KERCH-FEODOSIA LANDING OPERATION (DECEMBER 26, 1941 - JANUARY 3, 1942) When planning the Kerch operation, the command of the Transcaucasian Front initially set a very narrow task for the troops, which, in essence, boiled down to occupying only the eastern coast

The tragedy of the Crimean front

The possession of the Crimean peninsula was of strategic importance. Hitler called it a Soviet unsinkable aircraft carrier that threatened Romanian oil.

October 18, 1941The 11th Wehrmacht Army under the command of General of Infantry Erich von Manstein began an operation to seize the Crimea. After ten days of stubborn fighting, the Germans entered the operational space. TO November 16, 1941 all Crimea, except for Sevastopol, was occupied.

December 26, 1941started Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. The troops of the Soviet 51st and 44th armies of the Transcaucasian Front recaptured the Kerch Peninsula, advancing 100-110 km behind 8 days.

Soviet troops stopped January 2, 1942 at the turn of Kiet - Novaya Pokrovka - Koktebel. The Soviet 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades and 2 tank battalions were opposed there by one German infantry division, a reinforced infantry regiment and Romanian mountain and cavalry brigades.

Mansteinwrote in his memoirs:

“If the enemy took advantage of the situation that had arisen and began to quickly pursue the 46th Infantry Division, and also decisively hit the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a hopeless situation would be created not only for this new sector of the front of the 11th Army. The fate of the entire 11th Army would be decided 1st Army A more determined enemy could have paralyzed the entire supply of the army with a swift breakthrough on Dzhankoy.- 170th and 132nd pd– could arrive in the area west or northwest of Feodosia no earlier than 14 days later.

The command of the Transcaucasian Front nevertheless planned to carry out operations to liberate Crimea. The operation plan was reported to the People's Commissar of Defense January 1, 1942. A strike by a motorized mechanized group (2 tank brigades and a cavalry division) and the 51st Army (4 rifle divisions and 2 brigades) was planned to reach Perekop, where it was planned in advance to drop an airborne assault. 44th Army (3 rifle divisions) - go to Simferopol. Two mountain rifle divisions were to strike along the Black Sea coast. The coastal army was supposed to tie down the enemy at Sevastopol and land troops in Yevpatoriya with the subsequent direction to Simferopol. General task–destruction of all enemy forces in the Crimea. The beginning of the operation - January 8-12, 1942.

However, the operation was not started at the scheduled time, and January 15, 1942 the Germans and Romanians launched a counterattack, recapturing Feodosia on January 18. Soviet troops were pushed back 10-20 km to the Karpacz Isthmus.

February 27, 1942the Soviet offensive began both from Sevastopol and from the Karpacz Isthmus. There, Soviet 7 rifle divisions and 2 brigades, several tank battalions operated against 3 German and 1 Romanian infantry divisions. In the second echelon of the Soviet troops there were 6 rifle divisions, one cavalry division and two tank brigades. The Romanian division on the northern flank retreated again to Kieta, 10 km. March 3, 1942 the front had stabilized - now it arched to the west.

On March 13, 1942, Soviet troops (8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades) went on the offensive again. The Germans held out, and on March 20, 1942, they tried to launch a counterattack with the forces of the 22nd Panzer Division (just reorganized from an infantry division) and two infantry divisions. The Germans were repulsed.

On March 26, 1942, four Soviet divisions tried to advance, but were repulsed in turn.

The last Soviet offensive in the Crimea was April 9-11, 1942.

"There will be no increase in the forces of the Crimean Front at the present time. Therefore, the troops of the Crimean Front will firmly gain a foothold on the occupied lines, improving their defensive structures in engineering terms and improving the tactical position of the troops in certain sectors, in particular by capturing the Koi-Asan knot."

By this time, the Crimean Front included 16 rifle divisions and 3 brigades, a cavalry division, 4 tank brigades, and 9 reinforcement artillery regiments. The front had 225 bombers and 176 fighters (serviceable). The enemy had 5 German infantry and 1 tank divisions, 2 Romanian infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade, as well as the Groddek motorized brigade, which consisted mainly of Romanian units under the command of the German headquarters.

With such a balance of forces (Manstein estimated the Soviet superiority in forces as double) the Germans and Romanians crossed May 8, 1942 on the offensive.

Mansteindecided to reverse the factor of the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops in St. oh favor. The front line consisted of two sections. The southern section from Koi-Asan to the Black Sea coast (8 km) was a well-equipped (since January 1942) Soviet defensive positions, they were occupied by the 44th Army. The northern section from Koi-Asan to Kiet (16 km) curved to the west. The Soviet command should have expected the Germans to strike in the Koi-Asan region in order to cut off the northern grouping (47th and 51st armies).

Indeed, given the small number of his forces, Manstein could only count on environment as many Soviet forces as possible on as small a territory as possible and then destroy them with aircraft and artillery. His forces were sufficient for operations on a narrow sector of the front, but further to the east the Kerch Peninsula is expanding, and there the numerical superiority of Soviet forces could cost the Germans dearly.

The idea of ​​​​the German operation "Hunting for bustards" was based on delivering the main blow not in the Koi-Asan area, but at the southern tip of the front line, where it was least expected. Moreover, three German infantry and tank divisions, as well as the Groddek brigade, were supposed to attack here, that is at least half all German-Romanian forces. On the northern and central sectors of the front, the Germans and Romanians were to conduct a demonstration of the offensive, really moving into it only after the breakthrough of the southern group. In addition, in the first hours of the operation, massive air strikes were carried out against the headquarters of units of the 47th and 51st armies.

The German ploy worked - the Soviet reserves remained in the north after the start of the offensive. On May 8, the Germans broke through the Soviet defenses on a 5 km section, to a depth of 8 km. On May 9, torrential rain began, which prevented the Germans from bringing a tank division into battle, but the Groddek motorized brigade managed to advance before the downpour, cutting off the 44th Army from the rear positions.In addition, a German boat landing force landed in the rear of the 44th Army. This was only one battalion, but he assisted the German offensive.

May 11, 1942The German 22nd Panzer Division reached the northern coast of the Kerch Peninsula. It was followed by the German 170th Infantry Division and the Romanian 8th Cavalry Brigade. 8 Soviet divisions ended up in the resulting cauldron, on that day the commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, died. On the same day, Stalin and Vasilevsky sent an angry directive to the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, which began with the words

"The Military Council of the Crimean Front, including Kozlov, Mekhlis, lost their heads, to this day they cannot contact the armies ..."

And ending by order:

"do not miss the enemy".

However, the Germans and Romanians advanced rapidly. On the evening of May 14, the Germans were already on the outskirts of Kerch. On May 15, 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered:

"Do not surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol."

However, already May 16, 1942 The German 170th Infantry Division took Kerch. May 19, 1942 hostilities on the Kerch Peninsula ceased, with the exception of the resistance of the remnants of Soviet troops in the Adzhimushkay quarries.

From 270 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Crimean Front for 12 days fights were lost forever 162.282 human - 65% . German losses amounted to 7.5 thousand. As it is written in the "History of the Great Patriotic War":

"it was not possible to organize an evacuation in an organized manner. The enemy captured almost all of our military equipment and heavy weapons and later used them in the fight against the defenders of Sevastopol".

On June 4, 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command declared the command of the Crimean Front guilty of the "unsuccessful outcome of the Kerch operation".

Army commissar 1st rank Mekhlis was removed from the posts of deputy defense commissar and head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and demoted to corps commissar.

Lieutenant General Kozlov was removed from the post of front commander and demoted to the rank of major general.

Divisional commissar Shamanin was removed from his post as a member of the Front's Military Council and demoted to brigade commissar.

Major General Eternal was removed from the post of chief of staff of the front.

Lieutenant General Chernyak and Major General Kolganov were removed from their posts as army commanders and demoted to colonels.

Major General Nikolaenko was removed from his post as Commander of the Air Force of the front and demoted to the rank of colonel.

July 1, 1942 (even before the capture of Sevastopol) Manstein received the title field marshal general.

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photo from the Internet, Kerch region. prisoners of war

I "d say it" s rather May 1942 (17-19), after Operation Trappenjagd.

Clarification

It is after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Image attached is from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Krim. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of world historical importance), which describes an international delegation who came to see how the German-Romanian troops conquered Sevastopol.

Text translation:

It was after the conquest of Sevastopol.

Images taken from the book:

Bessarabien Ukraine-Crimea. Der Siegeszug Deutscher und Rumänischer Truppen

Besuche von Weltgeschicher Bedeutung (Visits of World-Historic Significance), which describes the international delegations that came to see how the German-Romanian troops captured Sevastopol.

Presumably this is Marfovka.

Also Marfovka.

Soviet ammunition, the first two are high-explosive, the rest are fragmentation.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

Kerch Peninsula, autumn 2010.

my excavations

Spent shells

Akmonai positions. Dota.

bullet marks

Soldier's personal weapon 633 SP, 157 SD.

Fragment of a Mosin sniper rifle.

Kerch area, May 1942, pictured IL-2.

May 1942, Kerch region.

All 5 photos from the Bundesarchiv, Germany

“The alarmists should be shot on the spot…”

FROM THE TRAGEDY of the Crimean Front during the reign of Khrushchev, they created one of the most intricate myths about the Great Patriotic War - the myth that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief specially sent his incompetent in military affairs, but "loyal dog" Mekhlis, to various fronts, and he kept command in fear. As a result, in particular, the Crimean disaster of May 1942 occurred.

On the cover of the book by Doctor of Historical Sciences Yuri Rubtsov “Mekhlis. The Shadow of the Leader” (M., 2007), the following summary was made about the hero of the work: “The mere mention of the name of Lev Mekhlis terrified many brave and honored generals. For many years, this man was a real shadow of Stalin, his "second self" and in fact the owner of the Red Army. He was so fanatically devoted to his leader and country that he would stop at nothing to complete the task. On the one hand, Mehlis is accused of having the blood of hundreds of innocent commanders on his hands, some of whom he personally shot. On the other hand, he was respected by ordinary soldiers, whom he unfailingly cared about. On the one hand, Mekhlis was one of the main culprits for the defeat of the first months of the Great Patriotic War and the collapse of the Crimean Front in the spring of 1942. On the other hand, his inflexibility and firmness more than once saved the troops in the most desperate situations. Was Mehlis the embodiment of evil? Or was he just personifying his controversial time?”

The documents cited in the book by a respected colleague did not allow either the author or the readers to draw an unambiguous conclusion. Although, I note, our historiography is dominated by a persistent hostility to the personality of this Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. The majority of the creative intelligentsia evaluate this historical figure with a minus sign.

