In the book "Pioneers of the Russian submarine fleet" (Lavrov V.N. Publishing house "Sudostroenie". St. Petersburg. 2013), the seventh chapter is devoted to the first Soviet nuclear submarine, its creators, the first crew and individual episodes of more than 30 years of service this nuclear submarine as part of the Navy of the USSR and Russia.
Neither in this book, nor in a number of other sources devoted to the pioneers of the nuclear fleet, are there (or very few) materials about the creators and creators of the world's first nuclear submarines, as well as about the circumstances of the birth of the very idea of using atomic energy to ensure the movement of warships and primarily submarines. Only one thing is known - the idea originated in the USA. The American press called Admiral H. Rickover "the father of nuclear submarines". For a long time, the name of Rickover was always mentioned first when it came to the creation of nuclear submarines.
In the early 60s of the XX century, a scandal erupted: American scientists Ross Gann and Philip Hauge Abelson said that Admiral Rickover had illegally appropriated the authorship of the idea and priority in creating the world's first nuclear submarine. This "splashed out" on the pages of newspapers and magazines, and not only American ones. The situation was discussed in the US Congress. A special commission of the Congress was created, which, having studied the history of the creation of a nuclear submarine, prepared proposals and submitted them for approval by the Congress. In a special resolution on the priority in establishing nuclear boat, adopted in July 1963, the following is written:
“Dr. Ross Gunn, on March 20, 1939, began work in the Department of the Naval Forces on the development of atomic energy. In June 1939, Ross Gunn submitted a report to the Bureau of Shipbuilding on the use of atomic energy to propel submarines.
Dr. Philip Abelson has been working since 1941 on the separation of isotopes of uranium to create an atomic bomb. In 1944, he submitted a report to the design office on the use of atomic energy to propel ships, especially submarines, and began working with Gunn on the problem at the Naval Research Laboratory.
In 1945 and 1946 Gunn and Abelson made a presentation to Congress on the possibility of building a nuclear submarine. The pioneering work of Gunn and Abelson led to the actual creation of the Nautilus nuclear submarine. Admiral H. Rickover, relying on the reports of Abelson and Gunn, achieved the practical implementation of the first nuclear submarine. Congress informs the American people of Abelson and Gunn's priority."
Thus, everything fell into place. The above quote is taken from Yu.S. Kryuchkov's book "Submarines and their creators" (Step-info publishing house, Nikolaev, 2007
American mechanical engineer R. Gann in 1938-1939 put forward the idea of creating an atomic engine for underwater travel. At the beginning of 1939, together with Captain 1st Rank Cooley, he presented drawings of a "uranium fission chamber."
In June 1941, R. Gann, together with F. Abelson, developed a method for separating the U235 isotope. This method was proposed to the leaders of the Manhattan Project and successfully applied in the production of explosive for the first atomic bombs. In 1944, Gunn and Abelson presented a report on the development of methods for using atomic energy to propel naval ships. After the defeat of Japan, R. Gann was awarded the Order for his participation in the development of the atomic bomb.
The American scientist (physicist and geochemist) F. Abelson during the Second World War worked in the electromechanical department headed by R. Gann. His Scientific research were in the field of nuclear physics, biophysics, organic chemistry. Since 1944, Abelson, together with Gunn, began to work on the problem of using nuclear energy to propel nuclear submarines. In 1946, Abelson presented a draft design of the nuclear submarine. He placed the nuclear reactor outside the pressure hull in the double-hull space in the stern. Abelson attached this project to a detailed report prepared in the same year. The work of Abelson and Gunn formed the basis for the creation of the first nuclear installation for a submarine, which was noted in the above resolution of the US Congress.
F. Abelson
The American naval engineer H. G. Rickover graduated from the Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1922. During World War II, already in the rank of captain of the 1st rank, H. Rickover headed one of the departments of the Shipbuilding Administration. In 1947, he was appointed assistant head of this Department and at the same time headed the Department of Atomic Energy. Having familiarized himself with the Abelson project and the works of R. Gann, Captain 1st Rank Rickover became an active supporter of the idea of creating a nuclear submarine. In the period 1947-1949, despite the opposition of official leaders, H. Rickover, with a group of specialists selected by him, developed his own project for a nuclear submarine with a pressurized water reactor. In 1950, under the leadership of Rickover, construction began on the prototype of the Mark-I boat reactor on the shore. The following year, 1951, the world's first nuclear submarine "Nautilus" with a pressurized water reactor "Mark-II" was laid down. Thus, Rickover was the direct supervisor of the creation of the first nuclear submarine in the world, which entered service in 1954. In the future, all US Navy nuclear submarines were built and operated under the watchful eye of Rear Admiral (since 1953) H. G. Rickover. In 1954, Rickover proposed to the US Navy leadership to build a large submarine with two reactors and the latest radar equipment to monitor the situation in the ocean zone. This is how the nuclear submarine of the Triton radar patrol appeared. Since 1957, Rickover led the development of a nuclear power plant for submarines - missile carriers of the "George Washington" type.
Vice Admiral H.G. Rickover
For work on the creation of nuclear submarines, Vice Admiral (since 1958) H. Rickover was awarded a special Gold Medal in 1959, and President John F. Kennedy, by personal Decree, left Rickover in indefinite naval service. The "father" of the nuclear submarine fleet died in 1986.
Launching of the submarine "Nautilus". H. Rickover aboard the Nautilus.
58 years ago, on January 21, 1954, the nuclear submarine Nautilus was launched. It was the first submarine with a nuclear reactor, allowing months to be in autonomous navigation without rising to the surface. A new page in history has opened cold war…
The idea to use a nuclear reactor as a power plant for submarines originated in the Third Reich. Professor Heisenberg's oxygen-free "uranium machines" (as nuclear reactors were then called) were intended primarily for the "underwater wolves" of the Kriegsmarine. However, the German physicists failed to bring the work to its logical conclusion, and the initiative passed to the United States, which for some time was the only country in the world that had nuclear reactors and bombs.
In the early years of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA, long-range bombers were conceived by American strategists as carriers of the atomic bomb. The United States had extensive experience in the combat use of this type of weapon, American strategic aviation had a reputation as the most powerful in the world, and finally, the territory of the United States was considered largely invulnerable to enemy retaliation.
However, the use of aircraft required their basing in close proximity to the borders of the USSR. As a result of the diplomatic efforts undertaken, already in July 1948, the Labor government agreed to the deployment of 60 B-29 bombers with atomic bombs on board in the UK. After the signing of the North Atlantic Pact in April 1949, all of Western Europe became involved in the US nuclear strategy, and by the end of the 1960s the number of American bases abroad reached 3,400!
However, over time, the US military and politicians have come to understand that the presence of strategic aviation in foreign territories is associated with the risk of a change in the political situation in a particular country, therefore the fleet was increasingly seen as the carrier of atomic weapons in a future war. Finally, this trend was strengthened after the convincing tests of atomic bombs near Bikini Atoll.
