Features of the partisan battle in 1812 Start in science

The partisan war (partisan movement) of 1812 is an armed conflict between Napoleon's troops and Russian partisans during the Patriotic War of 1812.

The partisan troops consisted of detachments of the Russian army located in the rear, escaped Russian prisoners of war and numerous volunteers from the civilian population. Partisan detachments were one of the main forces participating in the war and resisting the attackers.

Prerequisites for the creation of partisan detachments

The detachments of Napoleon, who attacked Russia, moved quite quickly inland, pursuing the retreating Russian army. This led to the fact that the French army was quite stretched across the territory of the state, from the borders to the capital itself - thanks to the stretched communication lines, the French received food and weapons. Seeing this, the leadership of the Russian army decided to create mobile detachments that would operate in the rear and try to cut off the channels through which the French received food. This is how partisan detachments appeared, the first of which was formed by order of Lieutenant Colonel D. Davydov.

Partisan detachments of the Cossacks and the regular army

Davydov drew up a very effective plan for conducting a guerrilla war, thanks to which he received from Kutuzov a detachment of 50 hussars and 50 Cossacks. Together with his detachment, Davydov went to the rear of the French army and began subversive activities there.

In September, this detachment attacked a French detachment carrying food and additional manpower (soldiers). The French were captured or killed, and all goods destroyed. There were several such attacks - the partisans acted cautiously and always unexpectedly for the French soldiers, thanks to which they almost always managed to destroy wagons with food and other belongings.

Soon, peasants and Russian soldiers released from captivity began to join Davydov's detachment. Despite the fact that the partisans had strained relations with the local peasants at first, pretty soon the locals themselves began to take part in Davydov's raids and actively help in the partisan movement.

Davydov, along with his soldiers, regularly disrupted food supplies, freed prisoners, and sometimes took weapons from the French.

When Kutuzov was forced to leave Moscow, he gave the order to start an active partisan war in all directions. By that time, partisan detachments began to grow and appeared throughout the country, they consisted mainly of the Cossacks. Partisan detachments usually numbered several hundred people, but there were also larger associations (up to 1,500 people) that could well cope with small detachments of the regular French army.

Several factors contributed to the success of the partisans. Firstly, they always acted suddenly, which gave them an advantage, and secondly, local residents quickly established contact with partisan detachments rather than with a regular army.

By the middle of the war, the partisan detachments had grown so much that they began to pose a significant danger to the French, and a real partisan war began.

Peasant partisan detachments

The success of the partisan war of 1812 would not have been so stunning if it were not for the active participation of the peasants in the life of the partisans. They always actively supported the detachments working in their area, brought them food and provided assistance in every possible way.

The peasants also offered all possible resistance to the French army. First of all, they refused to conduct any trade with the French - often it came to the point that the peasants burned their own houses and food supplies if they knew that the French would come to them.

After the fall of Moscow and discord in Napoleon's army, the Russian peasantry turned to more active actions. Peasant partisan detachments began to be created, which also offered armed resistance to the French and carried out raids.

Results and role of the guerrilla war of 1812

Largely due to the active and skillful actions of the Russian partisan detachments, which eventually turned into a huge force, Napoleon's army fell and was expelled from Russia. The partisans actively undermined the ties between the French and their own, cut off the supply of weapons and food, simply defeated small detachments in the dense forests - all this greatly weakened Napoleon's army and led to its internal disintegration and weakening.

The war was won, and the heroes of the guerrilla war were rewarded.

Partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812.

Essay on the history of a student of grade 11, school 505 Afitova Elena

Partisan movement in the War of 1812

Partisan movement, the armed struggle of the masses for the freedom and independence of their country or social transformations, conducted in the territory occupied by the enemy (controlled by the reactionary regime). Regular troops operating behind enemy lines may also take part in the Partisan Movement.

The partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812, the armed struggle of the people, mainly the peasants of Russia, and detachments of the Russian army against the French invaders in the rear of the Napoleonic troops and on their communications. The partisan movement began in Lithuania and Belarus after the retreat of the Russian army. At first, the movement was expressed in the refusal to supply the French army with fodder and food, the massive destruction of stocks of these types of supplies, which created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic troops. With the entry of the pr-ka into the Smolensk, and then into the Moscow and Kaluga provinces, the partisan movement assumed an especially wide scope. At the end of July-August, in Gzhatsky, Belsky, Sychevsky and other counties, the peasants united in foot and horseback partisan detachments armed with pikes, sabers and guns, attacked separate groups of enemy soldiers, foragers and carts, disrupted the communications of the French army. The partisans were a serious fighting force. The number of individual detachments reached 3-6 thousand people. The partisan detachments of G.M. Kurin, S. Emelyanov, V. Polovtsev, V. Kozhina and others became widely known. Imperial law reacted with distrust to the Partisan movement. But in an atmosphere of patriotic upsurge, some landowners and progressive generals (P.I. Bagration, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, A.P. Yermolov and others). Field Marshal M.I., Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, attached particular importance to the people's partisan struggle. Kutuzov. He saw in it a huge force capable of inflicting significant damage on the pr-ku, assisted in every possible way in the organization of new detachments, gave instructions on their weapons and instructions on the tactics of guerrilla warfare. After leaving Moscow, the front of the Partisan movement was significantly expanded, and Kutuzov, to his plans, gave it an organized character. This was largely facilitated by the formation of special detachments from regular troops operating by partisan methods. The first such detachment of 130 people was created at the end of August on the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov. In September, 36 Cossack, 7 cavalry and 5 infantry regiments, 5 squadrons and 3 battalions acted as part of the army partisan detachments. The detachments were commanded by generals and officers I.S. Dorokhov, M.A. Fonvizin and others. Many peasant detachments, which arose spontaneously, subsequently joined the army or closely cooperated with them. Separate detachments of the formation of bunks were also involved in partisan actions. militia. The partisan movement reached its widest scope in the Moscow, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces. Acting on the communications of the French army, partisan detachments exterminated enemy foragers, captured carts, and reported valuable information about the pr-ke to the Russian command. Under these conditions, Kutuzov set before the Partisan movement broader tasks of interacting with the army and delivering strikes against individual garrisons and reserves of the pr-ka. So, on September 28 (October 10), on the orders of Kutuzov, a detachment of General Dorokhov, with the support of peasant detachments, captured the city of Vereya. As a result of the battle, the French lost about 700 people killed and wounded. In total, in 5 weeks after the Battle of Borodino 1812, the pr-k lost over 30 thousand people as a result of partisan attacks. Throughout the retreat of the French army, partisan detachments assisted the Russian troops in pursuing and destroying the enemy, attacking his carts and destroying individual detachments. In general, the Partisan movement provided great assistance to the Russian army in defeating the Napoleonic troops and driving them out of Russia.

Causes of guerrilla warfare

The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having flared up after the invasion of Napoleonic troops into Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took on more and more active forms and became a formidable force.

At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, represented by performances of small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire regions. Large detachments began to be created, thousands of folk heroes appeared, talented organizers of the partisan struggle came to the fore.

Why, then, did the disenfranchised peasantry, mercilessly oppressed by the feudal landlords, rise to fight against their seemingly "liberator"? Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their disenfranchised position. If at first promising phrases were uttered about the emancipation of the serfs, and even there was talk of the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landlords.

Napoleon understood that the liberation of the Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which he feared most of all. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when entering Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades-in-arms, it was "important for him to strengthen monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach revolution in Russia."

The very first orders of the administration established by Napoleon in the occupied regions were directed against the serfs, in defense of the serf landowners. The interim Lithuanian "government", subordinate to the Napoleonic governor, in one of the very first decrees obliged all peasants and rural residents in general to unquestioningly obey the landlords, to continue to perform all work and duties, and those who would evade were to be severely punished, involving for this if circumstances so require, military force.

Sometimes the beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, as if allowing the peasants to take up arms and actively join the struggle. In reality, things were different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, the inhabitants went into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned.

The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position, something in which they were before. The peasants also associated the struggle against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.

Peasants' War

At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants took on the character of mass abandonment of villages and villages and the departure of the population to forests and areas remote from hostilities. And although it was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. The French troops, having a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This was not long in affecting the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers starved, looting intensified. Even before Vilna, more than 10 thousand horses died.

The French foragers sent to the countryside for food faced not only passive resistance. One French general after the war wrote in his memoirs: "The army could only eat what the marauders, organized in whole detachments, got; Cossacks and peasants daily killed many of our people who dared to go in search." Skirmishes took place in the villages, including shootings, between French soldiers sent for food and peasants. Such skirmishes occurred quite often. It was in such battles that the first peasant partisan detachments were created, and a more active form of people's resistance was born - partisan struggle.

