The Baltic Fleet in the First World War. Navies of the leading powers at the beginning of the First World War

On August 1, 1914, the First World War began, unleashed by imperialist Germany, which declared war first on Russia, and then on France and Belgium. Simultaneously with the actions of the army on the land fronts, the German fleet began operations on the seas. Significant naval forces of the Germans were sent against the Russian Baltic Fleet, and Germans and Turek were sent against the Black Sea Fleet.

The results of the Russo-Japanese War left their mark on the Russian Navy. Through the efforts of the advanced part of the Russian naval officers and, above all, the followers of the school of Admiral Makarov, the fleet, starting in 1907, began to relatively quickly restore and strengthen its combat power. More advanced warships were built, the system of training and education of personnel was updated and improved. The system of organizing fleet management has become more perfect. Greater attention began to be paid in the fleet to the study of potential opponents and the development of war plans; the equipment of future theaters of military operations was deployed. As a result of all this, the Russian fleet turned out to be relatively well prepared for the First World War.

However, due to the technical and economic backwardness of the country and the lack of financial resources, the construction of battleships of the dreadnought type began in the Baltic in 1909, and on the Black Sea in 1941, and these ships entered service only in the second year of the war. The construction of coastal fortifications was also not completed by the beginning of the war. Germany, by the beginning of the war in the Baltic Sea, slandered with a significant superiority in forces.

Russian sailors had to fight against an insidious and strong enemy. But excellent knowledge, skillful use of military equipment and loyalty to military duty ensured their success in the fight against the German fleet.

On the day war was declared, the commander of the Baltic Fleet, a student and follower of the Makarov school, Admiral Essin, appealed to the personnel:

“Let each of you strain all your strength, spiritual and bodily. he will apply his knowledge, experience and skill on the day of the battle so that our shells would bring death and destruction to the enemy's pages:! and ships."

Starting the war, the German fleet set itself the goal of breaking into the Gulf of Finland, destroying Russia's naval forces in the Baltic, and attacking Petrograd from the sea. In the very first month of the war, the German cruisers Magdeburg and Augsburg, accompanied by destroyers and submarines, tried to penetrate the Gulf of Finland. During the operation "Magdeburg" ran aground near the island of Odensholm. A detachment of Russian cruisers and destroyers was sent against the enemy ships, which, having caused enormous destruction to the Magdeburg, captured it. The ciphers and codes found on the cruiser made it possible for the Allies to guess the intentions of the German command until the end of the war.

The Baltics achieved especially great success in carrying out active minefields near enemy shores. Of all the warring states, Russia turned out to be the most prepared for a miiion war. The Russian mine terrified the German pirates. This is evidenced by the confession of a German submariner.

“At the beginning of the war,” he wrote, “only one mine was dangerous - a Russian mine. Not one of the commanders to whom England was "entrusted" - and we, in fact, were all like that. - did not go willingly to the Gulf of Finland. "Many enemies - a lot of honor" - a great saying. But near the Russians with their mines, the honor was too great. Germany, I must say frankly, there was nothing to do there. Each of us, if he was not forced to do so, tried to avoid "Russian affairs."

Minefields were placed on a large scale in the first months of the war.

On October 31, 1914, a special-purpose semi-division as part of the destroyers General Kondratenko and Okhotnik. "Pogranichnik" and "Novik", under the cover of four destroyers, set up a minefield in front of Memel. The operation, carried out at night, was not noticed by the enemy. On November 5, a minefield was placed on the approaches to Memel and in front of Pillau. On November 17, the German armored cruiser Friedrich-Karl exploded on this minefield and died. On the same day, the pilot steamer Elbing died here, blown up by a mine.

On November 19, in difficult meteorological conditions, the Amur minelayer set up a minefield on the routes of the German fleet in the area between the island of Bornholm and the Stolpe Bank. On this barrier in March 1915, the German ships Koenigsberg and Bayern were killed. In mid-November, a large barrier was set up by the cruisers Rurik and Admiral Makarov in front of the Danzng Bay. On these mines in May 1915, two German minesweepers were blown up.

At the end of December of the same year, 3 German steamships were blown up and killed by mines. Since all barrage operations were carried out covertly, it was believed by some that: - ships and steamers were sunk by double boats.

