their arms. In their near rear was already the Russian cavalry.
The great battle painter of Russia V.V. Vereshchagin wrote: “It is difficult to convey in words the delight of the soldiers. All the hats flew up, and then again and again, higher and higher. Hooray! Hooray! Hooray! - without end. Later I painted this picture.
22,000 Turkish soldiers and officers surrendered, including the commander of the Sultan's army. Turkish losses in the Shipko-Sheynovsky battle amounted to more than one thousand people killed and wounded. The total losses of the winners (including frostbite, of which there were many) amounted to about 5 thousand people.
At the edge of the Sheinovsky Forest in 1964, a monument to the victory in the Battle of Shipko-Sheinovsky was erected, a monument to the military friendship of Russian soldiers and Bulgarian militias, which found such a vivid manifestation during the assault on Turkish redoubts. The monument stands on the spot where the Turks raised the white flag of surrender. The front side of the obelisk is decorated with a bas-relief symbolizing the meeting of the warrior-liberator, to whom the Bulgarians bring flowers. The names of the regiments and other military units that took part in the battle are inscribed on its eastern side.
The victory in the battle brought fame to the Russian army, its regiments and commanders, especially the “white” general Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev, who became one of the most striking heroes of the war for the liberation of Slavic Bulgaria. A difficult victory at Shipka and Sheinovo ensured the final breakthrough of the Russian army through the Balkan Mountains in a snowy and harsh winter.
The way to Southern Bulgaria and in the direction of Istanbul (Constantinople, Tsargrad) through the ancient Ottoman capital city of Adrianople was opened. A wide gap appeared in the Turkish defense in the Balkan Mountains, through which direct and convenient roads led to the shores of the Bosphorus. The Ottoman Empire also lost one of its best armies from Shipka and Sheinovo. Now the two armies that remained with her, Suleiman Pasha and the East Danube, blocked by the Russian Ruschuk detachment, were reliably isolated from each other.
Such was the strategic significance of the victory in the great Shipko-Sheinovsky battle. The actions of Lieutenant General M.D. Skobelev during the assault on the fortified camp of the enemy army deserved the highest appreciation of his contemporaries. His leadership of the troops was unmistakable, tactics were innovative.
Taking into account the new situation in the theater of war, the commander of the Russian army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, decided to immediately attack the city of Adrianople, which was located on the near approaches to Istanbul. The offensive was again carried out by separate detachments. General Skobelev was entrusted with the vanguard of the Central Detachment with the right to conduct independent military operations. The general offensive began on January 3, 1878. In one day, Skobelev's infantry and cavalry passed 80 versts (about 85 kilometers) descending from the mountains to the valley of the Maritsa River.
With a sudden blow, the Russian avant-garde captured the city of Adrianople, the fortress garrison of which capitulated. The detachment of General Skobelev entered the city to the sounds of a military band. There were no more serious obstacles in the way of the capital of the Ottoman Empire.
In February, Skobelev's avant-garde troops occupied the town of San Stefano (the summer residence of the Sultan), which stood on the near approaches to Istanbul, and went straight to the Turkish capital. There was no one to defend it - the best Sultan's armies capitulated, one was blocked in the Danube region, and the army of Suleiman Pasha was defeated shortly before that south of the Balkan Mountains.
On February 19 (March 3), 1878, a peace treaty was signed in San Stefano, according to which Bulgaria became an independent principality. Turkey recognized the sovereignty of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania. To Russian Empire Southern Bessarabia and Batum, Kars, Ardagan and Bayazet in the Caucasus joined. The defeated Ottoman Porte was obliged to pay 310 million rubles indemnity. The Russian army, under the terms of the San Stefano Treaty, remained on Bulgarian soil for two years as a guarantor of its statehood.
Alexey Shishov,
Senior Research Fellow, Research
Institute of Military History VAGSh Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Historical Sciences
The ratio of enemy forces at the beginning of the war of 1877 was in favor of Russia, the military reforms of the 1860-1870s began to give some positive results.
