Smolensk battle. Tanks T-26 on the offensive. August 1941
On July 10, Army Group Center (Field Marshal F. Bock) launched an offensive against the Western Front (Marshal S.K. Timoshenko). The Germans had a twofold superiority in manpower and fourfold in tanks. Using tank pincers, the German command achieved a new major success.
By July 16, the 2nd Panzer Group of the Germans (General X. Guderian), having advanced 100-150 km, broke into Smolensk from the south. At the same time, the 3rd Panzer Group (General G. Goth) advanced east to Yartsev and, turning south, connected to the west of Smolensk with the advanced units of the 2nd Panzer Group. As a result, north of the city, the 16th (General M.F. Lukin) and 20th (General P.A. Kurochkin) armies were surrounded. In the "bag" was, according to German data, 180 thousand people. However, the encircled troops did not lay down their arms and fought for another ten days, including in Smolensk itself.
Smolensk battle. Headquarters of the 16th Army in the Yartsevo area
To strengthen the Smolensk direction at the end of July, the Central (General F.I. Kuznetsov) and Reserve (General G.K. Zhukov) fronts were formed. In order to liberate the encircled troops, the Soviet command undertook from July 21 to August 7 a series of strong counterattacks from the Bely, Yartsev and Roslavl regions in converging directions to Smolensk. On the southbound On the Western Front, in the region of Gomel and Bobruisk, successful offensive operations were conducted by the 21st Army (General V.I. Kuznetsov), which fettered the forces of three German corps.
The Germans, at the cost of enormous efforts, held the front and prevented the Soviet troops from breaking through to Smolensk. And yet, some units managed to break out of the encirclement. Having suffered heavy losses in these battles (250 thousand people), the Germans were unable to continue the offensive. By the end of July, Army Group Center lost up to 20% of infantry personnel and up to 50% of tank equipment. On July 30, for the first time since the beginning of the war against the USSR, German troops received an order to go on the defensive in the Smolensk direction. The final liquidation of the encircled troops near Smolensk was completed on August 5.
During this period, for the first time, serious disagreements arose in the top leadership of Germany. The command of the ground forces was in favor of continuing the offensive against the capital of the USSR. However, Hitler, who did not achieve a quick breakthrough to Moscow through Smolensk, decided to stop the offensive in the central direction and turn part of the forces of Army Group Center to the Left-Bank Ukraine (see Kyiv operation II). According to the new Nazi plan, part of the forces of Army Group Center (2nd Army and 2nd Panzer Group), operating in the Moscow direction, were to turn south in order to encircle troops in Left-Bank Ukraine Southwestern Front.
In August the main fighting moved south of Smolensk, where the Central and Bryansk (General A.I. Eremenko) fronts held back the onslaught of the Germans on Ukraine. But they could not hold back the tank formations of General Guderian. Having broken through the positions of the Bryansk Front, German tanks rushed into the open spaces Left-bank Ukraine. Near Smolensk, the battles went on with varying success. In early September Soviet troops inflicted a counterattack on the Germans near Yelnya - this is one of the first successful offensive operations of the Red Army (see Yelnya). But the Soviet troops did not succeed in exploiting their success and hitting the rear of the German units, rushing from the north to Ukraine. On September 10, the Red Army went on the defensive in the Smolensk direction.
The battle for Smolensk contrasted sharply with the June catastrophe of the Red Army in Belorussia.
Soviet soldiers are considering the trophies of the battle of Yelnin.
If in the first two weeks of the war Army Group Center advanced 500-600 km, then in the next two months - only 150-200 km. This once again demonstrated that the Germans failed to encircle and destroy the main forces of the Red Army west of the Dnieper in accordance with the Barbarossa plan. The plans of the German command have changed. He had to abandon the rapid capture of Moscow and look for new solutions.
“It became quite obvious that the method of conducting combat operations and the morale of the enemy, as well as the geographical conditions of this country, were completely different from those that the Germans had met in previous “lightning wars”, which led to successes that amazed the whole peace,” wrote General F. Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Germany. According to a number of non-German military leaders, the delay near Smolensk had a negative impact on the entire further course of the German struggle against the USSR. The losses of the Red Army in the battle of Smolensk amounted to about 760 thousand people. (of which more than a third are prisoners). 1348 tanks, 9290 guns and mortars, 903 aircraft.
On July 10, the tank group of Hitler's general H.-V. Guderian crossed the Dnieper in the Mogilev region and rushed to Smolensk. Heavy fighting continued near Orsha. Here, on July 14, the battery of Captain I.A. Flerova for the first time introduced rocket launchers BM-13 ("Katyusha") into battle.
On the evening of July 15, German strike groups, advancing 200 km, broke into Smolensk, and on July 18 captured Yelnya.
July 30 Army Group Center went on the defensive. This was largely due to Hitler's decision to strengthen his troops in the Leningrad and Kiev directions, but one way or another, the German army was forced to defend for the first time since the beginning of World War II. By this time, the German troops had suffered heavy losses and felt a shortage of forces. Wehrmacht strategy in the war against Soviet Union turned out to be untenable.
In the second half of August, the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts fought heavy battles near Yelnya. On September 5, Yelnya was liberated, and on September 8, the Yelninsky ledge was liquidated, which could be used by the Germans as a springboard for an attack on Moscow. Thus ended the two-month battle of Smolensk.
Order No. 270 "On cases of cowardice and surrender and measures to prevent such actions.""Not one step back!")
