By the middle of the fifteenth century Golden Horde was divided into three separate states: the Kazan Khanate (created in 1445), the Crimean Khanate (1449) and the rest of the Golden Horde, which had its center in Sarai on the Lower Volga and was known as the Great Horde.
As V. I. Vernadsky notes, the formal political independence of Muscovy from the Tatar tsars could not and did not ensure the security of the Russian people. The interests of the Muscovite state assumed peaceful relations with the Crimean Khanate in order to ensure the security of the southern Russian lands.
The factors that determined the domestic policy of Crimea in question were completely different.
Since 1478, the Crimean Khanate officially became a vassal of the Ottoman Porte and remained in this capacity until the Peace of Kuchuk-Kaynarji in 1774. The appointment and removal of khans was usually carried out at the will of Istanbul. The social and ethnic composition of the population of the Crimean Khanate was not homogeneous. The process of Tatars settling was especially intensive in the mountainous and southern coastal regions of the Crimea, naturally, there was also a process of assimilation of Tatars with local residents. The steppe Tatars, who were not affected by the processes of assimilation, continued to be engaged mainly in cattle breeding. Farming for them for a long time was considered a troublesome business, and farming techniques remained primitive. It was they who were the main striking force in the fight against the Russian state.
The process of property and social differentiation in the period we are considering affected all the peoples that were part of the Crimean Khanate. Although the bulk of the population of the khanate, as before, were cattle breeders and farmers, who were called "black people". These people were personally free, they kept the tribal organization, which was the old shell, inside which the process of disintegration of the tribal system took place. The main social unit was the patriarchal family. The clan organization served for the ruling class as one of the means of strengthening its influence within the clan and for keeping its population in obedience. Having moved to the Crimea, the Tatars got acquainted with the agricultural community "dzhemaat". The form of land relations used in it was largely accepted by the Tatars. And gradually the community "Jemaat" came to replace the tribal community. There was collective ownership of the land, public hayfields, public wells, collective plowing of land, for the implementation of which several families united. The land in the community was distributed on shares, which eventually became the property of the farmer. This led to the emergence of property inequality among the community members.
The sources indicate that there were no regular troops in the Crimean Khanate, and in fact all men capable of carrying weapons took part in military campaigns.
The power of the khan was limited not only by the will of the sultan, but most importantly - by representatives of the most noble families - beys-karacheys, who were indispensable advisers to the khan. The Gireev family, having received the right to khanate power, failed to get the nobility to make the power hereditary and unlimited.
There were "small" and "big" councils, which played a very important role in the life of the state.
"Small" was called the council ("Small Divan"), if it was attended by a narrow circle of the nobility, who resolved issues that required urgent and specific solutions.
The "Big Sofa" is a meeting of the "whole earth", when all the Murzas and representatives of the "best" black people took part in it. Traditionally, the Karacheis retained the right to sanction the appointment of khans from the Girey clan as a sultan, which was expressed in the rite of placing them on the throne in Bakhchisarai.
In the Crimean Khanate, there was a constant struggle between noble Tatar families. The feudal authorities were often in opposition to the khan. The influence of the Turkish government, which sought to prevent the consolidation of the forces of the Crimean Khanate, affected internal strife. Türkiye often created conflict situations within the country, which naturally weakened it. This made it possible to control not only the activities of the khan, but also the restless Crimean nobility, and direct the development of the state in the right direction for the Ottomans.
Incentives for raids, according to Novoselsky, were constantly born within the Crimea itself. “The Crimeans themselves, from the kings to the simple Tatars, have repeatedly stated that their attacks on Rus' were caused only by their own internal needs and justified them only for form by some reasons allegedly arising from the Muscovite state.”
We dwelled in sufficient detail on the characteristics of the socio-political structure of the Crimean Khanate precisely because we consider its aggressive, “predatory” policy to be due to purely internal factors. However, Poland could objectively be the object of aggression of the Crimean feudal lords. The fact that Russia bore the brunt of the Tatar raids cannot be explained solely by the peculiarities of the internal socio-political development of Crimea. Nor can it be explained by the correlation of forces at the court of the Crimean Khan. Here, undoubtedly, external factors come into force that determined (in many respects) the anti-Russian orientation foreign policy Crimea.
The main stages in the development of Russian-Crimean relations.Russia and Crimea at the end of the XV-beginning of the XVII century.
At the end of the 15th century, relations with the Crimean Khanate were generally favorable for Russia. Nikita Beklemishev, on behalf of Ivan III, concluded an alliance with Mengli Giray, the effect of which was to extend to the children and grandchildren of the Grand Duke. Its conditions were very favorable for Russia. The basis of the Russian-Crimean alliance was the struggle against the Great Horde and its heirs.
During the reign of Vasily III (1505-1533), the khans of Crimea went over to the Polish-Lithuanian side. The Crimean Khanate, having defeated at the beginning of the 16th century its main enemy in the Black Sea region - the Great Horde and eliminated the danger from its side, no longer needed, as it was in the second half of the 15th century, to maintain good neighborly relations with the Grand Dukes of Moscow.
During this period, an increasingly noticeable aggravation of Russian-Crimean relations took place, which had both an economic and a political basis. Relying on the support of the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean khans hatched plans for the defeat of Russia, the revival in a new version of the Horde yoke. He saw the achievement of the goal by preventing the growth of the power of the Russian state, organizing devastating raids on its lands, strengthening the Turkish-Crimean influence in the Volga region, creating the widest possible anti-Russian alliance, which, in addition to Crimea and Turkey, would include the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates and the Polish-Lithuanian state . Such a coalition, according to its creators, was supposed not only to nullify the influence of Russia, but also to establish Turkish-Crimean domination in Eastern Europe.
It should be noted that throughout the first half of the 16th century, the Russian-Lithuanian struggle continued for the reunification of the Western Russian lands, which demanded from Russia a huge effort and did not allow it to divert troops from here to other areas, and in particular to the south, troops sufficient to carry out offensive policy against the Crimea. And on the eastern borders, the hostile position of the ruling circles of the Kazan Khanate towards them was fettering the Russian forces, which in itself could not but have a negative impact on Russian-Crimean relations.
A major raid on Russian lands was made in 1515. The Crimean prince Mohammed-Girey with the Kyiv governor Andrei Nemirov and the governor Ostafiy Dashkevich attacked Chernigov, Starodub and Novgorod-Seversky. It became clear that without the neutralization of the Crimea, neither an active Kazan policy nor effective resistance to Lithuanian attempts at revenge was possible. This explains the persistence of the Moscow sovereign in establishing strong diplomatic ties with the Porte. The Sultan was by no means going to sacrifice his interests in the Crimea and Kazan for the sake of an alliance with Russia, which in that situation did not promise him any real political benefits.
Moscow was aware of the close Turkish-Crimean ties and sought to use them to create a secure environment on its southern borders, concluding an alliance agreement with Ottoman Empire. However, the anti-Russian tendencies in the policy of the Turkish ruling circles were so strong that they did not allow Russian diplomacy to solve this problem.
Let us dwell in more detail on the Crimean campaign of 1521. Mohammed Giray failed to attract Turkey and Astrakhan to the anti-Russian coalition, but even without their help he had very impressive forces. On the night of June 28, the Crimean Khan crossed the Oka. It is known that the well-known Lithuanian commander Yevstafiy Dashkevich fought in the troops of Mohammed Giray. Perhaps, there were detachments of Nogais among them.
For the first time in the history of armed clashes with Russia, Crimean troops broke into the deep regions of the Russian state, committing them to robbery and fires. This made a stunning impression on the inhabitants of the southern regions of the country. Already on June 29, many people fled to Moscow, "under siege." The state of siege of the capital lasted two weeks.
The devastation caused by the Crimean raid was enormous. Detachments of the Crimeans approached Moscow at XV km. During the raid, the Crimeans took a huge full. Herberstein gives a clearly inflated figure - 800 thousand prisoners. On August 12, the Crimean Khan hastily left the Russian land, because the Novgorod and Pskov troops were quickly advancing towards him. Herberstein explains the departure of the Crimean Khan by the fact that he received a letter on behalf of the Grand Duke, according to which Vasily III pledged to be "an eternal tributary of the king, just like his father and ancestors were."
The troops of Mohammed Giray and the detachments of Evstafy Dashkevich, moving away from Moscow, laid siege to Ryazan. However, the siege was unsuccessful. Herberstein says that, being unable to take Ryazan, Mohammed Giray sent his man to the fortress, offering the besieged to capitulate. At the same time, he referred to the charter of the Moscow sovereign. Ryazan Governor, Prince Khabar, demanded to see this document. But as soon as it was brought, he destroyed it. Thus ended the campaign of Mohammed Giray against Rus', which had a strong influence on changing the course of foreign policy.
A. A. Zimin characterizes the reasons for his success as follows: “The rapid advance of the Crimean troops into the depths of Russian territory was ... a surprise for Mohammed Giray himself. His detachments were only capable of robbing the defenseless population during short-term raids, after which they returned full to the Crimea. So it was this time".
The events of 1521 showed that Vasily III could not successfully fight in the west, south and east at the same time. From now on, Crimea became one of the most dangerous enemies of Russia, and the fight against its aggressive policy was Moscow's most important task.
After the death of Muhammad Giray, internecine struggle began in the Crimean Khanate, complicated by the attack of the Nogais in 1523, who devastated the Crimea for a month.
During the years 1521-1533. the question of ensuring its security in the south continued to be important for Russia. His place in the system of foreign policy became even greater after the Crimean Khanate, by its actions in 1521, showed that it was openly anti-Russian and was moving to a direct armed struggle against the Russian state.
However, as a result of the campaign against Russia, Mohammed Giray failed to solve his task - to defeat the Russian state by armed force. Moreover, his attempt to strengthen his influence in the Lower Volga region also ended in failure. All this, as well as a sharp intra-clan struggle, forced the ruling circles of Crimea to abandon the active struggle against Russia, which made it possible, firstly, to further intensify their activities in order to create a better defense system for the southern borders of the country and, secondly, to direct their efforts on the weakening of the anti-Russian edge of the foreign policy of the Crimea.
Skillful diplomatic policy of the Russian state in 1521-1533. has borne fruit. “The anti-Russian edge of the Crimean policy turned out to be somewhat blunted, and the situation on the southern borders of the Russian state was less tense.”
However, Moscow was aware that the most aggressive circles of the Crimean feudal lords only temporarily weakened their anti-Russian activity. The stabilization of the situation in the Crimea and the consolidation of Russia's opponents around the khan were bound to revive tendencies hostile to her in Crimean politics.
In 1533-1545. The most important task of Russian diplomacy was to eliminate the danger that hung over the southern borders of the country, having achieved the maintenance of peaceful relations with the Crimean Khanate. The Crimean Khanate, concerned about the strengthening of Russia's internal political position, was reluctant to normalize relations with it. But despite the unfavorable conditions in which Russian diplomacy often found itself, it, according to A. B. Kuznetsov, "showed great flexibility, perseverance in achieving its goal." She skillfully used any friction in the ruling circles of the Crimean Khanate on issues of Russian-Crimean relations, trying to attract to her side those forces that could influence the khan, to force him to abandon actions hostile to Russia.
The efforts of diplomacy were constantly reinforced by defensive measures. during the years 1533-1545. the Russian government is doing everything possible to secure the southern borders of the country from enemy attacks. The line of defense continues to improve, the concentration of Russian troops in the most dangerous sectors is being carried out. A serious test of the strength of the defensive measures of Russia was the Crimean-Turkish campaign of 1541. Having repulsed it, the Russian troops proved their combat capability and high fighting qualities.
The selfless struggle of Russian soldiers and the skillful actions of diplomats did not allow the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire standing behind it in the mid-30s and the first half of the 40s. XVI century to defeat the Russian state and establish its dominance in Eastern Europe. This was a significant success for Russia.
Russian-Crimean relations in the second half of the 16th century.Throughout the second half of the 16th century, the Muscovite state and the Crimea confronted each other, as opponents, who were in an open struggle between themselves, which only at times subsided and took on the form of hidden antagonism. Before turning to the consideration of the history of the confrontation between the two states, we will make a few remarks about the reasons that determined the anti-Russian nature of the Crimean foreign policy during this period. The judgment that in relation to their neighbors, the Muscovite state and Poland, the Tatars were guided solely by considerations of greed and entered into an alliance either with Moscow or with Poland, depending on which side paid the commemoration more, comes from the recognition of such a degree of primitiveness of the Crimeans that no political motives could be assumed in it. Meanwhile, the Crimeans had a certain political calculation in their relations with their neighbors. Among their neighbors, they soon and quite correctly singled out, as their most dangerous enemy, not Poland, but the Muscovite state.
This point of view is also supported by the fact that throughout the entire Livonian War, the calculation of the Polish government for the assistance of the Tatars has always remained unchanged. The Polish government during the Livonian War three times (in 1558, 1567 and 1578) renewed its alliance with the Crimea, willingly forgetting about its violation of previously concluded agreements. The benefits of an alliance with the Tatars, according to Novoselsky, in the eyes of the Polish government a hundredfold paid off the damage caused to the Polish possessions by the Tatar raids. It should be noted that the attitude of the Polish and Moscow governments to the damage caused by the Tatar raids differed significantly from each other. The attacks of the Tatars did not threaten the political centers of Poland and almost did not affect the indigenous Polish lands; the disasters of Ukraine already painfully hurt the Polish government, the attacks of the Tatars had a completely different meaning for the Muscovite state: the Tatars captured the indigenous Russian population, they penetrated into the central regions of g and reached Moscow in the 16th century. For these reasons alone, it was easier for gentry Poland to reach an agreement with the Tatars.
Let's try to find out the role of the Crimean Tatars in the Livonian War. The Moscow government foresaw the danger of the Tatars intervening in the Livonian War, and even more so their alliance with Poland. The persistent diplomatic proposals of Ivan the Terrible to Poland for a treaty of peace and alliance against Crimea were intended to separate Poland and Crimea from each other and keep them from interfering in the war. That is how the intentions of the Russian Tsar were understood in Poland and therefore they rejected his proposals. For the same reasons, a little later, the Crimeans rejected Ivan IV's proposal to conclude a peace agreement. Poland and Crimea were equally afraid of the further strengthening of the Muscovite state; their interests coincided, and they preferred an alliance among themselves against Moscow to the peace proposals of Ivan IV.
Based on the indications of chronicles, bit books, Nogai, Crimean and some other documents, A. A. Novoselsky compiled a list of Tatar attacks in the second half of the 16th century. It shows that out of 24 years of the Livonian War, 21 years were marked by Tatar attacks; there is no indication of Tatar attacks only in 1566, 1575 and 1579. Devlet Giray himself made six attacks (1562, 1564, 1565, 1569, 1571, 1572); Crimean princes also made six attacks (1558, 1563, 1568, 1570, 1573, 1581). There is every reason to believe that the leadership of a king or prince Tatar campaigns- direct evidence of the participation of large forces in them. Regardless of how successful the individual attacks of the Tatars ended, in their totality they should have distracted a large number of Russians. armed forces from actions in Livonia and against Poland. Ivan the Terrible was able to send only part of his troops to the western front. "The calculations of Moscow's opponents were based on just such a diversion of the Russian military forces."
The direct direct connection between the raids of the Tatars on Russian lands and the course of hostilities in Livonia becomes especially noticeable if we take into account the fact that 1575-1578, there are years marked by a break in the attacks of the Crimeans on Rus', became a time of increased activity of Russian troops in Livonia.
After 1578, the last, final period of the Livonian War begins. The Muscovite state defends itself against the united Poland and Sweden and against the Tatars, and with honor comes out of the struggle. It should be noted that during this period the Crimeans were not able to actively fight the Muscovite state, as they suffered (in 1578 and 1579) crushing defeats from the Persian troops.
