"Tilsit duel" between Napoleon and Alexander. Alexander I and Napoleon

Military pleiades of Napoleon and Alexander Mikhail Luskatov 1. The Great French Revolution, a great event in itself, was the trigger for subsequent no less significant events, in particular, the Napoleonic Wars. Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia

Chapter XVI. Trafalgar campaign (end) - Changes in Napoleon's plan - Naval movements - War with Austria and the battle of Austerlitz - Battle of Trafalgar - Significant change in Napoleon's policy forced by the result of the naval campaign Behind the declaration of war

Wars of the Russian Empire

Emperor Alexander I and the Patriotic War of 1812

The Russian emperor, who went down in history as the Blessed One, is one of the most mysterious and controversial figures in the history of our state. The war became an ordeal for the young emperor Alexander, but he honorably fulfilled his sovereign duty to God and the people.

Emperor Alexander I

Alexander Pavlovich, the eldest son of Emperor Paul I and his second wife, Empress Maria Feodorovna, was born on December 12, 1777 in St. Petersburg. He owes his name to his grandmother, Catherine II, who named him in honor of Alexander Nevsky, the patron saint of St. Petersburg. Alexander's childhood and youth passed in the atmosphere of the "big court" of Catherine II in the northern capital and the "small" court of Pavel Petrovich in Gatchina, which were at war with each other.

The key to understanding the personality of Alexander is given by the Russian historian A.E. Presnyakov is the “born sovereign” of his country, that is. a man brought up for power and political activity, absorbed in thinking about it from childhood. He was brought up in the same way as other people of his generation, who belonged to the top of Russian society and to the wealthy nobility: on French literature, science, and art. The people around Alexander all spoke French better than their mother tongue. In official correspondence, they often resorted to French. Even on the Borodino field they spoke French among themselves.

Having become emperor, Alexander I turned out to be well prepared in his own way to fulfill his duty - the duty of the Russian emperor. Already at the beginning of his reign, he carried out a series of reforms: the establishment of ministries (1802), a decree on free cultivators (1803), a pedagogical institute in St. Petersburg (1804), successfully completed the war with Turkey (1806-1812) and Sweden (1808-1809), annexes Georgia (1801), Finland (1809), Bessarabia (1812), Azerbaijan (1813) to Russia. He took the crown when Russia was at a crossroads. The first quarter of the 19th century is a period full of contradictions and peculiar drama in the history of our Fatherland.

In international affairs, he inherited very complicated relations from his father: an alliance with France, a war with England, a break with Austria and an almost ready break with Prussia. Having become emperor, he immediately proclaimed the principle of Russian non-intervention: Russia does not need alliances, it should not bind itself with any agreements, but later, Alexander began to pursue a policy of maneuvering between England and France, concluding simultaneously with both powers peace treaties in 1801. In 1805 - 1807. Russia participates in the 3rd and 4th coalitions against Napoleonic France. At the same time, as commander-in-chief, Alexander did not show the proper qualities. The defeats of the Russian army near Austerlitz in 1805 and Friedland in 1807 led to the signing of the Tilsit peace in 1807

The humiliating Treaty of Tilsit dealt a blow to Russia's international prestige and caused growing discontent in society. Under the terms of the treaty, Alexander recognized the changes made by Napoleon in Europe. At the same time, it should be emphasized that Russia received freedom of action in relation to Turkey and Sweden. The alliance with France forced Russia to follow her aggressive policy. Participation in the Continental blockade directed against England caused significant damage to the Russian economy, since England was its main trading partner.

Emperor Alexander, contrary to the demands of Napoleon, allowed neutral ships to enter the Russian port and unload goods. In December 1810, he went even further, signing a new Russian tariff that imposed almost prohibitive duties on luxury goods, that is, on the main part of French imports, thus decisively violating the Treaty of Tilsit.

But Napoleon also violated the terms of the Peace of Tilsit. He increased the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw and sent his troops there, creating a direct threat to Russia. Alexander needed Poland not to increase the territory of Russia, but in order to deprive the enemy of Russia of the opportunity to have an ally almost in Russia itself, that is, in Western Russia and Lithuania, where sympathies for Poland were so strong. The contradictions between Russia and France continued to escalate.

Already in 1811, Napoleon began to gradually draw up a huge army to the borders of Russia. During a conversation with Calencourt, Napoleon said: “I want the union to be useful to me, and it is no longer such since Russia began to allow neutral ships into its ports ... In order for peace to be possible and lasting, it is necessary that England be convinced that she will not will find more sympathizers on the continent.” Meanwhile, it should be emphasized that both emperors treated each other with distrust, in particular, Napoleon said: “Alexander is smart, pleasant, educated, but he cannot be trusted, this is a true Byzantine ... subtle, feigned, cunning.”

Emperor Alexander I

In turn, Alexander I understood the inevitability of war with mighty France. Speaking with the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Armand de Calencourt, he says: “If Emperor Napoleon starts a war against me, it is possible and even likely that he will defeat us if we accept the battle, but this victory will not bring him peace. The Spaniards were often defeated in battle, but they were neither defeated nor subdued. However, they are not as far from Paris as we are, they have neither our climate nor our resources. We will stand up for ourselves. We have large spaces and we maintain a well-organized army. Even the winner can be forced to agree to peace… if military fate does not smile at me, I would rather retreat to Kamchatka than give up my territory and sign an agreement in my capital, which will still be only a temporary respite…”.

The restrained secretive sovereign did not allow himself to show feelings in public. It is hard to imagine what he experienced on the eve of the Battle of Borodino. According to eyewitnesses, someone decided to ask him what he intended to do if the French took Moscow. "Make a second Spain out of Russia", was the answer. On September 11, Alexander I received Kutuzov's report on the outcome of the Battle of Borodino. The text of the report said: “It ended with the enemy nowhere winning a single step of land with superior forces.”