The top leadership of the country, headed by Stalin, sought to shift the responsibility for failures at the front onto the soldiers and commanders, accusing them of cowardice. On August 16, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army adopted Order No. 270, which went down in history as one of the most inhumane documents.
Battles in Ukraine
In mid-July, when the German tank wedges had already reached Smolensk, the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front continued to hold out in the Pripyat marshes, threatening the communications of the enemy groups "South" and "Center". Fierce fighting went east of Zhytomyr - the Germans rushed to the capital of Ukraine. Fighting continued on the territory of southern Ukraine and Moldova.
Taking advantage of the 60-kilometer gap formed between the 5th Army and the units covering Kyiv, the German troops On July 11, they reached the near approaches to Kyiv but they couldn't take it. Stubborn protracted battles unfolded near Kyiv.
In August, Army Group South, pushing back the Soviet Southern Front, reached the Dnieper in its lower reaches - from Kremenchug to Kherson. Remained in the German rear Odessa . Her defense began on August 5 and lasted 73 days (August 5 - October 16, 1941) . The city was defended by Black Sea sailors and the Primorsky army, replenished by the inhabitants of the city. Over 100 thousand inhabitants of Odessa participated in the construction of defensive lines around the city. The assault on Odessa undertaken by the Nazis on August 20 ended in failure. For more than a month, the city's defenders repulsed the attacks of superior enemy forces, and at the end of September, having received reinforcements by sea, they even launched successful counterattacks. In the first half of October, the troops defending Odessa were evacuated to the Crimea. On October 16, German-Romanian troops entered Odessa.
The exit of German troops to the Dnieper south of Kyiv sharply complicated the situation in the entire southwestern direction. There was a danger of an enemy strike from the south and north to the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front holding the Kyiv bridgehead. Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov reported to Stalin that the Southwestern Front must be withdrawn beyond the Dnieper. However, Stalin categorically refused to surrender Kyiv, guided by not so much military as political considerations. Zhukov was removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff and replaced by Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.
Defense of Kyiv July 7 - September 26, 1941. The worst assumptions came true: Guderin's tank group moved from the north to the rear of the Southwestern Front. Now the front commander, General Kirponos, asked for permission to withdraw troops to the line of the river. Psel, but was refused by Stalin and Shaposhnikov. The Bryansk Front, thrown against the Guderian group, failed to stop it. The Germans hit under the base of the ledge, creating a significant superiority in forces in the shock areas. The new Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction S.K. Timoshenko (he replaced S.M. Budyonny, who was removed for supporting the withdrawal proposal) decided to give Kirponos the sanction to leave Kyiv, and even then verbally, only on September 16, when the Southwestern Front was already surrounded. Kirponos, afraid to follow the oral directive, requested a written confirmation. It took about a day to get it. Time was finally lost: the Germans sealed the encirclement. September 20 Kyiv fell. With a breakthrough from the boiler, the front command lost contact with the troops. General Kirponos and his staff were killed in action. Parts of the front, breaking into small groups, broke through the encirclement at their own peril and risk. The Red Army lost about 660 thousand people only as prisoners in the Kiev "cauldron". The blame for this second largest failure after the June defeat of the Western Front lies entirely with Stalin, who did not take into account the real situation at the front and the professional opinion of the military.
By the end of September 1941 The front line ran between Smolensk and Yelnya, west of Bryansk, east of Poltava and reached the shores of the Sea of Azov. The Germans captured the entire Baltic, Belarus, most of Ukraine, occupied the Pskov, Leningrad, part of the Novgorod, Kalinin, Smolensk, Bryansk regions of the RSFSR. They destroyed or captured almost the entire regular army that met them near the border. But they were infinitely far from the task set in the Barbarossa plan: in three months to inflict a final defeat on the Red Army and reach the Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Blitzkrieg failed. It is unlikely, however, that even the most far-sighted Hitlerite generals realized that even then Germany had lost the war.
Reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the first months of the war:
1) insufficient intelligence data, overestimation of one's own forces, underestimation of the enemy's forces, which ultimately led to a general underestimation of the situation, and decision about the general offensive was unreasonable;
2) military doctrine, which provided for military operations of an offensive nature only on foreign territory;
3) repressions in the army on the eve of the war among the command staff; lack of flexibility in management
4) dismantling of old and lack of new fortifications on the border (the border of the USSR was moved in 1940 in connection with the entry of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia into the USSR)
5) the allocated forces and means were not enough, there was not enough time for the preparation of offensive operations, there was a delay in bringing the troops to combat readiness;
Further developments on the Soviet-German front called into question the implementation of the German plan "Barbarossa". For the first time since 1939, the Wehrmacht command was forced to stop the offensive of the main strike force aimed at Moscow and go on the defensive for two whole months. The reason for this was the active actions of the Soviet troops in the Smolensk region, which were included in national history called the Battle of Smolensk in 1941.
On July 8, at headquarters near Rastenburg ("Wolf's Lair"), Hitler held a meeting to clarify plans for waging war in the East. Given the heavy losses of Soviet troops in Belarus and assuming their inability to provide serious resistance to the advancing Army Group Center (Field Marshal F. Bock), it was decided to consolidate the success of the Wehrmacht on the northern and southern wings of the front. After the encirclement and destruction of Soviet troops in the Smolensk region, which the German leadership had no doubts about, Army Group Center was to continue the offensive against Moscow with the forces of only infantry formations. The 3rd Panzer Group (General G. Goth) was to reinforce the North Army Group for the speedy capture of Leningrad, and the 2nd Panzer Group (General G. Guderian) and the 2nd Field Army (General M. Weichs) would be transferred to the composition of the Army Group "South", where they ensured the offensive with the last blow to the rear of the Kyiv grouping of Soviet troops. The enemy's calculation for an easy victory near Smolensk was based on the assumption that the command of the Western Front had only 11 divisions.