At the end of the Livonian War, the Crimeans stopped their raids. The reason for the turn of the policy of the Crimea was that in 1593 Turkey began a difficult and long war with Hungary, in which Crimea was to take part. This put the Crimean Khan before the need to renew the peace agreement with the Moscow government. The cessation of the Crimean raids on Muscovy at the end of the 16th century and in the early years of the 17th century was thus primarily due to the international situation.
Participation of the Crimean Tatars in the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the 17th century.A new round of military confrontation between the Russian state and the Crimea dates back to 1607. The first Tatar attacks coincide in time with the summer campaign of Tsar Vasily Shuisky against Bolotnikov. The Shuisky government tried to prevent the Tatars from interfering in the internal political struggle in the Russian state. For this purpose, a detachment of archers was sent to the Crimea with the most prominent governors and rich gifts. There was no hope that the Tatars could be sent to the Poles. The whole attempt was risky, as its outcome showed, but the position of the Shuisky government was such that it was not necessary to stop at anything.
In the next year, 1608, the Crimean Tatars did not take active actions against the Muscovite state. On the other hand, devastating raids in the Temnikov area were carried out by the Nogai Tatars.
In 1609, the main forces of the Crimeans began to move. Bussov in his "Moscow Chronicle" reports on the attacks of the Tatars, who "in three or four weeks took away many prisoners." If the "arrival" of the Tatars in 1609 coincided with the movement of the Polish king near Smolensk and the beginning of its siege, then the attack of the Tatars on Rus' in 1610 coincided with the campaign of the Poles near Moscow. It should be noted that as early as the end of 1609, the Polish king received a “kind response” from the Sultan, containing assurances “of his constant friendship, adding that since it existed with our ancestors, we should also try to maintain it.”
The Tatar attacks were one of the essential circumstances that extremely complicated the situation of Tsar Vasily Shuisky. There was a growing mood of hopelessness and futility in the defense of the "unfortunate" king, "an unworthy reign." Such a mood could also develop in the ranks of the Ryazanians, who until now were loyal supporters of Tsar Vasily, and now they were forced to think about protecting their homes from the Tatars.
The attack of the Crimeans in 1611 coincided with the first attempt to liberate Moscow from the Poles. When, in July 1611, the Poles were finally isolated in Kitai-Gorod and in the Kremlin, and all attempts to help the garrison were repulsed, Crimeans and Nogais attacked the Moscow Ukraine. Subsequent memories that have come down to us do not distinguish between individual moments of the attack, do not distinguish between the invasions of the Tatars, the actions of the Lithuanian people, the Cossack and other detachments: everything merged into an incessant and continuous “ruin”. On the basis of documentary data, A. A. Novoselsky established that in 1611 the Likhvinsky district was devastated by the Tatars, where Crimean and Lithuanian people came “unknown” and “reconquered” everything. Aleksinsky, Tarussky, Serpukhov counties, as well as Ryazan land, were also devastated.
It is noteworthy that the attack of the Tatars on the Moscow Ukraine coincides with the moment of the especially difficult situation of the Polish garrison in Moscow. This fact confirms Novoselsky's thesis about the random nature of the contradictions between Poland and the Crimea, about the natural one between the Crimea and the Russian state.
There are very few indications in the documents about the Tatar attacks in 1612. It was at this time that the relationship between Turkey and Poland changed and the struggle between them resumed. This distracted the main forces of the Crimean Tatars from attacks on the Moscow Ukraine. Since this year, attacks on Rus' have been carried out almost exclusively by the forces of the Nogai hordes.
Restoration of the system destroyed during the Troubles government controlled and the election in 1613 to the throne of Mikhail Romanov led to the establishment of more peaceful relations between Moscow and the Crimea.
Crimean Khanate in the system of international relations of the XVI-XVII centuries.The factor of Turkish military and political power far from unequivocally affected the nature of Russian-Crimean relations. On the one hand, any attempts by the Russian offensive against the Crimea would inevitably lead to a military clash with the Ottoman Empire, which would further complicate the international position of Russia, because its forces were clearly not enough to fight simultaneously on many fronts. That is why it was necessary to abandon plans for the military defeat of the Crimean Khanate and the question was raised of the need to ensure the security of the southern borders of the country by creating the most effective defense system possible, which was systematically developed and improved throughout the first half of the 16th century. But at the same time, one cannot fail to note the fact that during the 16th century there were periods of hostile relations between the Turkish sultan and the ruling elite of Crimea. Of course, this did not mean that Crimea ceased to be a conductor of Turkey's will. However, this significantly complicated the implementation of Turkey's policy towards Russia and created scope for the activities of Russian diplomacy.
Russian diplomacy and the Russian government took advantage of not only those political circles in the Crimea that were inclined to maintain peace with Russia, but also internal contradictions arising in the system of Muslim yurts, trying to prevent the creation of a united anti-Russian front. At the same time, they also searched in the south for those forces that could be opposed to the most implacable opponents of the Russian state. Hence the attempts to support Astrakhan and the Nogai Horde against Crimea.
We can agree with A. A. Novoselsky that the impact of Poland on Russian-Crimean relations was unequivocal, and the measures to consolidate the forces of all Christian states were purely declarative. It is known that in order to justify the agreements with the Crimea during the Livonian War, which discredited the reputation of the Polish kings, King Stefan Batory developed a whole theory of the conquest of the Muscovite state in order to subsequently turn all forces against the Tatars and Turks and, thus, implement the plans of the Pope. Stefan Batory spoke in an upbeat tone about the fact that Muscovy was in danger of being captured by the Turks; if this happens, then woe to Europe. In view of this, all of Europe must support the conquest plans of the king in the Muscovite state. As soon as such statements corresponded to reality, the Polish government had to go to the conclusion of an alliance treaty with Moscow, directed directly against the "Muslim threat". However, all proposals to conclude such an agreement were rejected by the Polish side. All this allows us to say that Poland and Crimea objectively acted as allies in the struggle against the Muscovite state throughout the entire 16th century. The raids of the Crimean Tatars on Poland, as A. A. Novoselsky convincingly shows, did not cause significant harm to the indigenous Polish lands and did not pose a threat to the existence of the Polish statehood. They were largely "spontaneous" in nature and were not sanctioned by the Crimean Khan. All this allows us to speak about the existence of a certain foreign policy course of the Crimean Khanate and draw conclusions about its predominantly anti-Russian orientation.
Tasks С1-С3 10-11 grades. Preparation for the exam. THEME #1
Ancient Russian state in the 9th - early 12th centuries.
Preparation for the exam. THEME #1
Ancient Russian state in the 9th - early 12th centuries.
No. 1. From a historical source.
“In the year 6370 they expelled the Varangians across the sea, and did not give them tribute, and began to rule themselves, and there was no truth among them, and clan upon clan stood up, and they had strife, and began to fight with each other. And they said to themselves: "Let's look for a prince who would rule over us and judge by right." And they went across the sea to the Varangians, to Rus' ... The Chud, Slavs, Krivichi and all said to the Rus: “Our land is great and plentiful, but there is no order in it. Come reign and rule over us." And three brothers with their clans were elected, and they took all of Rus' with them, and the eldest, Rurik, came and sat in Novgorod, and the other, Sineus, on Beloozero, and the third, Truvor, in Izborsk. And from those Varangians the Russian land was nicknamed.
C1. Give the title of the document and the name of its author. What events are mentioned in the document?
C2. What event is referred to in the passage? What caused it? Give at least two reasons.
SZ. What were the consequences of the event described in the historical source? List at least three consequences. 
Models of answers and options for constructing argumentation in tasks C1 - C3
Document #1
C1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) the name of the document - "The Tale of Bygone Years";
C2. Answer:
1. It may be indicated that we are talking about the calling of the Varangians.
2. The following reasons can be given:
1) “family to generation arose”;
2) strife and strife began;
3) this prompted the search for a prince who would own and judge by law.
SZ. Answer:
The following consequences can be named:
1) in response to the call, three Varangian brothers came;
2) the elder Rurik began to reign in Novgorod, Sineus - in Beloozero, and Truvor - in Izborsk;
3) the calling of the Varangians marked the beginning of the first princely dynasty - the Rurik dynasty. 
No. 2. From the treaty between Prince Igor and the Greeks in 945.
“In the year 6453, Roman, and Constantine, and Stefan sent ambassadors to Igor to restore the former world ... And they brought the Russian ambassadors, and ordered them to speak and write down the speeches of both on the charter:
If one of the Russians plans to destroy this friendship, then let the baptized of them accept revenge from God Almighty, and condemnation to eternal death, and let the unbaptized not accept help from God and from Perun, may they not defend themselves with their shields and their other weapons and let them be servants forever in the Hereafter.
And let the Russian Grand Duke and his boyars send as many ships as they want to the Greek land to the great Greek kings, with ambassadors and merchants, as it is established for them ... If a slave runs away from Rus', then the slave should be caught, since Rus' came to the country of our kingdom, if the slave fled from the holy Mama; if the fugitive is not discovered, then let our Christians swear to Russia according to their faith, and not Christians according to their own law, and then let Russia take the price of a slave on us (Greeks), as established before, 2 silk per slave ... "
C1. Name the chronological framework of the period of Igor's reign. What was the purpose of the treaty of 945? What was the nature of the terms of the treaty for Rus'?
C2. What was the punishment for violating the terms of the document? Name at least two positions. Make a conclusion about the beliefs of the population of Rus' in the middle of the X century.
SZ. What conclusions can be drawn from the text of the treaty on the economic development of Russia using the knowledge of the course national history? List at least two conclusions. 
Document #2
Document #2
C1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) the period of Igor's reign - 912-945;
2) the agreement was the renewal of the peace of 911. between Russia and Byzantium;
3) the agreement dealt with preferential terms of trade for Russian merchants in Byzantium.
C2. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) punishment for Christians - revenge from God Almighty and condemnation to eternal death;
2) punishment for the pagans - deprivation of the patronage of the god Perun;
3) conclusion - among the population Old Russian state were pagans and Christians.
SZ. Answer:
The following conclusions can be drawn:
1) the text contains a number of indications of the economic development of Rus': trade relations and relations with Byzantium;
2) the mention of slaves in the text should not serve as proof of the existence of the slave system in Rus', because. slavery among the Slavs was domestic in nature, it was patriarchal. 
No. 4. From a historical source.
“Do not forget the poorest of all, but feed as much as you can, and give to the orphan, and justify the widow yourself, and do not let the strong destroy a person. Do not kill the right or the guilty, and do not command to kill him; even if he is guilty of death, then do not destroy any Christian soul ...
And now I will tell you, my children, about my work, how I worked on the road and on the hunt from the age of thirteen. First I went to Rostov through the land of the Vyatichi; my father sent me, and he himself went to Kursk ...
And in the spring, my father put me in Pereyaslavl above all the brethren ... and on the way to Priluk-city, the Polovtsian princes suddenly met us, with eight thousand, and they wanted to deal with them, but the weapons were sent forward on wagons, and we entered city...
And then Oleg went to me with all the Polovtsian land to Chernigov, and my squad fought with them for eight days for a small shaft and did not allow them to enter the prison; I took pity on Christian souls, and burning villages, and monasteries, and said: "Let the pagans not boast." And he gave his father's table to his brother, and he went to his father's table in Pereyaslavl...
And from Chernigov to Kyiv about a hundred times I went to my father, one day driving before evening. And in total there were eighty campaigns and three great ones, and I won’t mention the rest of the smaller ones. And he concluded worlds with the Polovtsian princes without one twenty, and with a father and without a father ...
Do not condemn me, my children or anyone else who reads: I do not praise myself or my courage, but I praise God and glorify mercy for the fact that he has protected me, a sinner and a bad one, from mortal dangers for so many years, and not lazy He created me, and fit for all kinds of human deeds.
C1. To what century does the work from which this passage is taken belong? What is it called? Who is its author?
C2. Using knowledge from the history course, indicate what the author of the work is famous for. List at least three positions.
SZ. Using the text of the passage, name at least two problems that concern the author. What character traits does he celebrate? List at least two character traits. 
Document #4
Document #4
C 1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) the work was created in the 12th century;
2) title - "Teaching children";
C2. Answer:
1) the fight against the Polovtsy (organization of a campaign against the Polovtsy in the steppe in 1111);
2) the organization of the princely congress in Lyubech in 1097;
3) editing Russkaya Pravda;
4) restoration of the unity of Rus'.
SZ. Answer:
1. The following problems that concern the author can be given:
1) maintaining the unity of the Russian lands;
2) internecine wars;
3) the weakening of the defense capability and external threats of Rus'.
2. The following character traits may be indicated:
courage, mercy, diligence, modesty. 
No. 5. From the book "The World of History" by Academician B.A. Rybakov.
“Perhaps, there are not so many vivid memories of any of the figures of Kievan Rus as of Vladimir Monomakh. He was remembered both in palaces and in peasant huts after many centuries. The people composed epics about him as about the winner of the formidable Polovtsian Khan Tugorkan - “Tugarin Zmeevich”, and because of the similarity of the names of the two Vladimirs, they poured these epics into the old cycle of the Kiev epic of Vladimir I ...
It is not surprising that at the end of the 15th century, the figure of Monomakh was most noticeable to Moscow historians in their native past, with whose name they connected the legend of the royal regalia allegedly received by Vladimir from the emperor of Byzantium ...
It is not surprising that in the dark years of strife, the Russian people sought solace in their majestic past; their views turned to the era of Vladimir Monomakh. "The Word about the destruction of the Russian land", written on the eve of the Tatar-Mongol invasion, idealizes Kievan Rus, sings of Vladimir Monomakh and his era...
Vladimir received a good education, which allowed him to use not only the knight's sword, but also the writer's pen in his political struggle.
C1. Indicate the chronological framework of the great reign of Vladimir Monomakh. What royal regalia, allegedly received by him, did the historian mean?
C2. How do you understand the statement that the Grand Duke in the political struggle used "not only the knight's sword, but also writer's pen? Give at least two statements.
SZ. Why does the “Word about the destruction of the Russian land” sings of Vladimir Monomakh? Name at least three merits of the Grand Duke. 
Document #5
Document #5
C1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) the chronological framework of the reign - 1113-1125;
2) "Cap of Monomakh", with which all Russian tsars were crowned.
C2. Answer:
The following provisions may be specified:
1) Vladimir Monomakh went down in history with his literary works;
2) "Teaching Children" is not only a model of ancient Russian literature, but also a monument of philosophical, political and pedagogical thought;
3) of considerable interest is the “Chronicle” compiled by Vladimir Monomakh, which contains a description of the military and hunting exploits of the Grand Duke.
SZ. Answer:
The following merits can be given:
1) under the prince, Rus pacified the Polovtsy (they ceased to be a constant threat for a while);
2) the power of the Kyiv prince extended to all the lands inhabited by the ancient Russian people;
3) the strife of petty princes was decisively suppressed by Vladimir Monomakh;
4) Kyiv was the capital of a huge, the largest state in Europe. 
Topic No. 2. Russian lands and principalities in the XII - mid-XV centuries.
No. 6. From the work of the historian V.O. Klyuchevsky.