This phrase was taken in St. Petersburg as evidence of the victory of the Russian troops. The Emperor of Russia warmly thanked God for the granted victory and held a thanksgiving service in the Trinity Cathedral of the Alexander Nevsky Lavra.

When on September 19 it turned out that Kutuzov was surrendering Moscow, Alexander turned gray overnight. The frightened nobility cursed Kutuzov. The emperor got it too. His own sister Grand Duchess Ekaterina Pavlovna wrote to him from Yaroslavl: “The capture of Moscow brought irritation to the extreme ... You are publicly blamed for the misfortune of the empire, for the collapse of everything and everything, for the fact that you have dropped the honor of the country and your own ... I present to you to judge for yourself the state of affairs in a country where the leader is despised.”

The Russian tsar replied to this insulting letter with respectable calmness and firmness: “Remember how often in our conversations we foresaw these failures, even admitted the possibility of losing both capitals, that we recognized only firmness as the only remedy against the disasters of this cruel time. I am far from being discouraged under the yoke of blows pouring down on me. On the contrary, more than ever, I am determined to persevere in the struggle, and to this goal all my concerns are directed.

It should be emphasized that in this difficult time, the Russian emperor showed a firm will and determination not to make any concessions to the enemy. The intransigence of the tsar was unexpected for Napoleon, who remained in Moscow in vain, waiting for an answer.

Alexander the First accepts the surrender of Napoleonic Paris, 1814

The victory over Napoleon strengthened the authority of Alexander I, he became one of the most powerful rulers of Europe, who felt himself the liberator of its peoples, who was entrusted with a special, definite God's will mission to prevent further wars and devastation on the continent. He also considered the tranquility of Europe a necessary condition for the realization of his reformist plans in Russia itself. Undoubtedly, the personality of Alexander, both in domestic and foreign history, should be assessed with dignity, as A.Z. Manfred in a book about Napoleon: "Among the monarchs of the Romanov dynasties, not counting Peter I, Alexander I was, apparently, the most intelligent and skillful politician."

LECTURE VII

The second period of the reign of Alexander (1805–1807). – The international position of Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. - The break with Napoleon. - Czartoryski's plans and Alexander's attitude towards the Poles in 1805 - Unsuccessful outcome of the 1805 campaign - War of 1806-1807 - Defeat of Prussia. - Emergency preparations for war with Napoleon in Russia, - Winter campaign of 1807 - Depletion of Russia's military means. - Peace of Tilsit. - Alliance with Napoleon. – Acute discontent in Russia caused by the Treaty of Tilsit and its consequences. – Manifestations and nature of the opposition mood in society.

Russia and Napoleon at the beginning of the reign of Alexander I

Turning to the consideration of the second period of the reign of Alexander, marked by the first two wars with Napoleon, it should be said that those relations that led to the war of 1805 began to take shape long before that.

At the time of Paul's death, a war was coming with England, and the English fleet was already on its way to bombard Kronstadt. Immediately after the accession of Alexander, peace was concluded with England, and those controversial issues of maritime law, which for quite a long time harmed the peaceful relations of Russia and other powers with England, were also resolved. Although all the sympathies of Alexander himself in his youth were on the side of France, nevertheless he submitted, as we have seen, to the pressure that was exerted on him by those around him, in favor of an alliance with England. At the very first meetings of the secret committee, it was decided in principle not to interfere in any internal affairs. foreign states, and although a suspicious attitude was established towards France in view of the ambitious plans of Bonaparte, however, peaceful principles prevailed in external affairs. Russia, therefore, in the first years of Alexander's reign was freed from all external confusions and wars, and this was in full accordance with Alexander's own intentions to turn all his attention to internal affairs. These peaceful relations were not limited then only to Western Europe, but also extended to the eastern outskirts, so that when Georgia, fleeing the onslaught of Persia, asked to be annexed to Russia, this issue was initially resolved in the unspoken committee in the negative, and only due to the insistence of the Indispensable Council, Alexander decided this issue in in the opposite sense, and, however, prescribed that all income received from the population of Georgia annexed to Russia should go to local needs and that Georgia be governed according to local customs. Unfortunately, these good intentions and instructions of the young sovereign did not prevent the unsuccessful representatives of the Russian authorities in Georgia - Knorring and Kovalensky - within a few months to excite the entire public opinion of Georgia against Russia with their outrageous abuses and violence.

Relations with Napoleon, which had developed quite favorably in the first months of Alexander's reign and were secured by a peace treaty concluded in the autumn of 1801, began to deteriorate already from the end of 1801 - partly due to the hostile attitude towards Napoleon, which our new ambassador in Paris - an arrogant gr. Morkov, partly because of the Sardinian king, whom Napoleon wanted, contrary to the treaty concluded with Russia, to be wiped off the face of the earth, and Alexander considered himself obliged to protect as an old ally of Russia. In addition, Alexander himself became more and more inclined to think that it was necessary to limit the ambitious aspirations of Bonaparte, and from 1802 he gradually became convinced that sooner or later Napoleon would have to be curbed by an armed hand. At the same time, having become more familiar with international relations and personally entering into relations with representatives of foreign powers in St. propensity for direct diplomatic negotiations. He was apparently fascinated by the very technique of diplomatic relations. One can think, however, that even then he was guided by a vague desire to later liberate Europe from the growing despotism and boundless lust for power of Napoleon.