In order to save warships and commercial ships, the German command was forced to reduce shipping. The navigation of the most valuable warships was limited to the Gotland parallel. The German cruisers moved to the west - from Nepfarsasser to Svnnemünde.

As a result of the active operations of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the normal communication between Sweden and Germany was disrupted, which now could not receive the required amount of ore and cellulose used for the production of explosives and paper. All this could not but affect the military production of Germany.

In 1915, the Baltics inflicted even more sensitive blows on German communications. According to the maps found by our submariners on the German ships, it was established that the courses of the German ships lay in the southern part of the Gulf of Bothnia. from Kvarken to Alandsgaf, away from the coast. Followed by pg tellio. it was possible to carry out attacks on German ships without violating Schzed's neutrality.

Russian submarines were active in the Gulf of Bothnia. On October 24, 1915, the Alligator boat captured a German steamship and steered it into the Aland archipelago, transferring it to the Obedient destroyer.

On October 29, the Cayman submarine, acting in conjunction with the cruisers, captured the German steamer Stettin, on board of which there were conscripts, and brought it to Abo. In 1915 alone, submarines of the Baltic Fleet destroyed and captured 15 German transports. During this year they made 51 attacks on enemy ships.

Surface "ships conducted active mini-barrage operations on the communication routes of the enemy fleet.

In January 1915, the cruisers Oleg and Admiral Makarov, under the cover of three other cruisers, carried out minelaying. On January 25, between the island of Bornholm and the Stolpe Bank, the German cruiser Augsburg was blown up by a mine. The cruiser "Gazelle" was blown up on the Russian barrier near the lighthouse Arkona, which received serious damage.

In April, a German steamer sank in the same area. A special-purpose semi-division consisting of five destroyers laid mines on the approaches to Lnbava, occupied by the Germans. Minefields were also placed at Vindava.

In November, a detachment of four cruisers under the cover of the battleships "Petropavlovsk", "Gangut" and the destroyer "Novik" south of Gotland on German communications laid a minefield of 56 mines. A German cruiser was blown up on this barrier in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bBank X "borg< Данциг».

On December 6, a detachment of cruisers, under the cover of battleships and the destroyer Novik, laid a large minefield in the southeast of Gotland. On January 13, 1916, the German cruiser Lübeck sank here.

On December 16, three destroyers - "Novik", "Pobeditel" and "Zabiyaka" - northwest of Vindava, on the likely routes of German ships, set 150 mines. This area was under constant surveillance of enemy cruisers. In order to inflict damage not only on "Large, but also small enemy ships and transports, the mines were placed with a slight depression. On December 17, the Bremen cruiser, accompanied by two destroyers, was blown up on this minefield. The squadron minesman "V- 191". There was an explosion, and the ship sank. Rescuing the crew of the dead destroyer. "Bremen" hit two mines with her nose. Two strong explosions followed, and the cruiser disappeared under water.

Being sure that "Bremen" and "V-19I" were victims of submarines, German ships and transports continued:! use the old fairways. On December 23, the patrol ship Freya was blown up by a mine. German guards and two destroyers who arrived at the place of death discovered mines. Maneuvering between them, they sought to get out of the minefield area. After passing about five miles, the German destroyer "S-177" was blown up and sank. After that, by order of the commander of the German Baltic fleet, the entire Vindava region "was prohibited for navigation; the same order canceled the carrying of a permanent dez.ra between the island of Gotland and Vindava.

In 1914-1915, the total losses of the Germans in ships and transports amounted to 105 thousand tons. Pottern of Russians - 29 thousand tons.

Thus, a serious threat was created for German merchant shipping in the Baltic. Trading companies refused to send their ships to Sweden.

The lack of raw materials adversely affected the work of the German military industry. The needs of the German army for weapons and ammunition, as well as the requirements of industrial magnates, who received huge profits on military orders, forced the Germans to increase the supply of iron ore, cellulose and timber. The German high military command was forced to transfer two light cruisers and a destroyer flotilla from the North Sea to the Baltic, which led to a weakening of the naval forces. acting against the British.

During the 1916 campaign, Russian destroyers, supported by cruisers, attacked German communications along the coast of Sweden.