But at this time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sought to stop the advance of the enemy at any cost and provide conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to the counteroffensive. The Western Front was given the task of preventing the enemy from breaking through to Moscow. To this end, a defensive line began to be created in the Smolensk region based on natural barriers (the Desna and Dnieper rivers), the Polotsk fortified region and the defensive structures of the cities of Vitebsk and Orsha. However, it was not possible to fully complete the work on the defensive line. Moscow was also misinformed about the strength of the advancing enemy. It was assumed that a German grouping of 35 divisions was operating against the Western Front (in reality there were 66). It was on these data that the initial calculation of the General Staff of the Red Army was based on the possibility of stopping the enemy at the created line and preparing the conditions for going on the counteroffensive.
By the beginning of the Smolensk battle, the troops of the Western Front (Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, July 19-29, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko) were in an exceptionally difficult situation. The weakened and scattered divisions that withdrew from the border regions needed to be reinforced. The formations and units that arrived from the depths of the country were not yet fully concentrated and deployed on the defense lines. Of the seven armies that were part of the Western Front, Tymoshenko nominated five (13, 19, 20, 21st and 22nd armies) to the first echelon, the 4th army and the 16th army, which arrived from Ukraine, to the second echelon. At the turn from Idritsa to the area south of Zhlobin, by the beginning of the battle, only 37 of the divisions advancing here managed to take up positions. Behind the troops of the Western Front (100 km east of Smolensk), the Headquarters decided to deploy a second strategic echelon at the base of the front troops of the reserve armies (six combined arms), which significantly increased the stability of the defense in the western direction.
By July 10, mobile formations of the German 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups (until July 28 they were part of the 4th Panzer Army) of the Center Army Group reached the Dnieper and the Western Dvina. By this time, the ratio of forces directly involved in the battle was in favor of the enemy: in people - 1.5, artillery - 1.7, aircraft - 3.9, tanks - 7 times.
By the nature of the hostilities and the content of the tasks performed, the Battle of Smolensk is divided into four stages: July 10-20; July 21 - August 7; August 8-21; August 22 - September 10.
On July 10, the 3rd and 2nd tank groups of the enemy launched an offensive in the Smolensk direction. The main forces of the 3rd Panzer Group moved from the Vitebsk region around Smolensk from the north to Yartsevo, the rest - from the bridgehead east of Polotsk to Nevel. The 2nd tank group struck: one from the area south of Orsha on Smolensk and Yelnya, the other - south of Mogilev on Krichev, Roslavl. The most vulnerable point in the defense of the Western Front was the junction of the 20th (Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin, from August 8, Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin) and the 22nd (Lieutenant General F.A. Ershakov, from August General Major V.A. Yushkevich) of the armies. The 19th Army, which was advancing here (Lieutenant General I.S. Konev), had not yet had time to concentrate and deploy its formations. She could not hold back the massive tank attack of the enemy and retreated to Smolensk. An attempt to launch a counterattack by the forces of the 22nd Army on the flank of the enemy that had broken through failed, since the army was cut into two parts. The defenders of the Polotsk fortified region put up stubborn resistance to the enemy. The units of the 17th Infantry Division (Colonel A.I. Zygin) defending it until July 16 held back the enemy offensive. These days, General Goth was forced to admit that the German troops were suffering heavy losses, and the morale of the personnel was crushed by the stamina of the Soviet troops, their unexpected actions and fierce struggle.
Bypassing the fortified area, enemy tank formations rushed forward. On July 16 they occupied Nevel, on July 19 - Velikiye Luki. On the Vitebsk direction, units of the 3rd Panzer Group captured Vitebsk on July 13, and Demidov on July 13. By the end of July 20, they reached the river. Vop and created a bridgehead on its left bank north of Yartsev. The enemy's 47th mechanized corps advancing south of Smolensk on July 16 captured Orsha and the right-bank part of Smolensk. The 16th (Lieutenant General M.F. Lukin, since August 10, Major General K.K. Rokossovsky), the 19th and 20th armies were surrounded from three sides in the Smolensk region. To retreat to the east, they had one crossing across the Dnieper near the village of Solovyovo (15 km south of Yartsevo). To protect it from the remnants of the tank and motorized regiments of the 5th mechanized corps, a combined detachment (Colonel A. I. Lizyukov) was created, which defended the crossing for almost two weeks. In Europe, the Germans captured entire states in such a time, but here they could not do anything with a handful of Soviet soldiers. For this feat, many soldiers of the combined detachment were awarded orders and medals, and their commander was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
A difficult situation developed in the Mogilev direction, where the 13th Army was defending (Lieutenant General F.N. Remezov, from July 14, Lieutenant General V.F. Gerasimenko, from July 26, Major General K.D. Golubev, from August 25 Major General A.M. Gorodnyansky). Guderian's 2nd tank ipynna crossed the Dnieper on its flanks. Fierce fighting did not stop day or night. At the position of the 388th Infantry Regiment of the 172nd Infantry Division, the enemy threw large forces, but could not break through the defense on the move. In just one day, the regiment under the command of Colonel S.F. Kutepova destroyed 39 German tanks and 3 aircraft. Bloody battles unfolded in other sectors of the 172nd division. Up to ten attacks were repulsed daily by units of the 647th Infantry Regiment of Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Shcheglova. But the forces were unequal. On July 17, the enemy captured Krichev, went to the rear of the 13th Army. The troops of the 13th and 4th (Major General A.A. Korobkov, since July, Colonel L.M. Sandalov) armies had to fight heavy battles in three isolated areas. But even under these conditions, they managed to inflict significant damage on the enemy, stopping him on the river. Sozh, where in the section from Mstislavl to Krichev, the defense stabilized until August 1, and from Krichev to Novy Bykhov - until August 8.