In spite of the warnings and forebodings of his co-workers, as early as the spring of 1802 Alexander decided to take an active part in the affairs of Europe and, for a start, arranged a meeting with the Prussian king in Memel. In the same year, 1802, he had to be finally convinced of the rudeness and vulgarity of Napoleon's ambition, when he, having made a new coup d'état, declared himself consul for life. “The veil has fallen,” Alexander wrote to La Harpe at the time, “he, that is, Napoleon, himself deprived himself of the best glory that a mortal can achieve and which he had to acquire, the glory of proving that he, without any personal views, worked solely for the good and the glory of his fatherland, and, being faithful to the constitution to which he himself swore, lay down in ten years the power that was in his hands. Instead, he preferred to imitate the courts, while violating the constitution of his country. From now on, this is the most famous of the tyrants that we find in history.

At the same time, the rights of the Sardinian king, whose possessions were annexed to France, were finally violated. In 1803, after the renewal of the war with England, Napoleon captured Hanover and clearly threatened to become the arbiter of the fate of Central Europe. Napoleon's personal relationship with Count Carrot so deteriorated that Napoleon demanded a change in the Russian ambassador. But Alexander did not immediately go towards this desire, and then, recalling Morkov, defiantly awarded him the highest Russian order of St. Andrew the First-Called, in which Morkov appeared to bow to Napoleon.

In Paris, the Russian emperor did not appoint an ambassador at all, but temporarily entrusted the management of the affairs of the embassy to a minor official, Ubri. The proclamation of Napoleon as emperor and the murder of the Duke of Enghien that preceded this served as the last reason for the break.

Third coalition

From all of the above, it is clear that the interests of Russia in this whole story were, in essence, nothing to do with it: in this whole affair, Alexander acted not as a representative of Russian state interests proper, but as the head of one of the great European powers. Having broken with Napoleon, he actively began to draw up a coalition against him.

The management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at this time, after the retirement of Chancellor Count A.R. Vorontsov, whom Alexander did not like, was in the hands of Prince. Adam Czartoryski. Czartoryski was very sympathetic to the idea of ​​a coalition against Napoleon, he dreamed that one of the results of the war could be the restoration of Poland. He tried to convince Alexander that one armed force against Napoleon was not enough, that it was necessary, in view of his extraordinary genius and the prestige of invincibility, to arouse special enthusiasm in the peoples of Europe in the fight against him. As an idea that could create such enthusiasm, Czartoryski put forward the principle of restoring the trampled independence of nationalities, hoping that this would also lead to the restoration of the Polish nationality. Alexander, apparently, agreed with such a formulation of the question, although in the mouth of Czartoryski, the restoration of Polish nationality meant the rejection from Russia of such primordial Russian regions as Volhynia and Podolia, for Czartoryski dreamed of restoring Poland within the borders of 1772. With such a formulation of the question, the war against Napoleon in 1805 not only was not caused by Russian interests, but even threatened Russia later to become more complicated new struggle for territory, by the struggle, which in the past centuries determined all its backwardness and savagery. Pretending to share all the views of Czartoryski, Alexander took advantage, however in a very peculiar way, of the hopes of the Polish patriots. He encouraged them in every possible way, although he did not bind himself with definite promises, mainly, as one can now think, in order to force the wavering Prussian king to join the coalition against Napoleon and conclude an alliance with Russia by the threat of a Polish uprising in the regions of Prussian Poland; and as soon as he managed to force Friedrich Wilhelm to conclude a convention with him (which was later not even carried out), he abandoned all encouragement for the kindled hopes of the Poles and postponed the solution of the Polish question indefinitely. By this careless and incorrect behavior, he caused great disappointment in the Poles and pushed them into the arms of Napoleon, which the latter did not fail to take advantage of soon. In 1805, the war was thus decided, and the Russian people had to put up a sufficient armed force, since on the continent of Europe only Austrian and Russian troops actually opposed Napoleon. In order to gather this force, it took three consecutive recruitment sets, and up to 150 thousand recruits were recruited (10 recruits from every thousand male souls, but since recruits were then taken from persons aged 20 to 35 years, then the ratio of the number of recruits to the size of this population group was already 10:225). Moreover, it was necessary to allow a new significant deficit in the budget, which was again covered by a new issue of banknotes.

In this case, Alexander acted like a true autocrat, whom no one could interfere with and who was not responsible to anyone. But it should be noted that Russian public opinion was already so armed against Napoleon that Russia's participation in the war with him almost no one - with the exception of Napoleon's direct admirers, whose number was getting smaller - did not seem inappropriate, and Czartoryski's views were known to few, the people are accustomed to endure without grumbling and much greater hardships.

As you know, the war of 1805 ended unhappily for Russia and Austria, mainly due to the inept conduct of the case by the Austrian generals, and partly due to the inexperience and arrogance of Alexander himself, who forced the Russian commander in chief Kutuzov to act contrary to his convictions, in accordance with the plan of the Austrian armchair strategist, doctrinaire Weyrothera. After the surrender of the Austrian army of Mack at Ulm and the subsequent terrible defeat of the Russian troops in the battle of Austerlitz, given to Napoleon against the will and advice of Kutuzov, the Russian army had to hastily retreat to the Russian borders, and the war ended there. Austria made a humiliating peace at Pressburg; Prussia also concluded with Napoleon at the same time a defensive and offensive treaty.

Nevertheless, Alexander began to prepare for the continuation of the war: the defeat of the Russian troops created a patriotic mood in society, which Alexander kindled by direct appeals to the people. Wanting these appeals to reach the masses of the people, he set in motion a powerful means in the form of appeals from the Holy Synod, which were read in all churches. In these proclamations, Napoleon was declared an enemy of the human race, plotting to declare himself the Messiah and inciting the Jews to destroy the Christian church, and unprecedented blasphemy was attributed to him. Anticipating the transfer of the war to the borders of Russia, Alexander at the same time, regardless of the recruitment, convened a militia, which, according to the initial orders, was supposed to be a mass of 612 thousand warriors. One can imagine what the national economy cost in such preparation for war, accompanied, especially in the western provinces, by exhausting underwater service, with the help of which food and ammunition were brought to the theater of war.