In 1948, American designers completed the development of a nuclear power plant project and began designing and building an experimental reactor. Thus, there were all the prerequisites for creating a fleet of nuclear submarines, which not only had to carry nuclear weapons, but also have a nuclear reactor as a power plant.
The construction of the first such boat, named after the fantastic submarine invented by Jules Verne, the Nautilus and designated SSN-571, began on June 14, 1952, in the presence of US President Harry Truman at the shipyard in Groton.
On January 21, 1954, in the presence of US President Eisenhower, the Nautilus was launched, and eight months later, on September 30, 1954, it was adopted by the US Navy. On January 17, 1955, the Nautilus went on sea trials into the open ocean, and its first commander, Eugene Wilkinson, broadcast in plain text: "We are going under an atomic engine."
Apart from the completely new Mark-2 power plant, the boat had a conventional design. With a displacement of Nautilus of about 4,000 tons, a two-shaft nuclear power plant with a total capacity of 9,860 kilowatts provided a speed of more than 20 knots. The submerged cruising range was 25,000 miles at a flow rate of 450 grams of U235 per month.. Thus, the duration of the voyage depended only on the correct operation of the air regeneration facilities, food supplies and the endurance of the personnel.
At the same time, however, the specific gravity of the nuclear plant turned out to be very large, because of this, it was not possible to install part of the weapons and equipment provided for by the project on Nautilus. The main reason for the weight was biological protection, which includes lead, steel and other materials (about 740 tons). As a result, all the weapons of the Nautilus were 6 bow torpedo tubes with 24 torpedoes.
As with any new business, it was not without its problems. Even during the construction of the Nautilus, and specifically during the testing of the power plant, there was a rupture of the pipeline of the secondary circuit, through which saturated steam with a temperature of about 220 ° C and under a pressure of 18 atmospheres came from the steam generator to the turbine. Fortunately, it was not the main, but an auxiliary steam pipeline.
The cause of the accident, as established during the investigation, was a manufacturing defect: instead of pipes made of high-quality carbon steel grade A-106, pipes made of less durable material A-53 were included in the steam pipeline. The accident caused American designers to question the feasibility of using welded pipes in pressurized submarine systems. The elimination of the consequences of the accident and the replacement of already assembled welded pipes with seamless ones delayed the completion of the construction of the Nautilus for several months.
After the boat entered service, rumors began to circulate in the media that the personnel of the Nautilus had received serious doses of radiation due to flaws in the design of bioprotection. It was reported that the naval command had to hastily make a partial replacement of the crew, and dock the submarine to make the necessary changes to the protection design. How true this information is is not known until now.
On May 4, 1958, a fire broke out in the turbine compartment of the Nautilus, en route from Panama to San Francisco. The ignition of the port side turbine's oil-soaked insulation was found to have started a few days before the fire, but its signs were ignored.
The slight smell of smoke was mistaken for the smell of fresh paint. The fire was discovered only when the presence of personnel in the compartment became impossible due to smoke. There was so much smoke in the compartment that the submariners in smoke masks could not find its source.
Without finding out the reasons for the appearance of smoke, the ship's commander gave the order to stop the turbine, ascend to the periscope depth and try to ventilate the compartment through the snorkel. However, these measures did not help, and the boat was forced to float to the surface. Enhanced ventilation of the compartment through an open hatch with the help of an auxiliary diesel generator finally brought results. The amount of smoke in the compartment decreased, and the crew managed to find the place of ignition.
Two sailors in smoke masks (there were only four such masks on the boat) with the help of knives and pliers began to rip off the smoldering insulation from the turbine casing. A column of flame about a meter high burst out from under the torn piece of insulation. Foam fire extinguishers were used. The flame was put out and work to remove the insulation continued. People had to be changed every 10-15 minutes, as acrid smoke penetrated even masks. Only four hours later, all the insulation from the turbine was removed and the fire was extinguished.
After the arrival of the boat in San Francisco, its commander carried out a number of measures aimed at increasing fire safety ship. In particular, the old insulation was removed from the second turbine. All personnel of the submarine were provided with self-contained breathing apparatus.
In May 1958, during the preparation of the Nautilus for a trip to the North Pole, the main condenser of the steam turbine plant leaked on the boat. Outboard water seeping into the condensate-feed system could cause salinization of the secondary circuit and lead to the failure of the entire power system of the ship.
Repeated attempts to find the place of the leak were unsuccessful, and the submarine commander made an original decision. After the arrival of the Nautilus in Seattle, sailors in civilian clothes - the preparations for the campaign were kept in strict secrecy - bought all the proprietary fluid in automobile stores to fill in car radiators in order to stop the leak.
Half of this liquid (about 80 liters) was poured into the condenser, after which the problem of condenser salinization did not arise either in Seattle or later during the trip. Probably, the leak was in the space between the double tube plates of the condenser and stopped after filling this space with a self-hardening mixture.
On November 10, 1966, during a NATO naval exercise in the North Atlantic, the Nautilus, which was attacking in a periscope position on the American aircraft carrier Essex (displacement 33,000 tons), collided with it. As a result of the collision, the aircraft carrier received an underwater hole, and the fencing of retractable devices was destroyed on the boat. Accompanied by the destroyer, the Nautilus reached under its own power at a speed of about 10 knots to the naval base in New London, USA, covering a distance of about 360 miles.
On July 22, 1958, the Nautilus, under the command of William Andersen, left Pearl Harbor with the goal of reaching the North Pole. It all started with the fact that at the end of 1956, the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Burke, received a letter from Senator Jackson. The senator was interested in the possibility of nuclear submarines operating under the Arctic pack ice.
This letter was the first sign that forced the command of the American Navy to seriously think about organizing a campaign to the North Pole. True, some of the American admirals considered the idea reckless and were categorically against it. Despite this, the commander of the submarine forces of the Atlantic Fleet considered the polar campaign a done deal.
Anderson began to prepare for the upcoming campaign with triple zeal. On the Nautilus, special equipment was installed that made it possible to determine the state of the ice, and a new MK-19 compass, which, unlike conventional magnetic compasses operated at high latitudes. Before the very trip, Anderson got hold of the latest maps and sailing directions with the depths of the Arctic and even made an air flight, the route of which coincided with the planned route of the Nautilus.
On August 19, 1957, the Nautilus headed for the area between Greenland and Svalbard. The first test exit of the submarine under the pack ice was unsuccessful. When the echometer recorded zero ice thickness, the boat tried to surface. Instead of the expected polynya, the Nautilus encountered a drifting ice floe. From a collision with her, the boat severely damaged the only periscope, and the commander of the Nautilus decided to return back to the edge of the packs.
The mangled periscope was repaired in field conditions. Anderson was rather skeptical about how stainless steel welders work - even in ideal factory conditions, such welding required a lot of experience. Nevertheless, the crack formed in the periscope was repaired, and the device began to operate again.
The second attempt to reach the Pole also did not bring results.. A couple of hours after the Nautilus crossed the 86th parallel, both gyrocompasses failed. Anderson decided not to tempt fate and gave the order to turn - in high latitudes, even a meager deviation from the correct course could be fatal and lead the ship to a foreign shore.