The actions of the peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive. In the region of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, detachments of peasants - partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy carts, destroyed his foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced more and more often to remind the chief of staff Berthier about the heavy losses in people and strictly ordered that an increasing number of troops be allocated to cover the foragers.

The partisan struggle of the peasants acquired the widest scope in August in the Smolensk province. It began in Krasnensky, Porechsky counties, and then in Belsky, Sychevsky, Roslavl, Gzhatsky and Vyazemsky counties. At first, the peasants were afraid to arm themselves, they were afraid that they would later be held accountable.

In the city of Bely and Belsky district, partisan detachments attacked French parties making their way to them, destroyed them or took them prisoner. The leaders of the Sychevsk partisans, police officer Boguslavskaya and retired major Yemelyanov, armed their detachments with guns taken from the French, established proper order and discipline. Sychevsk partisans attacked the enemy 15 times in two weeks (from August 18 to September 1). During this time, they destroyed 572 soldiers and captured 325 people.

Residents of the Roslavl district created several partisan detachments on horseback and on foot, arming them with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their county from the enemy, but also attacked marauders who made their way to the neighboring Yelnensky county. Many partisan detachments operated in the Yukhnovsky district. Having organized the defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy's path in Kaluga, provided significant assistance to the army partisans to the detachment of Denis Davydov.

The largest Gzhatsk partisan detachment successfully operated. Its organizer was a soldier of the Elizavetgrad Regiment Fyodor Potopov (Samus). Wounded in one of the rearguard battles after Smolensk, Samus found himself behind enemy lines and, after recovering, immediately set about organizing a partisan detachment, the number of which soon reached 2,000 people (according to other sources, 3,000). Its strike force was a cavalry group of 200 men armed and dressed in French cuirassier armor. The Samusya detachment had its own organization, strict discipline was established in it. Samus introduced a system for warning the population about the approach of the enemy by means of bell ringing and other conventional signs. Often in such cases, the villages were empty, according to another conventional sign, the peasants returned from the forests. Lighthouses and the ringing of bells of various sizes informed when and in what quantity, on horseback or on foot, one should go into battle. In one of the battles, the members of this detachment managed to capture a cannon. The Samusya detachment inflicted significant damage on the French troops. In the Smolensk province, he destroyed about 3 thousand enemy soldiers.

In the Gzhatsk district, another partisan detachment was also active, created from peasants, headed by Yermolai Chetvertak (Chetvertakov), a private of the Kyiv Dragoon Regiment. He was wounded in the battle near Tsarevo-Zaimishch, and taken prisoner, but he managed to escape. From the peasants of the villages of Basmany and Zadnovo, he organized a partisan detachment, which at first consisted of 40 people, but soon increased to 300 people. The detachment of Chetvertakov began not only to protect the villages from marauders, but to attack the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him. In the Sychevsky district, partisan Vasilisa Kozhina became famous for her courageous actions.

There are many facts and evidence that the partisan peasant detachments of Gzhatsk and other areas located along the main road to Moscow caused great trouble to the French troops.

The actions of partisan detachments were especially intensified during the stay of the Russian army in Tarutino. At this time, they widely deployed the front of the struggle in the Smolensk, Moscow, Ryazan and Kaluga provinces. Not a day passed that in one place or another the partisans did not raid the enemy's food convoy, or defeated a detachment of the French, or, finally, suddenly raided the French soldiers and officers stationed in the village.

In the Zvenigorod district, peasant partisan detachments destroyed and captured more than 2 thousand French soldiers. Here the detachments became famous, the leaders of which were the volost head Ivan Andreev and the centurion Pavel Ivanov. In the Volokolamsk district, partisan detachments were led by retired non-commissioned officer Novikov and private Nemchinov, volost head Mikhail Fedorov, peasants Akim Fedorov, Filipp Mikhailov, Kuzma Kuzmin and Gerasim Semenov. In the Bronnitsky district of the Moscow province, peasant partisan detachments united up to 2 thousand people. They repeatedly attacked large parties of the enemy and defeated them. History has preserved for us the names of the most distinguished peasants - partisans from the Bronnitsky district: Mikhail Andreev, Vasily Kirillov, Sidor Timofeev, Yakov Kondratiev, Vladimir Afanasyev.

The largest peasant partisan detachment in the Moscow region was the detachment of the Bogorodsk partisans. He had about 6,000 men in his ranks. The talented leader of this detachment was the serf Gerasim Kurin. His detachment and other smaller detachments not only reliably protected the entire Bogorodsk district from the penetration of French marauders, but also entered into an armed struggle with the enemy troops. So, on October 1, partisans led by Gerasim Kurin and Yegor Stulov entered into battle with two squadrons of the enemy and, skillfully acting, defeated them.

Peasant partisan detachments received assistance from the commander-in-chief of the Russian army M. I. Kutuzov. With satisfaction and pride, Kutuzov wrote to St. Petersburg:

The peasants, burning with love for the Motherland, arrange militias among themselves ... Every day they come to the Main Apartment, convincingly asking for firearms and cartridges to protect themselves from enemies. The requests of these respectable peasants, true sons of the fatherland, are satisfied as far as possible and they are supplied with rifles, pistols and cartridges.

During the preparation of the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militias and partisans fettered the actions of the Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on the enemy's manpower, and destroyed military property. The Smolensk road, which remained the only protected postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subjected to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the Headquarters of the Russian army.

The partisan actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “Peasants,” Kutuzov wrote, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war, inflict the greatest harm on the enemy ... They kill the enemy in large numbers, and deliver those taken prisoner to the army.” The peasants of the Kaluga province alone killed and captured more than 6,000 French. During the capture of Vereya, a peasant partisan detachment (up to 1 thousand people), led by priest Ivan Skobeev, distinguished himself.

In addition to direct hostilities, the participation of militias and peasants in reconnaissance should be noted.

Army partisan detachments

Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played an important role in the war.

The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly. Its commander was General F.F. Vintsengerode, who led the combined Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of ​​​​the city of Dukhovshchina.

A real thunderstorm for the French was the detachment of Denis Davydov. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky hussar regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration's army to Borodin. A passionate desire to be even more useful in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov "to ask for a separate detachment." In this intention, he was strengthened by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to clarify the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov, who was captured. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest, the poor protection of the rear in the French army.

While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was to fight without an agreed plan of action for the flying peasant detachments. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.

D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment for operations behind enemy lines. For a "test" Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids on the rear of the enemy. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaymishch, Slavsky, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments, captured a wagon train with ammunition.

In the autumn of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring. Between Smolensk and Gzhatsk, a detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated. From Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk, a detachment of General I. S. Dorokhov operated. Captain A. S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow. in the Mozhaisk region and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I. M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by the detachment of Captain A.N. Seslavin. Colonel N. D. Kudashiv was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I. E. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F. F. Vintsengerode, who, separating small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access to Napoleon's troops in the northern regions of the Moscow region.

The main task of the partisan detachments was formulated by Kutuzov: “Since now the autumn time is coming, through which the movement of a large army becomes completely difficult, I decided, avoiding a general battle, to wage a small war, because the separate forces of the enemy and his oversight give me more ways to exterminate him , and for this, being now 50 versts from Moscow with the main forces, I am giving away important parts from me in the direction of Mozhaisk, Vyazma and Smolensk.

Army partisan detachments were created mainly from Cossack troops and were unequal in number: from 50 to 500 people. They were tasked with bold and sudden actions behind enemy lines to destroy his manpower, strike at garrisons, suitable reserves, disable transport, deprive the enemy of the opportunity to get food and fodder, monitor the movement of troops and report this to the General Staff Russian army. The commanders of the partisan detachments were indicated the main direction of action, and the areas of operations of neighboring detachments were reported in case of joint operations.

Partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first, there were many difficulties. Even the inhabitants of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to change into peasant caftans and grow beards.

Partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The actions of the partisans were sudden and swift. To fly like snow on the head, and quickly hide became the basic rule of the partisans.

Detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, took tens and hundreds of prisoners.

On the evening of September 3, 1812, Davydov's detachment went to Tsarev-Zaimishch. Not reaching 6 miles to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zaimishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost broke into the village with them. The baggage train and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of Frenchmen to resist was quickly crushed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 wagons with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans.

Sometimes, knowing in advance the location of the enemy, the partisans made a sudden raid. So, General Vinzengerod, having established that in the village of Sokolov there was an outpost of two squadrons of cavalry and three companies of infantry, singled out 100 Cossacks from his detachment, who quickly broke into the village, killed more than 120 people and captured 3 officers, 15 non-commissioned officers , 83 soldiers.

The detachment of Colonel Kudashev, having established that there were about 2,500 French soldiers and officers in the village of Nikolsky, suddenly attacked the enemy, more than 100 people and 200 captured.