“From this time on, signs of desolation of Kievan Rus become noticeable. The river strip along the middle Dnieper with tributaries, which has long been so well populated, has been emptying since that time, its population disappears somewhere .... Among the seven desolate cities of the Chernihiv land, we meet one of the oldest and richest cities in the Dnieper region - Lyubech. Simultaneously with the signs of the ebb of the population from Kievan Rus, we also notice traces of the decline of its economic well-being: Rus, emptying, at the same time became poorer. ... The ebb of the population from the Dnieper region went in two directions, in two opposite streams. One jet was directed to the west, to the Western Bug, to the region of the upper Dniester and upper Vistula, deep into Galicia and Poland. So the southern Russian population from the Dnieper region returned to long-forgotten places abandoned by their ancestors. ... Another stream of colonization from the Dnieper region is directed to the opposite corner of the Russian land, to the northeast, across the Ugra River, in the interfluve of the Oka and the Upper Volga. ... She is the source of all the main phenomena found in the life of Upper Volga Rus'. ... The entire political and social life of this Rus' was formed from the consequences of this colonization.
C1. Using the text of the document and knowledge of the course of history, indicate the name of the period in the history of Russia, which is discussed in the document. What is its chronological framework?
C2. How does the historian assess the consequences of the phenomena noted in the document? Using knowledge from history and the text of the document, indicate what role the Upper Volga Rus played in further Russian history. List at least three positions.
SZ. What phenomena characteristic of this period and their causes does the document testify to? Use the text of the document and knowledge of the history course to answer. List at least three positions. 
Document #6
Document #6
C1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) the name of the period - political (state) fragmentation;
2) chronological framework: the middle of the XII century. (30s of the XII century) - the first half of the XIV century.
C2. Answer:
The following statements may be made:
1) strengthening and elevation of North-Eastern Rus';
2) the political and social life of North-Eastern Rus' was largely due to the influx of people from Kievan Rus;
3) the role of the Upper Volga Rus' was that in the future it became the center of the unification of all Russian lands.
SZ. Answer:
1. Phenomena such as
1) the outflow of the population from Kievan Rus, the desolation of the cities of Kievan Rus;
2) colonization of the northwestern and northeastern Russian lands.
2. Reasons for Kiev's loss of its historical role can be named:
1) constant civil strife caused by the struggle for the "Kiev table";
2) the movement of the main trade routes, the fall of the role of "the path from the Varangians to the Greeks." 
No. 7. From the work of the historian B. A. Rybakov.
“In addition to the colorful and dramatic external history of the principalities and princes, this era is extremely interesting for us for those aggravated relations between the princes and the boyars, which were so clearly identified already in the time of Yaroslav Osmomysl. If we discard the element of personal gain and self-interest, then it should be recognized that the policy pursued by them of concentrating land, weakening appanages and strengthening the central princely power was objectively progressive, since it coincided with the interests of the people. In pursuing this policy, the princes relied on the broad strata of the townspeople and on the reserves of petty feudal lords (youths, children, merciful ones), who were completely dependent on the prince, grown by them.
It is necessary to pay attention to the fact that the initial phase of this period (before the conquest factor intervened in the normal development) is characterized not by the decline of culture, as one might expect, ... but, on the contrary, by the rapid growth of cities and the bright flowering of Russian culture during all its manifestations. It follows from this that the new political form obviously contributed (perhaps at first) to progressive development.
C1. Give the name of the historical period referred to in the passage. Using knowledge of the history course, name the largest political centers of this period. List at least three positions in total.
C2. Using the text of the document and drawing on knowledge of history, indicate at least three characteristic features of this period.
SZ. Attracting knowledge of history and using the text of the document, evaluate this period. Give at least two arguments to support your assessment. 
Document #7
Document #7
C1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) the name of the period - "Specific Rus'", feudal fragmentation;
2) the largest political centers: Vladimir-Suzdal principality, Velikiy Novgorod(Novgorod land, or Novgorod boyar republic), Galicia-Volyn principality.
C2. Answer:
The following traits may be indicated:
1) princely strife;
2) the struggle of the princes for the "Kiev table";
3) the aggravation of relations between the princes and the boyars (the policy of concentration of lands, the weakening of appanages, the strengthening of the central princely power);
4) independence of boyars-patrimonials in their lands;
5) the weakening of the military potential of the country, fragmentation and lack of unity in the Russian lands, which caused the defeat of Rus' in the fight against the Mongols;
6) flourishing culture;
7) the growth and strengthening of the political and economic power of cities.
SZ. Answer:
It should be indicated that the period can be estimated as contradictory, ambiguous, but natural for its time.
The following arguments can be given, for example,
1) along with a dramatic external history (civil strife, lack of unity, the conquest factor, increased nomad raids), there are also positive aspects of this period;
2) the new political form promoted progressive development;
3) progressive development includes such phenomena as the growth of cities, the bright flowering of Russian culture in all its manifestations. 
No. 8. From the work of N.M. Karamzin.
“Unfortunately, in this vigorous youth, she did not protect herself from the state common ulcer of that time, which the German peoples informed Europe: I am talking about the appanage system. The happiness and character of Vladimir, the happiness and character of Yaroslav, could only delay the fall of a state based on autocracy on conquests. Russia is divided.
Together with the cause of its power, so necessary for prosperity, both the power and the prosperity of the people disappeared. A miserable internecine strife of faint-hearted princes was revealed, who, forgetting the glory, the benefit of the fatherland, slaughtered each other and ruined the people in order to add some insignificant town to their lot. Greece, Hungary, Poland rested: the spectacle of our internal disaster served them as a guarantee of their safety. Until then, they were afraid of the Russians - they began to despise them. In vain, some magnanimous princes - Monomakh, Vasilko - spoke in the name of the fatherland at solemn congresses, in vain others - Bogolyubsky, Vsevolod III - tried to appropriate autocracy for themselves: the attempts were weak, unfriendly, and for two centuries Russia tormented its own bowels, drank its own tears and blood ".
C1. Indicate the trend in the process of state formation and the chronological framework of the historical period referred to in the passage.
C. Using the text of the document and drawing on knowledge of history, name at least three reasons for the princely civil strife.
SZ. Attracting knowledge of history and using the text of the document, indicate which way to overcome the domestic political situation was proposed by Vladimir Monomakh, Andrey Bogolyubsky. Give at least two statements. 
Document #8
Document #8
C1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) tendency - the process of formation of a system of appanages independent of the central government;
2) chronological framework - XII-XV centuries.
C2. Answer:
The following reasons may be given:
1) the cowardice of the princes, who, forgetting the glory, the benefit of the fatherland, slaughtered and destroyed the people;
2) the desire of specific princes for political and economic independence;
3) the development of feudal landownership;
4) the desire of the boyars to strengthen local power.
SZ. Answer:
1) Vladimir Monomakh proposed to create a single state;
2) Andrei Bogolyubsky advocated the subordination of weak principalities to strong ones. 
No. 9. From the work of the historian V.O. Klyuchevsky.
“From the whole figure of Andrei breathes something new; but this novelty was hardly good. Prince Andrei was a stern and wayward master, who acted in his own way in everything, and not according to the old days and custom. Contemporaries noticed this duality in him, a mixture of strength with weakness, power with whim. “Such a wise man in all matters,” the chronicler says about him, “so valiant, Prince Andrei ruined his meaning by intemperance,” i.e. lack of self-control. Having shown so much military prowess and political prudence in his youth in the south, he then ... did a lot of bad deeds: he gathered and sent large armies to rob either Kiev or Novgorod, scattered a web of power-hungry intrigues throughout the Russian land from his dark corner on Klyazma .. .
Having driven out the big paternal boyars from the Rostov land, he surrounded himself with such servants, who, in gratitude for his lordly favors, disgustingly killed him and plundered his palace. He was very pious and poor-loving, set up many churches in his region, before matins he himself lit candles in the temple, like a caring church elder, ordered to carry food and drink through the streets for the sick and the poor, paternally dearly loved his city Vladimir, wanted to make of it another Kiev, even with a special, second Russian metropolitan, built the famous Golden Gates in it and wanted to unexpectedly open them for the city feast of the Assumption of the Mother of God, saying to the boyars: “People will come together for the holiday and see the gates” ...
In the person of Prince Andrei, the Great Russian first appeared on the historical stage, and this performance cannot be considered successful.
C1. Which Prince Andrew is referred to in the document? Specify the chronological framework of his great reign.
C2. What events did the historian have in mind when he spoke of sending large armies "to plunder either Kyiv or Novgorod"? Name at least two positions.
SZ. How is the prince described in the document? Why, according to V.O. Klyuchevsky, the first performance of the Great Russian on the historical stage cannot be considered successful? Give at least two statements. 
Document #9
Document #9
C1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) Andrei Yurievich Bogolyubsky (Grand Duke of Vladimir);
2) the chronological framework of the reign - 1157-1174.
C2. Answer:
The following provisions may be specified:
1) in 1169, Andrei Bogolyubsky sent an army to Kyiv, captured it and devastated it;
2) in 1170, taking advantage of a poor harvest, the prince blocked the flow of food to Novgorod from his possessions, so the Novgorodians were forced to invite Bogolyubsky's protege to their princely table.
SZ. Answer:
1. The following provisions may be given:
1) the prince is characterized as an ambiguous political figure (there were positive and negative features);
2) Andrei Bogolyubsky could not establish autocracy (eliminate the specific system) in the Vladimir-Suzdal principality, because. the specific princes were still strong. 
No. 10. From the Tale of Igor's Campaign.
“... Then the great Svyatoslav dropped the golden word, mixed with tears, and said: “O my nephews, Igor and Vsevolod! Early you began to offend the Polovtsian land with swords, and seek glory for yourself. But without honor you overcame, without honor you shed filthy blood. Your brave hearts made of strong damask steel are chained and tempered in courage. What did they create from my silver gray hair?
And no longer I see the power of my strong, and rich, and plentiful warriors, my brother Yaroslav, with the Chernigov boyars. But you said: "Let's take courage ourselves: we will steal the past glory for ourselves, and we will divide the future ourselves" ...
Grand Duke Vsevolod! Don't you think to fly from afar, to observe your father's golden throne? After all, you can splash the Volga with oars, and scoop out the Don with helmets.
You, exuberant Rurik, and Davyd! ... Enter, gentlemen, into the golden stirrup for the offense of our time, for the Russian land, for the wounds of Igor, the exuberant Svyatoslavovich!
Galician Osmomysl Yaroslav! ... Your thunderstorms flow through the lands, you open the gates to Kyiv, you shoot from your father's golden throne of the saltans beyond the lands. Shoot, Lord, Konchak, a filthy slave, for the Russian land, for the wounds of Igor, the violent Svyatoslavovich!
C1. What historical event formed the basis of the "Word ..."? What time is this event?
Document #10
Document #10
C1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) the basis of the “Word ...” was the campaign of the Novgorod-Seversky prince Igor Svyatoslavich against the Polovtsians;
2) this event refers to the XII century. (1185).
C2. Answer:
The following provisions may be specified:
1) a reason for bitter thoughts about the fate of the Russian land - the strife between the princes, which caused the military failures of Rus' in the fight against the Steppe;
a) sought personal glory;
b) did not coordinate their actions with other princes;
c) conducted a campaign only on their own. SZ. Answer:
1) to the agreement of all princes of actions against nomads;
2) to end the strife between the princes. 
No. 11. From The Life of Alexander Nevsky.
"... Having worked hard for the Russian land, for Novgorod and Pskov, for all the great reign, giving his life and for the Orthodox faith."
From the historical work of S.M. Solovyov.
“Alexander Nevsky, having become the Grand Duke of Vladimir, had to humiliate himself before the Tatars in order to save his native land from destruction; I had to persuade the people to patiently take down the yoke, to allow the Tatars to rewrite themselves for the imposition of tribute. With the help of the prince, uprisings against the Horde were suppressed. The result was the prohibition of veche orders in the cities. However, the political activity of the prince made it possible to prevent a new destruction of cities.
C1. What two victories of Alexander Nevsky were meant by the mention of Novgorod and Pskov? Give a rationale proving that the prince “gave his belly [life] for the Orthodox faith.
C2. As explained by S.M. Soloviev, the motives for the actions of Alexander Nevsky? How did the historian assess the actions of the prince? Name at least two positions.
SZ. What personal qualities of Alexander Nevsky are evidenced by the given sources? List at least three qualities 
Document #11
Document #11
C1. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) victories - the Neva battle and the Battle of the Ice;
2) the struggle against the German knights was also a struggle against the imposition of Catholicism.
C2. Answer:
It may be indicated that
1) explanation - the desire to save the native land from destruction;
2) S.M. Solovyov assessed the actions of Alexander Nevsky positively.
SZ. Answer:
The following qualities of a prince can be indicated:
flexibility;
patience;
courage;
wisdom, etc. 
№ 12. From the Simeon Chronicle.
“The great prince set up an army on Lake Peipus on Uzmen, at the Voronya stone, and, having prepared for battle, went against them. The troops converged on Lake Peipus; there were plenty of those and others. And his brother Andrey was here with Alexander with many soldiers of his father, Alexander had many warriors brave, strong and strong, they were all filled with a warlike spirit, and their hearts were like lions. And they said: "Prince, now the time has come to lay down their heads for you." It was then the Sabbath day, and at sunrise the two armies came together. And there was an evil and great slaughter for the Germans and a miracle, and there was a crackling of breaking spears and a sound from the blows of swords, so that the ice on the frozen lake broke, and the ice was not visible, because it was covered with blood. And I myself heard about it from an eyewitness who was there.
And the Germans turned to flight, and the Russians drove them with a fight as if through air, and there was nowhere for them to escape, they beat them for 7 miles on the ice of the Subolitsky coast,
and 500 Germans fell, and countless miracles, and 50 of the best German governors were captured and brought to Novgorod, and other Germans drowned in the lake, because it was spring. Others ran away seriously wounded.
C1. In what year did the aggression of the German knights against the Russian lands, described in the text, take place? How did the battle on Lake Peipus end? List at least two outcomes.
C2. What actions did Prince Alexander take to repel
German aggression? Name at least two activities.
NW. Attracting knowledge from the course of history, indicate at least three provisions that reveal the historical significance of the victories of Prince Alexander Yaroslavich. 
Document #12
Describing the Battle of Kulikovo, some chroniclers accuse Prince Oleg Ivanovich of Ryazan of betrayal because he concluded a “non-aggression pact” with Khan Mamai and because Ryazan, together with Lithuania, was ready to help him. As you know, Oleg Ivanovich did not participate in the Battle of Kulikovo. However, does this mean that he betrayed all-Russian interests?
Between the hammer and the anvil
Prince Oleg came into possession of the Ryazan principality after the death of his father Ivan Alexandrovich in 1350. He was only 12 years old. The principality, which the young prince inherited, was between the "hammer and the anvil", that is, between two dangers. From the south, the threat of a Tatar invasion constantly emanated, from the west - the threat of raids from Lithuania, depending on which the principalities bordering Ryazan were located. In addition, the growing Moscow principality sought to expand its territories at the expense of the Ryazan lands. As the popular saying goes: “Wherever you throw it, there is a wedge everywhere ...”.
Under such conditions, Oleg Ivanovich, in order to ensure the safety of his subjects, was forced to pursue a flexible, evasive policy, concluding allied agreements not only with the Moscow prince, but also with the Tatars. And there is nothing treacherous here. The conclusion and termination of various treaties with the Tatars then practiced almost all Russian princes. And long before that, some princes had allied relations with them. For example, the holy noble prince Alexander Nevsky ...
Advisor to the godless Mamai?
1380. Kulikovo battle. It really was one of the decisive moments in upholding the independence of the Russian lands. Oleg Ivanovich understood the all-Russian significance of the Battle of Kulikovo, but he also understood something else - in any outcome, it could not but have an extremely negative impact on the position of the Ryazan principality. If he comes out on the side of the Moscow prince, the Tatars, even the defeated ones, after some time will gather their strength and go to Moscow. And their path always ran through Ryazan. Surely they would recoup on it for their defeat. There is no doubt that they would be wiped off the face of the earth. And then Oleg Ivanovich secretly sent his boyars with soldiers to battle. And he himself concluded a fake agreement with the Lithuanian prince Jagiello, who went to the aid of the Tatars, and decided to become ... an adviser to the Tatar Khan. So they designated him in the annals "adviser of the godless Mamai."
