Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart Sir Basil Henry: "Strategy of Indirect Action"

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Genre: History, Language: ru Annotation: English military historian and theorist Captain Basil Henry Liddell-Hart, being the editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica and forced to delve into various periods of military history, came to the conclusion that decisive results in any campaign were achieved only if the actions of the commanders were contrary to the expectations of the enemy, "indirect", ...

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Sir Basil Liddell-Gart

Decisive wars in history

Dedicated to Ivor Max, teaching soldiers to win

Protected by the legislation of the Russian Federation on the protection of intellectual rights. Reproduction of the entire book or any part of it is prohibited without the written permission of the publisher. Any attempt to break the law will be prosecuted.

Foreword

The first chapter of this book is a preface in the conventional sense of the word, explaining the purpose, scope and theme, developed more gradually and less consistently than in the usual introduction to the book, and how the main idea of the book is an attempt to highlight the essence of the study of the subject and reflection on it during a number of years, as well as a presentation of history - excerpts from notes made during the study of each of the displayed wars. It would have been easier for the author to develop these notes into a larger narrative, but the desire to “not obscure the forest with trees” led to a drastic reduction in irrelevant facts. If, for the taste of some readers, the book is lacking in detail, I ask them to forgive me in light of the fact that this book is more of a "guide" to the study of history for a student of this specialization, rather than a fundamental work containing all the details.

I would also like to express in this "preliminary preface" my gratitude for the courtesy of all those who have read and commented on the draft and references to various stages book preparation. For valuable comments and suggestions, I thank in particular my friends Brigadier Generals J.G. Dilla, B.D. Fisher, J.F. Fuller, H. Karslake, Colonel Count Gort, Mr. E.G. Hawk and T.E.S.

Part one

Great Wars 500 BC e. – 1914 AD e.

History as practical experience

“Fools say they learn from experience. I prefer to use the experience of others." This well-known saying, quoted by Bismarck, but by no means invented by him, relates strangely to questions of war. Since it has often been noted that a soldier, unlike the holders of other specialties, rarely has the opportunity to apply his knowledge in practice. In fact, one can even say that the military profession is literally not a job at all, but just "occasional employment." And it is paradoxical that military affairs ceased to be a profession precisely when the "soldier of fortune" was replaced by a "professional soldier" - when hired soldiers who were recruited and paid specifically for the purpose of waging war were replaced by armies maintained on a permanent basis, whose soldiers continued to be paid in peacetime.

This logical, if somewhat harsh, argument is reminiscent of the explanation, often given in the past, regarding the salary of officers, which is impossible to live on, and also the statements of some of these officers that they do a small amount of work per day - the essence of this The argument is that an officer's salary is not a salary, but a kind of deposit that is paid to him as a fee for providing his services in case of war.

If the argument that a "military profession" does not exist in its purest form is not valid in most armies today in terms of the amount of work done, it is inevitably reinforced in practice in light of the increasingly rare wars. Do we then come to the conclusion that armies are doomed to become more and more "amateur" - in the widespread bad sense of the word, which is very much abused and misused? Because, obviously, even the best military training program possible in peacetime provides more "theoretical" than "practical" experience.

But Bismarck's aphorism puts the problem in a different, more hopeful light. He helps us to understand that there are two forms of practical experience - direct and indirect. And of the two, indirect hands-on experience may be the more valuable because it is infinitely broader. Even in the most active career, especially the career of a soldier, the scope and possibilities of direct experience are extremely limited. In contrast to the military profession, medicine provides continuous practice, yet here, too, major discoveries are made by researchers, not by ordinary medical practitioners.

Direct experience is inevitably too limited and can only provide a solid foundation for theory or for practical application. At best, it creates an environment that is valuable because it streamlines the structure of our thinking and frees it from everything superfluous. The great value of indirect experience lies in its greater variety and limits. "History is a universal experience" - the experience of not just one, but of many different conditions.

Thus, we have a rationale for military history - its predominant practical value lies in the training and mental development of the military man. But the usefulness of its study, like other types of experience, depends on the breadth of the study and on the teaching methods used.