Most often, partisan detachments set up ambushes and attacked enemy vehicles on the way, captured couriers, and freed Russian prisoners. The partisans of the detachment of General Dorokhov, acting along the Mozhaisk road, on September 12 seized two couriers with dispatches, burned 20 boxes of shells and captured 200 people (including 5 officers). On September 16, a detachment of Colonel Efremov, having met an enemy convoy heading for Podolsk, attacked it and captured more than 500 people.

The detachment of Captain Figner, who was always in the vicinity of the enemy troops, in a short time destroyed almost all the food in the vicinity of Moscow, blew up the artillery park on the Mozhaisk road, destroyed 6 guns, exterminated up to 400 people, captured a colonel, 4 officers and 58 soldiers.

Later, partisan detachments were consolidated into three large parties. One of them, under the command of Major General Dorokhov, consisting of five infantry battalions, four cavalry squadrons, two Cossack regiments with eight guns, took the city of Vereya on September 28, 1812, destroying part of the French garrison.

Conclusion

It was not by chance that the War of 1812 was called the Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to reproaches of "a war against the rules," Kutuzov said that such were the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Berthier, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people who have been embittered by everything they have seen, a people who have not known war on their territory for so many years, a people ready to sacrifice themselves for the Motherland... ".

Activities aimed at attracting the masses of the people to active participation in the war proceeded from the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad possibilities that emerged in the national liberation war.

Bibliography

PA Zhilin The death of the Napoleonic army in Russia. M., 1968.

History of France, v.2. M., 1973.

O. V. Orlik "Thunderstorm of the twelfth year ...". M., 1987.

I offer my top list, top 5 Heroes of the war of 1812 and their exploits.
Each battle of that war was bloody and resulted in great casualties. Initially, the forces were not equal: from France - about six hundred thousand soldiers, from Russia - more than two times less. The war of 1812, according to historians, posed a question for Russia - a choice: either win or disappear. In the war against the Napoleonic troops, many worthy sons of the Fatherland showed themselves in battles, many of them died on the battlefield or died from wounds (as, for example, Prince Dmitry Petrovich Volkonsky, we wrote).

The exploits of the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812:

1. Kutuzov Mikhail Ivanovich

A talented commander, perhaps one of the most famous heroes of the war of 1812. Born in St. Petersburg, in a noble family, his father was a military engineer, a participant in the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-74. From childhood, a strong and healthy boy was talented in the sciences, received special education, graduated with honors from the artillery engineering school. After graduating from school, he was introduced to the court of the emperor Peter III. Over the years of service, Kutuzov had to carry out various assignments - he was a commander and fought in Poland with opponents of a supporter of Russia elected in Poland to the throne of the Commonwealth, fought and proved himself in battles in Russian-Turkish war under the command of General P.A. Rumyantsev, took part in the assault on the fortress in Bendery, fought in the Crimea (where he received a wound that cost him an eye). For all the time of his service, Kutuzov received vast command experience. And during the second Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791, he fought with Suvorov against the five thousandth Turkish landing detachment. The Turkish detachment was destroyed, and Kutuzov received a second wound in the head. And even then, the military doctor, who gave the operation to the commander, said that fate, preventing Kutuzov from dying after two wounds to the head, was preparing him for something more important.

Kutuzov met the war of 1812, being at a fairly mature age. Knowledge and experience made him a great strategist and tactician. Kutuzov felt equally comfortable both on the "battlefield" and at the negotiating table. At first, Mikhail Kutuzov opposed the participation Russian army together with the Austrian army against Austerlitz, believing that this was largely a dispute between two monarchs.

The then Emperor Alexander I did not listen to Kutuzov, and the Russian army suffered a crushing defeat at Austerlitz, which was the first defeat of our army in a hundred years.

During the war of 1812, the government, dissatisfied with the retreat of Russian troops from the borders inland, appoints Kutuzov Commander-in-Chief instead of Minister of War Barclay de Tolly. Kutuzov knew that the skill of a commander lies in the ability to force the enemy to play by his own rules. Everyone was waiting for a general battle, and it was given on the twenty-sixth of August near the village of Borodino, one hundred and twenty kilometers from Moscow. During the battle, the Russians chose a tactic - to repel the attacks of the enemy, thereby exhausting him and forcing him to suffer losses. And then on the first of August there was a famous council in Fili, where Kutuzov made a difficult decision - to surrender Moscow, although neither the tsar, nor society, nor the army supported him.

4. Dorokhov Ivan Semyonovich

Major General Dorokhov had serious military experience before the start of the War of 1812. Back in 1787, he took part in the Russian-Turkish war, fought in the troops of Suvorov. Then he fought in Poland, took part in the capture of Prague. Dorokhov began the Patriotic War of 1812, being the commander of the vanguard in Barclay's army. In the Battle of Borodino, a bold attack by his soldiers drove the French back from the fortifications of Bagration. And after they entered Moscow, Dorokhov commanded one of the created partisan detachments. His detachment inflicted enormous damage on the enemy army - one and a half thousand prisoners, of which about fifty were officers. Absolutely brilliant was the operation of the Dorokhov detachment to take Vereya, where the most important French deployment point was located. At night, before dawn, the detachment broke into the city and occupied it without firing a shot. After Napoleon's troops left Moscow, a serious battle took place near Maloyaroslavets, where Dorohov was seriously wounded in the leg by a bullet right through, and died in 1815, the lieutenant general of the Russian army was buried in Vereya, according to his last will.

5. Davydov Denis Vasilyevich

In his autobiography, Denis Davydov would later write that he "was born for 1812". The son of a regimental commander, he entered the military at the age of seventeen in cavalry regiment. He took part in the war with Sweden, the battle with the Turks on the Danube, was Bagration's adjutant, served in a detachment at Kutuzov.

He met the war of 1812 as a lieutenant colonel of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. Denis Davydov perfectly understood the state of affairs on the front line and proposed to Bagration a scheme for conducting a guerrilla war. Kutuzov considered and approved the proposal. And on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, Denis Davydov with a detachment was sent behind enemy lines. Davydov's detachment carried out successful partisan operations, and following his example, new detachments were created, which especially distinguished themselves during the French retreat. Near the village of Lyakhovo (now - detachments of partisans, among which was a detachment under the command of Denis Davydov, captured a column of two thousand Frenchmen. For Davydov, the war did not end with the expulsion of the French from Russia. He already fought valiantly in the rank of colonel near Bautzen, Leipzig , and in the rank of major general - in the battle of Larotiere. Denis Davydov received fame and recognition as a poet. In his works, he mainly sings of the hussars, "Lieutenant Rzhevsky" is, by the way, "the work of his hands." Creativity Pushkin appreciated Davydov, and Denis Davydov died in 1839.

State educational institution

Education Center No. 000

Heroes - partisans of the Patriotic War of 1812 D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner, their role in the victory of Russia and the reflection of their names in the names of the streets of Moscow.

Students of 6 "A" class

Degtyareva Anastasia

Grishchenko Valeria

Markosova Karina

Project leaders:

a history teacher

a history teacher

Ph.D. head Scientific and Information Department of the State Institution of Culture “Museum-panorama “Battle of Borodino””

Moscow

Introduction

Chapter 1 Heroes - partisans D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner

Page 6

1.1 Basic concepts used in the work

Page 6

1.2 Hero - partisan D. Davydov

Page 8

1.3 Hero - partisan A. Seslavin

Page 11

1.4 Hero - partisan A. Figner

Page 16

Page 27

Page 27

2.2 Monuments of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow

Wed.30

Conclusion

Page 35

Bibliography

Page 36

Applications

Introduction

Patriotic War 1812 - one of the most bright events in the history of Russia. As the famous publicist and literary critic of the XIX century wrote. : "Every nation has its own history, and in history there are critical moments by which one can judge the strength and greatness of his spirit ...". [Zaichenko [In 1812, Russia showed the whole world the strength and greatness of its spirit and proved that it was impossible to defeat it , even striking in the heart, capturing Moscow. From the first days of the war, the people rose to war with the invaders, all classes of Russian society were united: nobles, peasants, raznochintsy, clergymen.

Having visited the Museum-panorama "Battle of Borodino" we wanted to learn more about the heroes-partisans of the Patriotic War of 1812. From the guide we learned that for the first time the partisan movement arose during the Patriotic War of 1812. Kutuzov connected the partisan struggle with the actions of the regular army, D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner played a big role in this.

Therefore, the choice of the theme of our project is not accidental. We turned to the head of the scientific information department, Ph.D. GUK "Museum-Panorama" Battle of Borodino" with a request to tell us about the heroes of the partisans and provide us with materials on the activities of partisan detachments.

The aim of our study- to show the need to create partisan detachments, the activities of their leaders D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner, to note their personal qualities and fully appreciate their contribution to the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812.