Fourth Coalition

Although Prussia, after the first treaty of alliance with Napoleon, concluded a second treaty, apparently even more lasting, Alexander still did not lose hope of raising her against Napoleon, who kept his troops on German territory, refused to remove them and at the same time did not give his consent to the formation by the Prussian king of the North German Union from the German states not included in the Confederation of the Rhine formed by Napoleon himself. Alexander tried to persuade Friedrich Wilhelm to oppose Napoleon in every possible way, and the break between France and Prussia really did finally occur, moreover, it happened earlier than Alexander expected. Friedrich Wilhelm, as a man of weak character, did not dare for a long time, and then suddenly delivered an ultimatum to Napoleon, suggesting that he immediately remove his troops and not interfere with Prussia to form a North German alliance, otherwise threatening to break. All this happened so unexpectedly that Alexander did not have time to draw his troops to support Prussia. Napoleon, however, did not even answer the Prussian ultimatum, but immediately began hostilities and eight days later he had already inflicted a terrible defeat on Prussia at Jena. The main Prussian army here was destroyed and then, after the loss of the second battle of Auerstet, almost the entire Prussian territory was quickly occupied by the French. In the hands of the Prussians, only two fortresses remained in the northeastern corner of the kingdom - Danzig and Konigsberg; behind which Friedrich Wilhelm had to take refuge in the small town of Memel on the Neman near the Russian border. Poland became the theater of operations, and here Napoleon, wanting to oppose the hopes of the Polish population that were placed on Alexander, with his intentions, very cleverly took advantage of the disappointment that Alexander aroused in the Poles with his changeable behavior in 1805, and began to spread rumors that it is he, Napoleon, who intends to restore Poland as a bulwark of Europe against Russia.

The commander of the Russian army was the old field marshal Kamensky, who, having arrived in the army, suddenly went crazy and almost ruined it with his ridiculous orders; but, fortunately, he left without permission, having been in the army for only a week; upon departure, they were ordered to retreat, as best they could, to the borders of Russia. However, the generals decided not to obey him, and Bennigsen, pulling his troops to one point, gave a successful rebuff to the vanguard of the French troops near Pultusk, fifty miles from Warsaw on the other side of the Vistula. At first they thought - and Bennigsen supported this opinion - that there was a battle with Napoleon himself (in fact, the victory was won over the troops of Marshal Lannes, who were in the vanguard of the Napoleonic army). Bennigsen, bypassing his senior rank c. Bukshoevden, was appointed commander in chief. Then, in the battle of Preussish-Eylau (not far from Koenigsberg), one of the bloodiest battles, in which up to 50 thousand people fell. - including 26 thousand from our side - Bennigsen really managed to repel Napoleon himself: both troops remained in their places, and the fact that the battle with such an enemy as Napoleon was not lost greatly supported the spirit of the army. However, after 5 months of inactivity, Napoleon inflicted a decisive defeat on the Russian troops at Friedland (which cost us at least 15 thousand soldiers), after which we could no longer continue the war. There was no hope for reinforcements, except for one infantry division brought by Prince. Lobanov-Rostovsky and consisted entirely of recruits; meanwhile, we had to declare war on Turkey, and therefore part of the troops was needed to reinforce Michelson's army, which occupied Wallachia and Moldavia. As for the militia, in spite of all its enormity, it proved to be completely useless; it could offer great resistance in the event of an enemy invasion of Russia, in a guerrilla war, but untrained and poorly armed warriors were completely unsuitable for a regular war, in an army in the field; however, with the then impassability, they could not even be quickly mobilized.

It was especially difficult to replenish the huge loss in officers and generals; there were few good generals - the best were out of action - as for the officers, there was already a shortage in them before, which forced them to take the most extreme measures - to take, for example, students who were not prepared for military service, and even just nobles, as officers "undersized" if they agreed to undergo some training in a few months cadet corps. Thus, we could not fight alone. Meanwhile, it was necessary to act just one way: England participated in the war with subsidies, and they were released rather meagerly (in the amount of 2,200 thousand pounds sterling a year for all its continental allies). Thanks to all this, Alexander had no choice but to start peace negotiations, taking advantage of the fact that Napoleon himself willingly extended the hand of reconciliation, since he, too, was in great difficulty after the bloody battles of Preussisch-Eylau and Friedland.

Peace of Tilsit

A meeting took place between the two emperors on the Neman, in Tilsit. Here, for the first time, Alexander had to show his remarkable diplomatic talent in all its splendor, since Napoleon offered him to negotiate directly, without the participation of ministers, and Alexander willingly agreed to this. At the same time, he had to spend especially a lot of effort to keep Napoleon from the complete destruction of Prussia. Prussia was, however, brought to unprecedented humiliation: she lost half of her territory and from a great power turned for a time into a country dependent on Napoleon, which did not even have the right to maintain an army of more than 42 thousand people; her fortresses, even on the territory returned to her, were occupied by the French for a number of years (until payment of indemnity).