Military men generally acknowledge the general validity of Napoleon's most quoted dictum that "the moral is to the physical as three to one." The actual arithmetic ratio may be of little value, as morale tends to decline if weaponry is inadequate, and the strongest will is of little use when placed in a half-dead body. But although moral and physical factors are inseparable and indivisible, the saying has acquired its immortal value in that it expresses the idea of the predominance of spiritual factors in all military decisions. The outcome of war and battle invariably depends on them. And in military history they form the only constant factors, varying only in degree, while the physical factors in almost every war and every situation change fundamentally.

This awareness dominates the entire process of studying military history for the practical use of the knowledge gained. For the last few generations, the teaching method has been to choose one or two campaigns and study them thoroughly, as a means to develop our minds and military theory at the same time. But the constant change in the means of warfare, from war to war, entails a serious danger (even inevitability) that our horizons will narrow and the lessons learned will be erroneous. In the realm of the material, the only constant factor is that the means of warfare and the conditions for their use are invariably not constant.

On the contrary, human nature does not change much in its response to danger. Specific people, depending on belonging to a particular people (as well as race), their environment or the training they have completed, may be less sensitive in this regard than others, but this difference is in degree, it is not of a fundamental nature. The more precisely the situation is localized, the more disorienting and less calculable such a distinction will be. This can make it impossible for anyone precise definition the resistance that particular people will put up in any situation, but it does not invalidate the judgment that such resistance will be weaker if people are affected by the surprise factor, and vice versa, it will be stronger when they are alert and vigilant, or resistance, what is given by tired and hungry people will be weaker than what they themselves show, provided that they are rested and fed. The wider the field of psychological observations, the better the basis for conclusions they provide.

The primacy of the psychological over the physical and its greater constancy lead to the conclusion that the base of any military theory should be as broad as possible. intensive study one campaign, if it is not based on a broad study of military history as a whole, may lead us to the erroneous conclusion that this campaign is the pinnacle of military art. But if we see that a certain effect is the effect of a certain cause (in in large numbers cases, in different epochs and under different conditions), this is the reason to consider this reason as constituent part any military theory in general.

This book, like the thesis that follows from it, is the product of just such an "extensive" examination. It can obviously be called the composite effect of certain causes - related to my work as a military editor of the Encyclopedia Britannica - since, while earlier I delved into various periods of military history, choosing them according to my inclinations, this task forced me to study it in its entirety, often against my will. An observer, even a tourist if you will, has a better field of view and can at least get the big picture. earth's surface, while the miner knows only his own layer. In the course of this study, one impression of mine was constantly reinforced - that throughout history, decisive results in warfare were achieved only when the action was indirect. In other words, the "long way around" strategy is the shortest way to get where you want to go.

Basil Liddell-Gart is an English military historian, theorist and geostrategist. He graduated from the University of Cambridge, participated in the First World War as an officer, after being transferred to the reserve (1924) began to work professionally military history. In 1937 he served as adviser to the Minister of War. He worked as a war correspondent for the moderately conservative newspapers The Times (1935-1939) and The Daily Mail (1941-1945). After the Second World War, he was engaged exclusively in theoretical activities. He created the so-called "strategy of indirect action", from the point of view of which the main task of the army is maneuver, and not a decisive battle, opposing it to the strategy of victory at any cost. “The goal of war is to achieve a better state of the world ... Therefore, when waging war, it is important to constantly remember the goals that you want to achieve after the war,” for this, according to Liddell Hart, the country must end the war not exhausted, but powerful in industrial and military terms.

Being primarily a major military theorist, Liddell-Hart did not confine himself only to questions of military strategy. The most important conclusion of his strategy of indirect action is the proposition that “it is practically necessary to adapt general theory strategy to the nature of the general policy of the state. One of the most important indicators of this "adaptation" is the ability of politicians not to succumb to the influence of emotions and feelings, but to control the conduct of the war, to direct it towards achieving the goal set by the state.