On the left wing of the Western Front, the formations of the 21st Army (Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, from July 26, Lieutenant General M.G. Efremov, from August 7, Major General V.N. Gordov, from August 25, Lieutenant General V .I. Kuznetsov) went on the offensive on July 13 in the Bobruisk direction. The troops of the 63rd Rifle Corps (corps commander L.G. Petrovsky) crossed the Dnieper and liberated the cities of Rogachev and Zhlobin. In three days, the corps advanced 12 km west of the Dnieper. On July 16, all the forces of the German 53rd Army Corps turned against him and stopped the advance of Soviet formations. 232nd Rifle Division (Major General SI. Nedvichin) of the 66th Rifle Corps, General F.D. Rubtsova advanced almost 80 km with battles and captured the crossings across the Berezina and Ptich rivers. To repel the attack of the 21st Army, which posed a threat to the deep rear of the Guderian tank group, Field Marshal Bock had to involve about 15 divisions, and eight of them suffered heavy losses, which limited the ability to build up efforts in the Smolensk direction. Meanwhile, the German command, confident in its success, clarified plans for the further conduct of the war in the east. In directive No. 33 signed by Hitler on July 19, Army Group Center was ordered to attack Moscow after the destruction of the encircled Soviet troops in the Smolensk region. The enemy was forced to admit that Field Marshal Bock would need a lot of time to solve the first task, so Army Group Center would not play a decisive role in the upcoming offensive. The attack on Moscow was to be carried out by infantry formations and part of the tank troops, who did not take part in the offensive to the southeast, beyond the line of the Dnieper. From now on, the main efforts of the Wehrmacht were transferred to the south-western direction to defeat the Soviet troops in Ukraine.
At the same time, the Soviet command focused all its attention on the Moscow direction. The headquarters was intensively transferring reserves here. In the rear of the Western Front, the reserve army front (Lieutenant General I.A. Bogdanov) created defenses. The divisions of the border and internal troops were included in the new front. On July 18, the Headquarters began to create a third strategic echelon in the western direction. On the distant approaches to Moscow, the front of the Mozhaisk line of defense (Colonel-General P.A. Artemyev) was formed as part of three combined arms armies. At the same time, three defensive lines were equipped to a depth of up to 300 km.
On July 20, the Chief of the General Staff issued a directive to conduct an operation to encircle and defeat the enemy in the Smolensk region. For this purpose, five army operational groups were created out of 20 divisions of the front of the reserve armies, which then became part of the Western Front. They were to deliver simultaneous strikes from the northeast, east and south in the general direction of Smolensk. After the defeat of the enemy that had broken through, they were to link up with the main forces of the 16th and 20th armies. Three aviation groups were allocated to support strike groups from the air, and a cavalry group (three divisions) was created to assist the troops advancing from the front with the task of raiding the rear of Mogilev of the enemy's Kosmolensk grouping. The overall leadership of the offensive was entrusted to the commander of the Western Front.
On July 23, army task forces launched an offensive. The enemy had to repulse attacks on a wide front, and in a number of sectors go over to the defensive. The active actions of the group of General Rokossovsky contributed to the exit from the encirclement of the troops of the 16th and 20th armies. When the deep rear of the Goth tank group and the 2nd Army was threatened, Field Marshal Bock, not having the strength to eliminate the breakthrough, turned to Field Marshal V. Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, for help. However, the troops of the Western Front could not defeat the enemy in the Smolensk region. They failed to go on the counteroffensive, and their scattered attacks on a wide front proved to be ineffective. But even these strikes deprived the troops of Army Group Center of maneuver towards the flanks - to Ukraine and Leningrad, which facilitated the position of Soviet troops in the southwestern and northwestern directions.
Meanwhile, fierce fighting continued in the Mogilev area. The encircled troops held the city until July 26, pinning down the forces of four enemy divisions. By July 26, having used up all the ammunition, the defenders of the city began to leave the encirclement, blowing up the last bridge across the Dnieper in this area. The 21st Army, operating in the interfluve of the Dnieper and Berezina, pinned down 15 divisions of the 2nd German Army, disrupting their attack on the city. For the convenience of command and control, on July 25, the Stavka formed the Central Front (Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov, from August, Lieutenant-General M.G. Efremov) as part of three armies. The task of this front was to firmly cover the junction of the Western and Southwestern Fronts and to promote the success of the Western Front by active operations to the northwest (in the direction of Gomel, Bobruisk).