Our reference. Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis was born in 1889 in Odessa. He graduated from the 6th grade of the Jewish commercial school. Since 1911 in the army, he served in the 2nd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. In 1918 he joined the Communist Party and was in political work in the Red Army. In 1921-1922 - in the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, which was headed by Stalin. In 1922-1926 he was one of the personal secretaries of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of Stalin, in 1926-1930 he studied at courses at the Communist Academy and the Institute of Red Professors. In 1930 he became the head of the department of printing and publishing of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and at the same time the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Pravda. In 1937-1940 - Head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, in 1940-1941 - People's Commissar of State Control. According to the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, "he was a truly honest man, but in some ways crazy," because he had a mania to see enemies and pests everywhere. On the eve of the war, he was again appointed head of the Main Political Directorate, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (while retaining the post of People's Commissar of State Control). In 1942 he was a representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Crimean Front. After the defeat in May 1942 of the troops of the Crimean Front, he was removed from his posts, in 1942-1946 - a member of the military councils of a number of armies and fronts. In 1946-1950 - minister state control THE USSR. Died February 13, 1953.

Konstantin Simonov is sometimes credited with such a statement about Mekhlis: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. I understand the reason for the shameful defeat. Complete distrust of the army and front commanders, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mekhlis, an illiterate man in military affairs ... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. Moved heavy artillery and army headquarters to the very front line. Three armies stood at the front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere and never then have I seen such saturation with troops. And all this was mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because a madman commanded the front ... "

BUT THIS, I note, is not Simonov's personal assessment. Here is how it was. On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the Victory, on April 28, 1965, the front-line writer decided to express some thoughts related to the history of the Great Patriotic War. There is such a fragment in the material. It should be quoted in full (I quote from: K. Simonov. “Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections on I.V. Stalin.” M., APN, 1989).

“I want to give an example of an operation in which the true interests of waging a war and false, slogan ideas about how a war should be waged, based not only on military illiteracy, but also on the disbelief in people generated by 1937, clearly clashed. I am talking about the sad memory of the Kerch events of the winter-spring of 1942.

Seven years ago, one of our front-line writers wrote to me the following: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. I understand the reason for the shameful defeat. Complete distrust of the commanders of the armies and the front, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mekhlis, an illiterate man in military affairs ... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. He advanced heavy artillery and army headquarters to the very front line, and so on. Three armies stood at the front of 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 meters along the front, nowhere else have I ever seen such saturation with troops. And all this was mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because the front was commanded not by a commander, but by a madman ... ”(I emphasize that these are not the words of Simonov, but of a writer he knows. - A.M.)

I did not speak about this at all in order to once again commemorate Mekhlis with an unkind word, who, by the way, was a man of impeccable personal courage and did everything he did not from the intention of personally becoming famous. He was deeply convinced that he was acting correctly, and that is why, from a historical point of view, his actions on the Kerch Peninsula are fundamentally interesting. This was a man who, in that period of the war, without going into any circumstances, considered everyone who preferred a comfortable position a hundred meters from the enemy an uncomfortable one fifty meters away, a coward. He considered everyone who wanted to simply protect the troops from possible failure as an alarmist; He considered everyone who realistically assessed the strength of the enemy to be unsure of his own strength. Mekhlis, for all his personal readiness to give his life for the Motherland, was a pronounced product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938.

And the commander of the front, to whom he came as a representative of the Headquarters, an educated and experienced military man, in turn, also turned out to be a product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938, only in a different sense - in the sense of fear of taking full responsibility, fear of opposing a reasonable military decision to an illiterate the onslaught of "everything and everything - forward", fear, at the risk for oneself, of transferring one's dispute with Mehlis to Headquarters.

From a historical point of view, the difficult Kerch events are interesting in that both halves of the consequences of 1937-1938 are screwed together in them, both the one that was represented by Mekhlis and the one that was represented by the then commander of the Crimean Front Kozlov.

I WILL NOT argue with the great writer. Everyone has their own view of the past. I will express my personal opinion about Mehlis, supported by acquaintance with the documents of that time. Yes, indeed, Lev Zakharovich is a very difficult and controversial political figure. He was harsh, sometimes even very, often straightforward in his assessments and demands. To put it mildly, he did not like diplomacy. He was tough, including on the verge of cruelty, and during the war years he went beyond this line in a difficult front-line situation.

Several examples can be cited in this regard. September 12, 1941. 34th Army of the Northwestern Front. Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Mehlis personally draws up an order for the troops of the front No. 057: “... For the cowardice shown and personal withdrawal from the battlefield to the rear, for violation of military discipline, expressed in direct failure to comply with the order of the front to come to the aid of units advancing from the west, for failure to take measures to save the material part of the artillery ... Major General of Artillery Goncharov, on the basis of the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. At the same time, the general had already been shot extrajudicially the day before on the basis of an oral order from Mehlis and General of the Army K.A. Meretskova.

Cruel? Yes, cruel. But this is a war, and it was about the fate of the entire state ... In addition, in those tragic months at the front, in the conditions of retreat under the onslaught of German troops, a very nervous situation reigned.

It should also be noted in this connection that Stalin by no means condoned this kind of reprisals. In early October, he harshly reprimanded the commanders and commissars who practiced lynching and assault instead of educational work. The order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0391 of October 4, 1941, signed by Stalin and the Chief of the General Staff B. Shaposhnikov, was called: "On the facts of replacing educational work with repressions." In it, Stalin demanded "in the most resolute manner, up to bringing the guilty to trial by a military tribunal, to fight against all manifestations of illegal repression, assault and lynching."

I'll allow myself a little digression. Since the time of perestroika, historical literature and journalism has been dominated by the desire to evaluate the actions of statesmen, their motives from the standpoint of the realities of the present time - a time of peace and kindness. Then there was a fundamentally different situation, and the life school of that generation was different. Many were tested in the fight against the special services of Imperial Russia and in the fratricidal Civil War. This embittered the future Soviet leaders, there were no sentimental people among them.

It is also impossible to understand the reasons for the extreme cruelty towards other military leaders in 1941 - the same command of the Western Front - outside the context of the circumstances of the dramatic beginning of the repulse of the aggression of Nazi Germany. Unfortunately, despite the decisions made to declassify documents of the Great Patriotic War, we know far from everything about them.

A specific example: a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov to the troops of the western military districts on June 18, 1941. This document is still inaccessible to researchers - even to the staff of the Institute world history Russian Academy of Sciences involved in the preparation of a new multi-volume history of the Great Patriotic War.

And such a telegram existed. In 2008, the publishing house "Kuchkovo Pole" published a book by counterintelligence veteran Vladimir Yampolsky "... Destroy Russia in the spring of 1941", which includes materials on the case of the commander of the Western Front, General of the Army D.G. Pavlova. There is such an episode in the minutes of a closed court session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR dated July 22, 1941. Court member A.M. Orlov reads out the testimony of the defendant - the former communications chief of the headquarters of the Western Front, Major General A.T. Grigoriev during the investigation: "... And after the telegram of the Chief of the General Staff of June 18, the troops of the district were not put on alert." Grigoriev confirms: "All this is true."

There is every reason to believe that on June 18, 1941, Stalin allowed the troops of the first strategic echelon to be put on full combat readiness, but the directive of the General Staff sanctioned by him turned out to be unfulfilled for some reason by the command of the western military districts, and primarily in the Western Special.

Another document has been preserved, indicating that on June 18, 1941, a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff was sent to the command of the western military districts. This is a study carried out in the late 1940s - the first half of the 1950s by the military scientific department of the General Staff under the leadership of Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky. Then, even during Stalin's lifetime, it was decided to generalize the experience of concentrating and deploying troops of the western military districts according to the plan for covering the state border on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. For this purpose, five questions were asked to the participants in those tragic events, who held command positions in the troops of the western districts before the war (fragmentary answers to some questions were published in the Military History Journal in 1989).

The questions were formulated as follows: 1. Was the plan for the defense of the state border brought to the attention of the troops in the part that concerns them; when and what was done by the command and staffs to ensure the implementation of this plan? 2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to reach the state border, and how many of them were deployed before the start of hostilities? 3. When an order was received to put the troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22; what and when instructions were given to carry out this order, and what was done by the troops? 4. Why was most of the artillery in training centers? 5. To what extent were the headquarters prepared for command and control, and to what extent did this affect the conduct of operations in the first days of the war?

The editors of the Military Historical Journal managed to publish answers to the first two questions, but when the turn came to answer the third question: “When was the order received to put the troops on combat alert?”, the editor-in-chief of the journal, Major General V.I. Filatov received a command from above to stop further publication of the answers of participants in the events of June 1941. But even from the first two answers it follows that the telegram (or directive) of the Chief of the General Staff existed ...

NOW about the behavior at the front of Mehlis himself.

From the memoirs of Colonel-General of the Engineering Troops Arkady Khrenov: “In one of his mouths, the order to attack found him. He, without hesitation, became the head of the company and led it along. None of the people around managed to dissuade Mehlis from this step. It was very difficult to argue with Lev Zakharovich ... "

From the memoirs of Major General David Ortenberg, who edited the newspaper of the 11th Army “Heroic Campaign” during the war with Finland (1939-1940) and, together with Mehlis, was surrounded by one of our divisions: “Army Commissar 1 rank put the editorial staff on a truck - a former Leningrad taxi, gave several fighters for protection: "Break through." And they broke through the still fragile ice of the lake. And Mehlis himself, together with the division commander, led her exit from the encirclement ... Seeing that ours could not bring down the Finnish barrier near the road, Mehlis placed the fighters in a chain, got into the tank himself and, moving forward, opened fire from a cannon and a machine gun. The fighters followed. The enemy was shot down from his position.

The statement of Army General Alexander Gorbatov about Mekhlis has also been preserved: “At every meeting with me, right up to the liberation of Orel, Mekhlis did not miss the opportunity to ask me any question that could lead to a dead end. I answered simply and probably not always in the way he wanted. However, it was noticeable that, although with difficulty, he was changing for the better his former attitude towards me. When we were already behind the Eagle, he suddenly said:

I have been watching you for a long time and I must say that I like you as an army commander and as a communist. I followed your every step after your departure from Moscow and I did not quite believe what I heard good about you. Now I see that I was wrong."

Mekhlis, of course, did not have an academic military education and did not possess military leadership talents like the great Rokossovsky. By the way, he highly appreciated this commander, and shortly before the catastrophe of the Crimean Front, which became obvious to him already in the spring of 1942, he asked Stalin to appoint Konstantin Konstantinovich as commander of the Crimean Front. Alas, due to a severe wound, Rokossovsky was then still in the hospital (on March 8, 1942, the commander of the 16th Army of the Western Front, Rokossovsky, was wounded by a shell fragment and was treated until May 23. - Ed.).