What did the Ryazan prince advise him? It is likely that it was he who advised him that Jagiello join the battle only after he joined the Ryazan squads, who, allegedly, together with the Lithuanians, would definitely come to the aid of the Tatars.
How Ryazan taught Lithuania a lesson
Hiding behind an alliance agreement with Mamai and Jagiello, Oleg Ivanovich began to secretly help the Moscow prince Dimitri Ivanovich. And, above all, he promptly notified the Moscow prince Dmitry Ivanovich that the Lithuanians came to the aid of the Tatars. Here is how the very, very authoritative historian Boris Aleksandrovich Rybakov writes about this in the article “The Battle of Kulikovo”: “The important news that the steppe Russian intelligence could not tell was conveyed to Dimitri by the Ryazan prince Oleg Ivanovich. His letter contained important and truthful information that determined the entire strategic calculation of the Moscow commanders. So - neither more nor less, but "the whole strategic calculation."
Oleg Ivanovich provided invaluable assistance to the Moscow squads by the fact that, having concluded an agreement with the Lithuanians, he forced them to wait during the Battle of Kulikovo. What to expect? Fortifications of their squads by Ryazan. Jagiello was waiting for this fortification, but did not wait. But he did not dare to fight. Why? Asking this question, the historian F. Shakhmagonov writes: “The blow of the Lithuanian troops, even without the Ryazan squads, would also call into question the outcome of the battle on the Kulikovo field, but Jagiello did not budge. What kept him? Behind Demetrius there was only one force that could keep Jagiello from a treacherous blow - the Ryazan army, Oleg Ryazansky.
Thus, having entered into “allied” relations with Lithuania, Prince Oleg so skillfully led the Lithuanian prince by the nose, which, in the end, left him with his nose.
As reported in the annals, Jagiello later lamented about his unreason: “Your Lithuania has never been taught from Ryazan, but now I’ve fallen into madness.”
All-Russian patriot
The results of the Battle of Kulikovo justified the political calculations of Oleg Ivanovich. Jagiello did not enter the battle, Mamai was defeated, the Ryazan principality was saved from ruin.
For political wisdom, for military victories over the Lithuanians, which Oleg Ivanovich won more than once, for paternal care of his subjects, he remained in the memory of the people of Ryazan as the best prince. It is no coincidence that Oleg Ivanovich is depicted on the coat of arms of the city of Ryazan.
But he was also an all-Russian patriot. Laying the foundations for the annexation of Ryazan to Moscow, in 1385 Oleg Ivanovich concluded with Dmitry Ivanovich "an eternal peace from generation to generation." But before that, he won Kolomna from him, which previously belonged to Ryazan, and was ready to return all the Ryazan lands once captured by Moscow.
But, taking into account the all-Russian interests, Oleg Ivanovich did not fight against Dimitri Ivanovich. He made peace with him, following the advice of St. Sergius of Radonezh, who specially came to Ryazan to reconcile the princes. Moreover, he became related to the Moscow prince, marrying his son to the daughter of Dmitry Ivanovich.
Kinship relations between the Ryazan and Moscow princes greatly contributed to the rapprochement of their principalities and, in the end, to the union. Already the grandson of Oleg Ivanovich Ivan Fedorovich in 1456 transferred the Ryazan reign to the Moscow prince Vasily II.
Thus, as Metropolitan Simon (Novikov) of Ryazan and Kasimov noted quite rightly: “By uniting with Moscow, Ryazan honestly and faithfully served the Fatherland, caring for the common good of Russia. The first to lay the foundations of this union was none other than the Grand Duke Oleg Ivanovich.
The name of Judas has long been a household name in the designation of traitors and traitors. It is interesting that in Europe the plot of Iscariot is not as popular in folklore as it is in our country. But both overseas and on our land there are traitors, sometimes even in abundance.
The name of Judas has long been a household name in the designation of traitors and traitors. It is interesting that in Europe the plot of Iscariot is not as popular in folklore as it is in our country. But both overseas and on our land there are traitors, sometimes even in abundance.
Oleg Ryazansky
Historians are still arguing about whether the Ryazan prince Oleg Ioannovich was a traitor. He evaded participation in the Battle of Kulikovo - decisive in the fight against the Golden Horde yoke. The prince entered into an alliance with Khan Mamai and the Lithuanian prince Yagaila against Moscow, and later gave Moscow to Khan Tokhtamysh. For contemporaries, Oleg Ryazansky is a traitor whose name is cursed. However, in our time there is an opinion that Oleg took on the difficult mission of Moscow's secret infiltrator in the Horde. The agreement with Mamai allowed him to find out military plans and report them to Dmitry Moskovsky. Even Tokhtamysh's campaign against Moscow, which he supported, is explained in this theory. They say it was necessary to play for time and weaken the forces of the Horde by the siege of a powerful fortress. Dmitry, meanwhile, was gathering an army from all over Rus' and preparing for a decisive battle. It was Oleg’s Ryazan squads that were Moscow’s barrier from the Lithuanian prince Jagaila, and yet the blow of the Lithuanian troops would call into question the outcome of the battle on the Kulikovo field. Of his contemporaries, only Tokhtamysh guessed about the dual policy of the prince - and completely defeated the Ryazan principality.
Moscow Prince Yuri Danilovich
Only Moscow Prince Yuri (Georgy) Danilovich could count on intrigues in the Horde in the struggle for the Vladimir throne with Mikhail of Tver, son of Yaroslav III: Moscow at the turn of the 12th-13th centuries was significantly inferior to Tver in power. In the Horde, the prince was his own man, having lived for two years in Sarai. Having married the sister of Khan Uzbek Konchaka (in baptism Agafya), he received a label on the grand throne. But, having come to Rus' with this label and the army of the Mongols, Yuri was defeated by Michael and fled back to the Horde. Konchaka was captured by the Tverites and soon died. Yuri accused Mikhail of Tverskoy of poisoning her and disobeying the Horde. The prince was summoned to the Horde, where the court sentenced him to death. But for a long time, Mikhail, chained in stocks, had to wander along with the Tatar camp, and only after many torments was the prince killed. Yuri got Vladimir and a few years later - death at the hands of the son of the deceased prince of Tver. Mikhail - posthumous glory: on December 5, Russia celebrates the Day of Remembrance of the Great Martyr Holy Blessed Prince Michael of Tver, intercessor and heavenly patron of Tver.
Hetman Mazepa
The Ukrainian hetman Ivan Mazepa was for a long time one of the closest associates of Peter I. For his services to Russia, he was even awarded the highest state award- Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. But during the Northern War, Mazepa openly joined the Swedish king Charles XII and entered into an agreement with the Polish king Stanislav Leshchinsky, promising Kiev, Chernigov and Smolensk to Poland. For this, he wanted to receive the title of prince and the rights to Vitebsk and Polotsk. About three thousand Zaporizhzhya Cossacks went over to the side of Mazepa. In response, Peter I stripped the traitor of all titles and elected a new hetman, while the Metropolitan of Kiev anathematized the defector. Soon, many of Mazepa's adherents returned with repentance to the side of the Russians. By the decisive battle near Poltava, the hetman was left with a handful of people loyal to him. Peter rejected his attempts to negotiate a return to Russian citizenship. After the defeat of the Swedes in the Battle of Poltava in 1709, Mazepa, together with the defeated Swedish king, fled to the Ottoman Empire, where he soon died.
Prince Kurbsky
Prince Andrey Kurbsky is now called "the first Russian dissident". For a long time he was one of the most influential statesmen in Russia and the closest friend of Ivan IV. He was a member of the Chosen Rada, which ruled the state on behalf of the tsar through major long-term reforms. However, it was not in vain that Tsar Ivan Rada, nicknamed the Terrible, disbanded Rada, and subjected its active participants to disgrace and executions. Fearing the same fate, Kurbsky fled to Lithuania. The Polish king granted him several estates and included him in the Royal Rada. Already abroad, Kurbsky wrote a political pamphlet accusing the tsar of despotism - "The Story of the Grand Duke of Moscow." However, betrayal was discussed later, when in 1564 Kurbsky led one of the Polish armies in the war against Russia. Although he could leave military service. After Kurbsky's flight, his wife, son and mother were tortured and killed. Grozny explained his cruelty by the fact of treason and violation of the kiss on the cross, accusing his former friend of trying to seize power in Yaroslavl and of poisoning his beloved wife, Tsarina Anastasia.
General Vlasov
His name during the Great Patriotic War became a household name, denoting a traitor to the Motherland. The traitor was hated even by the Nazis: Himmler called him "a runaway pig and a fool." Hitler didn't even want to meet him.
Soviet Lieutenant General Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov in 1942 was the commander of the 2nd shock army and deputy commander of the Volkhov Front. Having been captured by the Germans, Vlasov deliberately cooperated with the Nazis, giving them secret information and advising them on how to fight against Soviet army. He collaborated with Himmler, Goering, Goebbels, Ribbentrop, with various high-ranking Abwehr and Gestapo officials. In Germany, Vlasov organized the Russian Liberation Army from Russian prisoners of war recruited into the service of the Germans. The troops of the ROA participated in the fight against partisans, robberies and executions of civilians, and the destruction of entire settlements. In 1945, immediately after the surrender of Germany, Vlasov was captured by the Red Army, in 1946 he was convicted on charges of treason and hanged.
I bring to your attention the article slovenorus14, published by him in the community "Ancient Rus'". From it you will learn about more than two centuries of history of relations between the Moscow State and the Crimean Horde. If at the beginning they were allied (which was due to the presence of common enemies), then from the beginning of the 16th century the states went into a state of constant war.
Part 1 "Allies"
In the second quarter of the 15th century, the Golden Horde finally disintegrated into a number of independent khanates, as a result of which Muscovy had to deal with several Tatar states, one of which was the Crimean Khanate formed in 1441. The Crimean Khanate lasted longer than other fragments of the Golden Horde (until 1783), and it was the struggle against the Crimea that was of the longest and fiercest nature. However, at the first stage, in the second half of the 15th and at the very beginning of the 16th century, the relations of Moscow Rus with the Crimean Khanate were peaceful, there were no hostile actions between the two states. Moreover, during this period, Moscow and Crimea were in allied relations, which was due to the presence of common opponents, primarily in the person of the Great Horde and, to a lesser extent, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
After the collapse of the Horde, the largest Tatar public education turned out to be the Great Horde, the rulers of which quite reasonably considered themselves the legal successors of the former Golden Horde and periodically attempted to restore the former unity of the Genghisid state, and the power that the Horde had over the Russian principalities. Under these conditions, the main enemy for both Moscow Rus and the Crimean state was precisely the Great Horde, on the success or failure of the confrontation with which the freedom of Rus' depended, and in the case of the Crimean Khanate, the very existence of this state is possible.
In the middle and second half of the 15th century, Moscow Rus won a number of military victories over the Kazan Khanate and the horde of Seyid-Ahmad, and by the end of the 50s and the beginning of the 60s of the XV century, it stopped paying tribute to the Great Horde, which inevitably led to an open armed confrontation with by this state. So, in 1460, the Great Horde Khan Mahmud attacked Ryazan, subject to Moscow, after another 5 years, he also launched a new large-scale invasion "on the Russian land with the entire Horde", but this time the khan failed to reach the Russian borders, due to the fact that the Greater Horde army, which set out on a campaign against Russia, was suddenly attacked by the Crimeans and was defeated: “The same summer, the godless Tsar Mahmut went to the Russian land with the entire Horde and was on the Don. By the mercy of God and His most pure Mother, King Azigireus came to him and beat him and took the Horde. And we began to fight between ourselves, and so God deliver the Russian land from the filthy ”(Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. Vol. 12). Thus, the Crimean Khanate unwittingly contributed to the disruption of the next large-scale invasion of the Horde into Rus'.
In the early 1970s, the first official contacts between Moscow and Crimea began, which was directly related to the increased foreign policy activity of the Great Horde and the aggravated relations between Crimea and Moscow with the Great Horde. Having replaced Mahmud, Akhmat took certain and very successful steps to restore the former unity and power of the "Ulus Dzhuchiev". In addition, the khan was not going to refuse to restore the lost power over Russia, while, as can be seen from the demands put forward by Akhmat during negotiations with Moscow in 1474-1480, the plans of the Greater Horde ruler included not only the restoration of tributary relations, but and the restoration of long gone forms of political dependence in the form of trips of the Russian prince to the Horde and the approval of his power by the khan's label. All this naturally created a threat to the independence of both the Moscow principality and the Crimean horde.
Under these conditions, both Moscow and Crimea were objectively interested in an alliance with each other, in connection with which the question inevitably arose of concluding an agreement against the “whole enemy”. The first to take the initiative, who had been at war with the Great Horde for many years, was the Crimean Khan Mengli-Girey, who sent an embassy to Moscow in 1473 with a proposal to establish allied relations against Akhmat: son named Azibaba, but sent to the Grand Duke with love and brotherhood ... ”(Moscow chronicle of the end of the 15th century. PSRL, T. 25 p. 301). For his part, Ivan III, after repulsing the invasion of Akhmat near Aleksin, who finally broke off tributary relations with the Great Horde, was also interested in having allies, and in next year a response embassy was sent to the Crimea. At the same time, the Moscow “draft treaty” was not limited only to the anti-Horde orientation, but also contained proposals for an alliance against the ally of the Great Horde, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Akhmat, and send me a message to you, and to you, my brother, Grand Duke Ivan, let your princes go to the Horde. And the king Akhmat will go against you, and I, Menli-Giray, the king, go against him, or let his brother go with his people, and be at him with you alone. Also mi against the king, against your enemy, be one with you: if you go against the king, and I will go to him on his land; either the king will go against you against the Grand Duke, or he will send you, and I will also go against the king and his land ”(Collection of RIO. Vol. 41, p. 5). However, due to the fault of the Crimean side, which did not want to give an anti-Lithuanian character to the alliance with Moscow, the negotiations did not lead to the expected result. And although, despite the failure of the negotiations, contacts between the two states were not interrupted, and the next year a new Russian embassy was sent to the Crimea, but this time the agreement was not concluded ...
In the future, the situation became even more complicated, in connection with the outbreak of civil strife within the Crimean Khanate. In 1475, Mengli-Girey was overthrown by his brother Nurdavlet, at the same time the Turks seized the Genoese possessions in the Crimea, and Mengli-Girey himself was taken prisoner by them. In 1476, the Great Horde undertakes a successful campaign against the Crimea, as a result of which, the protege of Akhmat, Dzhanibek, occupies the Crimean throne, and the Crimea is under the control of the Great Horde: "(Typographic chronicle. PSRL. Vol. 24). But the very next year, Nurdavlet expelled Janibek and restored the independence of the Crimean Khanate, in turn, a year later, Mengli Giray, with the support of the Turks, regained power, but at the same time he himself became a vassal of the Turkish Sultan.
With the return of Mengli Giray, the period of Crimean civil strife ends, and contacts with Moscow are resumed. As a result, after lengthy negotiations, at the beginning of 1480, the union treaty was finally approved. At the same time, Mengli-Giray nevertheless made concessions and agreed to include Lithuania among the “vocal enemies,” which the Moscow prince insisted on from the very beginning: to you, my brother, Grand Duke Ivan, let your princes go to the Horde with lancers and princes. And Akhmat the king will go to you, and I Menli-Girey the king to go to Akhmat the king, or let his brother go with his people. Also, against the king, against the cry of your enemy, be with you together: if you go against the king, or send, and I will go to him and to his land; if the king will go against you against my brother against the Grand Duke, or send me, and I will also go against the king and his land. And I’ll be in wool with the king, but what will it be like for you, my brother, the Grand Duke, with the king, and I’ll lay down the wool for the king, and be with him alone with you ”(Sat. RIO. T. 41, p. 20). Thus, the persistence of Ivan III, the firm and consistent position of the Russian side eventually gave their results, the union treaty, necessary for both sides, was concluded, which undoubtedly was a significant diplomatic victory for Rus'.