At the end of October 1957, Anderson made a short presentation at the White House, which he devoted to a recent campaign under the Arctic ice. The report was listened to with indifference, and William was disappointed. The stronger became the desire of the commander of the Nautilus to go to the pole again.
Thinking about this voyage, Anderson prepared a letter to the White House, in which he convincingly argued that the passage through the pole would become a reality as early as next year. From the presidential administration they made it clear that the commander of the Nautilus could count on support. The Pentagon was also interested in the idea. Shortly thereafter, Admiral Burke reported on the upcoming campaign to the president himself, who reacted to Anderson's plans with great enthusiasm.
The operation was to be carried out in an atmosphere of strict secrecy - the command was afraid of a new failure. Only a small group of people in the government knew about the details of the campaign. To hide the true reason for installing additional navigational equipment on the Nautilus, the ship was announced to participate in joint training maneuvers along with the Skate and Halfbeak boats.
On June 9, 1958, the Nautilus set off on its second polar voyage.. When Seattle was far behind, Anderson ordered that the number of the submarine on the cabin fence be painted over to preserve incognito. On the fourth day of the journey, the Nautilus approached the Aleutian Islands.
Knowing that they would have to go further in shallow water, the ship's commander ordered the ascent. "Nautilus" maneuvered in this area for a long time - looking for a convenient gap in the chain of islands in order to get to the north. Finally, navigator Jenkins discovered a fairly deep passage between the islands. Having overcome the first obstacle, the submarine entered the Bering Sea.
Now the Nautilus had to slip through the narrow and ice-covered Bering Strait. The path to the west of St. Lawrence Island was completely closed by pack ice. The draft of some icebergs exceeded ten meters. They could easily crush the Nautilus, pinning the submarine to the bottom. Despite the fact that a significant part of the path was completed, Anderson gave the order to follow the reverse course.
The commander of the Nautilus did not despair - perhaps the eastern passage through the strait would be more friendly to rare guests. The boat left Siberian ice and headed south from St. Lawrence Island, intending to pass into deep water past Alaska. The next few days of the campaign passed without incident, and on the morning of June 17 the submarine reached the Chukchi Sea.
And then Anderson's bright expectations collapsed. The first alarm signal was the appearance of a nineteen-meter-thick ice floe, which went straight to the submarine. Collisions with her were avoided, but the recorders of the instruments warned that there was an even more serious obstacle in the way of the boat.
Pressing close to the very bottom, the Nautilus slipped under a huge ice floe at a distance of only one and a half meters from it. It was only by a miracle that he escaped death. When the recorder pen finally went up, indicating that the boat had missed the ice floe, Anderson realized that the operation had failed completely ...
The captain sent his ship to Pearl Harbor. There was still hope that at the end of the summer the ice boundary would move to deeper regions, and it would be possible to make another attempt to get close to the pole. But who will give her permission after so many failures?
The reaction of the highest US military department was immediate - Anderson was summoned to Washington for an explanation. The commander of the "Nautilus" behaved well, showing perseverance. His report to senior Pentagon officers expressed his firm conviction that the next, July, campaign would undoubtedly be crowned with success. And they gave him another chance.
Anderson immediately began to act. To monitor the ice situation, he sent his navigator Jenks to Alaska. A legend was made up for Jenks, according to which he was a Pentagon officer with special powers. Arriving in Alaska, Jenks lifted into the air almost the entire patrol aircraft, which daily conducted observations in the area of \u200b\u200bthe future route of the Nautilus. In mid-July, Anderson, still at Pearl Harbor, received the long-awaited news from his navigator: the ice situation had become favorable for the transpolar transition, the main thing was not to miss the moment.
On July 22, a nuclear submarine with overwritten numbers left Pearl Harbor.. The Nautilus was moving at top speed. On the night of July 27, Anderson took the ship to the Bering Sea. Two days later, having made a 2900-mile journey from Pearl Harbor, the Nautilus was already cutting through the waters of the Chukchi Sea.
On August 1, the submarine sank under the pack arctic ice, in some places going into the water to a depth of twenty meters. It was not easy to navigate the Nautilus under them. Almost all the time Anderson himself was on watch. The crew of the ship was excited about the upcoming event, which they wanted to celebrate properly. Some, for example, proposed to describe twenty-five small circles around the pole. Then the Nautilus could enter the Guinness Book of Records as the first ship in the history of navigation to make 25 round-the-world voyages in one campaign.
Anderson rightly believed that such maneuvers were out of the question - the probability of going astray was too high. The commander of the Nautilus was worried about completely different problems. In order to cross the pole as accurately as possible, Anderson did not take his eyes off the pointers of the electric navigation instruments. On August 3, at twenty-three hours and fifteen minutes, the goal of the campaign - the North Geographic Pole of the Earth - was reached.
Without delaying in the area of the Pole longer than required by the collection of statistical information on the state of ice and outboard water, Anderson sent a submarine to the Greenland Sea. The Nautilus was to arrive in the Reykjavik area, where a secret meeting was to take place. The helicopter, which was waiting for the submarine at the rendezvous point, removed only one person from the submarine - Commander Anderson.
Fifteen minutes later, the helicopter landed in Keflavik next to a transport aircraft ready to depart. When the wheels of the plane touched the runway of the airfield in Washington, Anderson was already waiting for a car sent from the White House - the president of the Nautilus wanted to see the president. After the report on the operation, Anderson was again returned to the boat, which in the meantime managed to reach Portland. Six days later, the Nautilus and its commander entered New York with honors. A military parade was held in their honor...
On March 3, 1980, the Nautilus, after 25 years of service, was removed from the Navy and declared a National Historic Landmark. Plans were made to convert the submarine into a museum for public display. Upon completion of the decontamination and a large amount of preparatory work, on July 6, 1985, the Nautilus was towed to Groton (Connecticut). Here at the US Submarine Museum, the world's first nuclear submarine is open to the public.
The first Soviet nuclear submarine "Leninsky Komsomol" experienced a great triumph during its combat service, as well as a great tragedy. Moreover, this tragedy did not become public knowledge either in 1967 or during perestroika, and even today, few people know about it.
The decision to start designing a nuclear submarine in the Soviet Union was made in the early 1950s. On September 12, 1952, Stalin himself signed a decree "On the design and construction of object 627". The birth of the first-born of the domestic nuclear shipbuilding industry took place in an atmosphere of deep secrecy. The chief designer was V.N. Peregudov, since 1953 the project was led by S.A. Bazilevsky. Meanwhile, in 1954, the Americans launched their first nuclear submarine, the Nautilus.
Initially, the Soviet nuclear submarine was called K-3; it had nothing in common with the American Nautilus. The K-3 hull was designed from scratch, the main emphasis was on the quality of the underwater course. The boat turned out to be faster than the Nautilus, with a pressurized water reactor.