At the same time, Mehlis knew what war was. Indeed, during the Civil period, he was at the front, was the commissar of the brigade, then the 46th Infantry Division and the Right-Bank Group of Forces in Ukraine, participated in battles against the gangs of Ataman Grigoriev and one of the most talented commanders of the White Army, General Ya.A. Slashchev, was wounded.

Since the Civil War, Mekhlis had a habit of telling people head-on about mistakes and miscalculations. On this, he, of course, made a lot of enemies. Mehlis always spoke with pathos, but sincerely. Of course, it was not without his characteristic manner of seeing everything either in white or in black. It should be noted that as People's Commissar (Minister) of State Control, he was forced to engage in what today would be called anti-corruption measures, and as a result of inspections, many Soviet officials had to change their warm offices to barracks in Kolyma. The officials under Stalin also stole and lorded at the expense of the state. Could this be the source of hatred for Stalin's "chief inspector" on the part of the descendants of the families of the Soviet nomenklatura, most of whom have adapted well to the new life? ..

And so the Great Patriotic War began. Mehlis is back in the army. On January 20, 1942, he arrived at the Crimean Front (until January 28, 1942, the front was called the Caucasian Front) in the status of a plenipotentiary representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. On the eve of his arrival, the troops successfully carried out the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation (December 26 - February 2) and captured a vast bridgehead.

Commander of the Caucasian Front, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov was instructed by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to accelerate the concentration of troops on the bridgehead in every possible way. They decided to transfer additional forces (47th Army) there and, no later than January 12, go on a general offensive with the support of the Black Sea Fleet. It was about how to go to Perekop as soon as possible and strike at the rear of the Sevastopol grouping of the Wehrmacht. Crimea by the summer of the 42nd could really become Soviet again.

Our reference. As a result of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, by January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. As the commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, admitted after the war, “in the first days of January 1942, for the troops that landed at Feodosia and approached from Kerch, the path to the vital artery of the 11th Army was actually opened - railway Dzhankoy - Simferopol. The weak front of the cover (of the Sevastopol grouping of the Wehrmacht. - Ed.), which we managed to create, could not resist the onslaught of large forces. On January 4, it became known that the enemy already had 6 divisions in the Feodosia region. The German general also believed that “if the enemy took advantage of the situation and quickly began to pursue the 46th Infantry Division from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would be created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged sector ... However, the front command postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.

The offensive of the Soviet troops nevertheless began, but it was not possible to break through the positions of the German divisions. This disruption is usually described in such a way that our command underestimated the strength and capabilities of the enemy. Historians try not to name the specific culprits for the failure of the offensive, which could lead to the liberation of the entire Crimea, so as not to offend anyone.

It is hushed up that the offensive failed due to the lack of a well-thought-out plan, as well as a clear logistics and combat support for the troops landed in the Crimea. This was primarily manifested in the lack of transport ships for the transfer of manpower and artillery from the "mainland". With the provision of troops with ammunition and fuel, things were also catastrophic. This is the testimony of Major General A.N. Pervushin, commander of the 44th Army participating in this operation (he was seriously wounded in January 1942 - Ed.).

Then weather conditions intervened - the onset of a thaw brought field airfields into complete disrepair. The lack of normal communications and air defense systems also had an effect. They “forgot” to deliver anti-aircraft artillery to the port of Feodosia, and as a result, until January 4, 5 transports died from the unpunished actions of German aviation, and the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz received heavy damage.

On January 18, the Germans, taking advantage of the passivity of the Soviet troops, recaptured Feodosia. Then General Kozlov decided to withdraw troops to the Ak-Monai positions - a defensive line about 80 kilometers from Kerch. It was in this situation that Mekhlis arrived at the front.

Two days after his arrival, he sent a telegram to Stalin with the following content: “They flew to Kerch on January 20, 1942. We found the most unattractive picture of the organization of command and control ... Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as enemy groupings. Not a single division has data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who is confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading workers of the front has been in the army since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula ... "

Our reference. Kozlov Dmitry Timofeevich (1896–1967). In military service since 1915, he graduated from the school of ensigns. Member of the First World War. In the Red Army since 1918, commanded a battalion, regiment. After the Civil War, he studied at the Frunze Military Academy. During Soviet-Finnish war commanded the 1st Rifle Corps of the 8th Army. Since 1940 - Deputy Commander of the Odessa Military District, then - Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the Red Army. Since 1941 - Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District. After the disaster in the Crimea, reduced military rank to major general. In August 1942 he was appointed commander of the 24th Army of the Stalingrad Front, from August 1943 - Deputy Commander of the Trans-Baikal Front. Participated in battles against Japan.

Mehlis' telegram is usually characterized as follows: two days "enough" for the arrogant people's commissar of state control to get an idea of ​​​​the state of affairs at the front. However, in essence, Mehlis was right. The main provisions of his telegram corresponded, by the way, to the content of the order of the front command No. 12 of January 23, 1942. The order was signed by Kozlov, a member of the Military Council of the Front F.A. Shamanin and Mekhlis.

To this it must be added that the command of the Caucasian Front at that time was in Tbilisi. And from there he led the fighting. From a thousand kilometers away.

Mehlis really quickly figured out what was going on. And he immediately raised the question of separating an independent Crimean front from the Caucasian front and transferring command and control of troops to the Kerch Peninsula before the Headquarters. At the same time, he requested replenishment in manpower (3 rifle divisions), began to demand that the front command urgently restore order in artillery, air defense, and logistics.

"1. The command of armies, divisions, regiments should take into account the experience of the battles of 15-18.01.42, immediately restore order in the units ... Regimental artillery and anti-tank artillery (anti-tank. - A.M.) have infantry in combat formations ...

2. Alarmists and deserters to be shot on the spot as traitors. Those found guilty of deliberately wounding left-handed crossbows are to be shot in front of the ranks.

3. Within three days, restore complete order in the rear ... "

The Mekhlis checked with particular care the state of the Air Force and artillery of the front, on which the combat effectiveness of the entire grouping of our troops depended to a decisive extent. It turned out that due to poor logistics, 110 defective aircraft had accumulated on the Kerch Peninsula, so less than one sortie was made per day.

Mekhlis, using his official status, obtained additional weapons from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff - the front received 450 light machine guns, 3 thousand PPSh, 50 mortars of 120 mm caliber and 50 of 82 mm caliber, two divisions of M-8 rocket launchers. The issue of allocating an additional number of tanks to the front, including heavy KV, anti-tank rifles and ammunition, was decided.

On January 24, a new commander of the Front Air Force was appointed - Major General E.M. Nikolaenko. A little later, the new head of the engineering troops arrived - Major General A.F. Fucking. On the eve of the planned offensive, Mekhlis also managed to send a large number of political workers of various levels to the front, including specialists in special propaganda against the Germans.

The 47th Army (commander - Major General K.S. Kalganov), transferred from northern Iran, crossed over the ice of the Kerch Strait to the peninsula.

On February 15, Stalin received Mekhlis. At the meeting, he, to the displeasure of the Supreme, asked for more time to prepare the front for the offensive. This is to the question of whether Mekhlis thoughtlessly followed the orders of the Headquarters. And Stalin agreed with him - apparently, the arguments of Mekhlis had an effect.

On February 27, 1942, the planned offensive began. The Crimean Front had 12 rifle divisions, four tank brigades, and one cavalry division. But the command of the Crimean Front, instead of actively using tanks, including KV and T-34, to break through the German defenses in the conditions of the treeless terrain of the Kerch Peninsula, sent infantry forward, the attacks of which the Germans repelled with machine-gun fire.

For three days they drove the infantry into senseless attacks, killing thousands of people. 13 Soviet divisions advanced against three German and one Romanian. And irretrievable losses are huge (by April already 225 thousand people).

On March 9, Mekhlis sent Stalin a proposal to immediately remove Kozlov and the staff, Major General F.I. Tolbukhin from office. They replaced only the chief of staff of the front - with Major General P.P. Eternal. On March 29, Mekhlis again insists in writing to Stalin on the removal of Kozlov. The characterization of the commander is impartial: he is lazy, “a glutted gentleman from the peasants”, is not interested in operational issues, regards trips to the troops as a “punishment”, in the troops of the front, does not enjoy authority, painstaking, everyday work does not like.

Instead, Mekhlis asked to appoint one of the following generals: N.K. Klykov, but he commanded the 2nd shock army, which was breaking through to Leningrad, and at that moment it was impossible to change him; K.K. Rokossovsky, who was still recovering in the hospital; Commander of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, whom he met on the Kerch Peninsula. But for some reason, the candidacy of the latter did not find the support of Stalin.

By the beginning of May, the grouping of the troops of the front prepared for the offensive, but it was still being postponed. On May 6, 1942, the Headquarters ordered the front to go on the defensive, apparently having information about the upcoming German offensive. But the front command did not have time to reorganize the troops for defense. Their grouping remained offensive.

Meanwhile, the German command reinforced its 11th Army. Back in early April, the 22nd Panzer Division appeared in its composition (180 Czech LT vz.38 tanks: weight - 9.5 tons, frontal armor - from 25 to 50 mm, 37-mm gun). On May 8, the Germans went on the offensive with massive air support (Operation Bustard Hunting). The command post of the 51st Army was destroyed, on May 11, General Lvov died.

Already during the May breakthrough of our defense by the Germans, the Stavka instructed General Kozlov:

“1) The entire 47th Army must immediately begin to withdraw behind the Turkish Wall, organizing a rearguard and covering the retreat with aircraft. Without this, there will be a risk of being captured ...

3) You can organize a strike by the forces of the 51st Army in order to gradually withdraw this army behind the Turkish Wall.

4) The remnants of the 44th Army must also be withdrawn behind the Turkish Wall.

5) Mehlis and Kozlov should immediately start organizing defense along the Turkish Wall line.

6) We do not object to the transfer of the headquarters to the place indicated by you.

7) We strongly object to the departure of Kozlov and Mekhlis to Lvov's group.

8) Take all measures so that artillery, especially large ones, is concentrated behind the Turkish Wall, as well as a number of anti-tank regiments.

9) If you manage and have time to detain the enemy in front of the Turkish Wall, we will consider this an achievement ... ".

But neither the Turkish Wall nor the Kerch contours were equipped in engineering terms and did not represent a serious obstacle for the Germans.

Even worse. All three armies of the front (44th, 47th and 51st), prepared for the offensive, were deployed in one echelon, which sharply reduced the depth of defense and sharply limited the ability to repel enemy attacks in the event of a breakthrough. When the Germans launched a decisive offensive, their main blow fell precisely on the most unsuccessful formation of troops - on the 44th Army (commander - Lieutenant General S.I. Chernyak). The second echelon of this army was only 3-4 km from the front line, which gave the Germans the opportunity, even without changing the positions of their artillery, to inflict fire damage on our units to the entire operational depth. Which they did.