The fierce resistance of the Soviet troops near Smolensk weakened the offensive power of Army Group Center, it was pinned down in all sectors of the front. The staffing of German divisions at the end of July, despite the replenishment received, decreased: infantry - up to 80 percent, motorized and tank - up to 50 percent. For three and a half weeks, German aviation lost 169 aircraft in air battles. During the battle, the miscalculation of the political and military leadership of Germany in assessing the ability of the Soviet troops to resist was clearly manifested. The main goal of the campaign - to destroy the Russian armies - was not achieved. The German command was not able to conduct an offensive simultaneously in all three main directions. This forced Hitler to sign Directive No. 34 on July 30, where Army Group Center was instructed to go on the defensive. The strategy of "blitzkrieg" crumbled right before our eyes. By order of the Fuhrer, the main efforts of the Wehrmacht, due to unfavorable circumstances in the central sector of the front, were transferred to the flanks. In August, first of all, it was planned to continue the offensive with the aim of destroying the Soviet troops in Ukraine, as well as blocking Leningrad together with the Finnish troops.
Not knowing the true intentions of Berlin, Stalin still believed that the enemy was going to use the main forces to capture Moscow. The Soviet command expected that after the failed frontal attack, the German troops would try to outflank the main forces of the Western Front. Therefore, the troops were ordered to firmly hold the Velikoluksky and Gomel ledges, maintaining an enveloping position in relation to the Army Group Center, while continuing to strike at its main forces in the Smolensk direction, in the areas of Dukhovshina and Yelnya. Strengthening the defense in the Moscow direction. On July 30, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command united the reserve armies on the Rzhev-Vyazma defensive line, creating the Reserve Front (General of the Army G.K. Zhukov).
In August, the enemy sent 25 divisions of Army Group Center to the Central Front, including 6 tank and motorized divisions. They delivered a blow in order to reach the rear of the Southwestern Front, which stopped the offensive of Army Group South at the turn of the Dnieper. On August 8, with the support of large aviation forces, Guderian's formations went on the offensive. and on August 12 they were supported by the 2nd Army of General Weichs.
The troops of General Efremov could not hold back such a powerful tank attack and, under the threat of envelopment by superior enemy forces, began to retreat in the south and southeast. The Headquarters unraveled the intentions of the Germans and, in order to prevent the encirclement of the Central Front and the enemy from reaching the rear of the troops that defended Kyiv, deployed the Bryansk Front between the Central and Reserve Fronts, led by Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko. But this measure did not change the situation. By August 21, German troops advanced to a depth of 140 km, reached the line of Gomel, Starodub and deeply wedged between the Bryansk and Central fronts, creating a threat to the flank and rear of the Southwestern Front, on August 26 the Central Front was abolished, and its troops were transferred to the Bryansk front.
On August 8, formations of the 19th and 30th Soviet armies attacked the enemy near Dukhovshina. For several days they unsuccessfully tried to break through the enemy's defenses. The Germans, having managed to regroup their forces, organized a steady resistance.
On August 15, the commander of the Western Front gave the order to continue the offensive. The main blow to the enemy was delivered by Konev's army, reinforced with fresh reserves. On the very first day of the offensive, she advanced 10 km deep into the German defenses. At the same time, the troops of the 24th (Major General K.I. Rakutin) and the 43rd (Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin, since August 23, Major General D.M. Seleznev) dealt a blow to the enemy near Yelnya. Although the offensive did not develop, the enemy suffered significant losses in the battles and was forced to use reserves. The Soviet troops were also weakened.
Taking this into account, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command clarified the tasks: the Western Front was supposed to. continuing the offensive, seize the line Velizh, Demidov, Smolensk; The reserve front was to defeat the enemy in the Elninsk ledge and then advance on Roslaal. The most difficult task assigned to the Bryansk Front - to defeat the 2nd Panzer Group, which continued to advance to the south. in the rear of the Kyiv group of troops of the Southwestern Front. However, the troops of the front did not have real opportunities for this.
In the 20th of August, fierce battles unfolded in a huge strip, from Toropets to Novgorod-Seversky, about 600 km wide. On the right wing of the Western Front, the enemy broke through the defenses of the 22nd and 29th armies, pushing their divisions to the left bank of the Western Dvina. Here he was stopped.
The 30th Army played a significant role in this. Going on the offensive on August 29 with the right flank, she broke through the enemy defenses, forcing him to withdraw. Taking advantage of the success, Timoshenko introduced a cavalry group (Major General L.M. Dovator) into the breakthrough. Her deep raid on the German rear caused serious concern among the Wehrmacht command. To fight the Soviet cavalry and protect rear facilities, the main command of the ground forces was forced to allocate three infantry divisions from the reserve. On September 1, the 16th, 19th and 20th armies went on the offensive near Smolensk. But, weakened in previous battles, in nine days of stubborn attacks they were able to advance only a few kilometers and went on the defensive.
In early September, the Germans created a serious threat to the Bryansk Front. Guderian's tanks crossed the Desna south of Novgorod-Seversky. The front commander tried to defeat the enemy who had broken through with flank attacks from the east, but could only slow down the pace of his advance. Under these conditions, the Headquarters decided to conduct an air operation (more than 460 aircraft). From August 29 to September 4, Soviet aviation made over 4 thousand sorties. On August 30-31 alone, Soviet pilots, having dropped 4,500 bombs, destroyed more than 100 tanks, 20 armored vehicles, and blew up a fuel depot. In air battles, 55 enemy aircraft were shot down. On August 30, eight enemy airfields were subjected to air strikes, on which another 57 aircraft were destroyed. And yet, it was not possible to disrupt the offensive of Guderian's formations. To solve such a serious problem, aviation alone was not enough. The command of the Bryansk Front failed to properly use the results of air strikes. All this made it possible for the Germans to continue moving south and reach the Konotop-Chernigov line by September 10, creating a direct threat to the deep rear of the Southwestern Front.