The first test and test of the effectiveness of the Russian-Crimean alliance were the events of 1480, when Akhmat, not having achieved the restoration of power over Russia through diplomatic means, made an attempt to achieve his goals by force, organizing a new large-scale invasion, ending with the famous "standing on the Ugra". As you know, the Russian-Horde confrontation took place without the participation of "third parties": the Crimean Tatars did not provide military assistance to Moscow, the Lithuanians also did not support their Tatar allies, despite the fact that earlier King Casimir himself put forward the initiative for a joint Lithuanian-Horde campaign against Russia: “And Kazimer, the King of Lithuania, then hearing the great princes rosemary, the great prince Ivan Vasilyevich with his brother not in the world, with Prince Andrei and Boris, but hearing the anger of the great Akhmatov Tsars against the Grand Duke Ivan Vasilyevich, and rejoicing at that the king of Lithuania Kazimer. Then Prince Akirey Muratovich of the Horde served him, and sent him to the Horde to Tsar Akhmat with the speech that the great prince was not peaceful with his brother, that his brother Prince Andrei and his brother Prince Boris came out of the earth with all their strength, otherwise the land of Moscow is now empty. “But now he’s unpeaceful with me, and you would now go to him, your time, but now I’m going to him for my offense with you.” The godless king Akhmat rejoiced at this and the council of evils confers with the king with Kazimer, and releases him soon to the king, and the council repairs the mouth of the Ugra with the king in the fall. And having gathered strength, the godless king Akhmat will soon go to Rus' ”(Vologda-Perm Chronicle. PSRL. T. 26, pp. 262-263).
The reasons why Casimir evaded the fulfillment of his allied obligations to the Great Horde are often associated with the existence of an alliance between Moscow and Crimea, and in particular with the raid of the Crimean Tatars on Lithuania in October 1480. However, a detailed examination of the actions of Mengli Giray and the political situation within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania raises doubts about the validity of such an assertion. First of all, it should be noted that the attack of the Crimean Tatars on Lithuania was limited to a raid on Podolia, which the Lithuanians quite easily repulsed with local troops. Consequently, this anti-Lithuanian action of the Crimea was insignificant in scale and could hardly be the reason for Casimir's refusal to speak on the side of the Horde. In addition, there are direct indications of sources explaining the reasons for Casimir’s inaction by intra-Lithuanian strife, and by no means a raid by the Crimean Tatars “The king himself did not go to him, nor did he send his forces, because he had his own strife for him” (Simeonov Chronicle. PSRL. vol. 18. p. 268). With a high degree of probability, it can be assumed that Casimir was afraid of the speeches of the pro-Moscow-minded nobility of the GDL. And such fears were clearly not unfounded, for example, it is known about the failed plot against King Casimir of the Orthodox princes of Lithuania in 1481, in addition, over the following years, many Russian princes, who were in vassal dependence on the GDL, together with their power of Ivan III. All this testifies to the serious pro-Moscow sentiments of a significant part of the Orthodox Lithuanian nobility, and it is likely that these sentiments already in 1480 could develop into a direct armed uprising against the Lithuanian state, as happened repeatedly later. Apparently, it was this circumstance, and not the predatory raid of the Crimean Tatars, that main reason the fact that Lithuania did not dare to provide military support to the Great Horde.
Thus, we have to admit that during the events of 1480, the Crimean side actually evaded the fulfillment of its allied obligations to Russia. With regard to the main enemy, the Great Horde, Mengli-Girey did not take any military actions, as required by the obligations of the allied treaty with Moscow (“And Akhmat the king will go against you, and Menli-Girey the king will go to Akhmat the king ...”), and the Tatar raid to the outskirts Principality of Lithuania, could not be the reason for Casimir's refusal to participate in the Russian-Horde war.
A similar situation was repeated during the Russian-Lithuanian war of 1487-1494. Starting the war for the liberation of the Verkhovsky principalities, Ivan the Third, with full right, in accordance with the concluded agreement, counted on the help of the Crimea. But this time too, Mengli-Giray did not render any real help to Muscovite Rus. In response to the demand of the Russian embassy in 1492 for military support, the khan refused, justifying his unwillingness to send troops to help his ally, by being busy building a fortress at the mouth of the Dnieper, which supposedly was to become the main stronghold in the “Lithuanian direction” and ensure success in the war against the ON. However, Ivan III was well aware that the construction of the fortress was only a pretext for evading the fulfillment of allied obligations, and demanded that the khan directly participate in the war: the mouth of the Dnieper, and now you would single-handedly leave that matter, and you yourself would have mounted a horse and gone with an army to the Lithuanian land ”(Collection of RIO. T. 41, p. 158) ...
At the same time, the Russian side properly fulfilled its allied obligations to the Crimea. So, repeatedly in 1485, 1487, 1490 and 1491, Ivan III sent his troops on campaigns against the Great Horde, with which Crimea was at war at that time, Moscow’s assistance turned out to be especially effective in 1491, when it was defeated by the “Akhmatova children” and the Crimean Horde, ousted beyond Perekop, found itself in an extremely difficult situation, and only thanks to the timely advance of the Russian troops to the steppe, the Great Horde was forced to abandon the continuation of offensive operations against the Crimea. “The same spring of May came to the Grand Duke Ivan Vasilyevich that the Horde kings Seit, Akhmet and Shigakhmet were coming, with power against Tsar Menli Girey of Crimea. To help the Crimean Tsar Menli Giray, the prince released his governor in the field to the Horde, Prince Peter Mikitich Obolenskovo and Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Repnya Obolensky, and with them many children of his boyar court, and Merdoulatov’s son, Tsarevich Satylgan, with lancers and with princes and with all sent the Cossacks along with their commanders. And the Kazan Tsar Mahmet Amin ordered to send his governors with strength, along with the prince and from the Grand Duke governors. And he ordered Prince Andrei Vasilyevich and Prince Boris Vasilyevich and his brothers to send their governors with force along with their governors. And Prince Boris Vasilievich sent his governor from the Grand Duke as governors, but Prince Ondrey Vasilyevich did not send his governor and his forces. And descending together with the Grand Duke Governor with Tsarevich Satylgan, and with the Kazan Tsar governors with Abash Ulan and Bubrash Seit in the field, and Prince Borisov Vasilyevich Governor. And poidosha together to the Horde. Hearing the same tsars of the Orda, the strength of the great prince in the field was approaching them, and being afraid to return from Perekop, the strength of the great prince returned to his own place without strife ”(Moscow chronicle of the end of the 15th century. PSRL. T. 25, p. 332).
Although in fairness it should be noted that at the end of the Russian-Lithuanian war, our Crimean allies nevertheless opposed Lithuania. In the winter of 1492-1493, the Crimean Tatars attacked the outskirts of Kiev and Chernigov, but this raid could no longer significantly affect the course and results of this war: by that time, the hostilities between Moscow Russia and Lithuania had already basically ended, by the beginning of 1493 most The Verkhovsky lands were cleared of the Lithuanians, and all this year, the opponents conducted lengthy and difficult negotiations, which ended in February 1494 with the conclusion of a peace that was generally beneficial for Moscow.
The next test of the effectiveness of the Russian-Crimean alliance was the new Russian-Lithuanian war of 1500-1503, in which the Great Horde also took part on the side of Lithuania. In the first months of the war, the Russian troops enjoyed significant success: in the summer of 1500, the Seversk lands were liberated and a major victory was won in the Battle of Vedroshi. The Crimeans also took part in the hostilities against the GDL: “In the same autumn, at the instigation of the Grand Duke of Moscow, the Perekop Tsar Mengli-Girey sent his son Akhmat-Girey, the Sultan, with his other children and with many Tatar forces. And [they] fought the lands of Volhynia and Podlasie and Poland, and then burned the cities of Vladimir and Brest, and fought near Lublin to the very Vistula River, and, crossing the Vistula, they burned the large city of Opatov and caused much evil and created untold bloodshed for Christians in the Grand Duchy Lithuanian and in Poland ”(Chronicle of Bykhovets. M. 1966), but it should be borne in mind that this is a rather large invasion that took place in the fall of 1500, that is, after the Russian troops had won decisive victories in Russian -Lithuanian front came a temporary lull.
In 1501 hostilities between Moscow Russia and Lithuania resumed with renewed vigor: Russian troops launched an offensive in the Smolensk direction. But at the same time, the Great Horde, allied to Lithuania, made a large-scale attack on the Seversk land, recently annexed to the Moscow state, the Tatars took Novgorod Seversky, a number of other cities and ravaged Russian territories up to Bryansk ... Moscow's situation was further complicated by the fact that the Livonian Order, taking advantage of the distraction of the Russian forces to fight the Lithuanians and Tatars, began hostilities on the northwestern borders of Rus'. As a result, Moscow found itself in an extremely unfavorable military-strategic situation: in addition to the ruin of Seversk land, the attempt to take Mstislavl ended in failure and the attack on Smolensk was suspended, thus Moscow final stage the war was no longer able to achieve the same success as in 1500. Under these conditions, the help of the Crimean allies would be urgently needed. But this time, too, Mengli-Girey evaded the military actions agreed with Moscow, going on a campaign against the Great Horde only at the beginning of 1502, after the completion of hostilities in the "northern Ukraine" and near Mstislavl.
Weakened by previous battles with the Crimea and Russia, the Great Horde was unable to hold back the onslaught of the Crimeans: “the same summer, June, the Crimean king Menli-Girey beat Shiakhmat, the king of the Bolshia horde and took the Horde” (Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. Vol. 12). Thus, the successor state of the Golden Horde ceased to exist. Of course, the defeat and subsequent liquidation of the Great Horde had a huge positive significance both for the Russian state and for the Crimea, but at the same time, this did not affect the results of the Russian-Lithuanian war, the following year Moscow and Vilna concluded peace under the terms of which Muscovite Russia retained for itself the territories annexed in the first year of the war.
War of 1500-1503 came latest event in the history of Eastern Europe, where Rus' and the Crimea acted as allies. The absence of the Greater Horde threat led to a radical change in the nature of Russian-Crimean relations. The Russian-Crimean Union is a thing of the past, because after the cessation of the existence of the Great Horde, against which this union was originally created, the need for the latter disappeared by itself, the Crimean Khanate has now turned from an ally into the main enemy of Rus' in southbound, and relations between Rus' and Crimea thus entered a new stage - a long period of fierce confrontation that continued with varying success for almost three centuries ...
Assessing the “allied” period of Russian-Crimean relations, it must be admitted that the alliance with Crimea certainly played a certain positive role: being at war with Moscow Russia, both the Great Horde and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were forced to take into account the presence of the Russian-Crimean military alliance, which thus, it was a certain deterrent in the policy of these states in relation to Moscow. However, it should also be recognized that the alliance with Crimea still did not show itself properly, which was due to repeated violations by the Crimean side of its allied obligations. The participation of the Crimean Tatars in the Russian-Lithuanian and Russian-Horde wars was almost always limited to the use of very insignificant forces. In addition, the campaigns of the Crimean troops against Lithuania and the Great Horde, as a rule, were not coordinated with the Russian side, as a result of which the Crimean “help” often turned out to be useless and did not have a significant impact on the outcome of the military confrontation between Rus' and its opponents. However, despite the absence of the expected military assistance from the Crimea, the Russian state in the last quarter of the 15th - early 16th century still managed to achieve significant results in solving foreign policy issues, the main of which was the successful repulse of the attempts of the Great Horde to restore the yoke, and the beginning of the process of liberation , previously captured by Lithuania, Western Russian lands. These successes were the result of a reasonable and decisive policy of Moscow, while the alliance with the Crimean Khanate was only one, and as practice has shown, far from the most important and effective, of the elements of the foreign policy of the Moscow state.
Part II. Bicentennial War
At the beginning of the 16th century, the period of peaceful relations between Moscow Rus and the Crimean Khanate ended, which was due to the presence of a common enemy that threatened their independence - the Great Horde. The liquidation of the Great Horde led to a significant change in the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe. No longer needing an ally, which Rus was for the Crimea, the Crimean horde turns to a hostile policy towards Moscow and during the 16th century becomes the most dangerous enemy for the Russian state.
The Crimean Khanate, being one of the "heirs" of the Golden Horde, continued in almost unchanged form the policy pursued by the Horde towards its neighbors, which predetermined the nature of further relations between Rus' and Crimea. As rightly noted by V.V. Kargalov “The reasons for the constant military activity of the Crimea should be sought in the features of its economic and social system. The basis of the economic life of the Crimea was nomadic cattle breeding, which was unproductive and highly dependent on fodder crops. Agriculture among the Crimean Tatars was poorly developed. Crimea could not feed its population and constantly needed imported bread. Contemporaries called the Crimea a country, "not a strong fodder." In lean years, a real famine began in the Crimea. The reports of the Russian ambassadors from the Crimea are full of reports of crop shortages and famine, high prices, the extinction of the population, mass deaths of horses and livestock. The Crimean feudal lords were looking for a way out of economic difficulties not in the development of the country's productive forces, although the natural conditions of the Crimea were very favorable for this, but in raids on neighboring countries, in extorting forced payments from them - "tributes" and "commemoration". Predatory campaigns were a constant factor in the economy of the Crimea. Without these “infusions” of foreign wealth, the Crimean Khanate could not have survived without breaking its socio-economic system ... ”(V.V. Kargalov“ Rus' and Nomads ”M.“ Veche ”2004, p. 318-319).
In 1505-1507, the foreign policy situation of Rus' became much more complicated: in 1505 military conflicts with Kazan resumed, in 1507, after a four-year truce, a new war with Lithuania began. At the same time, Crimea actually broke allied relations with Moscow and began rapprochement with the GDL, which subsequently led to the formation of a Lithuanian-Tatar military alliance directed against Rus'. Since that time, a two-hundred-year period of almost continuous military conflicts between Muscovite Rus' and the Crimea begins, filled with constant predatory raids of the Tatars on the southern outskirts of Rus' and retaliatory campaigns of Russian troops in the "Wild Field", as well as a number of large-scale invasions aimed at tearing away vast territories from the Muscovite state and even the subordination of Rus' to the Crimean Khanate.
The first military clashes between Muscovite Rus and the Crimean Horde took place in the summer of 1507, when the Tatars raided the Verkhovsky lands. The areas of Belev, Odoev and Kozelsk were attacked. Governors Ivan Kholmsky and Konstantin Ushaty, sent by Grand Duke Vasily III, together with the troops of local specific princes, overtook the Tatars, defeated and freed the captured prisoners. Soon the situation changed in favor of Moscow: in the same year a peace treaty was concluded with Kazan, and in the next year an “eternal peace” with Lithuania, at the same time the Crimean Khan Mengli-Girey became involved in a war with the Nogais, which forced the Tatars to temporarily suspend aggressive actions in relation to Rus'. However, after a four-year break, the attacks of the Crimeans resumed and became almost annual. So, in 1511, the Crimean Tatars raided the outskirts of Tula, and already in the next 1512, a series of attacks by the Crimean troops, led by the sons of Mengli Giray, affected almost the entire southern outskirts of Rus'. In May, the Tatars raided the environs of Vorotynsk, Aleksin, Belev and Odoev, in June they attacked Putivl and Starodub, in July they attempted to raid Ryazan, but having ravaged the outskirts of the Ryazan land, they hastily retreated as a result of the timely advance of the Russian troops towards the enemy under the command of the governor Prince Alexander Rostov. In October of the same year, the Crimeans again suddenly attacked the Ryazan "Ukraine", and this time they reached Ryazan, besieged the city, but could not take it, and having captured the full, retreated to the steppes. The following year, the Tatars ravaged the environs of Putivl, Starodub and Bryansk. In 1514, the outskirts of Ryazan and then Seversk land were again attacked, but this time the Crimeans did not manage to leave with impunity, near Starodub they were defeated by the appanage princes Vasily Shemyachich and Vasily Starodubsky. Seversk "Ukraine" was subjected to an even larger invasion in March 1515. Moreover, this time the Lithuanian allies of the Tatars also took part in the invasion of Russian lands. The Lithuanian-Crimean Union is becoming a permanent factor in relations between Moscow and Crimea. As the chronicler noted, King Sigismund: “refers to the Crimean king Mengli-Girey and leads him to Christianity, to the great prince of the earth, and so that the king goes to the great prince” (Nikon Chronicle PSRL vol. 13 p. 15).