In addition, most of the Soviet troops were concentrated on the northern sector of the Crimean Front. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the German command, imitating the main efforts in the north, delivered the main blow from the south, where the 44th Army was located.

Here is a sharp and emotional opinion of Mekhlis about her commander: “Chernyak. An illiterate person, incapable of leading an army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. One can wonder whose hand introduced Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general.

“Failures in wars are always inevitable, but they cannot be justified if they arose from the carelessness of people who are entrusted with the conduct of war. This apparent disregard for the enemy served as a tragic prelude to the fatal turns in May 1942.

Valentin Pikul. "Square of the fallen fighters".

On the night of May 7, the military council of the Crimean Front, with the approval of Mekhlis, sent the necessary orders to the troops (in connection with the expected German offensive. - Ed.). Alas, the employees of the front headquarters did not bother with the speed of their transfer. As a result, by the morning they did not even reach all the commanders of the armies!

On May 7, the Germans launched heavy air strikes on Soviet positions, especially command posts. The next day, under the cover of artillery fire, infantry units went on the attack.

On May 8, Mekhlis sent a telegram to Stalin in which he wrote: “Now is not the time to complain, but I must report so that the Stavka knows the front commander. On May 7, that is, on the eve of the enemy offensive, Kozlov convened a military council to discuss the draft of a future operation to capture Koi-Aksan. I recommended that this project be postponed and instructions given to the armies immediately in connection with the expected advance of the enemy. In the signed order, the front in several places indicated that the offensive was expected on May 10-15, and proposed to work until May 10 and study the army defense plan with all command personnel, commanders of formations and headquarters. This was done when the whole situation of the past day showed that the enemy would advance in the morning. At my insistence, the erroneous orientation in terms was corrected. Kozlov also resisted the advancement of additional forces to the sector of the 44th Army.

All the data hit right in the eye - tomorrow the Germans will start the offensive, and the commander in the order indicates the date of May 10-15. Obviously, the intelligence of the front headquarters did not work.

In response to his telegram, in which he once again asked to replace Kozlov, Mekhlis received a very irritated message from Stalin: “You hold on to the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very convenient, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If "the whole situation showed that the enemy would attack in the morning", and you did not take all measures to organize a rebuff, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. So, you have not yet understood that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as the State Control, but as a responsible representative of the Headquarters.

You are demanding that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you cannot fail to know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve ... If you had used attack aircraft not for side affairs, but against enemy tanks and manpower, the enemy would not have broken through the front and the tanks would not have passed. You don’t have to be a Hindenburg to understand this simple thing while sitting on the Crimean Front for two months.”

Mekhlis seems to have deservedly received "on the nuts." Especially when you consider that Stalin then recalled him from the front and demoted him. The irritation of the Supreme Commander is understandable: despite the numerical superiority of our troops in the Kerch region, they failed to stop the German offensive. But let's see what in the position of Mekhlis could cause Stalin's anger? In my opinion, first of all, the fact that Mekhlis limited himself to the position of an observer and did not interfere in the decision-making process, which is obvious not even to a professional military man. With ground attack aircraft, anti-tank artillery, and T-34 and KV, superior to German tanks of Czechoslovak production with a weak 37-mm gun, the Soviet command could stop the German 22nd Panzer Division.

Today, all the bumps are falling on the head of Mekhlis, on the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, who de “built tricks to the Crimean Front”, on the commander-in-chief of the troops of the North Caucasus direction, Marshal S.M. Budyonny, at Headquarters. And the command of the front, as it were, had nothing to do with it ... Without justifying the mistakes of Mekhlis, for which he was punished by Stalin, I note that to the last he tried to reverse the rapidly deteriorating situation in May 1942.

It is known how the German “bustard hunt” ended: on May 13, the defense of our troops was broken through, on the night of May 14, Marshal Budyonny allowed the evacuation from the Kerch Peninsula, on May 15, the enemy occupied Kerch. This allowed the Germans to focus their efforts on the capture of Sevastopol.

Such is the price of the catastrophe on the Crimean front. But let's not "savor" its details and keep in our hearts the bright memory of all the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who died on Crimean soil.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

About the facts of substitution of educational work by repressions

Recently, there have been frequent cases of illegal repressions and gross abuse of power by individual commanders and commissars in relation to their subordinates.

The lieutenant of the 288th regiment, Komissarov, without any reason, killed a Red Army soldier Kubica with a shot from a revolver.

The former head of the 21st UR, Colonel Sushchenko, shot Jr. Sergeant Pershikov for slowly getting off the car due to an illness in his hand.

The commander of a platoon of a motorized rifle company of the 1026th rifle regiment, Lieutenant Mikryukov, shot dead his assistant, junior platoon commander Baburin, allegedly for not following orders.

The military commissar of the 28th Panzer Division, Regimental Commissar Bankvitzer, beat a sergeant for lighting a cigarette at night; he also beat Major Zanozny for an unrestrained conversation with him.

The chief of staff of the 529th Infantry Regiment, Captain Sakur, without any reason, hit twice with a pistol Art. Lieutenant Sergeyev.

Similar intolerable facts in the Red Army of perversion of disciplinary practice, excesses [the word "excesses" was entered by Stalin instead of "violation". - Ed.] granted rights and power, lynching and assault are explained by the fact that:

a) the method of persuasion was incorrectly relegated to the background, and the method of repression in relation to subordinates took first place;

b) daily educational work in units is in some cases replaced by swearing, repression and assault;

c) the method of explanations and conversations of commanders, commissars, political workers with the Red Army soldiers is abandoned, and the clarification of questions incomprehensible to the Red Army soldiers is often replaced by shouting, abuse and rudeness;

d) individual commanders and political workers in difficult conditions of battle get lost, fall into a panic and cover their own confusion with the use of weapons without any reason;

e) the truth is forgotten that the use of repression is an extreme measure, permissible only in cases of direct disobedience and open resistance in a combat situation or in cases of malicious violation of discipline and order by persons deliberately going to disrupt the orders of the command.

Commanders, commissars and political workers must remember that without a correct combination of the method of persuasion with the method of coercion, the imposition of Soviet military discipline and the strengthening of the political and moral state of the troops is unthinkable.

Severe punishment in relation to malicious violators of military discipline, accomplices of the enemy and obvious enemies should be combined with a careful analysis of all cases of violation of discipline that require a detailed clarification of the circumstances of the case.

Unjustified repressions, illegal executions, arbitrariness and assault on the part of commanders and commissars are a manifestation of lack of will and handlessness, often leading to backfire, contribute to the fall of military discipline and the political and moral state of the troops and can push unstable fighters to defect to the side of the enemy.

I order:

1. Reinstate educational work, widely use the method of persuasion, not to replace everyday explanatory work with administration and repression.

2. To all commanders, political workers and chiefs to talk daily with the Red Army soldiers, explaining to them the need for iron military discipline, honest fulfillment of their military duty, the military oath and orders of the commander and chief. In conversations, also explain that a serious threat looms over our Motherland, that the greatest self-sacrifice, unshakable steadfastness in battle, contempt for death and a merciless struggle against cowards, deserters, self-mutilators, provocateurs and traitors to the Motherland are needed to defeat the enemy.

3. Broadly explain to the commanding staff that lynching, assault and square abuse, degrading the rank of a soldier of the Red Army, lead not to strengthening, but to undermining the discipline and authority of the commander and political worker.

At the front, I found an unimaginable panic. All cannons, machine guns, anti-tank rifles were thrown onto the battlefield, and people fled in groups and alone to the Kerch Strait. And if they saw a board or a log floating near the shore, several people immediately jumped on this object and immediately drowned. The same thing happened if it was possible to find any of the floating facilities on the shore or saw an approaching boat - they threw themselves in a cloud, immediately everything was flooded, and people died.

I have never seen such panic in my life - this has never happened in my military practice.

It was some kind of disaster, although the enemy did not particularly advance. His aircraft worked well, and it created panic. But she managed to do this only because our aviation was inactive, and the front command was confused and lost control.

Despite this, I managed to occupy the near defensive Kerch bypass and gain a foothold on it. I ordered Mekhlis and Kozlov to lead this defense, and if they have to be evacuated, they should leave the Kerch land last.

Some people have already reached the Taman Peninsula through the Kerch Strait. I had a three-regiment rifle brigade stationed there. I ordered her to detain all those crossing and put them on the defensive line of Taman.

After all this, I called HF I.V. Stalin and reported on the situation. He asked, "What are you thinking of doing next?" I replied that we would fight on the near defensive line (to defend Kerch). But Stalin said: "Now you must firmly defend the Taman Peninsula, and evacuate Kerch."

Nevertheless, I decided to defend Kerch for as long as possible, because the fall of Kerch would immediately affect the defense of Sevastopol, which, by the time I arrived in this direction, had half the combat set of ammunition. And I brought it to 15.5.42 to 6 rounds ...

I was at the command post of the front when I.A. approached me. Serov (Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. - Ed.) and introduced himself as an authorized representative of the NKVD from Beria. Serov asked me what the orders would be. I replied that during the evacuation he should sink the locomotives so that they would not fall into the hands of the Germans.

After 2-3 hours, Serov came up to me and reported that my order had been carried out, the locomotives were flooded. I asked: "How?!" He replied that he let them off the pier. I said, “Well, you fool. I told you that this should be done during the evacuation, but we are not going to leave yet, and we need steam locomotives. I ordered him to leave Kerch and not complicate things.”

Then we moved to the city of Taman, where my command post was. And suddenly I lost contact with Kerch, with which we were connected by the only wire - a HF telephone. It turned out that Serov ordered him to be cut.

When I asked why he did this, Serov replied that this connection belongs to the NKVD and he has the right to dispose of it.

I told him: “But, unfortunately, you don’t know how to manage. Therefore, I will put you on trial as a traitor to the Motherland, because you deprived me of the opportunity to manage the front, I was left without communication.

The next day, Beria called me from Moscow and asked me to settle the matter with Serov. I repeated that Serov would be put on trial. Then Beria said that he was recalling Serov to Moscow and would punish him himself.

From the diary entries of Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny,
in May 1942, the commander-in-chief of the troops
North Caucasian direction.

Letter from the "disgraced general"

“11.2.66 Hello, Alexander Ivanovich!

Thank you very much for not forgetting the disgraced old general. My disgrace has been going on for almost 25 years.