Liddell-Harth believed that "war is contrary to reason", but if it is unleashed, then "victory ... implies that the post-war order of the world and the material situation of the people should be better than before the war."

From a geostrategic point of view, Liddell Hart viewed the USSR as an adversary to Britain and NATO. He considered the allied relations of the USA and Great Britain with the USSR, which led to the defeat of Germany, the strengthening of the influence of communism in Europe and the world, to be a mistake. He advocated the return of the balance of power system in Europe, where the geopolitical advantages of the USSR would be equalized by Germany and other countries.

He was opposed to the use of nuclear weapons, which would lead to the implementation of "direct military strategies" aimed at destroying both the military-industrial potential and the population of the opposing countries.

Liddell-Gart is the author of over 30 books. Main works: “New Ways of Modern Armies” (M.; L., 1930), “The War of 1914-1918, as it really was” (in Russian translation “The Truth about the War of 1914-1918”, M. , 1935), "Revolution in the war" (M., 1947), "Strategy of indirect actions" (in Russian translation "Strategy", M., 1957), "Second World War"(M., 1976)

about the author

Liddell Hart was born October 31, 1895 in Paris, the son of a priest. He was educated at St. Paul's School in London, and then continued his studies at Cambridge. During World War I, he served in the British Army, where he was an officer in a rifle company. Garth's experience on the front line was limited to the autumn, and in the winter of 1915, after being wounded, he went home.

He returned to the front in 1916 to take part in the Battle of the Somme. Garth was injured in a gas attack and was sent to the hospital on July 19, 1916. The battalion in which Liddell served was completely destroyed on the first day of the offensive - July 1. Losses of 60,000 people in one day were the most significant in British history.

Experience gained on Western front, influenced the whole life of Basil Liddell Garth. "Strategy of indirect actions" (the book with which the name of the author is usually associated) - the best of that proof.

Garth continued his service in the volunteer units of Stroud and Cambridge, where he was preparing replacements for the army in the field. During this time, he wrote several booklets on infantry training, which reached General Maxse. After the end of the war, he was transferred to the Royal Army Training Corps and prepared the final version of the Infantry Manual.

Due to health reasons, Liddell could not serve in the army, so he continued his career as a theorist and writer. In 1924 he worked as a war correspondent for the Morning Post, from 1925 to 1935 as a military correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, then until 1939 he worked for The Times. Liddell wrote a series of stories about military figures, where he put forward his ideas on military strategy.

Liddell's concept

Having experienced the senseless way of fighting, Garth, back in the twenties, thought about the reasons for the huge loss of life and analyzed the principles that, in his opinion, were ignored by all military leaders. These principles formed the basis of his theory, which he detailed in the pages of the "Strategy of indirect action." Basil Liddell Hart denounced persistent head-on attacks, wasting manpower in futile attempts.

Gradually, thoughts formed into a concept published in the work "Decisive Wars in History" in 1929. The author proposed the most complete formulation of the principles in the "Strategy", published in 1941. The book received great acclaim in both military and academic circles.

The release in 1967 of the fourth edition of the "Strategy" was seen as a major event in the Armed Forces of the West. Although Liddell was considered a bourgeois historian, and far from being pro-Soviet, his books were also published in the Soviet Union. The depth of analysis and truly encyclopedic scope have made this work of Garth indispensable for lovers of military history.

From Sparta to World War II

In the "Strategy of Indirect Actions" the writer consistently analyzes wars and battles, from ancient times to the Second World War. Using real examples, he proves that indirect actions bring more effect and lower costs than attempts to defeat the enemy in a frontal attack. Garth dissects bloody battles, military mistakes and military disasters and connects them with the violation of the basic principles of strategy.

In the first part, the author analyzes the Greek wars, analyzing the military experience of Epaminondas, who made a significant contribution to the development of military art. It also tells about Philip II, who created a strong army, the leadership of which was taken over by his son Alexander the Great. Roman generals and their military art were also analyzed by a military historian.