It should be borne in mind that the Tatars no longer limited themselves to predatory raids, but began to put forward territorial claims and interfere in the relations of Rus' with their neighbors. Thus, the Crimean embassy, which arrived in Rus' in August 1515, put forward a demand for the transfer of the Seversk land to the Crimean Khanate and the return of Smolensk to Crimean allied Lithuania, and also demanded the release of the former Kazan Khan Abdul-Latif, who was in Rus', whom the Crimeans considered as a candidate for the Kazan throne. Khan's demands were rejected and the attacks of the Crimeans on the Russian "Ukraine" continued: in the summer and autumn of 1516, the Tatars made a number of raids on the outskirts of the Ryazan land, in 1517 the Tatars attacked Rus' twice, but both times were defeated: in July near Tula and in November near Putivl. But soon civil strife began in Crimea, and the next three years passed without Tatar invasions, which allowed Moscow to temporarily solve the Kazan problem by placing its protege Shah Ali on the Kazan throne.
However, after a short break, the situation within the Crimean Khanate stabilized and the Tatars resumed their aggression against Moscow Rus. In 1520, Mohammed-Girey concludes a peace treaty with Lithuania, and in the spring of 1521, the “pro-Moscow” Khan Shah-Ali was overthrown in Kazan and the Crimean protege Sahib-Girey seized power, at the same time Crimea managed to attract the Nogai Horde to its side. Thus, by 1521, an anti-Moscow coalition was formed as part of the Crimean Khanate, Kazan, Nogai horde and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. And in July 1521, Mohammed Giray, having gathered a huge army with a total number of up to 100 thousand people, which, in addition to the Crimean Tatars, also included Lithuanian and Nogai detachments, made a large-scale invasion of Rus'. The superior forces of the Tatars broke through the Oka line of defense and began to advance into the center of Rus', at the same time the Kazan Tatars also struck from the east. Not having time to gather sufficient forces to repel the invasion, Vasily III left the capital and retreated to the Voloka region, where the collection of troops began. Meanwhile, the Tatars ravaged the surroundings of Kolomna, Borovsk, Nizhny Novgorod, Vladimir and Moscow for two weeks, but did not dare to storm the capital and engage in battle with the Russian army, began to retreat, unsuccessfully trying to capture Ryazan on the way back. The invasion of Mohammed Giray brought significant damage to Muscovite Rus': the central regions of the country were devastated and a large number of prisoners were captured: according to various sources (clearly inflated), the number of captured Russian people reached 800,000 people! At the same time, the goals of the Tatars were not limited to robbery: there is evidence that the Crimean Khan demanded that Vasily III restore tributary relations. So, according to Sigismund Herberstein, “Muhammed-Giray promised to lift the siege and leave the country if Vasily pledged by letter to be an eternal tributary of the king, as his father and ancestors were. Having received a charter drawn up according to his desire, Mohammed Giray led the army to Ryazan ”(Sigismund Gerberstein. Notes on Muscovy. Moscow State University. 1988 http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus8/Gerberstein/frametext7.htm).
Assessing the first decade of the Russian-Crimean confrontation, it must be admitted that Moscow was not ready to repel the attacks of the Crimean Tatars: even the defense of the central regions of Moscow Rus' as a whole was not established effectively enough, as for the territories beyond the Oka, the southern outskirts of Rus' were in even more vulnerable position and during the Crimean raids were very often subjected to significant ruin. First of all, there was no continuous line of defense of the southern regions of the country. In the first decades of the 16th century, the Moscow government limited itself to concentrating troops on the Oka and Ugra to prevent the enemy from breaking through into the central regions of Rus', while the defense of the “Ukrainians” was carried out mainly by local forces (beyond the Oka, initially only in Tula were Moscow governors with regiments) . At the same time, the governors standing on the Oka and Ugrian borders, in the event of Tatar raids, although they had to, while holding the defense of the "shore", sent "light governors" behind the Oka and Ugra to repel Tatar raids, pursue the retreating Tatars and release prisoners, but given the surprise attacks, the mobility and maneuverability of the Tatars, help did not always arrive on time, very often before the local governors and specific princes managed to gather sufficient forces, and the Oksky and Ugric governors sent help, the Crimeans managed to devastate significant territories, capture full and hide in the steppes.
The change in the military-political situation in connection with the beginning of the Russian-Crimean military conflicts forced the government of Vasily III to take a number of measures to strengthen the defense. In particular, additional military forces were deployed on the Oka and Ugra, in 1507 the construction of a stone fortress in Tula began, the construction of fences began on the routes of the Crimean invasions, and "forest guards" and "outposts" were organized. Nevertheless, as the events of 1511-1517 and especially 1521 showed, these measures were clearly not enough. To prevent breakthroughs into the central regions and successfully defend vast "Ukraines", it was necessary both to strengthen the Oka-Ugric line and to create a fortified defense line on the southern steppe border, similar to the one that was created on the Oka. The government of Vasily III began to carry out this task in earnest in the 1920s. The Moscow authorities took into account the sad experience of the invasion of 1521 and took a number of serious measures to organize the defense of both the central regions and Ukraine. Additional forces were deployed at the Oka line. At the same time, the guard service was strengthened at the borders, and “villages” and “guards” of the Cossacks were advanced far into the steppe, performing the functions of reconnaissance and warning of the approach of the enemy. But the most important event was the construction of a continuous defensive line beyond the Oka, which later received the name "Great notch line". For this purpose, the garrisons of the Zaoksky fortresses were strengthened: the regiments of the Moscow governors were stationed in Odoev, Vorotynsk, Belev, Ryazan, Pronsk, Mtsensk, Mikhailov, Rylsk, Novgorod-Seversky, Putivl and other southern cities, in addition, for 20-50- In the 1990s, a number of new fortresses were erected beyond the Oka, including stone fortresses in Tula, Kolomna and Zaraysk, and in the areas between the fortresses, fences were built en masse. The construction of a defensive line beyond the Oka along the Belev-Ryazan line was basically completed by the beginning of the 60s, as a result of which a fairly effective defense system was created. First of all, it should be noted that after 1521 for 50 years there were no breakthroughs of the Crimeans into the central regions of the country, in most cases it was possible to repulse the raids of the Tatars even without allowing the enemy to the Oka.
Meanwhile, the Crimean horde was by no means going to give up hostile actions. After a break caused by the war with Astrakhan and civil strife in the Crimea itself, the Tatars resumed their onslaught on Rus'. In 1527, a large Crimean army, the "prince" Islam Giray, numbering from 40 to 60 thousand people according to various sources, approached the Oka in the Rostislavl region. However, this time Moscow received timely news of the Crimean campaign, which made it possible to concentrate military forces in advance on the way of the Tatars. On September 9, a battle took place on the “crossings” across the Oka, during which Russian troops under the command of princes Fyodor Lopata-Telepnev, Ivan Ovchina-Telepnev and Fyodor Mstislavsky repelled an attempt by the Tatars to break through the defenses of the “shore”. After that, the pursuit of the retreating enemy began, the Russian troops, having crossed the Oka, overtook and defeated the Tatars in two battles in the Zaraysk region, freeing the captured full. After this invasion was repulsed, a relative calm again set in for several years on the southern outskirts of Rus', only in 1531 the Crimean detachment ravaged the environs of Odoev and Tula, but after the advance of the Russian troops, they retreated back to the steppes. But two years later, a more serious invasion took place. In August 1533, a 40,000-strong Tatar army led by Islam Giray invaded the Ryazan direction, but this time the Tatars did not even manage to reach the Oka line. Having reached Ryazan and undertaking failed attempt to take the city, the Tatars retreated as soon as the governors Ivan Telepnev-Ovchina and Dmitry Paletsky were put forward against them, who pursued the retreating Crimeans to the Prony River.
In January 1534, the government of Elena Glinskaya tried to normalize relations with the Crimean Horde. For this purpose, the embassy of Ivan Chelyadishchev was sent to the Crimea, who managed to make peace with Khan Islam Giray. However, this "peace" did not last even six months: already in the spring of 1534, the Tatars raided the outskirts of the Ryazan land, and were defeated by the governor Semyon Khripunov. In the summer of 1534, another Russian-Lithuanian war began, during which the Crimean allies of Lithuania constantly attacked Russia: in 1535, despite the resumption of Russian-Crimean peace negotiations, the Ryazan outskirts and Severskaya land were again raided, in 1536 the neighborhood of Belev and again Ryazan, in 1537 Tula and Odoev. All these attacks were successfully repelled by Russian troops. Apparently, this, as well as the fact that a peace treaty was concluded with Lithuania in 1537, forced the Crimean Khan Sahib-Girey to resume negotiations with Moscow, which resulted in the conclusion of a truce in September 1539.
However, this “peace”, like all the others, did not last long: in October of the same year, the Tatars raided Ryazan, and in the summer of 1541, Sahib-Giray again launched another major invasion of Russia, and this time, as in 1521 year, in addition to the Crimean horde, Lithuanians, Nogais and Kazan Tatars took part in the campaign, and for the first time Turkish detachments with artillery took part in the invasion of Russia. The defense system of the southern borders worked effectively: after receiving news of the Tatars' march, the government of Ivan IV managed to concentrate troops, covering the main directions along which a Tatar invasion could be expected. On July 28, Sahib-Giray approached Zaraysk, but could not take the city and continued moving towards the Oka, two days later the Tatars approached the "shore", however, the troops of governor Ivan Turuntai-Pronsky and Vasily Okhlyabinin repelled the onslaught of the Tatars, then reinforcements approached and Sahib-Giray was forced to retreat from the Oka, but the hostilities did not end there: a day later, the khan approached Pronsk, but the Crimeans failed here too, the garrison of the fortress withstood the assault. In the meantime, “light governors” were sent from the Oka line, and the khan lifted the siege of Pronsk and hastily left the borders of Rus'. The failure did not stop the Tatars, the attacks continued, however, over the next decade, these were relatively small predatory raids, most of which were successfully repulsed by the forces of the border governors. In 1542, the Seversk and Ryazan Ukraines were attacked, in 1543 the Crimeans fought in the Odoev region, and in 1544 they again raided Ryazan. The next raid took place in 1548 on Meshchera, and was repulsed by the voivode Mikhail Voronov. In 1549, near Tula, the governor Zakhar Yakovlev defeated a three thousandth Crimean detachment.
Important events unfolded in 1552. As you know, in the summer and autumn of this year, John IV launched a decisive attack on Kazan, which ended with its capture and the liquidation of the Kazan Khanate. In the same year, the Crimean Khan organized another major invasion in order to disrupt the Russian campaign against the Kazan horde, allied to Crimea. On June 22, 1552, a Crimean army of many thousands, led by Khan Devlet-Giray, approached Tula and a fierce battle for the city began: the townspeople under the command of governor Grigory Temkin repulsed the first assault and the next day made a successful sortie “many Tatars were beaten under the city and the royal brother-in-law was killed Prince Kambirdey and a cannon outfit, cannonballs, arrows and a lot of potion, brought to the ruin of the city, were taken by the Orthodox. Meanwhile, advanced Russian detachments of governor Mikhail Repnin and Fyodor Saltykov, sent to help the besieged, were already approaching Tula. The Tatars, not daring to enter into battle with them, lifted the siege of the city and hastily retreated: “The Crimean Devlet-Girey fled from the city with great shame, but the city did not have time to do anything ...” (Nikon Chronicle. PSRL vol. 13 p. 191), after this governor began the pursuit of the enemy and defeated several Tatar detachments that lagged behind the main forces. As a result of this invasion, the threat of the Crimean invasion was eliminated for some time, and the main military forces of the Russian state were used in the Kazan campaign. Thus, the victory near Tula was one of the factors that contributed to the victorious end of the Kazan war.
In the mid-1950s, the military-political situation changed in favor of Rus'. After the defeat near Tula, the Crimean Khan did not attack Rus' for several years and even resumed peace negotiations (which, however, ended, as always, in nothing). The victories over Kazan and Astrakhan significantly strengthened the military-political position of Moscow, which allowed the government of Ivan IV to no longer be limited to purely defensive tactics in the war with the Crimea, and to undertake a number of offensive operations against the Crimean horde. It should be noted that, apparently, Moscow’s plans did not include the liquidation of the Crimean Khanate, just as it was done with the Kazan and Astrakhan hordes, because the Crimean khans were vassals of one of the strongest powers of that time - the Ottoman Empire, therefore, the attempt to finally defeat the Crimea inevitably caused there would have been direct military clashes with the Turks, for which Muscovite Russia at that time, apparently, was not yet ready. The Crimean campaigns of the second half of the 50s were essentially preemptive strikes aimed at preventing the Tatars from reaching the Russian borders.
The first major campaign in the steppe took place in the summer of 1555, after the Crimean Khan stopped peace negotiations and began preparations for the next campaign against Rus'. In June, the governor Ivan Vasilievich Sheremetyev set out on a campaign and soon discovered a Tatar army advancing towards Tula. In the first battle, Sheremetyev's soldiers suddenly attacked the Tatar convoy and captured a large number of horses. Meanwhile, the main forces of the khan were advancing towards Tula, but the Russian army led by the tsar had already advanced there, in connection with this, the khan decided to turn back and in the area of the village of Sudbischi, a detachment of Sheremetyev of about 7000 people met with the retreating sixty thousandth Crimean army ... During a fierce two-day battle with superior Tatar forces, Sheremetyev's soldiers still managed to survive and go to Russia. Thus ended the first campaign of Russian troops in the Crimea.
Another failure forced the Crimeans to resume negotiations, however, they ended, as always, to no avail, and hostilities soon resumed. In 1556, the Russian army of the voivode clerk Matvey Rzhevsky, with the support of the Don Cossacks, made a trip to the territory controlled by the Crimean Khanate. In June 1556, Rzhevsky reached the Lower Dnieper, won a number of victories in the area of Islam-Kermen and Ochakov, and in September of the same year returned to Rus', to Putivl. At the same time, the Cossacks of Mikhail Cherkashenin successfully fought on the northern coast of the Black Sea. In the autumn of the same year, the Lithuanian prince Dmitry Vishnevetsky, who had transferred to the Russian service, began military operations against the Tatars, captured Islam-Kermen and founded a fortress in the immediate vicinity of the possessions of the Crimean Khan, on the island of Khortitsa. In the summer of 1557, Devlet Giray tried to capture the fortress, but Vishnevetsky withstood a 20-day siege and until October 1557 was on Khortitsa. In the spring of the following year, 1558, Dmitry Vishnevetsky made a new campaign against the Crimea. Having defeated the Tatar detachment and having reached Perekop itself, Vishnevetsky occupied Khortitsa for some time, where he joined the army of Rzhevsky and remained on the Dnieper until he was recalled by the king. However, the Russian presence at the Crimean borders remained even after the departure of Dmitry Vishnevetsky: the troops of the voivodes Rzhevsky, Chulkov and Bulgakov remained on the lower Dnieper.