The events of those days often come to mind in my memory. It is hard to remember them, especially because the blame for the death of all our regiments lies not only with us, the direct participants in these battles, but also with the leadership that was carried out over us. I mean not a layman in the operational art of Mekhlis, but the commander of the North Caucasus direction and Headquarters. I also mean October The outstanding writer of the twentieth century, Konstantin Simonov, who repeatedly visited the Kerch Peninsula during the days of military confrontations, reflected in his famous “Different Days of the War”, had every right to say: “You can’t shoot a war from a distance, you can only shoot a war close up.” With these words, K. Simonov once again emphasized the invaluable role of film and photographic documents, which left for posterity the heroism and tragedy of the people's victory over fascism.

One of such genuine testimonies of the horrors of the Great Patriotic War was the photograph of the military photojournalist Anatoly Garanin "The Death of a Soldier", which became a classic of Soviet military photography.

Seconded to the headquarters of the Crimean Front, A. Garanin, as a representative of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, in the spring of 1942 once again went to the front line to film the attack of the fighters on the enemy during the battle.

The unit, carried away by the commander, rushed forward. Anatoly pointed his "watering can" at a group of soldiers. The shot was supposed to turn out to be successful - several people got into the lens, directed with a single impulse forward, at the enemy. But at that very moment, before the camera shutter was released, an enemy shell suddenly exploded a few meters from the attackers. The frame instantly changed. The explosion broke the picture of the battle, made terrible adjustments to the photo. Instead of the intended shot of the attack, the film captured the tragedy. The mortally wounded soldier closest to us slowly descends to the Crimean land. For him, the war was over - the body took the deadly metal.

Somewhere far away from here there will be tears of a wife, mother, children and relatives and the eternal hope for the return of a loved one from that damned war - a hope fading every day after the Victory ....

The archive of film and photographic documents helped to establish that the famous Ak-Monai positions, located in the western part of the Kerch Peninsula, became the location for shooting the photo "Death of a Soldier". Unfortunately, no one knows the exact location of the filming yet. A strip of land from the village of Ak-Monai (Kamenskoye) to the Black Sea itself, almost 17 kilometers long, is a witness to the death of a fighter. The very place where from January to May 1942 there were fierce battles with varying success, ending in tragedy for the troops of the Crimean Front.

Who is the fighter whose death we see in the picture? His name remains unknown. He, most likely, was buried in one of the numerous mass graves located in the area of ​​the Ak-Monai isthmus. The remains of a soldier can rest in Semisotka, Kamenskoye, Batalny, Yachmenny, Uvarovo and other villages, in which there are several mass graves with thousands buried. The majority, despite the almost seventy years that have passed since the end of hostilities in the Crimea, remain nameless. AND main reason this is the destruction of archival documents.

The photo "Death of a Soldier" once again makes us think about the cruelty of the most barbaric war in the history of mankind, where the death of one is a tragedy, and the death of millions is a statistic. The same unflappable statistics that considers more than seventy percent of those who did not come from the war to be missing. In battle - marines of the 83rd brigade (1942).

On April 6, 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees conferring the honorary title of the Russian Federation "City military glory» Feodosia, Gatchina, Grozny, Petrozavodsk and Staraya Russa. This honorary title was established by federal law on May 9, 2006. It is awarded to Russian cities, on the territory of which or in the immediate vicinity of them, during fierce battles, the defenders of the Fatherland showed courage, steadfastness and mass heroism.

For what merits was the honorary title awarded to Theodosius? In her military history there were two brightest episodes directly related to the military chronicle of Russia. The first in 1771, the 27,000-strong Russian army under the command of General-in-Chief Dolgorukov-Krymsky, in the battle of Kef, defeated the 95,000-strong Turkish army and occupied the city. Even more famous is the heroic Feodosia landing at the end of December 1941. It was the largest landing operation of the Great Patriotic War: in the most difficult conditions, the Black Sea Fleet managed to land an entire combined arms army in the city occupied by the enemy. Due to various objective and subjective reasons, it was not possible to win a big victory at that time, so the unique landing was not appreciated. Today we will talk about it in detail.

In December 1941, the troops of the Army Group "Center" were not only stopped near Moscow, but also rolled west under the blows of fresh Soviet reserves. Also, the Germans were defeated in the south of the country, near Rostov-on-Don, and in the north, near Tikhvin. These failures on the Eastern Front infuriated Hitler and the entire Nazi establishment. The Germans urgently needed a bright, demonstrative success, which could symbolically crown the outgoing 1941. And it was success at any cost that the Fuhrer demanded from the commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein.

On December 17, the Nazis began a decisive assault on Sevastopol, conducting business with skill and assertiveness characteristic of the Wehrmacht of the 1941 model. The defenders of the city fought desperately, but their strength was dwindling. The supply of reinforcements and ammunition by sea by transports and warships did not have time to compensate for the loss. Everything went to the fact that in the first week of January 1942 the city would fall.

In order to pull the enemy forces away from Sevastopol, the Soviet command decided to carry out an amphibious landing on the Kerch Peninsula, thereby opening a new front in the Crimea. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the plan of operation developed by the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Front, supplementing it with a proposal from the command of the Black Sea Fleet, in addition to the planned landing sites in the Kerch region, to land troops also in the port of Feodosia.

This operation went down in history as the Kerch-Feodosiya. This is one of the largest landing operations carried out by the warring parties during the Second World War, and by a number of parameters the largest landing operation of the Soviet fleet. The lion's share of all the combat-ready forces of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla, an impressive tonnage of transports, a number of marine infantry units, two combined arms armies (51st and 44th) and even tanks were involved in its implementation. T-26 tanks and T-38 amphibious wedges.

On December 26-27, landing units were landed on several bridgeheads north and south of Kerch. Not everything went smoothly. Our troops suffered significant losses, and most importantly, they were sealed in the bridgeheads by a desperately resisting enemy. The position of the landed troops worsened over the next 2 days, when a strong storm and the freezing of the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov disrupted the delivery of reinforcements and supplies to the bridgeheads. As a result, the goal of the landings, the capture of Kerch, was not achieved in the first three days.

When the situation in the Kerch region became critical, Soviet naval formations with landing troops on board were just approaching Feodosia.

The ships of the squadron were given the following missions: to land a forward assault detachment consisting of two regiments in the port of Feodosia, to suppress enemy opposition in the landing areas with artillery fire, and to support the landing operations with artillery. To solve these problems, two detachments of ships were formed under the general command of Captain 1st Rank N.E. Bassist. In the landing and artillery support detachment, commanded by Captain 1st Rank B.A. Andreev, the cruisers Krasny Kavkaz and Krasny Krym, the destroyers Nezamozhnik, Zheleznyakov and Shaumyan, as well as the transport Kuban entered.

A detachment of landing craft under the command of Lieutenant Commander A.I. Ivanov was formed from the minesweepers "Shield", "Explosion" and 12 boat hunters of the MO-4 type. On board the ships of these detachments, the first echelon of the landing of the 251st mountain rifle and 633rd rifle regiments, numbering more than 5 thousand soldiers and commanders, was delivered.

In total, the first (assault) landing echelon consisted of 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 2 minesweepers and 12 MO4 boats.

After the landing of the first echelon, two detachments of transports with security forces were to deliver to Feodosia the main forces of the 44th Army of the 263rd Rifle and 63rd Mountain Rifle Divisions. Armored vehicles were also delivered on transports: 20 T-38 light amphibious tanks and 14 T-26 tanks. T-38s went on the Jean Zhores transport, T-26 on the Kalinin transport.

In general, the operation plan provided for the landing of 23,000 soldiers of the 44th Army in three echelons in Feodosia.

In the first echelon of the landing for assault operations, a detachment of marines numbering 600 people was formed. It was headed by Senior Lieutenant A.F. Aidinov. The assault detachment was supposed to land the MO-4 boats. Together with the assault detachment of Aidinov, in the first throw, the reconnaissance detachments of the fleet headquarters and the hydrographic department of the fleet, as well as corrective groups of ships of the landing detachment and artillery support, landed.

At 3 h. 48 min. NOT. Basisty ordered to begin artillery preparation. The ships opened fire on the port and artillery batteries. The destroyers fired their first volley of illuminating shells, followed by the cruisers.

At 4:03 a.m. the order was given to the landing craft detachment: "Boats go to port!" The landing has begun.

The first boat to break into the waters of the Feodosia port was MO-0131 (commander Lieutenant I.G. Chernyak), the second MO-013 (commander Lieutenant N.N. Vlasov) with the commander of the landing craft detachment, Captain Lieutenant A.I. Ivanov on board. They landed marines and spotters on the Protective (Long) pier. This group was headed by the commander of the detachment of small hunters, senior lieutenant V.I. Chupov. The Marines quickly captured the lighthouse building on the pier, and then began to advance along the pier to the shore. The hydrographers who were part of this group measured the depths at the pier to determine the mooring places for ships. After the capture of the lighthouse, the signal “Entrance is free” was transmitted from it to the ships.

Having received a signal, N.E. Basisty gave the order to break into the port of minesweepers and destroyers.

After the boats, the destroyer Shaumyan and the minesweeper Shield entered the port. At 4:26 a.m. "Shaumyan" moored at the Shirokoye Mole and began the landing of paratroopers. The enemy immediately concentrated fire on the stationary ship. The landing of the paratroopers took only a few minutes, but the debarcation of cargo, mainly ammunition, required much more time. Several shells hit the ship. Shrapnel killed and wounded about 20 people from the crew. Only 20 minutes later, having completed the unloading of cargo, "Shaumyan" left the port.

In no less difficult conditions, the destroyers Nezamozhnik and Zheleznyakov landed troops in the port.

In accordance with the plan, the Krasny Kavkaz was supposed to moor with the port side to the outer side of the Wide Mole, however, due to a strong squeezing wind, this maneuver could not be performed immediately. At 5:08 a.m. two mines hit the cruiser. Their explosion killed several people. A fire started in the first pipe. An enemy shell hit the foremast and caused a fire in the area of ​​the chart house. Emergency parties began extinguishing fires. At 5:23 a.m. an artillery shell pierced the armor and exploded inside the fighting compartment of the second turret.

Only at eight o'clock the cruiser was moored and began the landing of paratroopers.

All this time, the "Red Caucasus" was firing. The artillery of the cruiser, which is the 180-mm main caliber, 100-mm and 76-mm universal guns, suppressed enemy batteries located on the heights around the city, destroyed several tanks, dispersed a convoy of vehicles with infantry approaching the city.

At 8:15 a.m. "Red Caucasus" completed the landing, unloading equipment and moved away from the pier to the outer roadstead, from where it continued to fire according to the corrective posts.

The cruiser "Red Crimea" anchored in the outer roadstead 3 cabs from the entrance to the port and from 4 hours 50 minutes. began the landing, using first ship's watercraft, and then the MO-4 boats and the minesweeper "Shield". The cruiser completed the landing at 0930 hours.