May 31, 1916 three Russian destroyers - "Novik". "Pobeditel" and "Thunder" - "attacked a German convoy located in Norkopingskon Bay. As a result of the attack, the German auxiliary cruiser German and two armed escort ships were sunk. These actions of Russian ships caused great damage to German trade.

The Baltics engaged in battle with the enemy under any conditions. The crew of the destroyer "Novik" in a fierce battle with two German destroyers showed determination, fearlessness and contempt for the enemy - qualities that were shown by almost all sailors of the Baltic Fleet.

On August 17, 1915, Novik spotted the silhouettes of two ships. These were the German destroyers "V-99" and "V-YuO", trying to break into the Nrbensky Bay.

Despite the fact that the Germans had a clear advantage in strength, the Novik commander, Captain 2nd Rank Berents, decided to approach the German destroyers. The distance quickly decreased. When the enemy was 43 cable, "Novik" opened fire. From the third volley, cover was achieved, and from the fourth he switched to defeat. A few minutes later, a fire broke out on the lead destroyer of the Germans. The order of the commander of the fleet gave a high rating to the Russian destroyer. “After six minutes of battle, due to excellent shooting and skillful maneuvering of the Novik, the destroyer, hit by shells, began to retreat.” Encouraged by the first successes, the gunners of the Russian destroyer intensified their fire. On the destroyer "V-99" the middle pipe was shot down and a fire broke out in the poop. "Novik" transferred the fire to the "V-100", which caused serious damage.

Trying to break away from the pursuing Russian ship, the V-99 hit a net barrier; backing up, he ran into Russian mines. There were two deafening explosions. A few minutes later, the enemy ship disappeared under water.

This success was possible thanks to the high combat training of the crew, the courage and organization of all its members. The commander of the Novik, Berents, wrote in a report addressed to the commander of the mine division: “I consider it my duty to note the amazing calmness and endurance of all personnel. So, for example, shooting was opened strictly on command, and after the “shot” signal, not a single extra shot was fired; the transition from volleys to rapid fire and back was just as good. Minor damage, so characteristic of guns, was corrected quickly, but without fuss.

The German fleet suffered a major defeat in the Baltic in a raiding operation that the German command decided to undertake in November 1916.

On November 10, the German flotilla, consisting of 11 of the latest high-speed destroyers G-56, S-57, S-58, S-59, 0-89, cG-90, V-72 ”, “V-75”, “V-76”, “V-77”, “V-78” with a displacement of 1000 tons each and a speed of 34 knots, under the command of Vnting went to sea.

The flotilla was tasked with finding and attacking light forces

Baltic Fleet, protecting the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and then shelling the Baltic port, in which at that time there were a large number of wagons with artillery weapons prepared to send the 12th Army. The Germans wanted to show that Germany had large forces in the Baltic that could paralyze the actions of Russian battleships that had just entered service, as well as create a flank danger for the army.

Before the advanced Russian minefields, the flotilla was accompanied by the light cruiser Strasbourg. The destroyers left to carry out their task, and the cruiser remained here until they returned. They decided to carry out the operation at night under the cover of darkness. The destroyers walked in the formation of a wake column at a distance of about 1.5 cables from each other, forming a long straight line. From the lead ship, only the first three destroyers were visible, following in the wake of the flagship.

The sea was calm. Low clouds that covered the moon, poor visibility - all this favored "the secrecy of the actions of the flotilla. By 21 o'clock it was supposed to arrive at the island of Odensholm, from where it was planned to search for Russian soldiers.

At 2038 hours, the commander of the flotilla, who was on the * destroyer S-56, was told that the three terminal ships had fallen behind. Paying no attention to this, Vnting continued to take the flotilla on the same course. Unexpectedly, alarming news was received on the radio: one of the lagging U-75 destroyers ran into a mine and blew up. Water quickly filled the boiler room, and the ship lost speed. The destroyer S-57, which was nearby, took on board the personnel from the V-75. After some time, the second mine exploded, and the V-75 sank. From a huge concussion on the "S-57" the steam pipeline was damaged, the destroyer lost its course; "G-89" took on board the team of the sinking ship and, having taken the opposite course, went to connect with the cruiser "Strasbourg".