During the negotiations in Tilsit, Napoleon did not want to reckon with anyone except Alexander, with whom he intended for the time being to share dominion over the world. Alexander, realizing that now further struggle is impossible, decided to temporarily meet the wishes of his rival, who, in appearance, offered rather honorable terms of peace. But the indispensable condition of peace, the condition sina qua non, Napoleon set, in the event that England refused the conditions set for her - and she obviously could not agree to them - Alexander's declaration of war with her acceptance at the same time of the notorious continental system. This system invented by Napoleon consisted in the fact that all the states of Europe, allied with him or dependent on him, refused trade relations with England and pledged not to allow English merchant ships into their ports. Alexander pledged, in addition, to force Sweden and Denmark to break with England and take part in the continental system directed against her; moreover, it could be foreseen in advance that Sweden, completely defenseless from the attack of the British, could not agree to this, while its king, Gustav IV, showed a fanatical hatred of Napoleon. Thus, even then it was possible to foresee the inevitability of an attack by England and Sweden on Russia from the sea and land near St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, at that time, the northern coast of the Gulf of Finland belonged to Sweden. Therefore, Napoleon quite thoroughly, from a strategic point of view, pointed out to Alexander the need to conquer it. Thus, in Tilsit, the accession of Finland to Russia was prepared, for which we had to in 1808 and 1809. wage a difficult two-year war with Sweden.

As for Turkey, with which we were at that time in a war caused by the Turks thanks to the intrigues of the French ambassador in Constantinople, Sebastiani, Napoleon offered his mediation to end it on terms favorable to Russia, and at the same time, in verbal negotiations with Alexander, he even expressed readiness , in the event of Porta's persistence in ceding the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, go hand in hand with Alexander, if he wishes, up to the partition of Turkey (its European possessions); but at the same time he made it a precondition for the beginning of a truce and peace negotiations to withdraw our troops from both principalities, so that, however, the Turks could not occupy them with their troops. In fact, the war with the Turks did not stop, and although Napoleon later tried to seduce Alexander with the brilliant prospects of expelling the Turks from Europe and a joint campaign with him in India, Russia, however, had to wage a rather fruitless war with the Turks this time, without any assistance from him. before 1812

The intrigues and measures of Napoleon on the Polish question were very unfavorable for Russia: Napoleon did not agree in Tilsit to the return of the Polish regions occupied by the French to Prussia and formed the Duchy of Warsaw from them under the leadership of the Saxon king and under the protectorate of the emperor of the French. Thus, a military outpost of Napoleon himself was created on the Russian border. At the same time, Napoleon put Alexander in a difficult position in relation to the Poles; Alexander had to stand in apparent contradiction with himself and prevent the restoration of an independent Poland. This circumstance caused the final disappointment of the Poles in their hopes for Alexander and forced them to transfer them entirely to Napoleon.

In Tilsit and after Tilsit, Alexander outwardly expressed admiration for the genius of Napoleon and his friendship with him. He was reproached by his contemporaries for having allowed himself to be deceived by the cunning Corsican, since much of what Napoleon had promised orally was not later included in the written contracts. However, Alexander was by no means infatuated with Napoleon; he skillfully played his part in Tilsit, and then in Erfurt, so that he even gave Napoleon reason to call him later northern Talma(the name of a then famous dramatic actor) and "Byzantine Greek".

It is difficult to say who was more deceived in this diplomatic tournament, since Napoleon was later repeatedly told by those close to him that he was deceived by Alexander. If we look at the matter from the point of view of the then international relations and if we take into account the real conditions of the moment, then it should, in any case, be recognized that the policy of Alexander in Tilsit and then a year later at a new meeting with Napoleon in Erfurt was very skillful. In these negotiations, Alexander appears for the first time as a subtle and insightful diplomat, and it seems that now we can assume that this was his real sphere, in which he was undoubtedly a great statesman, capable of competing with all the European celebrities of his time.

Russia and the continental blockade

These wars with Napoleon affected the situation of the population in Russia most sharply. We have already talked about the severity of wars for the population - the severity of recruiting, militia, food supplies, etc. The suspension of the legislative activities of the government caused by the war also had a huge negative effect. Finally, the plight of the finances, under the influence of military expenditures, greatly curtailed all the plans of the government in the field of public education, which had advanced so much just before. As a result of the wars of 1805-1807, to which was added a complete crop failure in Russia in 1806, the financial situation began to deteriorate from year to year. In 1806, revenues were 100 million rubles, while expenses were 122 million rubles; in 1807, income - 121, and expenses - 171 million rubles; in 1808 it was 111.5 million rubles. income and 140 million rubles. expenses only for the army, and the total amount of expenses in 1808 reached 240 million rubles. Huge deficits were again covered by new issues of paper money, the total amount of which already reached 319 million rubles in 1806, 382 million rubles in 1807, and 477 million rubles in 1808. Meanwhile, the turnover of foreign trade under the influence of the war, and then the continental system and the prohibition of the export of grain from the western provinces, which followed under the influence of a bad harvest in 1806, was extremely reduced, and the export of Russian raw materials abroad was especially reduced, which changed the balance of trade in an unfavorable direction, which caused, in turn, the outflow of specie, which greatly influenced the depreciation of paper money.

Thanks to all these circumstances, the exchange rate of our paper money, which held firm from 1802 to 1805 and even increased during these years, now began to fall sharply: in 1806 the paper ruble was equal to 78 kopecks, in 1807 - 66 kopecks. and in 1808 fell to 48 kopecks. Meanwhile, taxes were paid in banknotes, and a significant part of foreign state expenditures (for the maintenance of the army and for subsidies to the completely ruined Prussian king) had to be made in specie. The situation thus became very difficult, and after the Peace of Tilsit and the accession of Russia to the continental system, it became, as we shall see, downright unbearable. The Treaty of Tilsit made a depressing impression on all sections of Russian society and on the people. Many considered this treaty more shameful than all the lost battles. After the peace with Napoleon, Alexander lost a significant part of the popularity that he enjoyed. The people, who shortly before this had heard curses against Napoleon from the church pulpit, could not understand how the Russian tsar could be so defiantly friends with the “enemy of the human race”, who was plotting to abolish the Christian faith.