At 7.20 am, the Kuban transport moored in the captured port. 627 fighters were landed from it, 9 guns, 6 mortars, 15 vehicles and about 112 tons of cargo, ammunition, food, etc. were unloaded.

Street fighting, starting at about 5.00, continued all day on December 29 until about 18.00 (darkness) and ended with the capture of the city. Separate enemy groups continued to resist on December 30.

The successful landing of troops of the 44th Army in Feodosia dramatically changed the situation on the Kerch Peninsula. For the entire enemy grouping, located in the eastern part of the peninsula, there was a threat of encirclement. The command of the 11th German Army was forced to make a decision to withdraw its troops from the peninsula. On December 30, the enemy left Kerch without a fight. The German fascist command was forced to urgently strengthen its troops in the Feodosia direction. In early January, northwest and west of Feodosia, in addition to the 46th Infantry Division, units of the 73rd Infantry Division and the Romanian Mountain Rifle Corps were already operating. In addition, the 132nd and 170th Infantry Divisions, deployed from near Sevastopol, were on the way to this area, where the second German offensive was disrupted by the heroic efforts of the soldiers of the Sevastopol defensive area. fascist troops. By the end of January 2, Soviet troops reached the Kiet-Koktebel line, where they met organized enemy resistance. This ended the operation to seize the Kerch Peninsula. The Kerch-Feodosia landing operation ended with the capture of an important operational foothold in the Crimea, the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, the capture of important enemy strongholds in the Crimea, the cities and seaports of Kerch and Feodosia, the troops advanced 100-110 km west.

As a result of the operation, the position of the troops of the Sevastopol defensive region was strengthened. On January 1, 1942, the German command was forced to stop its second offensive against Sevastopol and transfer part of its forces from there to the Feodosia region. The Kerch grouping of the enemy suffered heavy losses. These results were achieved thanks to the heroic actions of the ground forces and the navy. The operation, which was carried out as part of the counter-offensive of the Red Army, which unfolded in December 1941, was the largest amphibious assault operation during the Great Patriotic War. Its main significance was that the enemy lost the opportunity to use the Kerch Peninsula as a springboard for penetrating the Caucasus. At the same time, it diverted part of the enemy forces from near Sevastopol, making it easier for its defenders to repulse the second enemy assault.

When the Nazis came to the Crimean land, many Feodosians went to the partisans. For the courage shown during the Great Patriotic War and the significant labor contribution of the Crimeans in restoring their hometown Feodosia was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class.

The events of the modern period have shown that the current generation of city residents adequately preserves the memory of their fellow countrymen. On March 19, 2014, the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as new subjects, became part of Russia. The recognition of the heroic merits of the defenders of Feodosia was the assignment of the honorary title of the Russian Federation "City of Military Glory" to it.

	Kerch Peninsula
	Defeat of the Red Army
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
D. T. Kozlov	E. von Manstein
F. I. Tolbukhin	Von Sponeck
L. Z. Mekhlis	Von Richthofen
A. N. Pervushin
V. N. Lvov
K. S. Kolganov
F. S. Oktyabrsky
S. G. Gorshkov
Side forces
Crimean front: 44th Army, 47th Army, 51st Army, KV and T-34 battalions, RGK artillery	unknown
Black Sea Fleet
Azov flotilla
More than 300 thousand, including more than 170 thousand prisoners, 1100 guns, 250 tanks	About 10 thousand people

Kerch landing operation- a major landing operation of Soviet troops on the Kerch Peninsula in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. It took place from December 26, 1941 to May 20, 1942.

Despite initial success, the operation ended in a major setback: three Soviet armies were surrounded and defeated; total losses amounted to more than 300 thousand people, including about 170 thousand prisoners, as well as a significant amount of heavy weapons. The defeat of the landing had a serious impact on the fate of the besieged Sevastopol and facilitated the Wehrmacht's summer attack on the Caucasus.

Previous events

The battles for the Crimea began at the end of September 1941. On September 26, units of the 11th Wehrmacht Army broke through the fortifications of the Perekop Isthmus and entered the peninsula. The remnants of the 51st Army were evacuated to the Kuban by November 16th. The only center of resistance remained Sevastopol with the adjacent fortified area. An attempt by the Wehrmacht to take Sevastopol on the move during October 30 - November 21, 1941 failed. To continue the siege of Sevastopol, the commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein, pulled most of the available forces to the city, leaving only one infantry division to cover the Kerch region. The Soviet command decided to use this circumstance to deliver a retaliatory strike by the forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the Black Sea Fleet.

Operation plan

On December 7, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned the command of the Transcaucasian Front (commander - D.T. Kozlov, chief of staff - F.I. Tolbukhin) the task of preparing and conducting a landing operation to capture the Kerch Peninsula within two weeks. The plan of the operation drawn up by Tolbukhin was to encircle and destroy the Kerch enemy grouping by the simultaneous landing of the 51st and 44th armies in the Kerch region and in the port of Feodosia. In the future, it was supposed to develop an offensive deep into the peninsula, unblock Sevastopol and completely liberate the Crimea.

The main blow, in the region of Feodosia, was to be delivered by the 44th Army removed from the Iranian border (gen. . N. Lvov). The landing of troops was planned to be carried out on a wide front (up to 250 km) at several points simultaneously in order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to maneuver with reserves and pin him down in all the most important directions.

1st stage: landing

Side forces

Soviet troops

The landing force included 8 rifle divisions, 2 rifle brigades, 2 mountain rifle regiments - a total of 82,500 people, 43 tanks, 198 guns and 256 mortars:

• 44th Army (Major-General A.N. Pervushin) consisting of: 157th, 236th, 345th and 404th rifle divisions, 9th and 63rd mountain rifle divisions, 1st and 2nd detachments of sailors 9th Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet under the 44th Army.
• 51st Army (Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov)) consisting of: 224th, 302nd, 390th and 396th Rifle Divisions, 12th Rifle Brigade, 83rd Marine Brigade

For their support, 78 warships and 170 transport ships were involved, in total over 250 ships and vessels, including 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 52 patrol and torpedo boats:

• Black Sea Fleet (Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky)
• Azov Military Flotilla (Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov)

The air forces of the Transcaucasian Front and the armies operating on the Taman Peninsula, as of December 20, had a total of about 500 aircraft (excluding air defense fighter aircraft), the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet had about 200 aircraft.

The 156th, 398th and 400th rifle divisions and the 72nd cavalry division were also in reserve on the Taman Peninsula.

German troops:

The wounding of the Kerch Peninsula was carried by:

• Part of the troops of the 46th division (42nd army corps of the 11th army)
• 8th Romanian Cavalry Brigade
• 4th Mountain Brigade
• 2 field regiments and 5 anti-aircraft artillery battalions

Landing

At the end of December 1941, units of the Transcaucasian Front, with the support of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov-Black Sea Flotilla, made an amphibious assault: on December 26 in the Kerch region and on December 29 in the Feodosia region. The initial number of troops was more than 40 thousand people,

In Feodosia, the landing forces were unloaded at the port. The resistance of the German garrison (3 thousand people) was broken by the end of the day on December 29, after which reinforcements began to arrive in Feodosia.

In the Kerch area, the landing was much more difficult: the infantry landed directly into the icy sea and went chest-deep in water to the shore. Hypothermia caused great losses. A few days after the start of the landing, frost hit and most of the 51st Army crossed the ice of the frozen Kerch Strait.

At that moment, the enemy forces on the Kerch Peninsula were represented by one German division - the 46th Infantry and the Romanian Regiment of Mountain Riflemen, guarding the area of ​​the Parpach Range. The landing forces in Kerch were many times superior to the forces of the Wehrmacht in this area, in addition, the landing in Feodosia threatened encirclement, so the commander of the 42nd Corps, Gen. von Sponeck immediately gave the order to withdraw. Later, an order was received from Manstein to keep the defense, but it was no longer possible to fulfill it. The German troops retreated, thus avoiding encirclement, but at the same time leaving behind all heavy weapons. For a formal violation of the order, von Sponeck was removed from command and put on trial.

results

As a result of the landing, the position of German troops in the Crimea became threatening. The commander of the 11th Army, E. von Manstein wrote:

However, the 51st Army, advancing from Kerch, did not move forward fast enough, and the 44th Army from Feodosia, with its main forces, moved not to the west, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. This allowed the enemy to create a barrier at the turn of the Yaila spurs - the Sivash coast west of Ak-Monai. The defense of the line was held by the 46th division of the Wehrmacht, reinforced by an additional infantry regiment, and the Romanian mountain units. To strengthen the combat capability of the Romanian units, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the rear units of the German army, including those from the army headquarters, were included in their composition.

Planning errors

When planning the operation, significant miscalculations were made:

• there was not a single medical institution on the bridgehead, the nearest hospital was in the Kuban. The wounded fighters, having received the initial dressing in the regimental squadron, were brought from their positions to Kerch, from there they independently reached Novorossiysk on steamboats.
• air defense systems were not delivered to the port of Feodosia in a timely manner. As a result, before January 4, 5 transports were killed by enemy aircraft: Krasnogvardeets, Zyryanin, and others; the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz received heavy damage.

Losses

During the operation, the total losses amounted to 40 thousand people, of which more than 30 thousand were irretrievably: killed, frozen and missing, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars.

2nd stage: battles for the Parpach Range

By January 2, 1942, Soviet troops completely occupied the Kerch Peninsula. Given the weakness of the German defense, the Headquarters pointed out to General Kozlov the need for an early exit to Perekop and strikes at the rear of the Sevastopol enemy grouping.

The enemy also understood the danger of a possible offensive. According to E. von Manstein:

However, the front commander D.T. Kozlov postponed the offensive, citing insufficient forces and means.

Loss of Theodosius

In the first half of January 1942, the troops of the Crimean Front were preparing for a further offensive deep into the Crimea. To support the future offensive, the Sudak landing was landed. However, Manstein was ahead of Kozlov by several days. On January 15, the Germans suddenly went on the offensive, delivering the main blow at the junction of the 51st and 44th armies in the Vladislavovka area. Despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet troops and the presence of armored vehicles, the enemy broke through the positions of General Pervushin and recaptured Feodosia on January 18. The troops of the Caucasian Front were forced to leave their positions and retreat behind the Ak-Monai Isthmus. Among other losses suffered by the Soviet side was the Jean Zhores transport with a load of ammunition. The Sudak landing force, which had heroically defended the captured bridgehead for almost two weeks, also almost completely perished.

Despite the loss of the port in Feodosia, the Soviet command retained the ability to deliver reinforcements across the ice of the Kerch Strait.