The Germans continued their unsuccessful search for Russian ships at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland for more than two hours. Having lost two of his destroyers and not finding Russian ships, Witnng decided to go to the Baltic port in order to bombard it. On November 11, at about 01:20, 8 German destroyers approached Rogervik Bay. Three destroyers assigned to bombard the city and port entered the bay; the rest of the ships were at the entrance to the harbor. Having illuminated the port and the city with searchlights, the Germans began shelling, which lasted about 20 minutes. The shelling caused damage to several buildings and killed a few civilians. Having finished the shelling, the German destroyers lay down on the return course.

It was decided to bypass the area of ​​the death of the first two destroyers to the north.

At 3 hours 15 minutes, the third German destroyer V-72, which was the penultimate one, was blown up. "V-77" took on board the team from "V-72" and sank the blown up destroyer with artillery fire.

The commander of the flotilla, hearing artillery fire, decided that* the Russian ships had attacked his terminal destroyers. Having made a successive turn of 180 ° with his lead ship, Witnng rushed to the place of firing. At 0320 hours, immediately after the turn, there was a deafening explosion under the G-90 following the flagship. The ship began to sink. "S-59" removed the team from the "G-90" and "V-78" fired a torpedo into the sinking destroyer. "G-90" in an instant disappeared under the water. The structure is broken. Two destroyers - "S-58" and "S-59" - separated from the core of the flotilla. What was happening around, Witnng could not understand 21 only when he received the “MM” signal from “V-72” (“I have a “mine hole”), he realized that the destroyers were in the minefield and ordered the remaining ships to pack up and leave the dangerous place. At 3 hours 58 minutes, the destroyer S-58, in a hurry to connect with the flagship, hit a mine. Mines floating on the surface were found near the explosion. In view of this, "S-59" could only send boats to save the personnel of a sinking ship. Having accepted the command, the destroyer began to maneuver between the mines, wanting to get out of the danger zone. Soon he was blown up by a mine. The flagship destroyer S-56, having accepted the crew, sank it with a torpedo. After 45 minutes, he hit a V76 mine. After the smoke cleared, there was no ship or people on the surface of the water. Several minutes passed. The next explosion severely damaged the boilers of the flagship.

Thus, as a result of this adventurous operation, the Germans lost seven ships.

For 11 months after that, they did not dare to take action. And only in the autumn of 1917, when the working class of Russia was preparing for an armed uprising with the aim of overthrowing the Provisional Government, did the German imperialists undertake a major operation to seize the Baltic Islands. The Germans hoped to break into the Gulf of Finland and hit revolutionary Petrograd from the sea.

But the Baltic sailors, led by the Bolsheviks, inflicted

powerful blows to the German fleet and thwarted the insidious plans of the enemy.

The Black Sea Fleet fought no less stubbornly against the Germans and Turks.

In October 1914, the German-Turkish fleet suddenly attacked the Russian cities and ports of the Black Sea. Sevastopol was shelled. Odessa, Kerch and Novorossiysk. However, the Chernomorians repulsed all attacks of the enemy.

The response actions of the Black Sea Fleet soon followed.<0 ноября 1914 года русские корабли обстреляли турецкий порт

Zunguldak. from where the enemy transferred coal to Constantinople. At the same time, Russian destroyers set up minefields near the Bosphorus. Returning to their bases, they sank three Turkish transports with troops.

On November 17, Russian ships fired on Trebizond, and then laid a minefield off the Anatolian coast. The next day, at Cape Sarych, a battle took place between Russian ships and the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau, as a result of which the Goeben was seriously damaged.

In 1915, the Black Sea Fleet carried out active cruising operations. In May, during one of them, the Goeben was again hit by the artillery of Russian ships. In addition, surface ships and submarines laid mines off the Turkish coast, which blew up enemy warships and transports. In April 1915, the Turkish cruiser Medzhidie was blown up in a minefield near Odessa-Ochakov, and in June, the cruiser Breslau.

Russian submariners acted skillfully and courageously on the Black Sea. On October 12, 1916, the submarine "Seal" entered into battle with the armed steamer "Rodosto", captured it and brought it to Sevastopol.

During the 1916 campaign, the Black Sea Fleet supported the Caucasian Army advancing on Trebizond.