At first, the developers planned to use a single thermonuclear torpedo capable of hitting a target at a distance of 50 kilometers on a submarine to attack enemy naval bases. However, by this time the British and Americans were already establishing anti-submarine lines at a distance of 100 kilometers from the coast. A commission was created that decided that the country needed a submarine capable of destroying ships in the seas and oceans, but for this there should be more than one torpedo. It is necessary to have a large stock of torpedoes with nuclear warheads on board the boat. Thus, the assignment for the construction of K-3 was adjusted, and the submarine's hull had to be redone.
The first domestic nuclear-powered ship was laid down on September 24, 1955 in Severodvinsk. The whole country took part in the construction of K-3, although it did not even suspect it. A special steel was developed at the Moscow plant, which made it possible to dive to a depth unthinkable in those years - 300 meters. Reactors were made in Gorky, and steam turbine plants were made at the Leningrad Kirov Plant. The captain of the 1st rank L. G. Osipenko was appointed commander of the submarine in the same year. To be among the first officers of a nuclear submarine was as prestigious as to be in the cosmonaut corps. The submarine was launched for the first time on October 9, 1957.
In those years, no one in the West believed that a nuclear submarine fleet could be built in the war-torn Soviet Union. The American Nautilus crossed the North Pole on August 3, 1958. Since then, the USSR has been within the reach of missiles, which at any moment could be launched from American submarines in the Arctic. Therefore, when K-3 reached the Pole in 1962, it was a shock to other states, especially the United States. There is evidence that Alain Dulles, who led the CIA at that time, even lost his post because he did not know anything about the campaign of Soviet sailors to the North Pole. Then the USSR was able to prove to the whole world that it was still capable of much.
In the summer of 1962, K-3 was no longer the only nuclear submarine in the country's Navy. Other ships could also make a trip to the Arctic, especially since the “troika” by this time was already rather shabby. Being a prototype, it was subjected to all kinds of tests, it worked out the limiting modes of all devices, primarily the reactor, steam generators, turbines. In addition, being designed in a big hurry, the boat was constantly in need of repairs, improvements and alterations. There was literally no living place on the steam generators - solid overcooked and muffled tubes.
Why, then, did the Soviet authorities, knowing about the almost emergency state of the K-3, still send the boat on such an important campaign for the country? The answer is quite obvious: when choosing between technology and people, we mainly rely on the latter. Therefore, during the trip to the North Pole, the maintenance of the boat in working condition was provided mainly by the forces of a qualified crew, who performed complex repairs on their own.
Lev Mikhailovich Zhiltsov commanded K-3 during a campaign in the Arctic. Together with his crew, he walked under the ice straight to the "crown" of the Earth. At that time, there was no detailed map with depth isobaths and marks of underwater peaks, that is, the boat moved blindly and blindly. The huge thickness of ice above the submarine reflected the noise of its own propellers, giving rise to auditory illusions, the acoustics worked in impossible conditions. And then, one day, they felt that the depth under the keel dropped sharply.
Having received an alarming report, Zhiltsov ordered to go up a little and reduce the speed of the boat. Experts carefully studied the echogram, so a giant underwater ridge was discovered at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean. This was the largest geographical discovery of the 20th century, after Severnaya Zemlya was mapped in 1913. The discovered underwater ridge was named after the famous hydrograph Yakov Gakkel.
The Soviet nuclear submarine K-3, which was later renamed "Leninsky Komsomol", crossed the North Pole on July 17, 1962 at 06:50 and 10 seconds. The crew of the ship jokingly offered the midshipman-helmsman to move slightly off course so as not to bend " earth's axis". Lev Zhiltsov later recalled that the thickness of the ice in those places was about 25 meters. The boat was driven close to the surface, and when they noticed a hole, they immediately surfaced. The bow of the submarine then froze at the very edge of the ice, from all sides K-3 was squeezed by endless snow. According to the commander of the submarine, there was such silence around that even his ears rang.
State flag solemnly hoisted on the highest hummock, and the crew of the "troika" received a shore leave. The moment of wild fun of the submariners is captured in many pictures. It is noteworthy that before the boat went on a hike, the staff of the special security department checked the ship for cameras, it was strictly forbidden to take pictures. But who knows the boat and secret places better than divers? We made our way back to base at full speed.
On the shore, the crew of the submarine was personally met by Nikita Khrushchev himself. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was then given to the head of the historical campaign, Rear Admiral Alexander Petelin, the commander of the submarine, Captain 3rd Rank Lev Zhiltsov, engineer-captain 2nd Rank Rurik Timofeev. Earlier, the star of the Hero was received by the first commander of the ship, Captain 1st Rank Leonid Osipenko.
Approximately five years later, the Leninsky Komsomol nuclear-powered icebreaker was sent on a combat watch to the Mediterranean Sea. Lieutenant Captain Alexander Leskov, assistant commander of the submarine, said that this decision was initially erroneous: in recent years, the ship's crew has mainly attended various events: party and Komsomol congresses, no combat training and going to sea. And then immediately - a long trip. The crew of the ship was also assembled in haste, since according to the plan, another substrate, K-11, was supposed to go on patrol in the Mediterranean Sea, but it was found to have a serious malfunction.
Leskov was appointed assistant captain two days before the ship went on duty, Yuri Stepanov was appointed commander a month before sailing. All 80 days of patrol, something constantly went wrong: first technical problems, then one of the crew members died. An order was received to surface and transfer the body to one of the Soviet ships that were nearby. The nuclear-powered ship was declassified, they had to return to the base. When the submarine was in the Norwegian Sea, a terrible tragedy happened.
On that day, September 8, Alexander Leskov was on the command watch at the central post. At 01:52 a signal was received by the communication panel. The assistant commander flipped the switch and asked: "Who's calling Central?" Then he released the switch, and the terrible screams of people burning alive were heard in the room. For many years afterwards, he dreamed of these screams at night.
As it turned out, flammable hydraulic vapors ignited in the forward torpedo room. The fire spread rapidly. The 39 people who were in the first and second compartments burned out in a matter of minutes. A little more and the entire torpedo ammunition would have exploded. The situation was saved by the commander of the second compartment, Captain-Lieutenant Anatoly Malyar, who, before dying, managed to slam the hatch from the inside, which prevented the further spread of fire. The commander of the nuclear boat, Stepanov, gave the order to equalize the pressure with the emergency compartments, since TNT explodes with a simultaneous increase in pressure and temperature. The crew members put on gas masks, and Captain Leskov opened the exhaust ventilation clink. Immediately, black smoke with poisonous gases burst into the central post.
Stepanov lost consciousness, Leskov took command. He managed to give a signal about the accident on a submarine and carry out an emergency ascent. At two o'clock in the morning, the surviving crew left the central post and went up to the bridge. The submarine surfaced, and then returned to base under its own power.
The commission formed on the shore initially recognized the actions of the crew as heroic. All sailors, including those who died, were presented for the award. The cause of the ignition in the torpedo compartment was called a breakthrough in one of the nodes of the hydraulic system: instead of a sealing gasket made of red copper, there was a primitive washer cut from paronite and not designed for pressure drops. Apparently, someone changed the gasket during the factory repair. Over time, the seal became limp, and there was a breakthrough of oil, which immediately ignited.