In 2012 we will celebrate the 200th anniversary of the Patriotic War of 1812. It became interesting to us how the descendants paid tribute to the memory and honor, the courage of the heroes who saved Russia in that terrible time.

Hence the theme of our project "Heroes - partisans of the Patriotic War of 1812 D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner, their role in the victory of Russia and the reflection of their names in the names of the streets of Moscow."

Object of study are the activities of partisans in the Patriotic War.

Subject of study are the personalities of D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner and their activities in the Patriotic War of 1812.

We assume that without the action of the partisans, without their courage, heroism and dedication, the defeat of the Napoleonic army, its expulsion from Russia, is not possible.

Having studied the literature, diaries, memoirs, letters and poems on this topic, we developed a research strategy and defined research objectives.

Tasks

1. Analyze literature (essays, poems, stories, memoirs) and find out how partisan detachments acquired mass character and became widespread.

2. To study in what ways and means the partisans acted to achieve their goals and victories in the war of 1812.

3. To study the biography and activities of D. Davydov, A. Seslavin, A. Figner.

4. Name the character traits of the partisan heroes (D. Davydova, A. Seslavin, A. Figner), provide for discussion the appearance of partisans, partisan detachments, show how necessary, difficult and heroic their work was.

5. To study and visit the memorable places in Moscow associated with the war of 1812.

6. Collect material for the school - military museum and speak to the students of the education center.

To solve the tasks we used the following methods: definition of concepts, theoretical - analysis, synthesis, generalization, free interviewing, application of toponymic knowledge in the search for memorable places in Moscow.

The work was carried out in several stages:

First stage, organizational, visit to the Museum - panorama "Battle of Borodino". Research planning. Finding sources of information (interviews, reading printed sources, viewing a map, finding Internet resources) for study. Determination in what form the result of the work can be presented. Distribution of responsibilities among team members.

Second phase stating the selection of the necessary material. Interviewing (Head of the Scientific Information Department, Candidate of Historical Sciences, GUK "Panorama Museum" Battle of Borodino ""). Studying the map of Moscow. Reading and analysis of sources of information.

Third stage, forming, selection of the necessary material, finding memorable places in Moscow associated with the Patriotic War of 1812.

Fourth stage, control, report of each team member on the work done.

Fifth stage, promotional, creating a presentation, collecting material for the school - military museum and speaking to the students of the education center

Chapter 1

1.1 Basic concepts used in the work.

What is Guerrilla Warfare? How is it different from ordinary war? When and where did it appear? What are the goals and significance of the Guerrilla War? What is the difference between the Guerrilla War from the Small War and from the People's War? These questions appeared in our study of the literature. In order to correctly understand and use these terms, we need to give their concepts. Using the encyclopedia "Patriotic War of 1812": Encyclopedia. M., 2004., we learned that:

guerrilla war

In the XVIII-XIX centuries. understood as guerrilla warfare independent action small mobile army detachments on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. The purpose of the Guerrilla War was to disrupt the communication of enemy troops with each other and with the rear, with convoys, destroy stocks (stores) and rear military establishments, transports, reinforcements, as well as attacks on milestone posts, release of their prisoners, interception of couriers. The partisan detachments were entrusted with establishing communication between the divided parts of their army, initiating people's war behind enemy lines, obtaining information about the movement and strength of the enemy army, as well as the constant anxiety of the enemy in order to deprive him of the necessary rest and thereby lead "to exhaustion and frustration." Guerrilla warfare was seen as part of small war, since the actions of the partisans did not lead to the defeat of the enemy, but only contributed to the achievement of this goal.

In the XVIII-XIX centuries. the concept of a small war denoted the actions of troops in small detachments, as opposed to the actions of large units and formations. The Small War included guarding own troops (service at outposts, guards, patrols, pickets, patrols, etc.) and actions by detachments (simple and enhanced reconnaissance, ambushes, attacks). Guerrilla warfare was carried out in the form of short-term raids by relatively strong "flying corps" or in the form of long-term "search" for small partisan parties behind enemy lines.

Partisan actions were first used by the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Western Army, General. By permission, on August 25 (September 6), the party of the lieutenant colonel was sent to the "search".

The partisan war intensified in the autumn of 1812, when the army stood near Tarutino. In September, a "flying corps" was sent to the raid on the Mozhaisk road. In September, a colonel's party was sent to the rear of the enemy. September 23 (October 5) - the party of the captain. September 26 (Oct. 8) - the party of the colonel, September 30 (12 Oct.) - the party of the captain.

Temporary army mobile detachments were created Russian command for short raids ("raids", "expeditions"), they were also called "small corps", "detachments of light troops". The "light corps" consisted of regular (light cavalry, dragoons, rangers, horse artillery) and irregular (Cossacks, Bashkirs, Kalmyks) troops. Average population: 2-3 thousand people. The actions of the "light corps" were one of the forms of guerrilla warfare.

We learned that guerrilla warfare is understood as the independent actions of small mobile army detachments on the flanks, in the rear and on enemy communications. We learned the goals of the Guerrilla War, that the Guerrilla War is part of a small war, that "flying corps" are temporary mobile units.

1.2 Davydov (1784 - 1839)

Nevstruev, 1998
Shmurzdyuk, 1998

1.3 Hero of the partisans - A. Seslavin

Along with Denis Davydov, he is one of the most famous partisans of 1812. His name is inextricably linked with the events immediately preceding the transition of the Russian troops to the offensive, which led to the death of the Napoleonic army.

Only shortly before World War II, Seslavin was promoted to captain. Such a modest advance on the "ladder of ranks" was the result of a two-time break in military service. Having graduated from the Artillery and Engineering Cadet Corps in 1798, the best military educational institution At that time, Seslavin was released as a second lieutenant in the guards artillery, in which he served for 7 years, being promoted to the next rank for this, and at the beginning of 1805 "resigned from service at the request." In the autumn of the same year, after the declaration of war with Napoleonic France, Seslavin returned to service and was assigned to the horse artillery.

For the first time he took part in hostilities in the campaign of 1807 in East Prussia. In the battle of Heilsberg, he was seriously wounded and awarded a golden weapon for his bravery. Soon after the end of the war, he left the service for the second time and spent 3 years in retirement, being treated for the consequences of a wound.

In 1810, Seslavin again returned to the army and fought against the Turks on the Danube. During the assault on Ruschuk, he walked in the head of one of the columns and, having already climbed the earthen rampart, was seriously wounded in his right hand. For differences in battles with the Turks, Seslavin was promoted to staff captain and soon after to captain.

At the beginning of World War II, Seslavin was Barclay de Tolly's adjutant. Possessing a good theoretical background, a broad military outlook and combat experience, he served in the headquarters of Barclay de Tolly as a "quartermaster", that is, an officer general staff. With units of the 1st Army, Seslavin took part in almost all the battles of the first period of the war - near Ostrovnaya, Smolensk, Valutina Gora and others. In the battle near Shevardino he was wounded, but remained in the ranks, participated in the Battle of Borodino and was awarded the St. George Cross of the 4th degree among the most distinguished officers.

Soon after leaving Moscow, Seslavin received a "flying detachment" and began partisan searches, in which he fully showed his brilliant military talents. His detachment, like other partisan detachments, attacked enemy transports, destroyed or captured parties of foragers and marauders. But Seslavin considered his main task to be the tireless monitoring of the movement of large formations of the enemy army, believing that this reconnaissance activity could most of all contribute to the success of the operations of the main forces of the Russian army. It was these actions that glorified his name.

Having decided in Tarutino to unleash a "small war" and surround the Napoleonic army with a ring of army partisan detachments, Kutuzov clearly organized their actions, assigning a certain area to each detachment. So, Denis Davydov was ordered to act between Mozhaisk and Vyazma, Dorokhov - in the Vereya - Gzhatsk region, Efremov - on the Ryazan road, Kudashev - on Tulskaya, Seslavin and Fonvizin (the future Decembrist) - between the Smolensk and Kaluga roads.

On October 7, the day after the battle of Murat's corps near Tarutin, Napoleon gave the order to leave Moscow, intending to go to Smolensk through Kaluga and Yelnya. However, in an effort to maintain the morale of his army and at the same time mislead Kutuzov, Napoleon set out from Moscow along the old Kaluga road in the direction of Tarutino, thus giving his movement an “offensive character”. Halfway to Tarutin, he unexpectedly ordered his army to turn right at Krasnaya Pakhra, went by country roads to the New Kaluga road and moved along it south, to Maloyaroslavets, trying to bypass the main forces of the Russian army. Ney's corps at first continued to move along the Old Kaluga road to Tarutino and united with Murat's troops. According to Napoleon's calculation, this was to disorient Kutuzov and give him the impression that the entire Napoleonic army was marching towards Tarutino with the intention of imposing a general battle on the Russian army.