The reorganization of the armed forces of the Russian Empire took place under the leadership of the Minister of War Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin, who took the post of Minister of War in 1861 and remained in it for twenty years, speaking from the very beginning of his activity as a supporter of reforms. Milyutin achieved a reduction in the term military service from 25 to 16 and other changes. At the same time, he took a number of measures to improve the life of soldiers - their food, housing, uniforms, began teaching soldiers to read and write, mitigated corporal punishment, etc.
Milyutin believed that the corps should be abolished, as the experience of recent wars showed, the corps, due to its bulkiness (3 divisions), were still not used at full strength, and troops had to be made up of detachments whose strength corresponded to the task. In 1862, they began to gradually disband all existing corps - Guards, Grenadiers, 1-4 infantry, Caucasian and 1-2 cavalry. Brigades were abolished simultaneously with the corps in the infantry. Milyutin planned to have a division as the highest administrative unit in peacetime. The War Department lost some of its functions. Executive power was vested in special local bodies - the military districts. The military district was the link between the center and the troops. Then they created four military districts - Vilna, Warsaw, Kyiv and Odessa. The Polish rebellion of 1863 suspended the reform, but in 1864 the districts of Finland, St. Petersburg, Riga, Moscow, Kazan and Kharkov were established. In 1865, the Caucasian, Orenburg, West Siberian and East Siberian districts were established, and in 1867 - Turkestan. The Riga district was soon attached to the Vilna and St. Petersburg.
With the formation of military districts, and then provincial and district military administrations, the practice of drawing up mobilization plans began, which ensured a relatively quick mobilization and deployment of the army in case of war. Now mobilization could be carried out in 30-40 days, previously it took from 3 to 6 months. It was also positive that in wartime the district administrations could be turned into army headquarters or provide personnel for their formation.
On the other hand, Milyutin's decentralization soon began to have a negative effect. District headquarters, which were often in charge of 8-10 infantry and 2-4 cavalry divisions, were overworked. The post of brigadier also turned out to be not superfluous, as they thought, and in 1873 it was restored. In 1874 the Guards Corps was restored. In November 1876, with the partial mobilization of the army, 7 corps (from 7 to 12 and Caucasian) were formed, 2 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions each. The corps were not called "infantry", as before, but "army". In total, the army corps had 24 battalions, 18 squadrons and hundreds and 108 guns. In February 1877, on the eve of the war, 9 more corps were formed (Grenadier, from 1 to 6, 13 and 14). During the war, 18 reserve infantry divisions and 2 fortress divisions were formed. In total, more than 39 thousand officers, more than 13 thousand officials and 1.6 million people were mobilized during the war. lower ranks. In 1878, the 2nd Caucasian Corps was formed, and in 1879 the 15th Army Corps was formed, and all reserve divisions were abolished.
The educational reform that Milyutin carried out in 1863 cannot be called successful. Of the 17 cadet corps, only two were left - Page and Finland. The rest were converted into military gymnasiums and infantry schools (Pavlovsky, Konstantinovsky in St. Petersburg and Aleksandrovsky in Moscow). Military gymnasiums were institutions with a purely civilian way of life, the officers-educators were mostly replaced by civilians. As a result, excellent Nikolaev cadet corps were defeated, although they taught no worse and brought up better than in civilian educational institutions. In military gymnasiums, students were drawn to the university. And military schools covered with their graduates no more than a third of the army's annual need for officers. In 1864, district cadet schools were established with a one-year course, which produced ensigns in the army. Graduates of these cadet schools became the bulk of the combatant army officers, and, as a rule, did not go far in the service. In total, 16 cadet schools were established (11 infantry, 2 cavalry, 2 mixed and 1 Cossack). Artillery and engineering troops were replenished from schools.
As a result, a significant part of the officers, with all their loyalty to duty and courage, as the military historian A. A. Kersnovsky noted, “could not, due to lack of training, be at the height of the new tactics, characterized by the actions of rifle chains on wide fronts, the fire of a quick-firing gun and requiring quick use of the situation and the constant manifestation of private initiative.
On January 12, 1866, by merging the Inspectorate Department with the Main Directorate of the General Staff, the General Staff was formed, which was in charge of the management of the armed forces, mobilization, matters of personnel and recruitment of troops and military institutions, their organization, service, deployment, combat training and economy . However, the General Staff was placed by Milyutin in full subordination to the Ministry of War, therefore, in fact, it became one of the offices of the ministry. That is, the General Staff did not matter to the German General Staff, where Moltke carried out reforms from the point of view of the General Staff.