The Soviet troops achieved their first significant success near Yelnya, where the 24th Army from August 30 to September 8 conducted an offensive operation to destroy the enemy grouping that had penetrated the defenses of the Reserve Front. The basis of the plan was the front commander G.K. Zhukov laid down the most decisive method - bilateral encirclement with the aim of encircling and subsequently defeating the Germans piecemeal. To solve this problem, he created two shock groups, which included all serviceable tanks and about 70% of the army's artillery. The density in the breakthrough areas reached 60 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front, which was two to three times more than in the offensive of the Western Front near Smolensk in August 1941. After four days of stubborn resistance, the enemy could not withstand the blow and, under the threat of encirclement, began to retreat. On September 6, he left Yelnya. By the end of September 8, the Elninsk ledge was cut off. The enemy lost an advantageous springboard for attacking the flanks of the Soviet troops and suffered heavy losses (up to 45 thousand people).
in Yeltsinskaya offensive operation For the first time since the beginning of the war, the troops of the Red Army broke through the strong defenses of the enemy and defeated his significant grouping. Here, near Yelnya, the Soviet Guard was born. The first four rifle divisions, which especially distinguished themselves in battles, were awarded the title of "Guards". It became a pride for all warriors, and every formation, every part of the active army sought to deserve it.
On September 10, given the exhaustion of the troops, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command ordered to stop the offensive. The battle of Smolensk is over. Its main result was the disruption of the Wehrmacht's plans for a non-stop advance towards Moscow. For the first time since the beginning of World War II, German troops were forced to go on the defensive in their main direction. These days, the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel-General F. Halder bitterly admitted: “The general
the situation shows more and more clearly that the colossus of Russia ... was underestimated by us. This statement extends to all economic and organizational aspects, to means of communication, and especially to purely military aspects. Halder's confession testified not only to the threat of failure of the "blitzkrieg" plan, but also to the fact that the Red Army was capable of beating the "invincible" German army.
Soviet troops showed unprecedented stamina and mass heroism. Thousands of fighters and commanders were awarded state awards, and 14 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In the battles near Orsha, the enemy first experienced the power of a new Soviet weapon - rocket launchers, which received the affectionate name "Katyusha" from our fighters.
But the price of the Smolensk battle was expensive: irretrievable losses amounted to over 486 thousand people, and sanitary - 273.8 thousand people. However, the losses of the enemy were significant. According to the Germans, by the end of August, only the motorized and tank divisions had lost half of their personnel and materiel, and the total losses amounted to about half a million people. These figures speak for themselves: now the Soviet troops fought with the Germans on an equal footing. In the fire of the Smolensk battle, the soldiers of the Red Army gained experience, without which it was impossible to fight against a strong enemy. The Soviet command gained time to prepare the defense of Moscow and the subsequent defeat of the enemy in the Moscow Battle of 1941-1942.
In the second half of July 1941, the armies of the Western Front, under the blows of a superior enemy, continued to retreat with battles. The Nazis captured the cities of Velizh, Demidov, Dukhovshchina, Pochinok (see diagram). By the end of the month, our troops left Smolensk and Yelnya. In the area northeast of Smolensk, formations and units of the 20th and 16th armies (commanded by Lieutenant General P. A. Kurochkin and M. F. Lukin) fought in the encirclement.
The reserves of the front and the reinforcements approaching from the depths of the country entered the battle on the move in practically disparate groups, trying to stop the enemy who had penetrated our territory and create conditions for his defeat.
On July 20, I. V. Stalin, in a conversation over a direct wire with the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, pointed out negative consequences dispersion of forces and expressed the following considerations: “Isn't it time to abandon such tactics and start creating fists in seven or eight divisions with cavalry on the flanks. Choose a direction and force the enemy to reorganize their ranks at the behest of our command. For example, out of three Khomenko divisions, three Orlovsky divisions, one tank division ... maybe add two or three more divisions from the reserve army, add cavalry here and aim this entire troupe at the Smolensk region in order to smash and knock out the enemy from this area, driving him away for Orsha ... ".
On the same day, a directive was issued from the Chief of the General Staff to conduct an operation to encircle and defeat the Nazis in the Smolensk region. It also contained the demands expressed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to concentrate efforts on the most important areas.
In pursuance of the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko decided, with the help of specially created operational groups of troops detached from the 29th, 30th, 24th and 28th armies, to go on the counteroffensive, inflicting simultaneous strikes from the Bely, Yartsevo, Roslavl regions in the direction of Smolensk, and in cooperation with the 20th and 16th armies, defeat the enemy grouping north and south of Smolensk. To assist the troops advancing from the front, a cavalry group (two divisions) was created with the task of raiding the rear of the enemy's Mogilev-Smolensk grouping.
The group of Major General V. A. Khomenko, with the help of three rifle divisions, received the task: on July 23, strike from the area of the city of Bely in the direction of Dukhovshchina and no later than July 25, together with the troops of the groups of Lieutenant General S. A. Kalinin (three rifle divisions) and Major General K.K. Rokossovsky (one rifle and two tank divisions), advancing from Yartsevo, to surround and destroy the enemy in the Dukhovshchina area, which had three tank divisions and one tank brigade there. The cavalry group, advancing in the general direction on Demidov, provided the actions of the main forces from the north. In the future, the troops of the groups were to advance directly on Smolensk and come into contact with the 20th and 16th armies.