When the continental system began to be implemented, which completely undermined our export trade, led to the bankruptcy of many trading houses, ruined many landlord farms that sold raw materials abroad (especially flax and hemp in various forms), and caused the high cost of many supplies, then discontent took over. universal character. According to contemporaries, Alexander, who, in the eyes of everyone, had to play such an unpleasant and difficult role in his relations with Napoleon, began to noticeably deteriorate in character, and his previously so even and kind treatment of everyone began to be replaced by an irritable, sometimes gloomy mood of the spirit, moreover, characteristic his stubbornness began to manifest itself sometimes in very unpleasant forms. It is remarkable that already in 1805, going to war, Alexander, by secret order, restored, in essence, the secret police, establishing a special temporary committee of three persons to monitor public opinion and talk among the public. This committee, after the Peace of Tilsit, was officially converted into a permanent institution, and a secret instruction was given to it, which restored, among other things, the revision of letters and those methods of police supervision, from which Alexander was so far away in the first years of his reign. Especially unpleasant at this time, Alexander was affected by the rumors in society about his friendship with Napoleon. At the head of the opposition to Alexander's foreign policy in court spheres was the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna herself. At the same time, Alexander's position was all the more difficult because he was forced to play his role without revealing his real intentions to anyone.

Patriotic opposition to the Peace of Tilsit

Alexander's closest friends, former members of the secret committee Kochubey, Czartorysky, Novosiltsev, retired and the last two even went abroad, and Stroganov moved to military service not to get involved in politics. Even the Marshal Alexandra gr. N. A. Tolstoy managed to express his opposition to Alexander’s friendship with Napoleon by refusing to put on, next to the ribbon of the Legion of Honor granted to him by Napoleon, the ribbon of the highest Russian order of St. Andrew the First-Called, which Alexander wanted to put on him. The opposition in the highest circles of St. Petersburg society was especially pronounced when General Savary, sent by Napoleon as a military agent, came to St. Petersburg, personally involved in the execution of the Duke of Enghien. Petersburg salons closed their doors to him, they did not receive him anywhere (except for the Winter Palace) and did not give him visits, until, finally, Alexander himself intervened in this matter and demanded from his confidants a more polite attitude towards the representative of his ally. Savary, later Napoleon's Minister of Police, decided to show his political and, one might say, downright provocative talents here too. He diligently began to collect and combine all sorts of gossip and careless phrases that sometimes broke out at Alexander in a circle of people dissatisfied with his policies, and went so far as to fabricate a legend about a major conspiracy and a coup that was being prepared, and did not hesitate to inspire all this to Alexander, trying to quarrel him with society and inflate the mutual distrust that began to form during this period between the young sovereign and his subjects.

In wider public circles, discontent manifested itself even more strongly, expressed in literature and in theaters, where patriotic tragedies like Dmitry Donskoy became the favorite plays of the public. Ozerova or "Prince Pozharsky" Kryukovsky, which caused stormy applause and even sobs from the audience in the most pathetic places. Comedies enjoyed the same success. Krylova"Fashion Shop" and "Lesson to Daughters", directed against French and imitation of French fashions.

This opposition manifested itself even more strongly in Moscow, where one of the most ardent patriots of that time S. N. Glinka began to publish since 1808 a new patriotic magazine "Russian Messenger", directed directly against Napoleon. In this journal, Glinka wrote in the interval between the Tilsit and Erfurt meetings - where Alexander so vividly demonstrated his friendship with Napoleon in the face of all Europe - that the Tilsit peace is only a temporary truce and that when there is a new war, then all measures will be taken in society to repel the power-hungry Napoleon. Napoleon's envoy, Caulaincourt, considered it his duty to draw Alexander's attention to this article, and Glinka, an ardent patriot and conservative of Glinka, one of the first in Alexander's reign, provoked censorship persecution against himself. Along with him, the old Pavlovian nobleman gr. Rostopchin, who lived in Moscow "out of work", published at the same time a pamphlet under the pseudonym Bogatyrev "Thoughts aloud on the Red Porch", in which he tried to spread the same views in wide circles of the common people.

At the same time, Admiral A. S. Shishkov, a Russian Old Believer, already known earlier for his attacks on Karamzin (in "Discourse on the old and new syllable of the Russian language"), now formed in St. and Karamzin and even the liberal Mordvinov.

It is remarkable that this opposition, which united fairly broad social circles and manifested itself in patriotic forms, was by no means chauvinistic in nature. It was directed entirely against Napoleon and the Treaty of Tilsit with its consequences, which were so heavily reflected in the position of Russian trade, Russian industry and the entire course of Russian public life. At that time we fought four wars, and Russian society, according to a contemporary ( Vigel, a man of quite protective views), treated with amazing indifference, sometimes even with direct hostility to the success of the goals set by the government! Two of these wars (with then weak Persia and with Austria, with which Alexander himself fought à contre coeur [reluctantly], as an ally of Napoleon), were given relatively easily, although they still required significant costs. But the other two cost us very dearly and required significant expenses both in money and in people. These were: the war with Turkey, which lasted from 1806 - with interruptions, but without the conclusion of peace - until the spring of 1812, and the war with Sweden, which began after the Treaty of Tilsit as a direct consequence of the treaty with Napoleon and ended after a number of vicissitudes and heroic , but heavy exploits for our troops in 1809 by annexing all of Finland to the Torneo River.

Alexander wanted to attract the hearts of new subjects with generosity, and even before the signing of the peace treaty, he gathered the Diet in Borgo, having previously confirmed the ancient rights and privileges of the Finnish population with a special letter. With accession to Russia, therefore, the legal situation of the population of Finland did not change for the worse, and the economic situation of the country even improved at the very beginning: the tax that Finland paid to cover Swedish debts was canceled, and internal customs were destroyed.

But Russian society nevertheless reacted rather disapprovingly to the Friedrichsham world - there were even regrets addressed to the Swedes.