The crown of all the changes was the introduction of universal conscription in 1874, instead of recruitment. The prerequisite for this reform was the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, which showed the advantage of the Prussian army. Under the new law, all young people over the age of 21 were called up, but the authorities each year determined the required number of recruits, and only this number was taken from the recruits by lot. As a result, usually no more than 20-25% of recruits were called up for service. The charter on universal military service provided for wide benefits for marital status and educational qualifications. The call was not subject to the only son of the parents, the only breadwinner in the family, and also if the older brother of the recruit is serving or has served. Those taken into service were listed in it: in the ground forces for 15 years - 6 years in the ranks and 9 years in the reserve, in the navy - 7 years of active service and 3 years in the reserve. For those who received primary education, the term of active service was reduced to 4 years, those who graduated from a city school - up to 3 years, a gymnasium - up to one and a half years, and who had higher education- up to six months. As a result, Milyutin pursued a good goal - to help public education. However, it turned out that the most intellectually valuable element was used the worst (they served only 6 months), which did not affect the army in the best way. At the same time, the peoples of entire regions were exempted from military service - the Caucasus, Turkestan, and northern Russia. The clergy were released from duty.
The reform of 1874 is generally assessed positively by military researchers. It made it possible to quickly create reserves to increase the number of troops and replenish the army during the war. Unfortunately, its results did not have time to affect by the time the war with Turkey began. Introduced three years before the start of the war, universal military service could not fully provide the armed forces with the necessary trained reserve. On November 1, 1876, when mobilization was announced, there were 722,000 lower ranks in the army, and only 752,000 in reserve. The wartime states planned to have 1,474,000 people in the army. The shortfall to the states of wartime reached 480 thousand people (30%), and it was not completely possible to close it with the call of 1877 and the Cossacks.
All infantry in the army was reduced to 48 divisions, 8 rifle brigades and 34 line battalions. An infantry division consisted of 2 infantry brigades, a brigade - of 2 infantry regiments of 3 battalions. There were 5 companies in the battalion - 1 rifle, 4 linear. The company was divided into 2 half-companies, the half-company - into 2 platoons, the platoon - into 4 squads. The rifle brigade had 4 rifle battalions. There were 4-5 companies in the line battalion, 1 of them was rifle.
Russian infantry has not mastered modern tactics. Infantry regulations of 1860 and 1874 could not eradicate linear traditions that ignored small-arms fire. The new charters underestimated him, considering fire combat as the lot of only a small part of the infantry - the shooters. During the offensive, only rifle companies of infantry battalions were deployed in the chain. The bulk of the infantry - line companies - followed in close formation, being an excellent target for the enemy. Only one weak rifle chain fired quickly, and the close formation knew only one type of fire - a volley. Outdated views also dominated in the training of infantry for defensive actions. The infantry was not trained to dig in. Most of the battalion's forces were located in close formation, in reserve, and only a small part in the rifle chain. They planned to let the enemy infantry closer - 300-500 meters, then burst fire, and when the enemy approached close (50 meters), our soldiers threw themselves into bayonets.
In the cavalry the situation was even worse. The combat training of the cavalry was weak. After the Eastern (Crimean) War, a false conclusion was made about the “reduction” of the role of cavalry in modern warfare and that it should refuse to strike at enemy infantry (as the experience of the First World War, Civil and Great Patriotic Wars showed, it was too early to refuse cavalry). They planned to use the cavalry only for strategic maneuvers in the theater of operations, attacks on enemy communications, reconnaissance, etc. As a result, the regular cavalry was halved, but the role of the Cossacks was increased. Regular and Cossack regiments were united in one division. The Cossacks were unhappy with this reform, believing that they were placed "in the backyard of the Russian cavalry" (their regiments were the fourth in the division). In 1875, the six-regiment divisions were disbanded, instead they created 14 army cavalry divisions in 4 regiments (1st Dragoon, 2nd Lancers, 3rd Hussars, 4th Cossack). The new cavalry division had 12 squadrons and 6 hundreds with 2 horse (or Cossack) batteries (12 guns). In addition, they established the 1st Don Division, also in 4 regiments. In 1860, the Black Sea and Caucasian troops were merged into one Kuban army. In the same year, the Amur army was established, in 1867 - Semirechensk.