However, a month later, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy S. Gorshkov stated that the accident was the fault of the crew. The results of the first commission were annulled and a second, obviously biased, was appointed, which suddenly found a lighter on the watch table. Thus, the entire surviving crew of heroes turned into criminals. It turns out that not only the sailors of K-3 were unfairly accused, but also the memory of their dead comrades was abused.
For the next 30 years, the participants in the tragedy tried to get the truth, wherever they wrote, to which authorities they did not apply. The presidential administration told the sailors that rehabilitation and awarding can only be carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Meanwhile, the submariners, one by one, passed away, the survivors for more than seventy years.
And just recently, the resolution of President Dmitry Medvedev helped restore the good name of the crew of the Leninsky Komsomolets nuclear submarine. The main headquarters of the Navy demanded archival documents, personal files of crew members. As a result, the main technical department admitted that the accident was not the fault of the submariners. After only 45 years, they waited for justice.
Leskov A. Ya. lost consciousness at the beginning of the accident and woke up 5 days after he was delivered to the hospital on the shore. He was rescued by the surviving members of the K-3 crew.
(Submitted to the editorial office by a reader of "VO" on January 11, 2014). "Leninsky Komsomol", originally K-3 - the first Soviet (third in the world) nuclear submarine, the lead in the series. The only boat of project 627, all subsequent boats of the series were built according to the modified project 627A. The name "Leninsky Komsomol" was inherited by the submarine from the diesel submarine "M-106" of the Northern Fleet of the same name, which died in one of the military campaigns in 1943. This honorary name has been worn since October 9, 1962. In recent years, the service has been reclassified from cruising to large (B-3). In this post there will be many photos of the current state of the submarine, maybe someone will see and remember that she is still alive, but this is unlikely to affect her fate. It will surely be disposed of soon, since attention to it is only from the side of the plant where it stands and no one is interested in its restoration as a museum.
The submarine was laid down on September 24, 1955 in Severodvinsk, at plant No. 402 (now Sevmash), factory No. 254. In August 1955, Captain 1st Rank L. G. Osipenko was appointed commander of the boat. The reactors were launched in September 1957, launched on October 9, 1957. It entered service (the flag of the Navy was raised) on July 1, 1958, on July 4, 1958, for the first time in the USSR, it launched under a nuclear power plant, on December 17, 1958 it was accepted from industry under the guarantee of eliminating deficiencies.
At the same time, with a noticeable lag, the new coastal infrastructure required to support nuclear submarines was designed and built. March 12, 1959 became part of the 206th separate BrPL based in Severodvinsk.
The name "Leninsky Komsomol" was inherited by the submarine from the diesel submarine "M-106" of the Northern Fleet of the same name, which died in one of the military campaigns in 1943.
In 1961 - the first military service in Atlantic Ocean. In July 1962, for the first time in the history of the Soviet Navy she made a long trip under the ice of the Arctic Ocean, during which she twice passed the point of the North Pole. Under the command of Lev Mikhailovich Zhiltsov, on July 17, 1962, for the first time in the history of the Soviet submarine fleet, she surfaced near the North Pole. The crew of the ship hoisted the State Flag of the USSR near the Pole in the ice of the Central Arctic. After returning to the base in Yokang, the boat was met at the pier by N. S. Khrushchev and Minister of Defense R. Ya. Malinovsky. The head of the campaign, Rear Admiral A.I. Petelin, the commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank L.M. Zhiltsov, and the commander of the BCH-5 (power plant), Captain 2nd Rank Engineer R.A. Timofeev, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The entire crew of the ship was awarded with orders and medals.
Vladimir Nikolaevich Peregudov, chief designer of the first nuclear submarine of the USSR "K-3". Chief designer of the K-3 submarine
Since the boat was fundamentally new, and besides, it was designed and built in a great hurry, it almost constantly required repairs, completions and alterations, which was hidden under the words "trial operation". In the first years of service and the trip to the Pole, the maintenance of the boat, often in actual emergency, in working condition was provided, among other things, by the forces of a very qualified crew capable of performing complex repairs on their own.
The weak point of the boat was the poorly designed and manufactured steam generators, in which microscopic, hardly recognizable cracks and water leaks in the primary (radioactive) circuit constantly appeared. It also affected a large number of alterations, improvements, new welds. For this reason, crew overexposure was not uncommon, but it was considered a necessary evil for such a revolutionary new ship. To reduce the radiation dose received by the crew in the "dirty" compartments, in the submerged position, periodic air mixing between the compartments was practiced to more evenly distribute the contamination, and, accordingly, the doses over the crew as a whole. Radiation sickness and its consequences among crew members were almost commonplace. Cases are known when an ambulance was waiting for a returning boat at the pier. A number of officers underwent bone marrow transplants, and many crew members subsequently died prematurely. At the same time, due to secrecy, false diagnoses were indicated in the case histories, which broke many careers.
On September 8, 1967, a fire broke out in compartments I and II while on combat duty in the Norwegian Sea, 39 people died. However, the boat returned to base on its own. The probable cause of the accident was the unauthorized replacement of the sealing gasket in the fitting of the hydraulic machine. There was a leak, the leaked hydraulic fluid was not completely collected, its remnants ignited.
In 1991, she was withdrawn from the Northern Fleet. Then, by decision of the Naval Board under the Government of the Russian Federation, chaired by Minister of Transport Igor Levitin, the first Soviet nuclear submarine should be converted into a museum. Design Bureau "Malachite" has developed a project to convert it into a floating museum. At the moment, the submarine has been on the slipway of the Nerpa shipyard for many years, awaiting its fate. According to the latest data, there will be no conversion into a museum. The money will not be found, and I think the issue with the museum will soon be closed, the ship is not eternal, the hull will soon be 55 years old.
Next week I will tell you about a Sevmash veteran who took part in the construction of the K-3 submarine.
In the 50s, a new era began in submarine shipbuilding - the use of atomic energy for the movement of submarines. According to their properties, atomic energy sources are the most suitable for submarines, since, without the need for atmospheric air or oxygen reserves, they make it possible to obtain energy for an almost unlimited time and in the required quantity.
In addition to solving the problem of long-term movement in a submerged position at high speed, the use of an atomic source removed restrictions on the supply of energy to such relatively capacious consumers as instruments and life support systems (air conditioners, electrolyzers, etc.), navigation, hydroacoustics and control weapons. The prospect of using submarines in the Arctic regions under the ice has opened up. With the introduction of nuclear energy, the duration of continuous submerged navigation of boats began to be limited, as many years of experience showed, mainly by the psychophysical capabilities of the crews.