In his book The Strategy of Indirect Actions, the author also includes numerous maps of battles. Byzantine and medieval wars, the generals Cromwell and Turenne - in a word, everyone who contributed to the development of military art attracted the attention of Liddell.

The author gives a special place to the French Revolution and the army of Napoleon Bonaparte, analyzing and analyzing battles, troop movements and political maneuvers. In a separate chapter, he summarizes and concludes that over twenty-five centuries, the priorities of the art of fighting have gradually shifted to the "science of the destruction of people."

Early 20th century

In the second part, Garth shares his views on the war, sets out the theory of strategy and the conclusions drawn from the analysis of military experience. Liddell assigned this part to the analysis of the First World War - from 1914 to 1918, he examined in detail all the directions in which the war was fought, analyzing the mistakes and plans of the commanders. "Strategy has become a servant of tactics" - this is how the author characterizes the actions of the military leaders of the First World War. And he sums up: "Victory or defeat mainly depends on the morale of the enemy and indirectly - on strikes against him."

In the third part of the "Strategy of Indirect Action" the writer analyzes the successes, failures and collapse of Hitler. He describes in detail the war in France, Italy, Poland, the Soviet Union. Gives dates, names of military leaders, movement of armies, role of allies. Germany contributed to its defeat, the author of the book is sure. “If the allied countries understood the basic principles of strategy, and did not fight in the old way, the destruction brought by this war would be less significant,” the author concludes the third part.

Indirect approach

The origin of Liddell's indirect approach is twofold. From a theoretical point of view, he provides a response to the actions of political and military leaders who, in his opinion, misinterpreted and misused the theory of the 19th century Prussian military thinker - Liddell states that the application of the poorly understood Clausewitzian strategy contributed to the bloodshed in the First World War and the slow implementation alternatives into World War II. The author sets out his point of view in the book "Strategy of Indirect Actions".

All this called into question the validity of the old theory and required a reconsideration of how military force could be used to achieve political goals. In particular, the massive losses and post-war exhaustion of the economy of the First World War, as well as the growing importance of aviation, sea power and mechanized ground forces in World War II, Liddell was told that the theory proposed by Clausewitz should be revised.

In fact, aviation is now able to strike at economic and head centers without destroying the enemy on the battlefield. Mechanized warfare is not only capable of direct attacks, but can also contribute to the collapse of enemy positions without a major battle. Liddell argues that good strategy does not require overcoming resistance, but rather using the elements of movement and control to win by unbalancing the enemy before a potential strike.

In other words, deployment is also part of the strategy and should be used to maximize gain. Liddell's strategy means that the commander must take advantage of the new opportunities that a successful deployment and strike inflicted on the enemy will bring before he has time to recover. Liddell pointed out the nuances of updating the indirect approach, which are known as the 8 principles of the strategy of indirect action.

Positive principles

Choose the goal according to the means, guided by sober calculation and common sense. Don't "bite off more than you can chew." Distinguishing the possible from the impossible is the main sign of military wisdom.
Keep the goal in mind and adapt your plan to changing circumstances. It is important to remember that the goal can be reached in various ways, but make sure that each captured object brings you closer to the intended goal.
Choose for your actions the direction from where the enemy least expects a strike. Put yourself in his place and decide which direction the enemy will consider less dangerous, and therefore will not take preventive measures.
Follow the line of least resistance. And stick to this direction as long as it is possible to approach the intended object without unnecessary losses. The author elaborates on each point, explains and gives examples from the story in the "Strategy of Indirect Action".
Choose the direction in which the threat will be created to several objects at the same time. If you target only one object, then you can certainly lose, since the enemy will know the direction of the blow.
Provide flexibility in the plan and deployment of troops, taking into account possible changes in the situation. Measures must be provided and developed for all cases: victory or defeat.

Negative Principles

While the enemy is in a more advantageous position, do not strike with all your might. As long as the opponent can parry the blow, it is impossible to deliver an effective blow. Therefore, it is necessary to act only when the enemy is paralyzed.
Do not resume the offensive in the direction where they failed. The strengthening of the troops cannot serve as a basis for a new action, since the enemy will also be able to strengthen his positions.