On October 10, Seslavin discovered the main forces of the French army near the village of Fominskoye and, having notified the command about this, gave the Russian troops the opportunity to preempt the enemy at Maloyaroslavets and block his path to Kaluga. Seslavin himself described this most important episode of his military activity as follows: “I was standing on a tree when I opened the movement of the French army, which stretched at my feet, where Napoleon himself was in a carriage. Several people (French) separated from the edge of the forest and the road, were captured and delivered to the Most Serene, as evidence of such an important discovery for Russia, deciding the fate of the Fatherland, Europe and Napoleon himself ... I found General Dokhturov in Aristov by chance, not at all knowing about his stay there; I rushed to Kutuzov in Tarutino. Having handed over the prisoners for presentation to the most illustrious, I went back to the detachment in order to observe Napoleon's movement more closely.

On the night of October 11, the messenger informed Kutuzov about the "discovery" of Seslavin. Everyone remembers from War and Peace the meeting between Kutuzov and the messenger sent by Dokhturov (in the Bolkhovitinov novel), described by Tolstoy on the basis of Bolgovsky's memoirs.

For the next month and a half, Seslavin acted with his detachment with exceptional courage and energy, fully justifying the characterization given to him by one of the participants in the Patriotic War as an officer of "tried courage and zeal, extraordinary enterprise." So, on October 22, near Vyazma, Seslavin, having galloped between the enemy columns, discovered the beginning of their retreat and let the Russian detachments know about it, and he himself broke into the city with the Pernovsky regiment. On October 28, near Lyakhov, together with Denis Davydov and Orlov-Denisov, he captured the brigade of General Augereau, for which he was promoted to colonel; together with another famous partisan, Figner, he recaptured from the French transport with valuables stolen in Moscow. On November 16, Seslavin broke into Borisov with his detachment, captured 3,000 prisoners, and established communication between the troops of Wittgenstein and Chichagov. Finally, on November 27, he was the first to attack the French troops in Vilna and was seriously wounded in the process.

In December 1812, Seslavin was appointed commander of the Sumy Hussar Regiment. In the autumn of 1813 and in 1814 he commanded the forward detachments of the Allied army, participated in the battles near Leipzig and Ferchampenoise; Promoted to major general for military distinction.

Seslavin, according to him, took part "in 74 combat battles" and was wounded 9 times. Intense combat service and severe injuries affected his health and mental balance. At the end of hostilities, he received a long leave for treatment abroad, visited France, Italy, Switzerland, where he walked along the path of Suvorov - through St. Gotthard and the Chortov bridge, was treated on the waters, but his health did not improve. In 1820, he left the service and retired to his small Tver estate Yesemovo, where he lived alone, without meeting with any of the neighboring landowners, for more than 30 years.

Seslavin was distinguished by exceptional courage and energy, courage fully justifying the characterization given to him by one of the participants in the Patriotic War as an officer of "tried courage and zeal, extraordinary enterprise" .. () Alexander Nikitich was a deeply educated person, was interested in various sciences. After retiring, he wrote memoirs of which only fragments have survived. This man was undeservedly forgotten by his contemporaries, but deserves to be remembered and studied by posterity.