At the same time, from the very beginning of the introduction of nuclear power plants (NPPs), new complex problems that arise in this case became clear: the need to ensure reliable radiation protection of personnel, increased requirements for the professional training of NPP maintenance personnel, the need for a more developed system than for diesel-electric Submarines, infrastructure (basing, repair, delivery and reloading of nuclear fuel, removal of spent nuclear fuel, etc.). Later, with the accumulation of experience, other negative aspects came to light: the increased noise of nuclear submarines (NPS), the severity of the consequences of accidents in nuclear power plants and boats with such installations, the difficulty of decommissioning and dismantling nuclear submarines that have served their time.
The first proposals from atomic scientists and naval sailors on the use of atomic energy for the movement of boats in both the USA and the USSR began to arrive in the late 1940s. The deployment of practical work began with the creation of projects for submarines with nuclear power plants and the construction of ground stands and prototypes of these installations.
The world's first nuclear submarine was built in the USA - "Nautilus" - and entered service in September 1954. In January 1959, after completion of the tests, the first domestic nuclear submarine of project 627 was commissioned by the Soviet Navy. The main characteristics of these nuclear submarines are given in Table. one.
With the commissioning of the first nuclear submarines, almost without interruption, a gradual increase in the pace of their construction began. In parallel, the practical development of the use of atomic energy during the operation of nuclear submarines, the search for the optimal appearance of nuclear power plants and the submarines themselves.
Table 1
*Equal to the sum of the surface displacement and the mass of water in the fully filled tanks of the main ballast.
** For American nuclear submarines (hereinafter) the test depth, which is close in meaning to the limit.
Rice. 6. The first domestic serial nuclear submarine (project 627 A)
circuit of a nuclear reactor. Along with water, which has a high degree of purification, which was used in the reactors of the first nuclear submarines, an attempt was made to use for this purpose a metal or an alloy of metals having a relatively low melting point (sodium, etc.). The advantage of such a coolant was seen by the designers, first of all, in the possibility of reducing the pressure in the primary circuit, raising the temperature of the coolant and, in general, obtaining a gain in reactor dimensions, which is extremely important in the conditions of its use on submarines.
Rice. 7. The first American nuclear submarine "Nautilus"
This idea was implemented on the second after the "Nautilus" American nuclear submarine "Seawolf", built in 1957. It used the S2G reactor with a liquid metal (sodium) coolant. However, in practice, the advantages of a liquid metal coolant turned out to be not as significant as expected, but in terms of reliability and
Rice. 8. The first domestic nuclear submarine "Leninsky Komsomol" (project 627)
the complexity of operation, this type of reactor was significantly inferior to the pressurized water reactor (with pressurized water in the primary circuit).
Already in 1960, due to a number of malfunctions revealed during operation, the reactor with a liquid metal coolant on the Seawolf nuclear submarine was replaced by the S2WA pressurized water reactor, which was an improved modification of the NautiIus nuclear submarine reactor.
In 1963, in the USSR, the nuclear submarine of project 645 was introduced into the fleet, also equipped with a reactor with a liquid metal coolant, in which an alloy of lead and bismuth was used. In the first years after construction, this nuclear submarine was successfully operated. However, it did not show decisive advantages over nuclear submarines with pressurized water reactors being built in parallel. At the same time, the operation of a reactor with a liquid metal coolant, especially its basic maintenance, caused certain difficulties. Serial construction of this type of nuclear submarine was not carried out; it remained in a single copy and was part of the fleet until 1968.
Along with the introduction of nuclear power plants and equipment directly related to them on the submarine, a change occurred in their other elements. The first American nuclear submarine, although it was larger than the submarine, differed little from them in appearance: it had a stem bow and a developed superstructure with an extended flat deck. The hull shape of the first domestic nuclear submarine already had a number of characteristic differences from the DPL. In particular, its fore end was given contours that were well streamlined in the submerged position, having in terms of the outline of a semi-ellipse and close to circular cross sections. The fencing of retractable devices (periscopes, RDP devices, antennas, etc.), as well as the hatch and bridge shafts, were made in the form of a streamlined body like a limousine, hence the name "limousine" form, which later became traditional for fencing in many types of domestic nuclear submarines.
To maximize the use of all the opportunities to improve the performance characteristics due to the use of nuclear power plants, studies were launched to optimize the shape of the hull, architecture and design, controllability when moving underwater at high speeds, control automation in these modes, navigation support and habitability in conditions of prolonged diving without surfacing.
A number of issues were resolved using specially built pilot and experimental non-nuclear and nuclear submarines. In particular, in solving the problems of controllability and propulsion of the nuclear submarine, an important role was played by the experimental Albacore submarine built in the USA in 1953, which had a hull shape close to optimal in terms of minimizing water resistance when moving submerged (the length-to-width ratio was about 7.4). Below are the characteristics of the DPL "Albacore":
Dimensions, m:
length................................................. .............................................62.2
width................................................. ...............................................8.4
Displacement, t:
surface ............................................................ ...................................1500
underwater ................................................. ....................................1850
Power plant:
power of diesel - generators, l. from ........................................1700
electric motor power *, l. s..................about 15000
number of propeller shafts ............................................... .......................one
Full submerged speed, knots .............................................. ..33
Test immersion depth, m .............................................. 185
Crew, people ............................................... ...............................................52
* With silver-zinc battery.
This submarine was re-equipped several times and was used for a long time to test propellers (including coaxial opposite rotation), controls when moving at high speeds, new types of TA and other tasks.
The introduction of nuclear power plants on submarines coincided with the development of a number of fundamentally new types of weapons: cruise missiles (CR) for firing at the coast and for hitting sea targets, later - ballistic missiles (BR), means of early warning radar detection of air targets.
Successes in the development of land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles led to a revision of the role and place of both land and sea weapons systems, which was also reflected in the formation of the type of nuclear submarines. In particular, the KR, intended for firing along the coast, gradually lost their significance. As a result, the United States limited itself to the construction of only one nuclear submarine "Halibut" and two submarines - "Grayback" and "Grow-ler" - with the Regulus cruise missile, and nuclear submarines built in the USSR with cruise missiles to destroy coastal targets were subsequently converted into nuclear submarines only with a torpedo weapons.
In a single copy, the nuclear submarine of the Triton radar patrol, built in the United States in these years, was designed for early detection of air targets using especially powerful radar stations. This submarine is also notable for the fact that of all American nuclear submarines, it was the only one that had two reactors (all other US nuclear submarines are single-reactor).
The world's first launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine was made in the USSR in September 1955. The R-11FM missile was launched from a converted submarine from the surface. With the same submarine, five years later, the first in the USSR launch of a ballistic missile from a submerged position was made.
Since the end of the 50s, the process of introducing BR on submarines began. First, a small-rocket nuclear submarine was created (the dimensions of the first domestic liquid-fueled naval ballistic missiles did not allow the creation of a multi-missile nuclear submarine at once). The first domestic nuclear submarine with three surface-launched ballistic missiles was commissioned in 1960 (by this time, several domestic submarines with ballistic missiles had been built).
In the United States, based on the successes achieved in the field of naval ballistic missiles, they immediately went to the creation of a multi-missile nuclear submarine with the launch of missiles from a submerged position. This was facilitated by the program successfully implemented in those years to create BR on solid fuel "Polaris". Moreover, to reduce the construction period of the first missile carrier, the hull of a serial nuclear submarine that was under construction at that time was used.