The most powerful blow to the Crimea was dealt in 1559. This time, Dmitry Vishnevetsky and Daniil Adashev again went on a campaign to the Crimean possessions, whose army was able to break into the Crimea and devastate its western regions: “and they came to the Crimean uluses on Yarlagash Island and here many camel herds were caught and beaten. And from there they came to the uluses, to the sedentary people, to Kremenchik and Koshkarly and Kogolnik, fifteen miles from Perekop, and sent Prince Fyodor Khvorostinin in front of them, and they themselves came to many places, dividing themselves; and, God willing, many uluses fought and caught, and many people were beaten and caught; and which the Tatars, having gathered, came to them, and they beat those many pissers and retreated to Otzibek Island, God gave, great ”(Nikon Chronicle. PSRL. T. 13. S. 318).
However, in the 60s, Ivan the Terrible refuses to continue campaigns in the Crimea and, having started a war for access to the Baltic, throws his main forces to the west. The rejection of offensive operations against the Crimean Khanate, as well as the diversion of significant forces to participate in the Livonian War, seriously complicated the situation on the "southern front". With the outbreak of the Livonian War, Crimean attacks resumed with renewed vigor and became almost annual. In 1558, a hundred thousandth Tatar army was stopped on the border of the Ryazan land, the next year the Tatars raided Tula and Pronsk, in 1560 and 1561 the Severskaya land was attacked. An even larger campaign of the Crimean troops took place in 1562 against Mtsensk, Odoev, Novosil and Belev. In 1563, the Tatars raided Mikhailov, and the following year, the khan himself, at the head of a 60,000-strong army, besieged Ryazan and ravaged the surrounding area. In 1565, the Bolkhov region was devastated, in 1567 and 1568 there were raids on Seversk land.
In 1569, the Crimean Khan, as a vassal of the Turkish Sultan, took part in the Turkish invasion of Astrakhan. Interestingly, Devlet Giray warned Ivan the Terrible about the impending Turkish invasion. Naturally, at the same time, the khan pursued his own goals: “The plans of the Ottomans and the Crimean nobility regarding Astrakhan seriously diverged. The Crimean nobility was not satisfied with the transformation of Astrakhan into the possession of the Sultan and the establishment of direct Ottoman power in the North Caucasus, which in the Crimea was traditionally considered as a sphere of their interests. Surrounded by Ottoman possessions, Crimea could easily lose the broad autonomy it enjoyed within the Ottoman Empire. Devlet Giray could not disobey the orders of the Sultan, but he hastened to inform Tsar Ivan about them. Trying to extract the maximum benefit from the current situation for himself, the khan suggested: if the tsar agrees to "plant" one of his sons in Astrakhan, he will convince the sultan to refuse to go to this city. (B.N. Florya. Ivan the Terrible. M. Young Guard, 2003, p. 261).
As you know, the Turkish invasion ended in complete failure, but this did not force Crimea to abandon its own plans in relation to Moscow, since the beginning of the 70s, Crimea has been further strengthening the “pressure to the north”, pursuing far-reaching goals. It should be borne in mind that by this time, the position of Rus' on the “southern front” had become much more complicated, due to the fact that the bulk of the Russian forces were involved in the Livonian War, as a result of which, a fairly effective system of defense of the southern borders created in previous decades , turned out to be largely weakened, which the khan naturally took advantage of. At the beginning of 1570, the Tatars attacked the outskirts of the Ryazan land and were driven away by the governor Dmitry Khvorostinin, at the end of the same year they raided Novosil. In May of the following year, for the first time in fifty years since the invasion of Mohammed Giray, the Tatars managed to cross the Oka, approach the capital and devastate the central regions of Muscovite Rus'. The consequences of the invasion were terrible: Moscow burned down, most of its population died, 36 cities were devastated, more than 100 thousand people were killed and driven into slavery ... Soon the Crimean embassy arrived in Moscow demanding the transfer of Kazan and Astrakhan, moreover, the khan did not limit himself to "territorial claims ". According to some reports, the plans of Devlet-Girey included the complete subordination of Rus': “The cities and counties of the Russian land - all were already painted and divided among the Murzas who were under the Crimean Tsar; [was determined] - which one should keep. Under the Crimean Tsar, there were several noble Turks who were supposed to watch this: they were sent by the Turkish Sultan (Keiser) at the request of the Crimean Tsar. The Crimean tsar boasted before the Turkish sultan that he would take the whole Russian land within a year, he would take the Grand Duke captive to the Crimea and occupy the Russian land with his murzas. (Heinrich Staden. About Moscow of Ivan the Terrible. M. and S. Sabashnikovs. 1925 http://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus6/Staden/frametext3.htm). Thus, it depended on the outcome of the confrontation with Devlet Giray whether Rus' would retain its freedom or the terrible times of the yoke would return ...
Under these conditions, Ivan the Terrible was ready to agree to a concession to Astrakhan, but this was not enough for the khan, and in July 1572, Devlet-Girey, having gathered a sixty-thousand army (Rus' could then oppose Crimea only 20 thousand soldiers), invaded Rus'. Despite taking measures to cover the Oka line, the Tatars still managed to find a weak spot in the Russian defense of the "shore" and on July 28, the main forces of the Khan, having crossed the Oka, began advancing towards Moscow. Meanwhile, the forward regiment under the command of Dmitry Ivanovich Khvorostinin entered the battle with the rearguard of the Tatars, defeated it and, retreating, led the Tatars to the Molodey region, where the main Russian forces under the command of Mikhail Vorotynsky were concentrated. Fearing a blow from the Russian troops stationed at Molody, Devlet-Giray stopped the attack on Moscow and on July 30 attacked the Russian troops with all his might. The center of the Russian positions was the Gulyai-gorod erected on a hill, under the walls, which played out a general battle. For three days, the Tatars did not stop trying to capture the walk-city. The turning point came on August 2, when the Russian command undertook a bold maneuver that decided the outcome of the battle: “the boyar Prince Mikhail Ivanovich Vorotynskoy walked around with his large regiment of Crimean people, and with a gunner ordered everyone from a large outfit, from cannons and from all the squeakers to shoot at the Totar. And how they fired from all along and Prince Mikhailo Vorotynsky climbed onto the Crimean regiments behind, and Prince Dmitry Khvorostinin left the city walking with the Germans. And in that case they killed the tsar's son and the grandson of the tsar's Kolgin's son and captured many Murzas and Totars alive. And on the same day of August, on the 2nd day in the evening, the Crimean tsar left three thousand frisky people in the swamp of the Crimean Totars, and the grasshopper ordered them; and the king himself of that night ran and climbed over the river Oka the same night. And in the morning the voevodas learned that the king of the Crimean ran and all the people came to those other Totars and those Totars broke through to the Oka of the river. Yes, on the Oka River, the Crimean tsar left two thousand people to protect the Totars. And those Totars were beaten by a man with a thousand, and many others drowned, and others went beyond the Oka. (Discharge books of a short and abridged edition. Ancient Russian vivliofika, part XIII, ed. 2. M, 1790. Sinbir collection, v.1. Discharge book. M, 1844. http://www.hrono.ru/libris/ lib_a/andeev30ar.html)
So, one of the greatest battles in the history of medieval Rus' ended, in addition, in 1572, to some extent, the entire previous period of Russian-Crimean relations was summed up, it was after the victory near Molodi that a turning point in the confrontation between Moscow and Crimea began. Despite the fact that Rus' and the Crimean horde continued to be at war, the defeat of the Crimeans led to the fact that for quite a long time the Tatars did not undertake serious invasions of Rus'. Although individual Crimean detachments sometimes attacked the southern outskirts, however, these were just ordinary predatory raids, in which very small forces were involved, only 19 years after Molody, the Crimeans were able to organize a new large-scale invasion, which also ended in failure. But the most important result of the Great Victory of 1572 was that Rus' defended its independence and territorial integrity, the attempt of the Tatars to tear away the vast Volga territories from the Russian state and restore the yoke overthrown a century ago was suppressed.
Summing up the first period of the struggle against the Crimean Horde, it should also be noted that the Crimean Khanate was in a more favorable military-political position than Rus': firstly, the presence of vassal relations of Crimea with the Ottoman Empire was a serious deterrent for the Russian state, and did not allow Moscow to achieve a final solution to the “Crimean issue”; secondly, throughout almost the entire period of the Russian-Crimean wars of the 16th century, Crimea was in allied relations with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in connection with this, Muscovite Rus', devoid of allies, very often had to wage war on two fronts. Nevertheless, even in such extremely unfavorable conditions, Muscovite Rus' managed to establish the defense of the southern borders and emerge victorious from the most difficult confrontation with the steppe enemy.
After the victory near Molody, the threat of Muscovite Rus' from the Crimea did not disappear, however, the defeat inflicted on the Tatars was so serious that they no longer attempted to subdue Rus' and for a sufficiently long period were not able to organize large-scale attacks similar to the invasions of 1571 and 1572. . The raids were carried out by very insignificant forces and were limited to purely predatory purposes, for which the frontier military forces were sufficient to repulse them. The raids of individual Crimean and Nogai detachments on the southern outskirts of Rus', which took place in 1574, 1577-1578, 1581 and 1585, were fairly easily repulsed and did not cause significant damage, and often the Tatars did not even dare to join the battle and hastily retreated when they became aware of the approach of Russian troops. Only 14 years after the Battle of Molodin, in 1586, the Tatars launched a relatively large attack, in which about 30 thousand soldiers participated, but were also defeated, the next year a large Crimean-Nogai army, numbering up to 40 thousand people, invaded the outskirts of the Ryazan land, but as soon as the Russian army under the command of Dmitry Khvorostinin approached Tula, the Tatars left the borders of Russia. A more serious invasion took place in the summer of 1591, when the Crimean Khan Kazy-Girey, taking advantage of the diversion of a significant part of the Russian forces to the war with Sweden, gathered a hundred thousandth army, which also included Turkish and Nogai troops, crossed the Oka and approached Moscow.
For the first time after 1571-1572, a real threat loomed over the capital of Rus'. But even this rather dangerous invasion was successfully repelled: “And as the king crossed the river, and the boyars with all the regiments went to Moscow and stood on the Kotelsky b, fields, where the Donskoe Most Pure Mother of God Monastery is now. ... And the Crimean people climbed to the convoy, and God saved - the battle was even, and at night they sent Vasily Yanov and 3,000 people to the tsar's camps in Kolomenskoye. And the tsar, having heard the arrival, went back, and the boyars were sent for the tsar of the heads of Tretiak Velyaminov, Vasily Yanov, Danil Isleniev, Timofey Gryaznov, and they descended the tsar under Dedilov and beat many Tatars and took four hundred people of living languages and sent them to the boyars in Serpukhov. And having driven the king away, having come to Moscow, God gave it great” (Moscow chronicler, PSRL vol. 34 http://www.russiancity.ru/books/b60.htm). The following year, the Tatars made another attack on Rus', albeit with smaller forces and only on the southern outskirts, on the regions of Tula and Ryazan, in 1594 the Crimeans again raided the Ryazan outskirts, but near Shatsk they were defeated by the governor Vladimir Koltsov-Mosalsky, a failure for the Tatars, the raid on Ryazan in 1596 also ended. And two years later, Kazy Giray was forced to conclude a peace treaty with Moscow.
Despite some weakening of the Tatar onslaught in the last quarter of the 16th century, the Moscow government continued to pay special attention to strengthening the defense of the southern borders, in particular after the end of the Livonian War, in the 80-90s many new fortresses were erected south of the main defensive line - Bolshoy notar lines: Voronezh, Belgorod, Lebedyan, Livny, Tsarev-Borisov, Kursk, Valuyki, Yelets and Oskol. Thus, the Russian state, fighting off the periodically occurring Tatar raids, slowly but surely moving south, continued to expand its territory.
However, the Time of Troubles soon began, in 1607 an alliance agreement was concluded between Turkey and the Commonwealth, according to which the Crimeans were obliged to assist the Poles in their wars with Russia, and the Tatar attacks resumed. In the same 1607, the Nogais, dependent on the Crimean Khan, raided northern Ukraine, in 1609 the Crimean Tatars ravaged Tarusa and the area of Serpukhov and Kolomna, the following year Serpukhov was again subjected to a Tatar attack, in 1611-1613 Ryazan land was subjected to continuous attacks. In 1614, the Seversk land was devastated, in 1615 the Orel and Krom regions. Simultaneously with the Crimean Tatars, their Nogai allies also made raids. So in 1614 and 1615 Nogai troops numbering about 20 thousand people invaded the central regions of Rus' and reached Moscow itself. At the same time, the Tatars did not always manage to plunder the Russian lands with impunity, for example, in 1616, the Kursk Cossack head Ivan Annenkov defeated the Nogai detachment and liberated the full. However, individual successes could not change the overall picture of the confrontation with the Tatars during the troubled times. As a result of not so much Tatar raids as wars with impostors and Polish-Lithuanian aggressors, the defense system of the southern regions was destroyed. Many fortified cities, which were the centers of defense against Tatar attacks, were devastated and deserted, all the forces of Muscovite Rus' were thrown into the fight against the Poles and their local accomplices, and as a result, the southern regions of Rus' for a long time remained almost defenseless against the steppe enemies ...
After the turmoil, one of the main tasks of the Moscow government was to restore the defensive system on the southern borders: by 1620, Moscow governors with regiments were again permanently stationed behind the Oka in key defense centers - Mtsensk, Tula, Dedilov, Pronsk, Ryazan, Mikhailov. Meanwhile, even after the end of the turmoil and the conclusion of a truce with Poland, the Tatar raids did not stop, although they became less intense and large-scale. In 1618, the Tatars raided Kursk and Belgorod. In 1622, the Tatars ravaged the environs of Tula, Odoev, Mtsensk and Belev, but were again defeated near Kursk. In 1623, Russian troops won another victory over the Tatars in the Kursk region: returning from a raid on Mtsensk and Orel, the Crimean horde was utterly defeated by the Kuryans under the command of Ivan Antipovich Annenkov and the Belgorod detachment of governor Vasily Torbin. In 1624 and 1625 the Tatars raided Belgorod and were defeated both times. In 1628, between Kursk and Belgorod, Ivan Annenkov inflicted another defeat on the Tatars.
From the beginning of the 1930s, Tatar attacks resumed with renewed vigor. In April 1631, the Crimean and Nogai Tatars raided the environs of Voronezh, Kursk, Yelets and Ryazan. In the spring and summer of the following year, numerous Tatar detachments attacked almost the entire southern Ukraine of Russia: major clashes with the horde occurred at that time near Livny, Mtsensk, Rylsk and Novosil, where the governor Ivan Velyaminov defeated a large Tatar detachment, freeing 2700 prisoners ... The fighting ended only at the end of August, after a large Tatar detachment that tried to capture the Lebedyan fortress was defeated by the governor Ivan Skornyakov-Pisarev. An even larger invasion occurred in 1633, again the southern outskirts of Rus' were attacked by the thirty-thousandth Crimean-Nogai horde, individual detachments even managed to cross the Oka and ravage the outskirts of the Moscow district. The Tatar hordes were within the Russian state for about a month and, having been defeated near Pronsk and Tula, retreated to the steppes, capturing about 6 thousand prisoners during the invasion. The activation of the Tatars in the early 30s coincided with the war between Rus' and Poland for Smolensk, when the main part of the Russian forces was involved in the western direction, and it was the Tatar invasions that were one of the main reasons for the failure of the Smolensk war. Again, as repeatedly in the 16th century and during the Time of Troubles, Rus' had to wage war on two fronts. After the end of the Smolensk War, the Poles generously thanked their Tatar allies by sending 20 treasury carts to the Crimean Khan. The war with the Tatars continued later: in October 1634, Ivan Annenkov once again defeated the Tatars near Kursk, and in the same year, near Orel, the local governor Dmitry Koltovsky defeated the Crimeans and freed several hundred prisoners. In 1636 the Tatars were defeated near Mtsensk.