Nevstruev, 1998
Shmurzdyuk, 1998

1.4 Hero of the partisans - A. Figner

The famous partisan of the Patriotic War, a descendant of an ancient German family who left for Russia under Peter I, b. in 1787, died on October 1, 1813. Figner's grandfather, Baron Figner von Rutmersbach, lived in Livonia, and his father, Samuil Samuilovich, having started his service with an ordinary rank, reached the rank of headquarters officer, was appointed director of a state-owned crystal factory near St. Petersburg and soon after, renamed state councilors, appointed in 1809 as vice-governor in the Pskov province (died July 8, 1811). Alexander Figner, having successfully completed the course in the 2nd cadet corps, April 13, 1805 was released as a lieutenant in the 6th artillery regiment and in the same year sent to the Anglo-Russian expedition to the Mediterranean. Here he found an opportunity to be in Italy and lived for several months in Milan, diligently studying the Italian language, with a thorough knowledge of which he subsequently managed to render so many services to the fatherland. Upon his return to Russia, on January 17, 1807, Figner was promoted to lieutenant, and on March 16 he was transferred to the 13th artillery brigade. With the beginning of the Turkish campaign of 1810, he entered the Moldavian army, participated with a detachment of General Zass in the case on May 19 during the capture of the Turtukaya fortress and from June 14 to September 15 - in the blockade and capitulation of the Ruschuk fortress by the troops of gr. Kamensky. In a number of cases near Ruschuk, Figner managed to show excellent courage and bravery. Commanding, during the imposition of the fortress, in the nearest flying sap 8 guns, he, during the repulsion of one of the enemy's sorties, was seriously wounded in the chest, but did not leave the line, but soon volunteered for a new feat. When gr. Kamensky decided to storm Ruschuk, Figner volunteered to measure the depth of the moat and did it with a boldness that amazed the Turks themselves. The assault on July 22 failed, but Figner, who brilliantly participated in it, was awarded the order St. George, removed by the commander-in-chief from the artillery general Sievers, who was killed on the glacis of the fortress, and on December 8, 1810, he was honored to receive a personalized Most Gracious Rescript. In 1811, Figner returned to his homeland to meet with his father and here he married the daughter of a Pskov landowner, retired state councilor Bibikov, Olga Mikhailovna Bibikova. On December 29, 1811, he was promoted to staff captain, with a transfer to the 11th artillery brigade, and soon received a light company in command of the same brigade. The Patriotic War again called Figner to the military field. His first feat in this war was the courageous defense by fire of the guns of the left flank of the Russian troops in the case at the river. Stragani; here, having stopped the shooters overturned by the French, he, at the head of them, recaptured one of the guns of his company from the enemy, for which the commander-in-chief personally congratulated Figner with the rank of captain. With the retreat of the Russian troops through Moscow to Tarutino, Figner's combat activity changed: he handed over the command of the company to the senior officer in it, having acted shortly before in the field of partisan operations. By secret order of Kutuzov, disguised as a peasant, Figner, accompanied by several Cossacks, went to Moscow, already occupied by the French. Figner failed to fulfill his secret intention - to somehow get to Napoleon and kill him, but nevertheless his stay in Moscow was a true horror for the French. Having formed an armed party from the inhabitants who remained in the city, he made ambushes with it, exterminated lone enemies, and after his nightly attacks, many corpses of the killed French were found every morning. His actions inspired panic fear in the enemy. The French tried in vain to find a brave and secretive avenger: Figner was elusive. Knowing fluently French, German, Italian and Polish, he wandered in all sorts of costumes during the day between the heterogeneous soldiers of the Napoleonic army and listened to their conversations, and at nightfall he ordered his daring men to kill the hated enemy. At the same time, Figner found out everything necessary about the intentions of the French, and with the collected important information, on September 20, having safely got out of Moscow, he arrived at the main apartment of the Russian army, in Tarutino. The courageous enterprise and sharpness of Figner attracted the attention of the commander-in-chief, and he was instructed, along with other partisans, Davydov and Seslavin, to develop partisan actions on enemy messages. Having gathered two hundred daring hunters and backwards, putting the footmen on peasant horses, Figner led this combined detachment to the Mozhaisk road and began to carry out his disastrous raids in the rear of the enemy army. During the day, he hid the detachment somewhere in the nearest forest, and himself, disguised as a Frenchman, Italian or Pole, sometimes accompanied by a trumpeter, drove around the enemy outposts, looked out for their location and, after dark, flew into the French with his partisans and every day sent to the main apartment of hundreds of prisoners. Taking advantage of the enemy's oversight, Figner beat him wherever possible; in particular, his actions intensified when armed peasants near Moscow joined the detachment. At 10 versts from Moscow, he overtook an enemy transport, took away and riveted six 12-pound. guns, blew up several charging trucks, put up to 400 people on the spot. and about 200 people, together with the Hanoverian colonel Tink, took prisoner. Napoleon appointed a prize for the head of Figner, but the latter did not stop his courageous activities; wanting to bring his heterogeneous detachment into a larger organization, he began to introduce order and discipline into it, which, however, did not please his hunters, and they fled. Then Kutuzov gave Figner 600 people at his disposal. regular cavalry and Cossacks, with officers of his choice. With this well-organized detachment, Figner became even more terrible for the French, here his outstanding abilities as a partisan developed even more, and his enterprise, reaching insane audacity, manifested itself in full splendor. Deceiving the enemy's vigilance with skillful maneuvers and secrecy of transitions and having good guides, he unexpectedly flew into the enemy, smashed foragers, burned wagons, intercepted couriers and disturbed the French day and night, appearing at various points and everywhere carrying death and captivity. Napoleon was forced to send infantry and Ornano's cavalry division to the Mozhaisk road against Figner and other partisans, but all searches for the enemy were in vain. Several times the French overtook the Figner detachment, surrounded it with superior forces, it seemed that the death of the brave partisan was inevitable, but he always managed to deceive the enemy with cunning maneuvers. Figner's courage reached the point that once, near Moscow itself, he attacked Napoleon's guards cuirassiers, wounded their colonel and captured them, along with 50 soldiers. Before the Battle of Tarutino, he passed "through all the French outposts", made sure that the French avant-garde was isolated, reported that to the commander-in-chief and thereby had considerable benefit in the complete defeat of Murat's troops that followed the next day. With the beginning of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, a people's war broke out; Taking advantage of this favorable circumstance for the partisan, Figner acted tirelessly. Together with Seslavin, he recaptured a whole transport with jewels looted by the French in Moscow; soon after, meeting with an enemy detachment at the village. Stone, broke it, put in place up to 350 people. and took about the same number lower ranks with 5 officers captured, and, finally, on November 27, in the case of s. Lyakhov, uniting with the partisan detachments of Count Orlov-Denisov, Seslavin and Denis Davydov, contributed to the defeat of the French General Augereau, who laid down his weapons by the end of the battle. Admired by the exploits of Figner, Emperor Alexander promoted him to lieutenant colonel, with a transfer to the guards artillery, and awarded him 7,000 rubles. and, at the same time, at the request of the commander-in-chief and the English agent at the main apartment, R. Wilson, who was a witness to many of Figner's exploits, freed his father-in-law, the former Pskov vice-governor Bibikov, from trial and punishment. Upon his return from St. Petersburg, Figner overtook our army already in northern Germany, under besieged Danzig. Here he volunteered to fulfill the courageous commission of Mr. Wittgenstein - to get into the fortress, collect all the necessary information about the strength and location of the fortress werks, about the size of the garrison, the number of military and food supplies, and also secretly incite the inhabitants of Danzig to revolt against the French. Only with an extraordinary presence of mind and an excellent knowledge of foreign languages ​​could Figner dare to carry out such a dangerous assignment. Under the guise of an unfortunate Italian, robbed by the Cossacks, he entered the city; here, however, they did not immediately believe his stories and put him in prison. For two months Figner languished in it, tormented by incessant interrogations; he was required to prove his true origin from Italy, every minute he could be recognized as a spy and shot. The stern commandant of Danzig himself, General Rapp, interrogated him, but his extraordinary ingenuity and resourcefulness saved this time the brave daredevil. Remembering his long stay in Milan, he introduced himself as the son of a well-known Italian family, told, at a confrontation with a native of Milan, who happened to be in Danzig, all the smallest details about how old his father and mother were, what condition, on what street they were standing. house and even what color the roof and shutters were, and not only managed to justify himself, but, hiding behind ardent devotion to the emperor of the French, even crept into the confidence of Rapp so much that he sent him with important dispatches to Napoleon. Of course, Figner, having got out of Danzig, delivered the dispatches, together with the information he had obtained, to our main apartment. For the accomplished feat, he was promoted to colonel and temporarily left at the main apartment. Following, however, his vocation, he again devoted himself to the activities of the partisan. At his suggestion, a detachment was formed from various deserters of the Napoleonic army, mostly Spaniards, who were forcibly recruited into it, as well as from German volunteers, and was called the "legion of revenge"; in order to ensure the reliability of partisan actions, a combined team from various hussar and Cossack regiments was attached to the detachment, which formed the core of the detachment. With this detachment, Figner again opened his disastrous raids on the enemy in the new theater of war. On August 22, 1813, he defeated an enemy detachment that he met at Cape Niske, three days later appeared already in the vicinity of Bautzen, on August 26 at Koenigsbrück he passed 800 steps past a puzzled enemy who had not even fired a single shot, and on August 29 attacked the French General Mortier at Speirsweiler and took several hundred people prisoner. Continuing further movement ahead of the Silesian army, illuminating the area, the Figner partisan detachment met on September 26 at Eulenburg with the corps of General Sacken, but on the same day, separated from it, took the direction of the Elbe. Twice the detachment then encountered enemy detachments, so few in number that their extermination could be certain, but Figner evaded attacks and did not even allow the Cossacks to chase the lagging behind. The brave partisan was obviously saving men and horses for some more important undertaking. Seeing from the movements of the belligerents that the fate of Germany would be decided between the Elbe and Sala, Figner assumed that in early October, Napoleon, in view of the decisive battle, would remove his troops from the left bank of the Elbe, and therefore, in anticipation of this movement, he wanted, holding out for several days near Dessau, then invade Westphalia, which remained loyal to the Prussian government, and raise its population against the French. But his assumptions were not justified. Napoleon, due to changed circumstances, took the intention to cross to the right bank of the Elbe, and, according to the orders given to them, Marshals Renier and Ney moved to Wittenberg and Dessau to master the crossings. On September 30, one of the patrols informed Figner about several squadrons of enemy cavalry that had appeared on the road from Leipzig to Dessau, but he, confident that the French troops had already begun a retreat towards Sala, explained the appearance of the squadrons by foragers sent from the enemy. Soon a party of Prussian black hussars ran into the detachment, explaining that the enemy squadrons belonged to a strong vanguard, followed by the entire army of Napoleon. Realizing the danger, Figner immediately turned the detachment into the gap between the main roads that went to Wörlitz and Dessau, and approached the Elbe with a forced march towards evening. Here news was received from the head of the Prussian troops stationed at Dessau that, in view of the unexpected advance of the French army towards this city, the Tauenzin corps would retreat to the right bank of the river, leaving not a single detachment on the left. But the people and horses of the Figner detachment were tired of the reinforced transition in the vicinity of Dessau, devastated by the French and allies; in addition, Figner was sure that the French movement was only a demonstration to divert the attention of Bernadotte and Blucher, and that Tauentzin, convinced of this, would cancel the proposed retreat to the right bank of the Elbe. Figner decided to stay on the left bank. On the next day, he planned to hide his detachment in the dense bushes of a small island near Wörlitz and then, letting the French pass, rush, depending on the circumstances, either to Westphalia or to the Leipzig road to search for enemy carts and parks. Based on all these considerations, Figner deployed his detachment seven versts above Dessau; the left flank of the detachment adjoined the coastal road to this city, the right flank to the forest, which stretched for a verst along the river, in front, about seventy sazhens, lay a small village; in it, as in the forest, were the Spaniards, and two platoons of the Mariupol and Belorussian hussars stood between the village and the forest, Don Cossacks- on the left flank. The patrols sent in all directions reported that the enemy was nowhere to be seen at a distance of 5 versts, and the reassured Figner allowed the detachment to make fire and indulge in rest. Ho, this was the last rest for almost the entire detachment. Before dawn on October 1, the partisans roused themselves with a drawn-out command: "to the horses!" Rifle shots and the cries of the fighting were heard in the village. It turned out that two or three platoons of the enemy cavalry, taking advantage of the night and the carelessness of the Spaniards, broke their picket and rushed through the streets, but, met by the hussars, turned back and, pursued by shots, scattered across the field. Several captured Polish lancers showed that they belonged to the vanguard of Ney's corps advancing along the Dessau road. Meanwhile, dawn began, and no more than a hundred fathoms from the village, the formation of the enemy cavalry was discovered. The situation became critical, moreover, with the rising of the sun, the presence of the enemy was detected not on one, but on all sides. Obviously, a detachment of brave men was bypassed and pressed against the Elbe. Figner gathered the officers of the detachment. “Gentlemen,” he said, “we are surrounded; we need to break through; if the enemy breaks our ranks, then don’t think about me anymore, save yourself in all directions; I told you about this many times. on the Torgau road, about ten versts from here ... "The detachment entered the gap between the village, occupied by a platoon of Spaniards, and the forest and prepared for a friendly attack. Commanding words of enemy officers were heard in the fog. "Akhtyrians, Alexandrians, peaks at the ready, march - march!" Figner commanded, and the detachment cut into the enemy, making his way with bayonets and pikes. Inspired by the example of their leader, a handful of brave men performed miracles of courage, but, crushed by disproportionately superior forces, were pushed back to the very bank of the Elbe. The partisans fought to the death: their ranks were broken through, the flanks were covered, most of the officers and lower ranks were killed. Finally, the detachment could not stand it and rushed into the river, seeking salvation by swimming. Weakened and wounded people and horses were carried by the current and died in the waves or from enemy bullets raining down on them from the shore. Figner was among the dead; on the shore they found only his saber, taken by him in 1812 from a French general. Thus ended the days of the famous partisan. His name became the best asset in the history of the exploits of the Russian troops, to increase the glory of which, it seemed, he devoted all his strength.