The troops of the group of Lieutenant General V. Ya. Kachalov (two rifle and one tank divisions) received the task of going on the offensive on July 22 from the Roslavl region along the highway going to Smolensk, destroying the opposing enemy and on the second day reaching the Pochinok-Khislavichi line, in further develop the offensive on Smolensk, repelling enemy attacks from the west. The group of Lieutenant General I. I. Maslennikov (three rifle divisions) had to take active steps to prevent the advance Nazi German troops in the Toropetsk direction.
The counteroffensive of the operational groups was provided from the air by aviation of the Western Front, which by that time numbered 276 aircraft (189 bombers and 87 fighters).
Two days remained to prepare for hostilities. This time turned out to be enough only to make a decision, to set tasks for the troops operating in different areas. It was not possible to complete the organization of interaction within the groups and with the 20th and 16th armies, as well as to ensure the combat operations of the troops. In addition, some formations that were part of the groups did not have time to reach the initial areas in a timely manner. Due to the strong impact of enemy aircraft, they suffered heavy losses in people and materiel even before the start of the offensive. As a result, the simultaneous transition to the counteroffensive of all formations of the operational groups on the morning of July 23 did not work out. This significantly weakened the force of the initial blow. In addition, the troops operated in wide bands, their small number did not allow them to achieve superiority in forces and means in the directions of the main attacks.
Since July 24, all operational groups have been advancing. Overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy, they slowly moved forward. As the commander of the 3rd tank group, General G. Goth, testifies, all units and formations of his group, including the training brigade, were drawn into the battle to repel the offensive of the Soviet troops. The formations of the Western Front delivered sensitive blows to the opposing Nazi grouping, deprived it of its freedom of maneuver, forced it to disperse along the front, and in a number of sectors go over to the defensive.
During July 26-27, the troops of the operational groups continued their offensive. The enemy began to transfer forces and equipment near Smolensk from non-attacked sectors of the front. Some of them came under attack from our cavalry divisions, which operated on the flanks and behind enemy lines, disrupted its communication lines, disrupted the supply of ammunition and fuel and lubricants, which contributed to the offensive of the operational groups.
The direct leadership of the operational groups was entrusted to the commander of the Western Front, Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko. After evaluating the current situation, in particular the results of the five-day offensive, on July 27 he clarified the tasks for the groups and demanded a decisive advance in order to finally defeat the enemy in the Dukhovshchina region. About 5 hours were allotted for preparation for the offensive. Tasks for formations, and in a number of cases for units, were set and refined mainly on the map.
One of the features of the newly unfolded hostilities was that they quite often had a counter character. For example, on July 27, in the area of the crossing on the Dnieper near Soloviev, part of the forces of the group of General K. K. Rokossovsky and the 108th Rifle Division of the 44th Rifle Corps (division commander Colonel P.V. Mironov), which had come up by the end of the day, was moved out of the front reserve , successfully repulsed the offensive of a large enemy tank column, which was trying to seize a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river. Further attempts by the Nazis to succeed at the crossing were thwarted. On the same day, the commander-in-chief of the Western Direction subordinated the 44th Rifle Corps (commander Major General V. A. Yushkevich) to General K. K. Rokossovsky.
On July 28, a group of General K.K. Rokossovsky attacked the enemy, trying to dislodge him from his positions. Air strikes by enemy aircraft, counterattacks by enemy tanks and motorized infantry slowed down the advance. The formations and units of the group suffered significant losses, and the enemy increased resistance more and more at the expense of units that arrived from other sectors of the front.
Intense battles were also waged by a group of General V. A. Khomenko. Having broken the resistance of the enemy, she began to advance in a southwestern direction. The troops of the group of General S. A. Kalinin advanced 1-1.5 km that day, General V. Ya. Kachalov - they captured the knot of resistance in the Koski area. The divisions of General I. I. Maslennikov on July 28 were preparing for an attack on Ilyino.
Thus, during July 28 and 29, significant damage was inflicted on the enemy, his advance was stopped on a number of sectors of the front, but it was not possible to create the necessary conditions for the complete defeat of the Dukhovshchina grouping.
The slow advance of the operational groups, as Marshal S.K. Timoshenko emphasized in his report to the Chief of the General Staff on August 3, is mainly due to poor air support for the advancing troops, a large understaffing of formations with tanks and artillery, and extremely limited time to prepare a counteroffensive.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction reported to the Headquarters the measures that were carried out on his instructions. In particular, he said: “I collected everything in my power and sent it to strengthen Khomenko and Kalinin. But you know that I have no guns, no planes, and very few people.”
At the same time, the slow advance of the operational groups was explained in some cases by poor command and control of troops on the part of their commanders and staffs. Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of organization of the leadership on the part of General V. Ya. Kachalov. In general, based on the results of the offensive of all operational groups, the commander-in-chief made the following conclusion: “I believe that with the battles of these days we completely upset the enemy’s offensive. Seven or eight tank and motorized divisions operating against us, and two or three infantry divisions, with huge losses, are deprived of an offensive capability for whole tens of days.
On August 4, the tasks were specified for all operational groups by the Headquarters. By active offensive actions, they were supposed to chain as many enemy forces as possible to themselves.
Fulfilling the order of the Headquarters, the operational groups continued to strike at the enemy, which further weakened the German grouping in the Smolensk direction, but our troops also suffered heavy losses. September 10 at the direction of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. the troops of the Western Front went over to the defensive on the lines they occupied.
Thus, the active actions of the operational groups provided significant assistance to the front as a whole, and especially to the 20th and 16th armies, contributing to their exit from the encirclement, and also had a positive effect on stabilizing the situation of the neighbors.