Rice. 9. Nuclear submarine missile carrier of the type "George Washington"
with torpedo armament of the "Skipjack" type. This missile carrier, named "George Washington", entered service in December 1959. The first domestic multi-missile nuclear submarine (Project 667A) with 16 submerged ballistic missiles entered service in 1967. In the UK, the first nuclear-powered missile carrier, created under a wide using American experience, was put into operation in 1968, in France - in 1974. The characteristics of the first nuclear submarines with BR are given in Table. 2
In the years that have followed since the creation of the first submarines, this new type of naval weapons has been continuously improved: increasing the flight range of naval ballistic missiles to intercontinental, increasing the rate of firing of missiles up to salvo, adopting missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs), which have in their consisting of several warheads, each of which can be aimed at its own target, an increase in the ammunition load of missiles on some types of missile carriers up to 20-24.
table 2
The fusion of nuclear power and intercontinental ballistic missiles gave submarines, in addition to their original advantage (stealth), a fundamentally new quality - the ability to hit targets deep in enemy territory. This has turned nuclear submarines into the most important component of strategic weapons, occupying almost the main place in the strategic triad due to its mobility and high survivability.
At the end of the 1960s, nuclear submarines of a fundamentally new type were created in the USSR - multi-missile submarines - carriers of CR with an underwater launch. The appearance and subsequent development of these nuclear submarines, which had no analogues in foreign navies, was a real counterbalance to the most powerful surface warships - strike aircraft carriers, including those with nuclear power plants.
Rice. 10. Nuclear submarine missile carrier (Project 667A)
At the turn of the 60s, in addition to missileization, another important direction in the development of nuclear submarines arose - increasing their stealth from detection, primarily by other submarines, and improving the means of illuminating the underwater situation to get ahead of the enemy in detection.
Due to the peculiarities of the environment in which submarines operate, the noise suppression of submarines and the range of sonar equipment installed on them act as determining factors in the problem of stealth and detection. It was the improvement of these qualities that most strongly influenced the formation of the technical appearance that modern nuclear submarines have acquired.
In the interests of solving emerging specified areas tasks in many countries, unprecedented programs of research and development work were launched, including the development of new low-noise mechanisms and propulsion systems, the testing of serial nuclear submarines under special programs, the re-equipment of built nuclear submarines with the introduction of new technical solutions, and finally, the creation of nuclear submarines with power installations of a fundamentally new type. The latter include, in particular, the American nuclear submarine Tillibee, commissioned in 1960. This nuclear submarine was distinguished by a set of measures aimed at reducing noise and increasing the efficiency of sonar weapons. Instead of the main steam turbine with a gearbox, used as an engine in nuclear submarines being mass-produced at that time, a full electric propulsion scheme was implemented on Tullibee - a special propeller motor and turbogenerators of the appropriate power were installed. In addition, for the first time for a nuclear submarine, a sonar complex with an oversized spherical bow antenna was used, and in connection with this, a new layout for placing torpedo tubes: closer to the middle of the submarine's length and at an angle of 10-12 ° to its diametrical plane.
When designing the Tillibee, it was planned that it would become the lead in a series of nuclear submarines of a new type, specially designed for anti-submarine operations. However, these intentions were not realized, although many of the technical means and solutions used and tested on it (hydroacoustic complex, layout of torpedo tubes, etc.) were immediately extended to the serial Thresher-type nuclear submarines under construction in the 60s.
Following the Tillibee, two more experimental nuclear submarines were built to develop new technical solutions to increase acoustic stealth: in 1967, the Jack nuclear submarine with a gearless (direct-acting) turbine plant and coaxial propellers of the opposite direction of rotation (similar to those used on torpedoes) and in 1969 the nuclear submarine "Narwhal", equipped with nuclear reactor of a new type with an increased level of natural circulation of the primary coolant. This reactor, as expected, will be characterized by a reduced level of noise emissions due to a decrease in the power of the primary circuit circulation pumps. The first of these solutions was not developed, and as for the new type of reactor, the results obtained were used in the development of reactors for serial nuclear submarines of subsequent years of construction.
In the 70s, American specialists again returned to the idea of using a full electric propulsion scheme on nuclear submarines. In 1974, the construction of the nuclear submarine "Glenard P. Lipscomb" was completed with a turboelectric power plant as part of turbogenerators and electric motors. However, this nuclear submarine was not accepted for mass production either. Characteristics of the nuclear submarine "Tillibee" and "Glenard P. Lipscomb" are given in table. 3.
The refusal to “replicate” nuclear submarines with full electric propulsion suggests that the gain in noise reduction, if it took place on nuclear submarines of this type, did not compensate for the deterioration of other characteristics associated with the introduction of electric propulsion, primarily due to the impossibility of creating electric motors of the required power and acceptable dimensions and, as a result, a decrease in the speed of a full underwater course in comparison with nuclear submarines with turboreducer installations that are close in terms of the time of creation.
Table 3
In any case, the testing of the Glenard P. Lipscomb nuclear submarine was still ongoing, and the assembly of the Los Angeles nuclear submarine with a conventional steam turbine plant, the lead nuclear submarine in one of the largest series of boats in the history of American shipbuilding, has already begun on the slipway. The design of this nuclear submarine was created as an alternative to the Glenard Lipscomb and turned out to be more successful, as a result of which it was accepted for serial construction.
The world practice of submarine shipbuilding knows so far only one exception, when the full electric propulsion scheme was implemented not on one experimental, but on several serial nuclear submarines. These are six French nuclear submarines of the Rubis and Amethyste types, commissioned in 1983-1993.
The problem of acoustic secrecy of nuclear submarines did not simultaneously become dominant in all countries. Another important direction in the improvement of nuclear submarines in the 60s was considered to be the achievement of the highest possible underwater speed. Since the possibilities of reducing the resistance of water to movement by optimizing the shape of the hull had been largely exhausted by that time, and other fundamentally new solutions to this problem did not give real practical results, there was only one way to increase the speed of the submarine's underwater movement - increasing their power-to-weight ratio (measured by the ratio power used to move the unit to displacement). Initially, this problem was solved directly, i.e. through the creation and use of nuclear power plants with significantly increased power. Later, already in the 70s, the designers took the path of a simultaneous, but not so significant, increase in the power of nuclear power plants and a decrease in the displacement of nuclear submarines, in particular, due to a sharp increase in the level of automation of control and, in connection with this, a reduction in the number of crew.
The practical implementation of these directions led to the creation in the USSR of several nuclear submarines with a speed of over 40 knots, i.e., significantly higher than that of the bulk of the nuclear submarines being simultaneously built both in the USSR and in the West. The record for the speed of a full underwater run - almost 45 knots - was achieved in 1969 during tests of a domestic nuclear submarine with a KR project 661.