Disregarding life, he volunteered to carry out the most dangerous assignments, led the most risky enterprises, selflessly loving his homeland, he seemed to be looking for an opportunity for cruel revenge on Napoleon and his hordes. The entire Russian army knew about his exploits and highly appreciated them. Back in 1812, Kutuzov, sending a letter to his wife with Figner, punished her: “Look at him closely: this is an extraordinary person; I have never seen such a high soul; he is a fanatic in courage and patriotism, and God knows what he won't do it." , Comrade Figner. by the nature of his activity, he decided to cast a shadow on the glorious partisan, explaining, in his letter to, all the heroism of Figner only with a thirst to satisfy his boundless feelings of ambition and pride. Figner is depicted in different colors according to the testimony of his other comrades and contemporaries, who valued in the famous partisan his true heroism, bright mind, captivating eloquence and outstanding willpower.

Despite different opinions about Figner's personal qualities, this man was brave, courageous, daring, fearless. He knew several foreign languages. The French assigned a large sum for the capture, they called him a “terrible robber”, who is elusive like the devil .. This man deserves the attention and memory of his descendants.

Conclusion

During the preparation of the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militias and partisans fettered the actions of the Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on the enemy's manpower, and destroyed military property. The troops of the Tarutinsky camp firmly covered the paths to the southern regions not devastated by the war. During the stay of the French in Moscow, their army, not conducting open hostilities, at the same time suffered significant losses every day. It became more and more difficult for Napoleon from Moscow to communicate with the rear troops, to send urgent dispatches to France and other Western European countries. The Smolensk road, which remained the only protected postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subjected to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the Headquarters of the Russian army.

The actions of the partisans forced Napoleon to send large forces to guard the roads. So, to ensure the safety of the Smolensk road, Napoleon advanced to Mozhaisk part of the corps of Marshal Victor. Marshals Junot and Murat were ordered to strengthen the protection of the Borovsk and Podolsk roads.

The heroic struggle of the army, partisans, the people's militia, led by Kutuzov and his headquarters, the feat of the people in the rear created favorable conditions for the Russian army to go on the counteroffensive. The war entered a new phase.

Analyzing the actions of military partisans and summing up their activities during the army’s stay in the Tarutino camp, Kutuzov wrote: “During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutino, my partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food.” Thus was laid the foundation for the impending victory. The names of Davydov, Seslavin, Figner and other brave commanders became known throughout Russia.

Denis Davydov, one of the first theorists of the partisan war in 1812, reasonably believed that during the retreat of the Napoleonic army, the partisans participated, together with the main parts of the Russian army, in all the most important military operations, inflicting enormous damage on the enemy. He emphasized that “partisan warfare also has an impact on the main operations of the enemy army” and that partisan detachments “help the pursuing army to push back the retreating army and use local benefits for its final destruction” 55. More than a third of the prisoners, a huge number of rifles, even cannons, various wagons were taken by the partisans. During the retreat of the Napoleonic army, the number of prisoners increased so rapidly that the command of the advancing Russian troops did not have time to allocate detachments for their escort and left a significant part of the prisoners in the villages under the protection of armed villagers.

Kutuzov had every reason to inform the tsar that "my partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food."

Chapter 2 Gratitude of the descendants to the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow

2.1 Patriotic War of 1812 in the names of Moscow streets Many architectural ensembles and monuments of Moscow today remind of the feat of the people in 1812. Poklonnaya mountain Triumphal Arch rises on Kutuzovsky Prospekt. Not far from the Arc de Triomphe are the Battle of Borodino Panorama Museum, a monument to the heroes of this battle, and the famous Kutuzovskaya Hut. The monument was erected on Victory Square.

From here the road to the center of Moscow leads through the monument to the heroes of Borodino - the Borodino bridge. And there, not far from Kropotkinskaya Street, where the house of the partisan of 1812 is located, and to the Khamovniki barracks (on Komsomolsky Prospekt), where the Moscow militia was formed in 1812. Not far from here is the Manege located next to the Kremlin - also a monument to the heroes of the Patriotic War of 1812, built for the 5th anniversary of victory in this war.

Every place, every house or other monument associated with the Patriotic War of 1812,

gives rise to a sense of pride: for the heroic past of our people

Street names are also reminiscent of the war of 1812. So, in Moscow, a number of streets are named after the heroes of 1812: Kutuzovsky Prospekt, Bagrationovsky, Platovsky, Barclay Drives, streets of General Yermolov, D. Davydov, Seslavin, Vasilisa Kozhina, Gerasim Kurin, st. Bolshaya Filevskaya, st. Tuchkovskaya and many others.

Metro stations Bagrationovskaya, Kutuzovskaya, Fili, Filevsky Park are also reminiscent of the war.

https://pandia.ru/text/77/500/images/image002_13.jpg" align="left" width="329" height="221 src=">

Fig.1 Seslavinskaya street

Seslavinskaya street (July 17, 1963) Named in honor of A. N. Seslavin () - lieutenant general of the hero of the Patriotic War of 1812

· Denis Davydov Street (May 9, 1961) Named after DV Davydov () - a poet one of the organizers of the partisan movement in 1812

https://pandia.ru/text/77/500/images/image005_7.jpg" align="left" width="294" height="221 src=">

One thousand eight hundred and twelfth year (1812) street (May 12, 1959) Named in honor of the feat committed by the peoples of Russia in 1812 to protect their Fatherland

· Kutuzovsky Prospekt (December 13, 1957). Named after -Kutuzov ()

Field Marshal General, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army during https://pandia.ru/text/77/500/images/image007_5.jpg" width="296" height="222">

Rice. 3 on

2.2 Monuments of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow

· The 1812 memorial at Poklonnaya Gora includes several objects.

Triumphal Arch

Kutuzov hut

Church of the Archangel Michael near the Kutuzov hut

Panorama Museum "Battle of Borodino"

Kutuzov and glorious sons Russian people

Fig. 4 Arc de Triomphe

https://pandia.ru/text/77/500/images/image011_4.jpg" align="left" width="235" height="312 src=">

Fig. 5 Kutuzov and the glorious sons of the Russian people

Fig.6 Kutuzovskaya hut

Rice. 7 Church of the Archangel Michael near the Kutuzov hut

Monuments of the Patriotic War of 1812 in Moscow

Cathedral of Christ the Savior

Kremlin arsenal

Moscow Manege

Alexander Garden

Georgievsky Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace

Borodinsky bridge

Fig. 8 Cathedral of Christ the Savior

Fig. 9 Kremlin arsenal

Rice. 10 Moscow Manege

Fig. 11 Alexander Garden

Fig. 12 Georgievsky Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace

Fig.13 Borodinsky bridge

Conclusion

In the process of working on the project, we studied a lot of material about partisans and their activities during the Patriotic War of 1812.

Even from literature lessons, we know the name of Denis Davydov, but he was known as a poet. Having visited the Museum-panorama "Battle of Borodino", we recognized Denis Davydov from the other side - a brave, brave partisan, a competent commander. Reading his biography in more detail, we became aware of the names of Alexander Seslavin,

Alexander Figner, who were also leaders of partisan detachments.

The guerrillas made daring raids on the enemy, obtained important information about the activities of the enemy. highly appreciated the activities of military partisans for their courage, unbridled courage,

Denis Davydov after the Patriotic War of 1812 summarized and systematized

military results of the actions of military partisans in two works of 1821: "Experience in the theory of partisan actions" and "Diary of partisan

actions of 1812”, where he rightly emphasized the significant effect of the new

for the 19th century forms of war to defeat the enemy. [12 c.181]

The collected material replenished the information fund of the school museum.

1. 1812 in Russian poetry and memoirs of contemporaries. M., 1987.

2. . Moscow: Moscow worker, 1971.

3. Heroes of 1812: Collection. M .: Young Guard, 1987.

4. , . Military Gallery of the Winter Palace. L .: Publishing house "Aurora", 1974.