Field artillery was divided into foot and horse. Foot artillery was reduced to 48 artillery brigades, according to the number of infantry divisions to which they were attached. The artillery brigade had six batteries of 8 guns. Artillery was doubled: over 12 years (from 1862 to 1874), the number of foot batteries increased from 138 to 299, and the number of guns from 1104 to 2392. Horse artillery consisted of 66 batteries with 416 guns. In total, the field artillery had 365 batteries with 2808 guns. In 1872, all artillery brigades were brought from 4-battery to 6-battery, they still had 8 guns per battery. In 1866, armament for field artillery was approved, according to which all batteries of foot and horse artillery should have rifled, breech-loading guns. 1/3 of the foot batteries should be armed with 9-pounder (42-line) guns, and all other foot batteries and horse artillery with 4-pounder (34.2 line). In the guards artillery, all foot batteries were 9-pounders, in field brigades - 3 battery batteries and 3 light 4-pound batteries. In the Caucasus, the sixth batteries were 3-pounder (3-inch) mountain batteries. Horse batteries were 6-gun and had 4-pounder guns. By 1870, the re-equipment of field artillery was fully completed. From 1872 to 1876, the sixth batteries of the field brigades received Gatling's quick-firing 10-barreled shotguns (they were later handed over to the fortress) and Baranovsky's 6-barreled shotguns with a rate of fire of 200 rounds per minute. In general, Russian artillery was on high level, artillerymen showed themselves well, both in Bulgaria and in the Caucasus.
Russian artillery entered the war armed with bronze rifled breech-loading guns. The shells were of three types: a grenade with a shock tube, shrapnel with a remote tube, and buckshot. The grenade gave good results when firing at light ground fortifications, but was ineffective against earth fortifications and against entrenched infantry. Shrapnel and buckshot gave good results only in terms of manpower outside the fortifications.
As early as 1857, sappers were consolidated into 3 brigades. There were 15.5 battalions (5 companies in a battalion). In 1864, 6 pontoon semi-battalions were formed, deployed in 1877-1878. in 8 battalions. Mobilization 1876-1877 led to the creation of 4, then 5 railway battalions. The sapper units were basically prepared to support the troops in terms of engineering and, on the whole, coped well with the tasks they faced. The pontoon units were also well prepared: their training was based on the rich experience of the Russian army in crossing large rivers, including the experience of multiple crossings across the Danube. The units of engineering troops involved in setting up minefields were perfectly prepared. This case was headed by M. M. Boreskov, a participant in the war of 1853-1856.
The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 showed the importance of the breech-loading gun. In 1867, Carlet needle rifles of the 6th linear caliber with a sliding bolt and a paper cartridge were introduced. But the advantage of the metal sleeve soon became clear, and in 1869 a significant part of the army was re-equipped with the Krnka (Krynka) rifle with a folding bolt. Both guns hit at 2000 paces, but this range was not used, since the sights were only 600 paces in line companies and 1200 paces for non-commissioned officers and rifle companies. As a result, our troops still did not know how to shoot at long distances. In 1868, the excellent 4-linear (10.6 mm) Berdan rifles chambered for a unitary cartridge were adopted by the army, and in 1870 - its modified version (No. 2). The Berdan rifle No. 2 was distinguished by its simplicity of design, accuracy and rate of fire. For the first time, a four-sided bayonet was adopted for it instead of the previously existing triangular one. Rifle #1 had a 2100-pitch scope, #2 a 2400-pitch scope. The problem was that by the beginning of the war with Turkey, only a third of the troops received these excellent rifles, while they were received by divisions that were not assigned to the active army. As a result, the range of useful fire of our infantry in the campaign of 1877 was the same as near Sevastopol during the Crimean War. Of the 48 infantry divisions, 16 had Berdan's guns, 26 Krnka, and 6 Carle. Berdan's guns had guards, grenadiers, rifle brigades and 9 infantry divisions. Carle - divisions of the Caucasian Military District and all linear battalions. The rest of the troops had Krnka. In the cavalry, both ranks of dragoons had Krnka carbines, while the hussars and lancers had only the second rank (the first had pikes). In the period 1878-1879. all troops received the Berdan rifle number 2.