One more feature development of nuclear submarines is a more or less monotonous increase in the depth of immersion in time. For the years that have elapsed since the commissioning of the first nuclear submarines, the depth of immersion, as can be seen from the data below for serial nuclear submarines recent years buildings has more than doubled. Of the combat nuclear submarines, the domestic experimental nuclear submarine Komsomolets built in the mid-80s had the greatest diving depth (about 1000 m). As is known, the nuclear submarine was destroyed by fire in April 1989, but the experience gained in its design, construction and operation is invaluable.
By the mid-70s, subclasses of nuclear submarines gradually emerged and stabilized for some time, differing in the purpose and composition of the main strike weapon:
- multi-purpose submarines with torpedo weapons, anti-submarine missiles, and later cruise missiles fired from torpedo tubes and special launchers, designed for anti-submarine operations, destruction of surface targets, as well as for solving other tasks traditional for submarines (mine laying, reconnaissance, etc.). );
- strategic missile submarines armed with ballistic missiles to destroy targets on enemy territory;
- submarines carrying cruise missiles, designed mainly to destroy surface ships and transports.
The abbreviated designation of the submarines of these subclasses: nuclear submarines, SSBNs, SSBNs (respectively, English abbreviations: SSN, SSBN, SSGN).
This classification, like any other, is conditional. For example, with the installation of silos for launching cruise missiles on multipurpose nuclear submarines, the differences between nuclear submarines and specialized SSGNs are largely erased, and the use of cruise missiles with nuclear submarines designed to fire at coastal facilities and carrying nuclear charges, transfers such submarines to the category of strategic ones. The navies and navies of different countries, as a rule, use their own classification of ships, including nuclear submarines.
The construction of combat submarines is carried out, as a rule, in series of several (sometimes several dozen) submarines in each on the basis of one basic project, in which relatively insignificant changes are made as experience in the construction and operation of submarines is gained. For example, in Table. 4 shows data on the serial construction of nuclear submarines in the United States. The series, as is usually accepted, are named accordingly as the lead
Table 4
* Built in three sub-series. A larger series of nuclear submarines of 77 units was implemented only during the construction of domestic missile carriers, which, although they differ in TTX, are based on one project 667A.
** The construction of the series is not finished. Submarine, time intervals are indicated by the timing of the laying of the head and commissioning of the last in the series of submarines.
The level of ALL development achieved by the mid-1990s is characterized by the following table. 5 data for three American nuclear submarines of the last years of construction.
Table 5
* Improved modification, lead nuclear submarine of the third sub-series.
** According to other sources - 2x30000 hp
In relation to the nuclear submarine (sometimes to the DPL), a rather conditional, but widespread concept of “generation” is used. The signs by which nuclear submarines are attributed to one or another generation are: proximity in time of creation, commonality of the technical solutions incorporated in the projects, uniformity of power plants and other equipment for general ship purposes, the same hull material, etc. be attributed to nuclear submarines for various purposes and even several successive series. The transition from one series of submarines to another, and even more so - the transition from generation to generation, is preceded by comprehensive studies in order to reasonably select the optimal combinations of the main performance characteristics of new nuclear submarines.
Rice. 11. The newest Russian multi-purpose nuclear submarine of the Bars type (project 971)
The relevance of this kind of research has especially increased with the advent of the possibility (due to the development of technology) of creating nuclear submarines that differ significantly in speed, depth of immersion, stealth indicators, displacement, armament, etc. The implementation of these studies sometimes continues for several years and includes the development and military-economic assessment for a wide range of alternative nuclear submarine options - from an improved modification of a mass-produced nuclear submarine to a variant that is a synthesis of fundamentally new technical solutions in the field of architecture, energy, weapons, hull materials, etc.
As a rule, these studies are not limited only to the design of nuclear submarine options, but also include entire programs of research and development work in hydrodynamics, strength, hydroacoustics and other areas, and in some cases discussed above, also the creation of special experimental nuclear submarines.
In countries that build nuclear submarines most intensively, three to four generations of these ships were created. For example, in the USA, among multi-purpose nuclear submarines, Skate and Skipjack nuclear submarines are usually referred to generation I, Thresher and Sturgeon to II, and Los Angeles to III. The Seawolf nuclear submarine is considered as a representative of the new, IV generation of US Navy nuclear submarines. Of the missile carriers, the George Washington and Ethan Allen boats belong to the I generation, the Lafayette and Benjamin Franklin to the II, and the Ohio to the III.
Rice. 12. Modern Russian nuclear submarine missile carrier of the "Shark" type (project 941)
In total, by the end of the 90s, about 500 nuclear submarines were built in the world (including those disabled due to obsolescence and those who died). The number of nuclear submarines by years in the Navy and the Navy of different countries is given in Table. 6.
Table 6
Note. Above the line - nuclear submarines, below the line - SSBNs.
According to the forecast, the total number of nuclear submarines that will be in service in 2000 will be (excluding Russian Navy nuclear submarines) about 130, of which about 30 are SSBNs.
The secrecy of nuclear submarines and almost complete independence from weather conditions makes them an effective tool for conducting various kinds of special reconnaissance and sabotage operations. Usually submarines are used for these purposes after the end of their service for their intended purpose. For example, the previously mentioned US Navy nuclear submarine Halibut, which was built as a carrier of Regulus cruise missiles, was converted in the mid-60s to search (using special devices carried by it) for objects lying on the ground, including sunken submarines. . Later, to replace it for similar operations, the US Navy's Parche torpedo submarine (of the Sturgeon type) was re-equipped, into the hull of which a section about 30 m long was embedded and a special underwater vehicle was received on the deck. The nuclear submarine was infamous for participating in a spy operation in the Sea of Okhotsk in the 80s. By installing a special device on the submarine cable, she, according to data published in the United States, ensured that the conversations between the Soviet naval base in Kamchatka and the mainland were monitored.
Rice. 13. The newest American nuclear submarine "Seawolf"
Several US Navy missile carriers of the Lafayete type, after being withdrawn from the strategic forces, were converted into amphibious assault submarines for covert delivery of several dozen marines. For this, durable containers with the necessary equipment are installed on the deck. This ensures the life extension of nuclear submarines, which, for various reasons, are no longer used for their original purpose.
For more than forty years of the existence of nuclear submarines, due to accidents (fires, explosions, depressurization of outboard water lines, etc.), two nuclear submarines of the US Navy and four nuclear submarines of the USSR Navy sank, of which one sank twice in places with relatively shallow depths and was raised both times emergency services. The rest of the sunken nuclear submarines are seriously damaged or almost completely destroyed and lie at depths of one and a half kilometers or more.
There was one case of combat use of nuclear submarines against a surface ship: the nuclear submarine "Conqueror" of the British Navy during the conflict over the Falkland Islands in May 1982 attacked and sank the cruiser "G. Belgrano" belonging to Argentina with torpedoes. Since 1991, US Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines have carried out several strikes with Tomahawk cruise missiles against targets in Iraq. In 1999, these missiles attacked the territory of Yugoslavia from the British nuclear submarine Splendid.
(4) Previously, a set of GAS for various purposes was used on nuclear submarines.
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