5. Davydov Denis. Military notes. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1940.

6. Moscow. Big illustrated encyclopedia. Moscow studies from A to. Eksmo, 2007

7. Moscow magazine. History of Russian Goverment. 2001. No. 1. p.64

8. Moscow is modern. Atlas. M. Print, 2005.

9. "Thunderstorm of the twelfth year ..." M. "Science" 1987 p.192

10. Patriotic War of 1812: Encyclopedia. M., 2004.

11. Popov Davydov. Moscow: Education, 1971.

12. Sirotkin war of 1812: Prince. For students Art. environment classes. school-M.: Enlightenment, 198s.: ill.

13. Khataevich. Moscow: Moscow worker, 1973.

14. Figner Posluzhn. list, store in the archives of St. Petersburg. artillery. museum. - I. R .: "Travel notes of an artilleryman from 1812 to 1816", Moscow, 1835 - "Northern Post", 1813, No. 49. - "Rus. Inv.", 1838, No. No. 91-99. - "Military Collection", 1870, No. 8. - "To All. Illustr.", 1848, No. 35. - "Russian Star", 1887, v. 55, p. 321- 338. - "Military encyclical lexicon", St. Petersburg, 1857. D.S. [Polovtsov]

The partisan movement is the "club of the people's war"

“... the cudgel of the people’s war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone’s tastes and rules, with stupid simplicity, but with expediency, without understanding anything, rose, fell and nailed the French until the entire invasion died”
. L.N. Tolstoy, "War and Peace"

The Patriotic War of 1812 remained in the memory of all Russian people as a people's war.

Don't shut up! Let me come! Hood. V.V.Vereshchagin, 1887-1895

This definition is not accidentally firmly entrenched in her. Not only regular army participated in it - for the first time in the history of the Russian state, the entire Russian people stood up to defend their homeland. Various volunteer detachments were formed, which took part in many major battles. Commander-in-Chief M.I. Kutuzov called on the Russian militias to help the army in the field. The partisan movement, which unfolded throughout Russia, where the French were located, received great development.

Passive resistance
The population of Russia began to resist the invasion of the French from the very first days of the war. The so-called. passive resistance. The Russian people left their houses, villages, entire cities. At the same time, people often devastated all warehouses, all food supplies, destroyed their farms - they were firmly convinced that nothing should have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

A.P. Butenev recalled how Russian peasants fought the French: “The farther the army went inland, the more deserted the villages they encountered, and especially after Smolensk. The peasants sent their women and children, belongings and cattle to the neighboring forests; themselves, with the exception of only decrepit old men, armed themselves with scythes and axes, and then began to burn their huts, set up ambushes and attacked the backward and wandering enemy soldiers. In the small towns through which we passed, almost no one was met on the streets: only local authorities remained, who for the most part left with us, having previously set fire to stocks and shops, where this was possible and time allowed ... "

"Punish the villains without mercy"
Gradually peasant resistance took on other forms. Some organized groups of several people, caught soldiers great army and killed them. Naturally, they could not act against a large number French at the same time. But this was quite enough to instill fear in the ranks of the enemy army. As a result, the soldiers tried not to walk alone, so as not to fall into the hands of "Russian partisans".


With weapons in hand - shoot! Hood. V.V.Vereshchagin, 1887-1895

In some provinces left by the Russian army, the first organized partisan detachments were formed. One of these detachments operated in the Sychevsk province. It was headed by Major Yemelyanov, who was the first to incite the people to adopt weapons: “Many began to pester him, from day to day the number of accomplices multiplied, and then, armed with what was possible, they chose the brave Emelyanov to be their boss, swearing an oath not to spare their lives for the faith, the tsar and the Russian land and to obey him in everything ... Then Emelyanov introduced there is an amazing order and structure between the warriors-settlers. According to one sign, when the enemy was advancing in superior strength, the villages became empty, according to another, they again gathered in houses. Sometimes an excellent beacon and a bell ringing were announced when going to battle on horseback or on foot. Himself, as a chief, encouraging by his own example, was always with them in all dangers and pursued evil enemies everywhere, beat many, and captured more, and, finally, in one hot skirmish, in the very brilliance of military actions of the peasants, he imprinted his love with life. to the fatherland…”

There were many such examples, and they could not escape the attention of the leaders of the Russian army. M.B. Barclay de Tolly in August 1812 appealed to the inhabitants of the Pskov, Smolensk and Kaluga provinces: “... but many of the inhabitants of the province of Smolensk have already awakened from their fear. They, armed in their homes, with courage worthy of the name of the Russian, punish the villains without any mercy. Imitate them all who love themselves, the fatherland and the sovereign. Your army will not go beyond your borders until it has driven out or destroyed the forces of the enemy. It decided to fight them to the very extreme, and you will only have to reinforce it with the defense of your own houses from raids more daring than terrible.

The wide scope of the "small war"
Leaving Moscow, Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov intended to wage a "small war" in order to create a constant threat to the enemy to encircle him in Moscow. This task was to be solved by detachments of military partisans and people's militias.

Being in the Tarutino position, Kutuzov took control of the activities of the partisans: “... I put ten partisans on the wrong foot in order to be able to take away all the ways from the enemy, who thinks in Moscow to find all kinds of allowances in abundance. During the six-week rest of the Main Army at Tarutino, the partisans instilled fear and horror in the enemy, taking away all means of food ... ".


Davydov Denis Vasilievich Engraving by A. Afanasyev
from the original by V. Langer. 1820s.

Such actions required courageous and resolute commanders and troops capable of operating in any conditions. The first detachment that was created by Kutuzov to wage a small war was the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel D.V. Davydov, formed at the end of August, consisting of 130 people. With this detachment, Davydov set out through Yegoryevskoye, Medyn to the village of Skugarevo, which was turned into one of the bases of the partisan struggle. He acted in conjunction with various armed peasant detachments.

Denis Davydov did not just fulfill his military duty. He tried to understand the Russian peasant, because he represented his interests and acted on his behalf: “Then I learned by experience that in people's war should not only speak the language of the mob, but adapt to it, to its customs and its clothes. I put on a man's caftan, began to lower my beard, instead of the Order of St. Anne I hung the image of St. Anna. Nicholas and spoke in a completely folk language ... ".

Another partisan detachment was concentrated near the Mozhaisk road, led by Major General I.S. Dorokhov. Kutuzov wrote to Dorokhov about the methods of partisan struggle. And when information was received at the army headquarters that Dorokhov's detachment was surrounded, Kutuzov reported: “A partisan can never come to this position, for it is his duty to stay in one place for as long as he needs to feed people and horses. Marches should be made by a flying detachment of partisans secretive, along small roads ... During the day, hide in forests and lowlands. In a word, the partisan must be resolute, quick and indefatigable.


Figner Alexander Samoilovich. Engraving by G.I. Grachev from a lithograph from the collection of P.A. Erofeeva, 1889.

At the end of August 1812, a detachment was also formed Winzengerode, consisting of 3200 people. Initially, his tasks included monitoring the corps of Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais.

Having withdrawn the army to the Tarutinsky position, Kutuzov formed several more partisan detachments: the detachments of A.S. Figner, I.M. Vadbolsky, N.D. Kudashev and A.N. Seslavin.

In total, in September, 36 Cossack regiments and one team, 7 cavalry regiments, 5 squadrons and one team of light horse artillery, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and 22 regimental guns operated as part of the flying detachments. Kutuzov managed to give the guerrilla war a wide scope. He entrusted them with the tasks of monitoring the enemy and delivering continuous strikes against his troops.


Caricature of 1912.

It was thanks to the actions of the partisans that Kutuzov had complete information about the movements of the French troops, on the basis of which it was possible to draw conclusions about Napoleon's intentions.

Due to the continuous strikes of flying partisan detachments, the French had to always keep part of the troops at the ready. According to the journal of military operations, from September 14 to October 13, 1812, the enemy lost only about 2.5 thousand people killed, about 6.5 thousand Frenchmen were taken prisoner.

Peasant partisan detachments
The activities of the military partisan detachments would not have been so successful without the participation of the peasant partisan detachments, which had been operating everywhere since July 1812.

The names of their "leaders" will long remain in the memory of the Russian people: G. Kurin, Samus, Chetvertakov and many others.


Kurin Gerasim Matveevich
Hood. A.Smirnov


Portrait of partisan Egor Stulov. Hood. Terebenev I.I., 1813

The Samus detachment operated near Moscow. He managed to exterminate more than three thousand Frenchmen: “Samus introduced an amazing order in all the villages subordinate to him. He performed everything according to the signs that were given by means of bell ringing and other conditional signs.

The exploits of Vasilisa Kozhina, who led a detachment in the Sychevsky district and fought against French marauders, gained great fame.


Vasilisa Kozhina. Hood. A. Smirnov, 1813

M.I. wrote about the patriotism of Russian peasants. Kutuzov report to Alexander I dated October 24, 1812 on the patriotism of Russian peasants: “With martyr firmness they endured all the blows associated with the invasion of the enemy, hid their families and young children in the forests, and the armed themselves sought defeat in the peaceful dwellings of their appearing predators. Often the women themselves caught these villains in a cunning way and punished their attempts with death, and often the armed villagers, joining our partisans, greatly assisted them in exterminating the enemy, and it can be said without exaggeration that many thousands of the enemy were exterminated by the peasants. These feats are so numerous and admirable to the spirit of the Russian…”.