As a result of active offensive operations, the Black Sea Fleet in 1914-1917 "sank 102 enemy steamships. 110 motor and about 5000 sailing ships. Russian sailors and German attacks were successfully repelled in the north, where the enemy sought to disrupt Russia's ties with its allies.

These are the brief results of the combat activities of Russian sailors during the First World War, with their activity, knowledge of the matter and skillful use of weapons inflicting crushing blows to the strongest enemy. In this war, the sailors * fought recklessly against the Germans, who were trying to subjugate Russia to their policy and seize Russian lands, but at the same time, the bulk of the sailors did not want victory for the autocracy. The most overdosed part of the sailors, under the leadership of the Bolsheviks, was preparing for a resolution, for only the overthrow of the autocracy could ensure the preservation of the national independence of the state and its free development and strengthening. In their struggle to turn the imperialist war into a civil war, the revolutionary sailors relied on rich revolutionary traditions and especially rich experience in the struggle against tsarism under the leadership of the Bolshevik goats.

Mine transport of the Baltic Fleet (minelayer) "Yenisei"

For known reasons, Baltic Fleet during the First World War, he sat down in mass memory only with revolutionary "brothers" in machine-gun belts on armored cars and the Aurora, which, for all its merits, did not belong to the main ships of the theater of operations.
It seems that for almost three years the fleet went to rallies, chased its own officers and sometimes, purely by chance, met with the Germans in the morning fog of the Gulf of Riga.
In terms of the scale of the confrontation, the fighting in the Eastern Baltic, of course, cannot be compared with the British-German war in the North Sea and the Atlantic. But the "work" of the Baltic Fleet began even before the declaration of war. The workers of that war will be discussed below.

The tactics of military operations were chosen based on the main task - the defense of the capital of the Empire at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and actions on German communications to Sweden. BF ships also defended the entrance to the Gulf of Riga, protected communication with Finland (then still part of the Empire) and quite successfully engaged in mine laying (including off the German coast). At a difficult moment, Britain sent submarines, which helped us a lot in the defense of the Baltic.
The geography of the theater of operations, and the eastern part of the Baltic does not abound in large deep-water spaces like the Black Sea, and the comparative weakness of the fleet made the use of large formations of surface ships ineffective. Naval battles, like Jutland, did not take place in Baltic waters. The naval mine became a successful weapon for the Russians.


Floating mine designed by E.V. Kolbasyeva. 1909

"By the beginning of the war, the Russian fleet had 15.5 thousand mines at its disposal (mostly of the 1908 model), of which 7 thousand in the Baltic, 4.5 thousand in the Black Sea, 4 thousand in Vladivostok. In addition, in production there were another 5250 mines, of which 2.5 thousand were in the pouring stage explosive.
The "Plan of Operations of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea" defined as a priority task: to prevent the enemy from breaking into the Gulf of Finland during the first two weeks of the war. This ensured the mobilization of the Guards Corps and the Petrograd Military District, as well as their preparation to repel the German landing force in order to capture the capital.
To solve the task set, the operational plan of the Baltic Fleet provided for the creation of a Central mine-artillery position at the Revel-Porkaludd line. The laying of mines was planned to be carried out before the start of hostilities, during the deployment of the forces of the fleet. Strictly in accordance with the plan, on July 18, 1914, five hours before the announcement of general mobilization, the minelayers "Ladoga", "Narova", "Amur" and "Yenisei", under the cover of the main forces of the fleet, began laying mines. It took four and a half hours to set up a barrage of 2129 mines.
In subsequent years, the Central mine position was repeatedly strengthened. In total, by the end of 1917, more than 11 thousand mines were exposed here, including 1158 mines of the 1908 model and the "Rybka" - in the anti-submarine version, with a deepening of 18.3 m.
In 1915, the Baltic Fleet began equipping a new defensive line - the Forward Mine Position. During the three years of the war, over 8 thousand mines were installed here. On the night of October 28-29, 1916, 7 out of 11 destroyers of the 10th flotilla of the German fleet blew up and sank on the mines of the Forward Position. For German sailors, this event was called "Black Monday".
Since 1915, the Irbenskaya mine position, which blocked the enemy's entrance to the Gulf of Riga, became the third major defensive line in the Baltic. In total, Russian sailors set up about 11 thousand mines here. "Korshunov Yu. L. "Mines of the Russian fleet"
In total, during the war, the ships of the Baltic Fleet laid 38,932 mines. 69 enemy ships were blown up on them, 48 of them were lost. We are talking here only about warships. The losses of the merchant fleet of Germany and neighboring states that traded with it are not taken into account in the figure.