Crimean front

On January 28, the Stavka decided to detach the troops operating in the Kerch direction into an independent Crimean Front under the command of General Kozlov. The front was reinforced with new rifle divisions, tank units and artillery. In early February, the 47th army of Major General K. S. Kolganov, withdrawn from Iran, crossed the strait and became part of the front. Troops in the Crimea were significantly reinforced with armored vehicles. The 39th and 40th tank brigades each had ten KBs, ten T-34s and 25 T-60s, the 55th and 56th tank brigades each had 66 T-26s and 27 flamethrower tanks. The 226th separate tank battalion consisted of 16 KV heavy tanks.

The headquarters also decided to strengthen the headquarters of the new front. Army commissar 1st rank L. Z. Mekhlis arrived in Kerch, accompanied by a group of officers, as a representative of the Headquarters.

The offensive of the Red Army

The Headquarters approved the start date for the offensive on February 26-27, 1942. By the beginning of the offensive, the Crimean Front had twelve rifle divisions, one cavalry division, several separate tank battalions with heavy KV and medium T-34 and artillery units RGK. Of the total number of troops, 9 divisions were part of the first echelon of the front.

The offensive began on 27 February. At the same time, the Seaside Army attacked from Sevastopol, but failed to break through the encirclement. The offensive on the Kerch bridgehead developed very slowly: the actions of the tanks were hindered by heavy rains and the enemy repelled all attacks of the attackers. Only the 18th Romanian division could not resist, in the northern section of the isthmus. Manstein had to throw his last reserve into battle - the 213th Infantry Regiment and headquarters units. Stubborn fighting continued until March 3. The troops of the Crimean Front failed to break through the enemy defenses to the full depth.

In the period from 13 to 19 March, the offensive resumed. Stubborn battles ensued, which E. von Manstein recalled:

This time, 8 rifle divisions and 2 tank brigades advanced in the first echelon. Of the latter, during the first three days of the offensive, 136 tanks were knocked out. Nevertheless, a critical situation was created in a number of areas. How stubborn the fighting was is evidenced by the fact that the regiments of the 46th [infantry division], in the zone of which the main blow was delivered, repelled from 10 to 22 attacks during the first three days.

Despite all efforts, decisive success was not achieved this time either.

3rd stage: German counteroffensive

In early April, reinforcements began to arrive in Manstein's army: for the first time since the beginning of the offensive on the Crimea, it was given a tank division (22nd etc.) - 180 tanks.

At the insistence of L. Z. Mekhlis, Soviet troops were concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the front line, not having sufficient depth. In addition, most of the forces of the Crimean Front were concentrated in the north of the Parpach Isthmus. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the German command planned a detour maneuver from the south (Operation Bustard Hunting). An important role in the operation was assigned to aviation, for which, by special order of Hitler, the 8th Luftwaffe Air Corps (commander Wolfram von Richthofen) was transferred to the Crimea.

The offensive began on 8 May. As a result of an aimed air strike, the command post of the 51st Army was destroyed, the commander, Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov, was killed, and the deputy commander, General K.I. Baranov, was seriously wounded. A distraction was carried out in the north, while the main attack came from the south. As a result, within two weeks the main forces of the Crimean Front were pressed against the Kerch Strait. On May 18, the resistance of the encircled group of the Red Army ceased.

Consequences

According to German data, the number of prisoners was about 170,000 people. The plans of the Soviet command to liberate the Crimea did not come true. After the liquidation of the Crimean Front, Manstein was able to concentrate his forces against the besieged Sevastopol.

This article does not claim to be 100% accurate. It is rather an attempt to rethink, and somewhere to criticize the official data.

The alignment of forces and the course of events.

(who is familiar with the situation on the Crimean Peninsula in May 1942, this paragraph can be skipped)

On October 18, 1941, the assault on the Crimean peninsula began. The fighting lasted almost a month and ended on November 16 with the almost complete capture of the Crimean peninsula, with the exception of Sevastopol. Both the Soviet command and the German command considered Crimea the most important strategic foothold. Because the struggle for the Crimea did not subside throughout the war. Already a month and a half after the capture of the Crimea by the Germans, the Soviet troops carried out the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, during which the entire Kerch Peninsula up to Feodosia was occupied. During the winter-spring of 1942, both sides launched repeated attacks and offensives, but neither side was able to achieve strategic success. The war in the Crimea took on a protracted character. This continued until May 1942.

Preparing the next offensive, the Soviet command thought that Manstein's 11th Army, sandwiched between two fronts (the Sevastopol line and the Crimean Front), would be easily defeated, that the Germans were not thinking of advancing, but would simply hold their positions. This apparently explains the almost complete absence of reconnaissance activities on the part of the Soviet troops. However, the German command thought differently. By the end of April, the German General Staff developed a plan to clear the Crimea from Soviet troops, which was called "Hunting Bustard". The Germans actively conducted reconnaissance, at the same time erected all sorts of false fortifications and firing points, to divert eyes. They performed all sorts of maneuvering actions, the movement of equipment in their rear. In a word, they stubbornly misled the Soviet command.

As early as the end of January 1942, L. Z. Mekhlis was sent as a representative of the headquarters to the Crimean Front. He immediately began to do his usual business: cleaning and shuffling personnel. For example, Mekhlis removed Tolbukhin, the chief of staff of the front, putting Major General Vechny in his place.

The Soviet units on the Crimean Peninsula in May 1942 were represented by the Crimean Front, under the command of Lieutenant General Kozlov Dmitry Timofeevich, it included the 44th Army (63rd Mountain Rifle, 157th, 276th, 396th, 404th rifle divisions, 124th and 126th tank battalions), 47th army (77th mountain rifle, 224th, 236th, 271st, 320th rifle divisions), 51st army (138 -I, 302nd, 390th, 398th, 400th rifle divisions) and units of front subordination (156th rifle division, 12th, 139th rifle brigades, 83rd marine rifle brigade, 72 1st cavalry division, 151st fortified area, 54th motorized rifle regiment, 39th, 40th, 55th, 56th tank brigades, 79th, 229th separate tank battalions).

Most of these units were badly battered either during the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, or in the recent (January-April 1942) offensives of the Red Army on the Crimean Peninsula itself. Some barely gained 50% of the payroll. For example, back in January 1942, the 63rd Mountain Division suffered huge losses in the Feodosia region, and experienced constant hunger from a lack of replenishment. Most felt a shortage of 20-40% of the personnel. Only the 396th, 271st, 320th rifle and 72nd cavalry divisions, which had recently crossed over from the Taman Peninsula, were fresh.

Absolutely the same picture was observed with tank formations. In the recent frontal attacks of the winter-spring offensives, the armored units of the Crimean Front also suffered huge losses. So only the 39th tank brigade from March 13 to March 19, 1942 lost 23 tanks.

The German units, on the Crimean Peninsula in May 1942, were represented by the 11th Army (Colonel-General Erich von Manstein) it included: 30th Army Corps (28th Chasseurs, 50th, 132nd, 170 -I infantry, 22nd tank divisions), 42nd army corps (46th infantry division), 7th Romanian corps (10th, 19th Romanian infantry, 8th Romanian cavalry divisions), 8- th air corps (about 400 aircraft) and units of army subordination (18th Romanian infantry division, Groddek motorized brigade, Radu Korne mechanized brigade, tank reconnaissance battalion).

German troops were also not full-blooded. So some infantry divisions experienced a shortage of up to 30% in personnel. For example, by the end of March 1942, the 46th Infantry Division had lost up to a third of its personnel and almost half of its heavy weapons. However, the German and Romanian units stationed near Kerch received significant reinforcements by mid-April 1942. This can be seen at least from the fact that the 8th Romanian cavalry brigade was deployed into a cavalry division, and this is an increase in personnel by 2.5-3 times. The mechanized parts of Manstein were mostly full-blooded. For example, in April, the 22nd Panzer Division received 15-20 Pz.IIIs and Pz.IVs with long-barreled guns, especially to combat the Soviet T-34s and KVs.

Among other things, the troops of both opposing sides were actively supported by the local population: Russian-speaking partisan formations on the side of the Red Army, and Crimean Tatar companies and self-defense battalions on the side of the Wehrmacht. Also on the side of the Wehrmacht were a number of Russian, Ukrainian collaborationist units and a Cossack cavalry squadron.

If you sum up all the units, then the number of troops on both sides will not differ much. But the presence of von Richthofen's 8th Air Corps, and fresh mechanized units, tipped the scales in favor of the Germans in the upcoming battle.

The Kerch defensive operation began on May 7 and ended on May 20, 1942, with the complete defeat of the Crimean Front. During it, the commander of the 11th German Army, Erich von Manstein, carried out the Blitzkrieg plan, only on a reduced scale. Having managed to correctly assess the situation and make the first move. Using the effect of surprise, Manstein struck where he was not expected: he launched a tank and mechanized attack in the only place where the Soviet positions had an anti-tank ditch. Having broken the defenses of the Red Army, the main part of the units of the 11th Army turned north (the main forces of the 22nd Panzer Division, most of the infantry divisions), to encircle and destroy the 47th and 51st Soviet armies. And mobile units (Groddek's motorized brigade, Radu Korne's mechanized group, the reconnaissance battalion of the 22nd Panzer Division, the Romanians' 8th Cavalry Division and a number of infantry divisions) rushed into the gap to the east.

During the Kerch defensive operation, the Germans did not wait for the actions of the Soviet troops, but imposed their tactics. The coherence of the actions of aviation, tank troops and infantry gave excellent results. The presence of an effective 8th Air Corps and fresh mobile mechanized units gave the German command a huge advantage.

The reason for the complete defeat of the Crimean Front, Supreme High Command seen in the next. The grouping of troops was offensive, not defensive. Too much congestion of troops in the first echelon. Lack of interaction between the military branches. The disregard of the command towards its troops. Poorly trained, in engineering terms, defensive and lack of rear lines. Bureaucratic and sometimes repressive method of work of the front command and personally L.3. Mehlis. Lack of understanding and sober assessment by the command of the rapidly changing situation. The direct culprits of the Kerch catastrophe were named: L.3. Mehlis, D.T. Kozlov, F.A. Shamanin, P.P. Eternal, K.S. Kolganov, S.I. Chernyak and E.M. Nikolaenko. All of them were removed from their posts and demoted in ranks.

Side losses.

In the works of the Soviet period, the Kerch defensive operation (among the Germans, the operation was called “Hunting for bustards”) was not considered in detail. Accordingly, the losses in this operation were mentioned, somehow in passing. In various modern scientific and near-scientific works, figures from 160,000 to 200,000 people are mentioned. irretrievable losses . (In the late 1980s, these figures could be as high as 300,000). The average figure is 170,000 people.