Krnk rifle
Thus, Milyutin was unable to fully implement the rearmament program of the army. The desire to establish their own production of all types of weapons, to do without foreign orders, was shattered due to the lack of capabilities of the Russian military-industrial complex. The disadvantage was the variety of small arms, while the active troops were not re-equipped with the most modern Berdan rifles; the absence of long-range steel cannons and mounted fire guns (mortars), as well as projectiles with a strong high-explosive effect, into service with field artillery.
Russian military thought continued to be influenced by the Prussian-German doctrines. Methods of Moltke, the largest military scientific value of the second half of XIX centuries, completely owned the minds in Russia. The Prussian army achieved excellent results in the wars of 1866 and 1870-1871. As a result, Moltke was unconditionally recognized in Russia as a "world authority". Although at the same time the French carefully studied the experience of Napoleon, whose student was Moltke. And here, instead of studying the national commanders Rumyantsev and Suvorov, who showed the superiority of the Russian army under the dominance of Russian methods that make it possible to create an army of "miracle heroes", they studied Moltke. As a result, a fatal mistake, traditional for Russia, was made - Russian military thought was in foreign captivity, like the entire top of the Romanovs' Russia. In general, it was the conceptual and cultural Westernization of the social elite of the Russian Empire that led to the catastrophe of 1917.
The methods of Russian strategy have become dependent, and as a result, mediocre, repetitive. As A. Kersnovsky noted:“The consequences of the monstrous underestimation of the national nature of military art and the predominant importance of the national element in the military sciences then affected the fields of Bulgaria, Manchuria, Prussia and Galicia ...”.
Thus, the positive merits of Milyutin's reforms had an immediate effect - it was the humanization of the army, the abolition of cruel corporal punishment, the improvement of the life of soldiers, the beginning of their training, the creation of public and adversarial military courts, military prosecutor's offices, etc. A trained reserve appeared in the army. However, there were also negative elements that affected in the long term. As the military historian Kersnovsky wrote, “Milyutin bureaucratized the entire Russian army from top to bottom. In all charters and regulations, he held the predominance of the staff (with a clerical bias) element over the combatant, the subordination of combatant chiefs of staff and departments. ... A non-military spirit was instilled in the military body ... This catastrophic decline in spirit, the moral impoverishment of the bureaucratized army did not have time to affect to a tangible degree in 1877-1878, but assumed formidable proportions in 1904-1905, catastrophic - in 1914-1917.
Already in that era, this danger of bureaucratization of the army was seen by an old warrior who crushed the highlanders, Field Marshal Prince Alexander Ivanovich Baryatinsky. "The fighting spirit of the army," he wrote to the tsar, would necessarily disappear if the administrative principle, which only contributed, began to prevail over the principle that constituted the honor and glory of military service. The Russian field marshal criticized the Milyutin Regulations on the field command and control of troops, pointing out its bureaucratic nature. “Why do we have wartime institutions running out of peacetime institutions? asked Prince Baryatinsky. - Since the army exists for war, the conclusions must be reversed. Meanwhile, the new martial law emerged from the current peaceful one, serving as its foundation, frame. No one complained about the military regulations of 46, on the contrary, he was called up by the military people of the whole world for perfection. The field marshal saw in the new position “the humiliation of the military principle in front of the administrative one, now based in our country on dual semi-subordination and on an insulting feeling of mutual distrust, which is not characteristic of the military spirit ... Fighting qualities are not required from the Minister of War; he must be a good administrator. That is why in our country he is more often appointed from people who are not famous army, who have little or no experience in military affairs ... The leader of the army is elected according to a different principle. He should be known to the army and the Fatherland for his valor and experience... The new position detracts from the power and position of the commander-in-chief, who is placed in complete dependence on the central military administration, which has received the significance of a gofkriegsrat... Army management has been lowered in importance, the chief of staff has been placed in harmful and unprecedented dependence on the Minister of War ... "However, the Milyutin Regulations of 1868 were abandoned.