Wishes were also expressed to end the war with Turkey. Mordvinov in 1810 submitted a note to Alexander, in which he explained in detail the uselessness territorial acquisitions for Russia, whose borders are already stretched, and insisted on the need for a speedy end to the Turkish war.

Such was the mood of Russian society after the Peace of Tilsit.

“A fierce enemy of peace and blessed silence,” the Synod’s proclamation begins, “Napoleon Bonaparte, who autocratically appropriated the royal crown of France and by force of arms, and more cunningly extended his power to many neighboring states, devastated their cities and villages with a sword and flames, dares, in the frenzy of her malice, to threaten Russia, which is patronized from above, with an invasion of its borders, the destruction of landscaping, which she now enjoys alone in the world under the meek scepter of our God-blessed and beloved pious sovereign Alexander the First, and the shock of the Orthodox Greek-Russian Church, in all its purity and holiness in this prosperous Empire ... "

After referring to the duties of the pastors of the church, the Synod continues:

“The whole world knows his ungodly plans and deeds, with which he trampled on the law and truth.”

“Even during the time of popular indignation that raged in France during the ungodly revolution, disastrous for mankind and brought a heavenly curse on the perpetrators of it, he broke away from the Christian faith, triumphed at the gatherings of the people, the idolatrous festivals established by false-minded apostates, and in the host of his impious accomplices paid worship, befitting the only Almighty deity, idols, human creatures and harlots, who served as an idol image for them.

“In Egypt, he joined the persecutors of the Church of Christ, preached the alcoran Mohammed, declared himself the defender of the confession of the superstitious followers of this false prophet of Muslims, and solemnly showed his contempt for the pastors of the holy church of Christ.”

“Finally, to her greatest disgrace, he convened Jewish synagogues in France, commanded that the rabbis be clearly honored and established a new great Jewish sanhydrin, this most ungodly cathedral, which once dared to condemn our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ to the crucifixion - and now is thinking of uniting the Jews, scattered all over the face of the earth by the wrath of God, and direct them to overthrow the church of Christ and (oh, terrible insolence, surpassing the measure of all atrocities!) - to proclaim a false messiah in the person of Napoleon ... "

At the end of the appeal, after various formidable curses and threats borrowed from Deuteronomy, the same thing is repeated once more:

“... Rejecting the thoughts of God's justice, he (i.e. Napoleon) dreams in his rampage, with the help of haters of the Christian name and capable of his wickedness, the Jews, to steal (which every person can even think terribly!) the sacred name of the Messiah: show him that he is a creature, burned with conscience and deserving of contempt...” A similar appeal was sent by the Catholic Metropolitan of Mogilev Sestrentsevich to the Catholic priests of the Western Territory (Schilder, name cit., II, p. 354 - in appendices to the text). At the same time, the local authorities of the Western Territory received an order to watch the Jews and warn them against relations with the Parisian all-Jewish institutions formed by Napoleon, and the Jews were instilled that the Parisian assembly (Sanhedrin) was striving to change their faith (Circus, February 20, 1807, see Heb. Encicl., vol. XI, p. 516). It is remarkable that the Jews in the Western Territory in 1812, contrary to all fears, remained loyal to Russia everywhere. (Compare “Acts, documents and materials for political and everyday history of 1812”, ed. K. Voensky, in "Collection, Russian. ist. gen., volumes CXXVIII and CXXXIII. SPb., 1910 and 1911, and his own art. "Napoleon and the Borisov Jews in 1812", in Voen. collection, for 1906, No. 9.)

Ref. Bogdanovich, name op. II, p. 177. The commanders of the divisions received an order directly from the field marshal: “when retreating to the Russian borders, take the shortest route to Vilna and report to the elder” (!). Gr. Buksgevden, to whom he handed over the command, Kamensky ordered to throw battery artillery on the road if it impedes the movement of troops, and to take care only of saving people. (Ibid.) All this before meeting the enemy.

Bogdanovich reports that due to the lack of guns only fifth part militia could have them; the rest of the warriors were supposed to be armed with peaks (Ist. Reigning them. Alexander I, vol. II, p. 165). After the battle of Pultusk, Alexander ordered the size of the militia to be reduced to 252,000 men. (Shiman."Alexander I", p. 17 Russian. translation and Bogdanovich, ibidem, vol. III, p. 1). Albert Vandal("Napoleon and Alexander I", vol. I, p. 49 of the Russian translation) quotes from Rustam's memoirs, published in Revue retrospective, nos. 8-9,. the following fact: when the Russian army fled after the Friedland defeat, having lost the ability to resist, the French, having reached the Neman near Tilsit, saw a strange sight: “a horde of barbarians with Asian faces, Kalmyks and Siberians (?) without guns, firing clouds of arrows, circled around plain and vainly frightened us. It was a reserve army, which Russia announced to the public and brought by Prince. Lobanov.

Ref. Napoleon's letter to Alexander dated February 2, 1808. Its text is given at vandal(vol. 1, p. 249, Russian translation) and Solovyov (“Imp. Alexander I”, p. 165), and both historians attach completely different significance to this letter.

Napoleon's Admirer vandal this is how he expresses this subject: "Not intending to put the victim of the triple partition in the position of a stable state, he wants to create in Europe - I will not say a Polish nation - but a Polish army, because he recognizes in the projected state only a large military force standing guard over France "(! - on the banks of the Vistula), called. cit., vol. I, p. 90 of the Russian translation.

Ref. a report to Napoleon Duroc, who managed, probably with the help of bribery, to get from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Napoleon to the Russian ambassador, Prince. Kurakin in 1809. The text of this curious document is given in extracts from Bogdanovich, vol. III, p. 85 et seq.