Considering the Russian-Crimean confrontation of the 17th century, it is impossible to ignore the heroic struggle of the Don Cossacks with the Tatars and Turks. The Don Cossacks made a huge contribution to the struggle of the Russian people against the Crimean Tatar aggression, while the relations of the free Don with Moscow Russia were not very simple. In those days, the Don Cossacks were a military-political force practically independent of the Moscow government, however, despite the complexity of relations, the struggle of the Don Cossacks with the Crimea was undoubtedly part of the confrontation between Rus' and its steppe enemies, in which the Don Cossacks always acted as, if not subjects of Moscow rulers, then their faithful allies. The history of the confrontation between the Don and the Crimea requires separate consideration, let us dwell on one of the significant events in the history of the Don Cossacks, which had an all-Russian significance - the Azov seat of 1637-1642.
In April 1637, the Don army besieged Azov, on June 18 the fortress was taken. Over the next two and a half years, Turkey and Crimea did not attempt to return Azov by military means, active hostilities against the Cossacks in order to establish a blockade of Azov by land were launched in the winter of 1641 by the Crimean Tatars, and in the summer of that year a huge Turkish army approached the city. Tatar army, numbering more than 200 thousand people. For three months, seven and a half thousand Cossacks under the command of chieftains Osip Petrov and Naum Vasilyev defended the fortress from the enemy's many times superior forces and eventually withstood, repulsing 24 attacks. On September 26, 1641, the Turks were forced to lift the siege, but the forces of the Cossacks were running out, and not having obtained Moscow's consent to the acceptance of Azov into Rus', the Cossacks were forced to leave the fortress next year ...
Apparently, the capture of Azov was agreed upon by the Cossacks with Moscow. At the same time, Moscow officially denied its involvement in the Azov events, in a letter to the Turkish Sultan, Tsar Mikhail Fedorovich said that the Cossacks took Azov "without our command, by arbitrariness", but at the same time, the Moscow government immediately before the start of the campaign against Azov and throughout "seats" provided the Cossacks with significant assistance, sending them food and ammunition in large quantities. Of course, control over Azov was beneficial to Rus', but not yet having sufficient forces for a direct military clash with Turkey, Moscow was forced to abandon Azov for the time being. Nevertheless, the Azov seat "had a great positive significance: first of all, in the period from 1638 to 1642, the raids of the Tatar troops stopped. As the author of “The Tale of the Azov Siege of the Don Cossacks” noted: “The Sovereign defended the Azov-city, all his Ukraine from the war, there will be no war from the Tatars until the century, when ours sit down in the Azov-city” (Military stories of Ancient Rus'. L. Lenizdat, 1985. P. 466). In addition, the peaceful respite allowed Russia to focus on further strengthening the defense of the country's southern borders.
From the second half of the 1930s, continuing to strengthen the old defensive line, the Russian government began to build a new frontier. In 1636, in order to determine places for the construction of defensive structures, voivode Fyodor Sukhotin was sent to the southern forest-steppe outskirts of Rus' with a detachment of Cossacks, and immediately after the voivode returned and his report was considered by the Tsar and the Boyar Duma, the construction of an even more powerful line of defense began. The new defensive line stretched for 800 kilometers from Akhtyrka to Tambov, its center was Belgorod (later the defensive line was called the "Belgorodskaya Zasechnaya line"), which became the location of the Big Regiment. Previously built fortresses were fortified and new ones were erected. Belgorod, Voronezh, Kozlov, Chernavsk, Tambov, Karpov, Korocha, Yablonov, Novy Oskol, Olshansk and other fortress cities became impregnable strongholds on the path of the steppe aggressors. In addition to large fortresses, the defense system of the Belgorod line included dozens of small fortresses, as well as a continuous line of ramparts and ditches between them. The construction of the Belgorod line was basically completed by the mid-1950s.
The erection of a defensive line was accompanied by regular attacks by the Tatars. September 1637. on the orders of the Sultan, the Crimean Khan raided the Livensky, Orlovsky and Karachevsky counties as a response to the capture of Azov, then over the next five years the Tatars did not attack. At the end of the "Azov Seat", the Tatar raids resumed: in 1643, various Tatars fought in the vicinity of Belgorod and Kursk, but these were relatively small detachments that quickly left the borders of Rus', meeting the resistance of the Russian troops. But a year later, a forty-thousand-strong Crimean horde fell upon Rus', during this invasion the entire Seversk outskirts were hit. Forces to repel the invasion were not enough, as a result of which the environs of Putivl, Rylsk and Sevsk were devastated and about 10 thousand people were captured. In the winter of 1645-1646. the Crimeans once again attacked Seversk "Ukraine" and again devastated the region of Putivl and Rylsk, but this time the Tatars failed to leave with impunity: the Kursk governor Semyon Pozharsky inflicted several defeats on them, freed about three thousand prisoners and forced the remnants of the Tatars to retreat back to steppe.
The response to the constant attacks of the Tatars was the campaign of the Moscow and Don troops to the Crimea in 1646. This was the first offensive anti-Crimean military action organized by the Moscow government after the Crimean campaigns of the 50s of the 16th century. Russian troops under the command of governor Semyon Pozharsky and Zhdan Kondyrev invaded the territory of the Crimean Khanate and defeated the Tatars near Azov, as a result of which, the new campaign against Rus' planned by Khan Islam-Giray was disrupted. The following year, the Tatars nevertheless attacked the Russian border territories, but, having met a rebuff at the Belgorod notch line and having suffered heavy losses, they retreated. By that time, the construction of a new defensive line was already almost completed, the southern borders of Muscovite Rus' were sufficiently well protected, which resulted in a temporary cessation of the Tatar attacks. Thus, by the middle of the 17th century, Russia managed to restore the defense system of the southern borders, destroyed during the years of unrest, and significantly strengthen it, pushing the advanced defensive line far to the south. As a result, not only the central regions of Moscow Rus were reliably protected, but also the Oka territories, which were the front line of defense in the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries, moreover, Russia got the opportunity to start developing the fertile lands of the Chernozem region, significantly expanding its territory to the south.
The aggravation of Polish-Crimean relations, connected with the involvement of the Crimean Tatars in the war with Poland on the side of the Zaporizhian Cossacks, also contributed to the suspension of the Crimean aggression to some extent. In addition, in the first years of the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich, there was some improvement in relations between the Moscow kingdom and the Commonwealth, in 1647 an anti-Crimean and anti-Turkish military alliance was even concluded between the two countries. But unfortunately, it did not develop: in 1654, in connection with the events in Ukraine, there was a break in Russian-Polish relations, and another war began between the two Slavic states. In 1654, Poland entered into an anti-Russian alliance with the Crimean Horde. For the umpteenth time, Rus' was forced to wage war on two fronts: with the Commonwealth and the Crimea, which resumed regular attacks on the Russian lands from 1656.
In 1656, the raid of the Tatars in the Shatsk region was repulsed; in September 1658, the Crimeans unsuccessfully tried several times to break through the fortifications of the security line in the Voronezh region. In 1659, the Tatars struck in several directions at once, and in some places even broke through the Belgorod line, the Yelets, Liven, Kursk, Novosilsky and Voronezh counties were attacked, but this invasion was eventually repulsed. In 1660, another Tatar raid was repulsed near Usman. Two years later, the Tatars raided the Karachevsky district. The Crimean hordes also participated in the hostilities in Ukraine: in 1657, the Crimean Tatars, together with the troops of Hetman Vyhovsky, captured Poltava, the next year they tried to take Kiev, but were stopped by Vasily Sheremetyev. The Crimeans also took part in the Battle of Konotop ... The Russians did not remain in debt either: in 1663 and 1664, the Moscow-Zaporozhye troops under the command of governor Grigory Kosagov and the Zaporozhye ataman Ivan Sirko reached Perekop and inflicted a number of defeats on the horde. Subsequently, Ivan Sirko independently made more successful campaigns in the Crimea, in 1666, 1667, 1670, 1673 and 1675. In 1670, Moscow and the Crimea conclude a peace treaty, but this "peace", like all the previous ones, did not last long - in 1673, the Khan's troops again attacked Russia and were stopped on the fortifications of the Belgorod line, and the next year the Moscow governor Ivan Leontiev and Ataman Sirko made a return trip to the Crimea, and in the same year, the Zaporizhzhya Cossacks repulsed the attack of the combined Turkish-Tatar army.
The active offensive policy of the Russian state in the southern and southwestern directions inevitably led to an open clash with the Ottoman Empire, therefore, the further relations of Rus' with the Crimean Khanate were one of the main components of the Russian-Turkish confrontation. In 1677, the Ottomans, seeking to oust the Russians from Ukraine, attempted to capture Chigirin, planning a further campaign against Kiev: to the Orthodox Russian region, especially to the God-saved royal city of Kiev, although you bring it under your Bisurman power, sent many of your Turkish and Tatar forces to Imbraim Bashe and the Crimean Khan before under the glorious ancient city of the Cossack chief Chigirin, ordering to get Chigirin, and having obtained, abie go under Kiev” (Kiev Synopsis. http://litopys.org.ua/old17/old17_09.htm). The garrison of the Chigirin fortress withstood the siege of the 60,000-strong Turkish-Tatar army until the approach of the combined army of Grigory Romodanovsky and Hetman Ivan Samoylovich, who pushed the enemy back from Chigirin.
The failure of the Turkish-Tatar campaign led to a change of power in the Crimea: Khan Selim-Girey was deposed by the Sultan, his place was taken by Murad Giray, who in March 1678 raided Pereyaslavl. In June of the same year, a hundred thousandth Turkish-Tatar army again besieged Chigirin, as last time, the troops of Romodanovsky and Samoilovich, as well as the Don Cossacks under the command of Mikhail Samarin and Frol Minaev, came to the aid of the Chigirinites. The Russian army managed to fight across to the right bank of the Dnieper and gain a foothold there, but they failed to defend Chigirin, during the assault the fortress was burned, the garrison was forced to leave it and join the army of Romodanovsky. But the battle did not end there: for another seven days the fighting continued, ending with the defeat of the Turkish-Tatar army. Thus, despite the loss of Chigirin, Moscow managed to defend the recently annexed Kyiv and Left-Bank Ukraine. After the battle of Chigirinsky, the war with the Crimean Horde continued for another two years, but without achieving any significant military successes, Moscow and Crimea in 1680 in Bakhchisarai signed a truce for 20 years, according to the terms of the agreement, the Crimean Khan recognized the Zaporozhye Cossacks as subjects of Moscow, as well as the transition to Russia, Left-Bank Ukraine and Kiev, the next year the Treaty of Bakhchisaray was approved by the Sultan.
In 1686, the geopolitical situation changed again: Rus' concluded an anti-Crimean and anti-Turkish treaty with the Commonwealth, thereby joining the struggle of the coalition of European powers against the Ottoman Empire, and the very next year, the Russian army under the command of Prince Vasily Golitsyn set out on a campaign against the Crimea, however, in due to lack of water and food, the campaign was stopped. In 1689, the second campaign against the Crimea took place, again the Russian troops, sweeping away the Tatar detachments on their way, approached Perekop, but for reasons not completely understood, Golitsyn refused to storm the Perekop fortress and turned back. The campaigns of the Russian troops continued in the future: in 1690-1692 and 1694, the combined Moscow-Zaporozhye troops launched a series of attacks on the Black Sea possessions of Turkey and the Crimean Khanate in the region of Ochakov, Akkerman and Kazi-Kermen. In 1695, the first campaign of Peter I against Azov took place, which ended in vain, nevertheless, certain successes were nevertheless achieved: at a time when the main Russian forces were engaged in the siege of Azov, Boris Sheremetyev, who carried out a distracting attack on the Crimea, managed to destroy a number of Turkish fortresses on the Lower Dnieper and found the Tavansk fortress, which played an important role in subsequent events. At the beginning of 1696, the Crimeans raided Poltava, recaptured by Sheremetyev, and in the same year, on June 19, as a result of the second campaign of Peter I, Azov was taken.
After the capture of Azov, the fighting continued: in 1697, the Tatars raided Azov, the troops of the governor Alexei Shein, who were in the fortress, repelled the raid, and then defeated the retreating horde near Kagalnik. And then the Turkish-Tatar army, led by Khan Selim-Giray, besieged the fortress of Tavansk. The garrison of the fortress under the command of the Duma nobleman Vasily Bukhvostov repelled the onslaught of superior enemy forces for three months. Here is what the defenders of Tavansk answered to the demand to surrender: “We, the foremen of the great Moscow troops, and we, the foremen of the Zaporizhzhya army and city and hunting regiments, took into our hands your sheet, given to us through an arrow, in which you ask to surrender the city to you and intimidate with your cavaliers and with a sword. Know that we are not like you, Busurman, we do not believe in any false prophets, and we put all our hope in the help of Almighty God and His Blessed Mother. Not only will you not take our city, but you will suffer notable destruction from it, for our sabers have not yet rusted, our hands have not weakened; we have no shortage of grain reserves and, for instilling you, in military reserves. So, we advise you better to refrain from threats and deceptions; We will not give up the city, expecting military people to help us. However, without them, we are ready to take up arms against you, busurman, for the Christian faith, for the honor of the great sovereign and for the homeland, and we have the hope of winning over you, with God's help, a noble victory for eternal reproach for you ”(quoted from A. R. Andreev "History of Crimea" http://acrimea.narod.ru/p10.htm). In early October, Moscow-Zaporozhye troops came to the aid of the besieged, and the siege was lifted. The victories of the Russian troops near Kagalnik and Tavansk allowed Russia to defend its gains and gain a foothold in the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov, in 1700 a peace was concluded with Turkey, according to which the sultan was forced to recognize the transition to Russia of Azov with the adjacent territory.
Thus ended the 17th century, and with it the Moscow period of Russian history came to an end, during which the Russian state was forced to wage an almost constant war with the steppe. Almost two hundred years of permanent war of Muscovite Rus with the Crimean Khanate was, in fact, only a continuation of the usual relationship that existed for many centuries between Russia and the steppe "Eurasian" world, which was absolutely hostile to it. Despite the fact that a number of factors, namely: the vassal relations of the Crimean khans with Turkey, the alliances of the Tatars with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland, as well as internal Russian civil strife during the Time of Troubles, seriously complicated the fight against the Crimean horde, the Russian state to late XVII century emerged victorious from the fierce confrontation, defended its independence, was able to create an effective defense system under the conditions of incessant attacks, significantly expand its territory and gain a foothold in the immediate vicinity of the possessions of the Crimean khans, while delivering a series of powerful blows to the Crimea itself. The Crimean horde no longer posed such a danger to Russia as in the 16th or early 17th centuries, in fact, the fate of Crimea was already decided in the second half of the 17th century, when a real opportunity arose for the complete defeat of the Crimean Khanate and Russia's access to the Black Sea, henceforth the elimination of the last fragment of the Golden Horde , was only a matter of time, and only the support of Turkey, for which the “surrender” of its Crimean vassals meant the loss of influence in the Northern Black Sea region, ensured the continued existence of the Crimean Khanate and prevented the “final solution of the Crimean Tatar issue”, which was successfully resolved in the next century.