Annotation. The article is devoted to the creation of the first samples of rifled artillery in the Russian army, the development of organizational forms of domestic artillery in the 60-70s years XIX century, the problems of its combat use on the eve of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878.
Summary . The article is dedicated to the creation of the first samples of rifled artillery in the Russian Army, development of the organizational forms of the domestic artillery in the 60–70s of the XIX century, problems of its combat employment on the eve of the Russian- Turkish War of 1877–1878.
FROM THE HISTORY OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
GOLOVKO Leonid Ivanovich- Associate Professor of the Department of Operational-Tactical Training of Missile Forces and Artillery of the Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery Academy, Colonel of the Reserve, Candidate of Military Sciences, Associate Professor
(St. Petersburg. E-mail: [email protected]);
POSTNIKOVAlexander Gennadievich- Lecturer at the Department of Operational-Tactical Training of Missile Forces and Artillery of the Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery Academy, Lieutenant Colonel
(St. Petersburg. E-mail: [email protected]).
"WITH THESE GUNS, OUR FIELD ARTILLERY WILL HAVE UNDISPUTABLE SUPERIORITY OVER THE ARTILLERY OF OTHER STATES"
On the state of domestic artillery on the eve of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878.
In the second half of the 19th century, the armies of all leading states began to massively arm themselves with rifled weapons. The army of the Russian Empire was no exception. The impetus for equipping the artillery of the Russian army with rifled guns was the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War. The development of new guns and the rearmament of the army took place in a constantly changing foreign policy environment. The oppression of the Slavic peoples in the Balkans was the reason for Russia's entry into the war against Turkey. This was the first war in which the Russian army used rifled artillery.
In the middle of the 19th century, work on the creation of rifled guns was carried out simultaneously in a number of Western European countries. The first, most satisfying, samples were created in France in 1857. At the same time, research was carried out in Russia. The design and manufacture of rifled guns was managed by the artillery department of the Military Scientific Committee, and since June 1859 - by the Artillery Committee of the Main Artillery Directorate. The success of the design of rifled guns was facilitated by major studies in the field of internal ballistics conducted by N.V. Mayevsky and A.V. Gadolin. On the basis of their theoretical justifications and experimental work, in 1858 the design was completed and tests of a light rifled gun - a 4-pound bronze gun loaded from the muzzle of a cannon - began. After testing and subsequent design changes, on August 10, 1860, the gun was adopted by the field artillery of the Russian army, which was a significant step in the development of domestic artillery1. An important advantage of a rifled gun over a smoothbore gun was the more than doubled firing range. With the same caliber, the volume explosive in an elongated projectile was three times more than in a spherical core, which increased the explosive effect of the projectile at the target. Thanks to giving the projectile the correct rotation due to rifling, the accuracy of shooting has significantly increased. However, a significant drawback of the gun was its low rate of fire. The process of loading from the muzzle was extremely inconvenient for calculation and thus slowed down the rate of fire during the battle. There is a serious problem of creating rifled breech-loading guns.
Despite the design imperfections of the cannons of the 1860 model, their arming of field artillery batteries significantly increased the combat qualities of Russian artillery. However, due to the backwardness of the industrial and technical base and insufficient funding, the mass production of these guns unfolded very slowly. In 1861, 29 rifled guns2 were created, which made it possible, taking into account the guns manufactured in 1860, to rearm only 9 batteries3. In 1862, in the field artillery, of the 1018 guns in the state, only 96 were rifled4. For several years, the domestic industry was able to produce 358 rifled 4-pounder field and mountain guns, which accounted for only 32 percent. of the total number of artillery pieces produced during the period from 1862 to 18665. Under these conditions, the Russian government was forced to place part of the orders abroad. So, for example, in 1864, one hundred 4-pound rifled breech-loading steel guns were received from the AG Krupp concern (North German Union). Beginning in 1866, Krupp factories supplied another three hundred and fifty 4-pound and two hundred and fifty 9-pound rifled steel breech-loading guns for Russian artillery.