However, in the course of the counteroffensive, it was not possible to completely solve the assigned tasks. The main reasons for this were the lack of forces and means in the operational groups and poor aviation support for the offensive. The circumstance that between the advancing operational groups, as well as between them and the 20th and 16th armies, was also negatively affected by the fact that full cooperation was not achieved. The formation of groups was carried out in an extremely short time, and they included troops, the concentration of which took a lot of time. In addition, the advance of formations and units to the initial areas for the offensive took place under the dominance of enemy aircraft.
It should be noted that their headquarters played a huge role in commanding the troops of the operational groups. Where the headquarters of one or another formation, acting as the commanding body of the group commander, successfully performed its functions, and the available means of communication provided clear control, those groups, as a rule, acted more in concert, and their results were significant.
We can say that in the conditions of the situation in the summer of 1941, the use of operational groups of troops justified itself. It was, in essence, the only possibility performing an active offensive task during the strategic defense in the Smolensk direction. The experience gained in the battle of Smolensk in the use of operational groups of troops was later studied and used in subsequent operations.
The battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941) is one of the largest defensive and offensive operations of the army of the Soviet Union against the German army in the period.
The operation was carried out on the territory of Smolensk and nearby cities. The battle of Smolensk, despite its name, is not a single clash between two armies, but a whole complex of large and small battles on the territory of the Western Front. It is also important to note that the Battle of Smolensk took place not only on the territory of Smolensk, but also affected many other cities.
It is customary to distinguish several main clashes during the battle of Smolensk:
- Bobruisk battle;
- Velikolukskoe battle;
- Gomel defensive operation;
- Dukhovshchinskaya operation;
- Elninskaya operation;
- Defense of Mogilev;
- Defense of Polotsk;
- Defense of Smolensk;
- Roslavl-Novozybkovskaya operation.
main goal Smolensk operation it was to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the direction of the Moscow strategic direction, thereby enabling the USSR to more carefully organize the defense of the capital and not allow the Nazis to take the city.
Reasons for the battle of Smolensk
In July 1941, the German command set a task for its army - to encircle and capture the Soviet troops located on the territory of the Western Front (Western Dvina, Dnieper, Vitebsk, Orsha, Smolensk). This was necessary in order to open the way for the Nazi army to Moscow. To carry out the operation, the Center group was sent, which included several large and well-equipped armies under the command of Field Marshal T. von Bock.
Preparations for the Smolensk operation
The Soviet command became aware of the plans, so an order was issued to immediately begin preparing their own defensive-offensive operation, which was supposed to protect the path to Moscow and push the Germans further from Smolensk and the front line. For these purposes, at the end of June, several Soviet armies were deployed on the middle reaches of the Dvina and Dnieper, which became part of the united Western Front under the command of S.K. Timoshenko.
Soviet soldiers were also sent to several other strategically important points, but they could not get there in time. Unfortunately, the preparation of the defense began too late, so by the beginning of the operation the Soviet army turned out to be fragmented, there was no single line of defense, it had significant gaps, which allowed the Germans to deliver a more accurate strike on weak points and shake the defense.
German troops reached Smolensk also not at full strength: part of the army was delayed by fighting in Belarus. However, even this delay could not significantly affect the balance of power: the German army was almost four times larger than the Soviet one, moreover, the Germans had the most modern equipment and weapons.
The course of the Smolensk battle
The first attack took place on July 10, 1941, when the German army began to advance on the right wing and in the center of the Western Front. The advancing group consisted of 13 infantry, 9 tank and 7 motorized divisions, which was several times more defensive units Soviet army. The attack ended with a complete breakthrough of the Soviet defense, which allowed the German troops to confidently move towards Mogilev. Mogilev was also captured in the shortest possible time, followed by Orsha, part of Smolensk, Yelnya and Krichev. The Soviet army not only suffered losses and lost the operation, but also lost a number of divisions that were surrounded by the Germans.
On July 21, the Soviet army received reinforcements and could participate in the battles almost on an equal footing. At the same time, the command announced the start of a counteroffensive - the Soviet troops made an unexpected attack, a fierce battle ensued.
Unfortunately, this time it was not possible to defeat the German army, however, the Soviet soldiers broke the German resistance and actually forced Hitler's army to retreat. From that moment on, the Germans turned from attackers into defenders, and the initiative was in the hands of the command of the USSR army. Several Soviet detachments were reorganized to create a more powerful front.
On August 8, the picture changed again. The Germans again went on the offensive in the region of the Central and Bryansk fronts. This was necessary in order to secure the German army from the Soviet threat and provide an opportunity for a wider and more open offensive. The Germans managed to achieve the retreat of the Soviet army, but later it turned out that this was a strategic move by the USSR in order to bring new forces into remote areas. On August 17, the USSR again launched an offensive against the German troops, which ended in huge losses for the latter.
Throughout the campaign, the alignment of forces kept changing, and the initiative passed from the USSR to Germany, but the German army suffered more and more losses every day, while the Soviet troops were in a more advantageous position. On September 8, 1941, the USSR managed to completely eliminate the fascist threat in this direction and secure the paths to Smolensk and, accordingly, to Moscow from the west.
The results of the Smolensk operation
Despite the length of hostilities, as well as the numerical and technical superiority of the Nazis, the USSR still managed to defend Smolensk. The victory near Smolensk thwarted the further plans of the German command, which allowed the USSR to gain the advantage and time to organize the army.
The USSR managed to buy time to ensure the protection and defense of Moscow, which was the main goal of the Germans.