How were such huge numbers calculated? Virtually no part of the Crimean Front was able to provide lists of casualties. The command of the North Caucasian Front calculated the losses of the Crimean Front as follows: data were taken on payroll composition at the beginning of May 1942, the number of those who crossed to Taman before May 20, 1942 was subtracted and the figure was 176,566 people.

However, let's look at everything in more detail.

Immediately make a reservation that everything that is described below is nothing but a hypothesis. It is not possible to accurately calculate the true losses of the parties in this operation due to the incompleteness and inaccuracy of the sources, or even their absence. I am sure of one thing: the order of the numbers is exactly that.

A very important point in this topic is the determination of the size of the Crimean Front at the beginning of May 1942.

When it is written about 300,000 (or more) people at the beginning of May in the Crimean Front, then the entire payroll is counted. And indeed, if you sum it up, it turns out that in May 1942 there were more than 300,000 people in the Crimean Front. However, as shown above, there simply could not be such a number of troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

Krivosheev G. F. estimates the number of troops of the Crimean Front (plus part of the forces of the Black Sea Front and the Azov Flotilla) at 249,800 people. However, these figures are also highly overestimated. In addition, Krivosheev takes into account both the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla. However, the authoritative researcher Nemenko A.V. believes that at the beginning of May 1942 there were “just over 200,000 people” in the Crimean Front. Taking the arithmetic mean of these two figures (249800 and 200000), we will be close to the real figure of the composition land(excluding the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla) the forces of the Crimean Front: 224,900 people.

The second important point will be the calculation of the number of evacuees to Taman. On May 21, Kozlov gave the following information in a telegram to Stalin: 138,926 people were taken out, of which 30,000 were wounded. But there, he adds that the calculation of the total number is indicative, since there is no data on two marinas and those who crossed on their own (and there were such, although not very many). In addition, those who crossed on airplanes did not succumb to accounting. In the report of military communications of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, figures are given of 119,395 people, of which 42,324 were wounded (by the way, this figure, rounded up to 120,000, was included in many official publications). However, this figure shows the number of crossings only for the period from 14 to 20 May. But in fact, the redeployment of the Crimean Front to Taman began on May 8: Vsevolod Abramov, referring to the archival documents of the 6th separate motor-pontoon bridge battalion, writes that from May 8 to 13, the wounded were transported to Taman. In the report of the military operations of the KVMB units, the figure is "about 150,000 people, excluding those who crossed on their own." As you can see, the numbers vary.

All data on those who crossed are taken from documentary sources, and not calculated. Therefore, in my purely personal opinion, it would be correct to take the average of the above data as the number of evacuees: 136,107 people.

On April 30, Commander-in-Chief Budyonny presented to the headquarters and personally to Stalin another plan for the liberation of the Crimea, in connection with which he asked to strengthen the troops stationed on the peninsula. To which Stalin ordered to go over to the defense of the positions occupied, however, replenishments were nevertheless sent to the Crimean Front. In May, about 10,000 people were transported to the Kerch Peninsula from Taman.

Now about losses.

Let's start with German sources: Manstein writes in his memoirs about 170,000 captured soldiers and officers of the Red Army. Franz Halder indicates 150,000 prisoners. Fedor von Bock first writes about 149,000 prisoners, but then points out that "another 3,000 prisoners were taken, thus about 170,000 prisoners were captured" . Great math, right? Maximilian Fretter-Pico is more cautious in his assessment of the prisoners: he gives the figure of 66,000 prisoners. Moreover, the Germans, as a rule, name only the number of prisoners. Only Robert Furzhik writes about the killed Russians: he writes about 28,000 killed and 147,000 prisoners. Now let's turn to our sources.

According to G. F. Krivosheev, on the Kerch Peninsula from January to May 19, 1942, irretrievable losses amounted to 194,807 people. According to the same Krivosheev G.F., only in another study, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army only for May 8-19, 1942 amounted to 162,282 people. Let's say. Although the well-known researcher of the Crimean defensive operation, Abramov V.V., considers this figure to be overestimated by at least 30,000.

Now let's try to calculate in a different way. To the received number of troops on the Kerch Peninsula at the beginning of May, we add the replenishment arrived for May and subtract the received number of evacuees. We get 224900+10000-136107=98793 people. But this number also includes people who remained in the Adzhimushkay quarries.

The number of Adzhimushkay garrisons should be discussed in more detail.

Trofimenko in his diary estimated the number of Adzhimushkais at 15,000 people. The head of the food supply of the garrison Pirogov A.I., after the war, gave an estimate of “more than 10,000 people”. But it seems that Pirogov and Trofimenko estimated the number of defenders only in the Central Quarries. German estimates for the number of defenders were as high as 30,000. But apparently “the eyes of fear are big” - the Adzhimushkais really caused a rustle, as if there were 30,000 of them. Vsevolod Abramov himself is inclined to the figure of 20,000 defenders of the quarries, meaning those who remained in all the quarries.

This means that the number of irretrievable losses is 78,793 people. It is clear that neither 150,000 nor 170,000 prisoners can "fit" into this number. Therefore, we will take the data of Maximilian Fretter-Pico as the only real figures for the number of prisoners, 66,000 people (although this figure seems to me too high). After not tricky calculations, we get the number of 12793 people killed.

The number of wounded was indicated above, and according to various estimates ranges from 30,000 to 42,324 people (average - 36,162 people).

Thus, in our opinion, the total irretrievable losses of the Crimean Front during the Kerch defensive operation amount to 78,793 people, of which 66,000 were captured, 12,793 were killed. It also mentions a number of missing people. But the “missing” are, as a rule, captured or (to a lesser extent) unfound dead and unidentified seriously wounded. So, in this case (taking into account the specifics of the operation) they are already taken into account in the previous figures. The total losses, together with 36,162 wounded who were safely evacuated to Taman, amounted to 114,955 people.

Perhaps the averaging of some figures catches the eye. Well, let's try to substitute for comparison first all the maximum (a) data, and then all the minimum (b):

a) 249800+10000-150000-66000-30000=13800 people.

b) 200000+10000-119395-66000-10000=14605 people.

As you can see, the numbers are about the same. Taking into account all the "about" and "about" up, this number could rise to 20,000 people.

This is exactly the order of losses of the Crimean Front killed in the Kerch defensive operation. This thousands, Maybe tens of thousands. But by no means hundreds of thousands as it is officially considered.

Further. I consider it just necessary to say a few words about the losses of the Germans in the operation “Hunting for bustards”. Here it is even more difficult with sources. The number of fascist troops involved in the operation “Hunting for bustards” is given by the well-known researcher A.V. Nemenko at 147,000 people, but this does not take into account units of army subordination: the 18th Romanian Infantry Division, the Groddek motorized brigade, the Radu Korne mechanized brigade, etc. d. The real number was at least 165,000 people.

The Germans evaluate their losses differently. Robert Furzhik writes that the total losses of the troops amounted to 3397 people, of which 600 were killed. Fedor von Bock writes in his memoirs about 7,000 irretrievable losses. Our historians call approximately the same numbers of German losses: Nevzorov names 7588 dead soldiers and officers and Nemenko points out 7790 dead. I note right away that many of our and German publications take a rounded figure of 7,500 people killed as the official losses of the Germans in Operation Bustard Hunting.

Of course, we will not take the data of Robert Furzhik as a basis, because the number of 600 Germans killed seems to us to be completely underestimated. Let's take the average figure of 7500 as officially accepted (besides, as we can see, most sources indicate approximately the same number: 7000, 7588, 7790). But these losses are exclusively German. It is known that the German command considered only its own losses, the Romanian - its own, the Italian - its own, etc. Moreover, among the Germans, even by combat arms, losses were recorded by different departments. Luftwaffe separately, Wehrmacht separately, SS separately, etc. Therefore, among the 7500 killed Germans, 2752 killed Romanians were not taken into account, that is, the losses of the Nazis on May 7-20, 1942 amount to approximately 10252 people killed. However, this figure is not entirely accurate: it does not take into account the prisoners (and although their number was not large, they were), the missing, the wounded, as well as the losses of the 8th air corps of von Richthofen (which, no doubt, also suffered significant losses: the 72nd Cavalry Division alone destroyed at least 36 enemy aircraft).

So what are the total losses of the 11th Army in the May battles on the Kerch Peninsula?

In my purely personal opinion, the total losses of the 11th Army on the Kerch Peninsula in May 1942 are characterized by an entry in the diary of the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces Franz Halder, I will quote it verbatim: “Requests for replenishment of the 11th Army cannot be fully satisfied. 60,000 people have been requested; a maximum of 30,000 people can be allocated. This means a shortage of 2-3 thousand people for each division. The situation is especially bad in the artillery units of the RGK. These words perfectly characterize the general losses of the Germans. These losses were indeed great. They are so large that a number of units of the 11th Army lost their combat effectiveness and were withdrawn to the rear.

Opponents during the May battles of 1942 on the Kerch Peninsula suffered fairly comparable losses in the dead. Despite the fact that Manstein brilliantly fulfilled his strategic tasks (in fact, he implemented the Blitzkrieg plan on a reduced scale), this was a Pyrrhic victory for him. Serious losses of the 11th Army forced the German leadership to abandon the implementation of the Blucher I operational plan, according to which the 11th Army was to force the Kerch Strait and advance into the Caucasus through the Taman Peninsula after the capture of Crimea. From all this it is very clear that the courage and ability to fight the Soviet soldiers were not much inferior to the Germans. After all, losses killed in open battle amounted to 10,252 people from the 11th German Army and 12,793 people from the Crimean Front. The blame for the defeat of the Crimean Front lies entirely on the shoulders of the command of the front itself.

This operation had grave consequences for the Red Army: the Sevastopol defensive region was placed in a difficult situation. Oil fields, oil pipelines and oil depots of the USSR were located in the Caucasus, the Germans had the opportunity to carry out a landing from Kerch to Taman. Crimea was an excellent springboard from which it was possible to carry out constant air raids on Soviet troops and facilities located in the Caucasus. The Germans were able to free part of the forces and transfer them from the Crimea to other parts of the theater of operations.

Nevertheless, the Kerch defensive operation showed the high morale of individual units of the Crimean Front. The units that did not panic and did not flinch in the face of a superior enemy showed a fine example of valor and resilience. The personal courage of individual units and the fighters themselves is what made it possible to delay the advance of the Germans for so many days and evacuate a large number of people of the deceased Crimean Front to Taman.

Gerasimenko Roman.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945: A Brief History. The team of authors under the leadership of Telpukhovsky B. S. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1984. p. 86.

Shtemenko S.M. The General Staff during the War: From Stalingrad to Berlin. - M.: AST: Transitbook, 2005. p. 68.

Nemenko A. V. Crimea 1941-1942. Riddles and myths of the peninsula. Electronic version, posted at http://www.litsovet.ru, (accessed 11/12/2013).