The technical re-equipment of domestic artillery is primarily due to D.A. Milyutin. While holding the post of Minister of War, he paid great attention to the issues of re-equipping the army with rifled weapons. In 1865 N.V. Mayevsky and A.V. Gadolin successfully completed the design of 4- and 9-pounder breech-loading guns. Tests carried out in 1866 showed that the guns had relatively high combat properties and had a number of advantages over smoothbore systems. The work of scientists was highly appreciated by D.A. Milyutin. “Our artillery scientists have made many essential research and discoveries, and now it remains only to wish that the financial allocations would allow us to complete the work begun with such success as soon as possible,” wrote the Minister of War7.
Despite the difficulties of a financial and economic nature caused by the situation of the country after the defeat in the Crimean War, the Ministry of War, headed by D.A. The Milyutins managed to raise funds for the technical re-equipment and re-equipment of the artillery. The following figures vividly testify to this: if in 1862, out of the total estimate of the Military Ministry of 112,525,000 rubles, 6,201,000 rubles, or 5.5 percent, were allocated for the needs of artillery. military budget8, then in 1868, out of a total appropriation of 134,957,000, 13,765,000 rubles, or 10.2 percent, already accounted for 10.2 percent. .
In 1867, 4-pounder and 9-pounder rifled bronze breech-loading guns were adopted by the field artillery. In terms of their tactical and technical characteristics, domestic samples were not inferior to the artillery systems of the armies of Western European states. The qualities of the new guns were noted by D.A. Milyutin. In his diary, he wrote: “With these guns, our field artillery will have undeniable superiority over the artillery of other states”10.
The hopes of the military leadership of the country were justified. The high quality of these guns, which formed the basis of the field artillery fleet, during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. allowed not only to fight on equal terms with the enemy, armed with the best foreign guns, but also to have an advantage.
Despite the low production capacity, the industry of Russia managed to establish the production of rifled guns and by 1870 re-equipped all field artillery. By 1877, the number of created 4-pounder and 9-pounder guns was already 1.5 times higher than the need for regular troops, which made it possible to complete the available reserve and spare batteries11.
The rearmament of siege and fortress artillery was much more difficult. By the beginning of the war, it was possible to provide only an insignificant part of this artillery with rifled guns. Perm, Obukhovsky and other factories of the mining department only mastered the production of steel rifled artillery, and the St. Petersburg, Bryansk and Kyiv arsenals and the St. Petersburg gun workshop could not cope with the required production volumes. They tried to solve the problem by manufacturing small series of guns abroad. However, their cost turned out to be high, and foreign orders absorbed a significant part of the appropriations allocated for the production of artillery weapons.
In 1868, they conducted a series of experimental shootings, during which they compared the capabilities of the 9-pounder gun in destroying the stone walls of the fortress with the 12-pounder and 24-pounder guns. Based on the results obtained, 9-pound rifled guns were included in the siege artillery. In 1873, a 24-pound bronze rifled short gun passed the test and replenished the siege park.
By the beginning of the war, the measures taken made it possible to increase the share of rifled cannons and mortars in siege artillery to 90 percent, and in fortress artillery to 48 percent, which significantly increased the artillery's ability to engage the enemy by fire.
In the second half of the 1870s, funding for the development and improvement of artillery was noticeably improved. In 1876, the amount of appropriations for the needs of artillery reached 20 percent. of the total amount of the entire military budget12. Along with the increase in funding, the development of the military industry and the improvement of weapons contributed to the greatest scientific discoveries of the 1860-1870s in the fields of mathematics, physics, chemistry and metallurgy. Experience and scientific works of outstanding Russian metallurgists D.K. Chernova, N.V. Kulakutsky and A.S. Lavrov opened a new page in the history of domestic steel production. Thanks to their scientific achievements, the quality of the metal for the manufacture of artillery barrels increased, which greatly extended the life of artillery pieces. This made it possible to use more powerful charges for firing, which increased the speed and stability of the projectile's flight along the trajectory. Hence the long range and high accuracy of shooting.
The achievements of Russian metallurgists contributed to the reduction in the cost of weapons production, which, in turn, accelerated the rearmament of the army with modern artillery systems. Skillfully using the discoveries of their compatriots, Russian artillery scientists and designers in a short time managed to create the best examples of artillery weapons for those times.