To ensure the success of a strategy of indirect action, two tasks must be solved: to break the stability of the enemy and to build on success. The first task must be completed before striking, and the other after. The blow itself is a simple act, but an effective blow cannot be delivered without creating favorable conditions for this. It is possible to bring the blow to a decisive result only by using the favorable opportunities that will appear before the enemy comes to his senses.

Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, known before his knighthood as Captain B. G. Liddell Hart, was an English military historian and theorist who had a great influence on the development of mechanized warfare in the 20th century, as well as on the theory of strategy in general. Liddell is his mother's maiden name, and he has been using it as part of his surname since 1921.

Liddell Hart was born in Paris, the son of an English Methodist minister. Studied at Cambridge. He enlisted in the Royal Yorkshire Light Infantry.

Served as an officer in the British Army during the First World War, witnessed trench warfare. Participated in the Battle of the Somme, was awarded for bravery. Over the next few years, he reflected on the causes of such high loss of life and developed the principles that underlie good strategy, principles that, he said, were ignored by all the military leaders of the first world war.

Liddell Harth retired as a captain in 1927 (after being placed on a part-time basis in 1923 due to two heart attacks in 1921 and 1922, probably the result of a wartime gas attack) and continued his career like a writer. The fact that he continued to use his rank greatly angered high-ranking military officers, since such a thing was considered bad form for officers below the rank of major.

Initially he was a military and sports (tennis) columnist for various English newspapers, this continued until the Second World War. Then he began to publish military essays and biographies of great generals, who, in his opinion, were great precisely because they had a good understanding of strategy. Among them were Scipio Africanus, General William Sherman and Thomas Lawrence. Shortly after the war, he interviewed many German generals and published them in The Other Side of the Hill (English edition) and The German Generals Tell (abridged US edition). He later persuaded Field Marshal Rommel's family to allow his surviving diaries to be processed and published them in 1953 as a pseudo-memoir under the title Rommel's Notes.

Basil Liddell Hart was knighted in 1966.

After his death, Alex Danchev, in collaboration with his widow, wrote a posthumous biography, The Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Harth.

Contribution to military theory

He reduced his principles for expressing indirect action to two basic rules:

A direct attack on an enemy who has taken a fortified position almost never gives a result and should not be used.
- In order to defeat the enemy, he must be thrown off balance, which cannot be achieved with a main attack, but must be done for the main attack to succeed.

Liddell Hart wrote:

"In strategy, the long detour is often the shortest; a direct attack exhausts the attacker and densifies the defender's defenses, while an indirect approach weakens the defender, throwing him off balance.

The deepest truth of war is that the outcome of the battle is decided in the minds of the generals, not in the bodies of their warriors."

Thus, victory can be achieved by keeping the enemy insecure in his understanding of the situation and your intentions, as well as doing something that he does not expect and for which he is not ready.

Liddell Hart argued that a rigid strategy of powerful direct strikes or fixed defensive positions should not be adopted. Instead, mobile units should be used, moving and operating in accordance with the doctrine of indirect action. He later cited Rommel's North African campaign as a classic example of the use of this theory.

He came to his conclusions by studying the methods and victories of the great strategists of the past (especially Sun Tzu, Napoleon and Belisarius). He believed that indirect action was a common element in the strategy of those he studied. Liddell Hart also argued that the strategy of indirect action can be applied to both business and human relationships.

He began publishing his theories in the 1920s in the popular press, and subsequently discovered that his or similar developments were used by Nazi Germany as the basis for blitzkrieg tactics [source not specified 1075 days]. Guderian’s memoirs say this about it: “I got the necessary literature and began to study it. These were mainly English articles and books by Fuller, Liddle Garth and Martel, which interested me extremely and enriched my imagination. These far-sighted specialists already at that time wanted to turn armored troops into something more than an auxiliary branch of the infantry.They placed the tank at the center of the beginning motorization of our era and were thus major innovators in the development modern methods waging war." (G. Guderian, "Memoirs of a Soldier", ch.2)

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