The prices of colonial goods, which until then had been received from England, rose so much that, for example, a pood of sugar in 1808 cost 100 rubles in St. Petersburg.

"The text of these decrees and instructions see Schilder, vol. II, pp. 362–367 – in appendices. There, by the way, there is a very curious list of the subjects of competence of these secret committees, and it is clear how this competence expanded from September 5, 1805 to January 13, 1807.

Ref. at vandal, name op. pp. 111 ff., Russian translation, a whole juicy chapter entitled "Diplomatic intelligence". It is curious that other foreign diplomats in St. Petersburg (for example, Bar. Steding) and Canning in London (as can be seen from his conversation with the Russian ambassador Alopeus) report the same disturbing (but undoubtedly unfounded) rumors about conspiracies supposedly being prepared in St. Petersburg and coups. It is very possible that these were traces of Savary's intrigues and inventions. Ref. Shiman, name op. page 18 Russian translation.

In 1807, the St. Petersburg newspaper The Genius of Times also spoke of Napoleon with great harshness. After 1808, when the government began to prohibit such reviews, in the same "Genius of the Times" N. I. Grech already wrote laudatory articles about Napoleon, which did not prevent him later (in 1812) from scolding him again without mercy in Son of the Fatherland. But the public in 1808-1811. she already treated such “official” praises and censures with contempt.

In 1809, after Erfurt, Alexander, convinced of the impossibility of keeping the Austrians from a dangerous war with Napoleon, in which he himself formally undertook to help Napoleon, in a fit of frankness, told the Austrian ambassador, Prince. Schwarzenberg: “... My position is so strange that although you and I are on opposite lines, I cannot but wish you success! ..” (Soloviev, p. 190). The Russian public in 1809 directly rejoiced at every success of our "enemies" of the Austrians and every failure of our "ally" Napoleon (Vigel, Notes).

Vigel. Notes, cf. at Schilder, vol. II, p. 242.

Alexander I and the search for strategic truths

It is difficult to say to what extent these events influenced Alexander I. One thing is certain, that another big blow was dealt to his views on the army and the war. From his youth, he dreamed of military exploits, and he wanted, shining with military leadership decisions on the battlefields, to surpass the old generals, whitened with gray hair and valor. Therefore, in 1805, he became the first Russian monarch after Peter I, who was present at the theater of operations. He, apparently, was impatient to cover himself with military glory, so flattering for the ruler. But then "military childishness" and Gatchina education were opposed to the genius of the first commander of Europe. Going to war, he hoped to bask in the rays of Russian victories over Napoleon. Well acquainted only with the front side of military affairs and overestimating the combat effectiveness of the Russian troops, the emperor witnessed the catastrophic defeat of the Russians at Austerlitz. Having fully drunk the bitterness of Austerlitz's failures, Alexander I was probably forced to conclude that his opponent would always be the first commander in Europe. The phenomenal events of Jena and Auerstedt should have once again convinced him of this. Therefore, he chose a different sphere for himself and directed all his forces to the area of ​​high politics (of course, not forgetting to keep the army under full control). As a diplomat, the Russian emperor then showed himself to be a master of political calculation, in which many contemporaries gave him credit. “This is a true Byzantine,” Napoleon himself spoke of him, “subtle, feigned, cunning.”

The only question is how far the Russian emperor decided to move away from military activities, because until the end of his life he most closely followed his army, since it was a very dangerous institution in extreme moments (remember at least the events of March 11, 1801), but without which autocracy could not exist. And internally, the sovereign, like all representatives of the Romanov dynasty, personally associated himself primarily as a military man. But from 1805 until the end of the Napoleonic Wars, he was constantly in difficulty - in search of people who could lead the army, in other words, good commanders who were ready to successfully resist French weapons. He himself did not see such military leaders among the Russian generals (he spoke about this more than once), he often looked for talents among foreign meters of military affairs. It must be said that the results of the search were not always positive for him. In order to raise his own level of military training and to master the theoretical foundations of military art, in December 1806, Alexander I accepted K. L. Fuhl into the Russian service, who had previously served as a colonel in the headquarters of King Frederick William III and participated in the battle of Auerstedt. Fuhl was considered a theoretician in Prussian military circles, so he was invited to teach the Tsar the basics of military strategy. This nevertheless indicates that, perhaps, the emperor did not leave the thought of acquiring the skills of a commander. But his choice of a teacher can be called somewhat strange, given the words that Russian military circles scolded General Ful in 1812. But it was precisely such foreign scholastics who knew how to clothe strategic truths in a scientific form that impressed the Russian monarch very much. Apparently, the latest scientific achievements of German theorists poorly corresponded with the practice that Russian generals encountered every time in the war.

Somehow it turned out that the German theory and the Russian reality turned out to be incompatible things, therefore, when superimposed on each other, one of them had to inevitably die. As a rule, the theory expressed by the unfortunate Germans suffered a complete defeat, either because it was too sophisticated and the Russians did not want to master it in any way, or its scientific foundations were false. One thing is true, reality has always been richer than theory, and also that practitioners and theorists have always mutually disliked each other. Hence, Alexander I, being in search of ideal candidates, due to his personal predilections, could not find military talents in his own country. It can be said that he was always forced to bifurcate and choose between theory and practice, and often taking for theory the ceremonial military show and stereotyped formations, which he loved so much all his conscious life. Let's make a reservation that for him the circle of people for choice was limited by the presence of imperial status. Most often, he promoted to the ranks of generals for impeccable service people whom, as a rule, he knew personally, they were from the guards (the forge of generals), but all the same, the most prominent representatives of the military sphere of Russia turned out to be heroes put forward by military life from the army environment. Perhaps the emperor was looking in the wrong place and missed the Russian Napoleon? May be. We cannot confirm or deny this.

L. L. Benningsen. 19th century engraving