The guns of the 1877 model adopted by the artillery of the Russian army had high combat qualities. A specially created commission established that 3,550 guns were required to re-equip field artillery, and developed a rearmament program. Within the framework of this program, at the direction of Alexander II, the Krupp concern was ordered to manufacture 1850, and the Obukhov plant - 1700 steel barrels with their delivery by the end of 1880. However, the task of re-equipping with new steel guns was successfully completed after the end of the war.
A significant drawback of Russian artillery was the lack of special guns in the composition of the field artillery capable of conducting mounted fire (mortar). After the Crimean War, field fortification developed rapidly, and this shortcoming was acutely felt. Designed in 1867, 6-inch, and a year later, 8-inch mortars were heavy and could only be used as siege or fortress artillery guns. The field 6-inch mortar was created only in 1885.
Ammunition was not powerful enough, as it had a small bursting charge13. For example, a 9-pound grenade with a total weight of 27.7 pounds had a bursting charge weighing only 1 pound. With a low initial speed and a large sloping trajectory, the grenade produced minor damage in the field earthen fortifications.
In 1870, it was adopted new type projectile - sharokha, which had a spherical core in the head part. When fired, these shells were supposed to ricochet and thereby cause great damage to enemy manpower. However, the fighting showed the low effectiveness of this ammunition, and it was gradually withdrawn from the ammunition load of the guns. In the same year, the developed by the commission under the leadership of V.N. Shklarevich a new sample of shrapnel. The introduction of diaphragm shrapnel made it possible to abandon buckshot and, with skillful shooting, made up for the shortcomings of grenades14. The main drawback of the shrapnel was the short duration of the burning of the remote tubes (7½, 10 and 15 seconds), which made it impossible to fire at long ranges15.
By the beginning of the war, Russian artillery, according to the organizational principle, was divided into field, siege, fortress, reserve, reserve and artillery of regular troops. Foot artillery consisted of 48 artillery brigades (according to the number of guards, grenadier and infantry divisions), which had the same type of structure, three brigades of a special composition (1st and 2nd Turkestan and East Siberian) and one separate battery. A total of 299 batteries with 2392 guns. In accordance with the standard staff, an artillery brigade consisted of six batteries of 8 guns each. At the same time, the first three batteries were armed with 9-pounders, and the last three with 4-pounder guns of the 1867 model. The exception was four artillery brigades (20th, 21st, 39th, 41st), in which the sixth batteries were armed with 3-pound mountain guns of the 1867 model16.<…>
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NOTES
1 Brandenburg N.E. 500th anniversary of Russian artillery (1389-1889). St. Petersburg: Artillery magazine, 1889, p. 108.
2 The Most Submissive Report on the Actions of the War Ministry for 1861, St. Petersburg, 1863, p. 171.
3 Ibid. S. 50.
4 History of domestic artillery in 3 volumes. T. 2. Book. 4. M.: Military publishing house, 1966. S. 49.
5 Ibid. S. 19.
6 Essay on transformations in artillery during the administration of Adjutant General Barantsov, 1863-1877. SPb., 1877. S. 200.
8 The Most Submissive Report on the Activities of the War Ministry for 1862, St. Petersburg, 1864, pp. 45, 319.
9 The Most Submissive Report on the Activities of the War Ministry for 1868, St. Petersburg, 1870, pp. 103, 549.
10 History of domestic artillery. T. 2. Book. 4. P. 14.
11 3920 4-pounder and 9-pounder guns were created, while the need for artillery was only 2592 guns.
12 The Most Submissive Report on the Actions of the War Ministry for 1876, St. Petersburg, 1878, pp. 132, 569.
13 Kozlovsky D.E. History of the material part of artillery. M .: Military publishing house, 1946. S. 193.
15 Remote tubes allowed firing: 7.5 sec. - 1700 m, 10 sec. - 2100 m, 15 sec. - 2900 m.
16 Description Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 on the Balkan Peninsula in 3 volumes. T. 1. St. Petersburg: Military Printing House, 1901. S. 89, 90.