Map of minefields laid by the Russian fleet in the southern part of the Baltic Sea in 1914-1915.

Russian mine washed up on the German coast

Active minelaying in the Baltic proved to be very effective. So on November 4, 1914, the armored cruiser Friedrich Karl blew up on two mines near Memel, on January 12, 1915, the cruisers Augsburg and Gazelle were blown up near Bornholm and Rügen on the same day, on November 19, on a minefield near Gotland the cruiser "Danzig" was blown up, on December 4, the cruiser "Bremen" and the destroyer V-191 were killed northwest of Vindava, and six days later, the destroyer S-177 was also killed in the same place.

German armored cruiser Friedrich Karl.

Cruiser "Danzig"

List of ships of the Russian Baltic Fleet that died in 1914-1917

N° p/n Date of death Name of the ship Fleet Area of ​​death Note
battleships
1 4.IO.I917 "Slava" BF Moonsund Strait Flooded by the team due to damage

Cruisers
1 09/28/1914 Pallada Baltic Fleet Gulf of Finland Sunk by a German submarine
2 11/6/1916 "Rurik" BF Gulf of Finland Blown up by a mine

Destroyers
1 11/29/1914 "Executive" Baltic Fleet Mouth of the Gulf of Finland
2 11/29/1914 "Flying" BF Mouth of the Gulf of Finland
3 08/21/1916 "Volunteer" Baltic Fleet Irbensky Strait
4 10/28/1916 "Kazanets" BF Gulf of Finland Sunk by the German square.
5 08/22/1917 "Slender" Baltic Fleet Gulf of Riga
6 09/26/1917 "Hunter" BF Irbensky Strait Blown up by a mine
7 10/14/1917 "Thunder" BF Kassarsky reach (Moonzund Strait) Scuttled by the team due to major damage
8 11/27/1917 "Vigilant" Baltic Fleet The Gulf of Bothnia Blown up by a mine

Submarines
1 03/1/1916 "Shark" BF In the Libava region Memel
2 05/10/1916 "Som" BF In the region of the Aland Islands
3 05/13/1917 "Bars" BF Central part of the Baltic. seas
4 06/1/1917 "Lioness" Baltic Fleet In the area of ​​about. Gotland
5 06/8/1917 "AG-15" BF In the Ganges region (Gangut)
6 11/1/1917 "AG-14" BF In the Libava region
7 1.12.1917 "Gepard" BF Central part of the Baltic. seas

gunboats

1 08/6/1915 "Sivuch" BF Gulf of Riga Sunk by German ships
2 08/7/1915 "Korean" BF Gulf of Riga Scuttled by the crew due to severe damage

minelayers
1 05/22/1915 "Yenisei" Baltic Fleet In the area of ​​the Baltic port

minesweepers
1 08/14/1914 "Explorer" BF In the district of about. Dago
2 09/09/1914 Minesweeper No. 07, Baltic Fleet In the region of about. Dago
09/09/1914 Minesweeper No. 08, Baltic Fleet In the area of ​​about. Dago
Kireev I. A. Trawling in the Baltic Sea during the war of 1914–1917. - M-L .: Military Publishing House of the NKVMF of the USSR, 1939.

Our guide to books about the First World "The Fatal War of Russia", compiled by Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Meshkov, entered the short list of the ASKI competition "Best Books of the Year"! In honor of this, the author sent another chapter from the book specially for this.

Leaving a foamy trail
The mine went off briskly.
Broken like a toy
The cruiser sank.

Floated to the surface
Gray submarine
And dissects proudly
Little wave.

A verse soothed by depth,
Whirlpool funnel.
The sea opened the cheekbones
their blue depths.

Bodies rise up ominously
It's a pity floating debris
furious sharks
Float between them...
Arseny Nesmelov. Episode

Former Russian Foreign Minister S.D. Sazonov in their "Memories" writes:

The Great War began on Eastern Front bombardment of Libava by the German fleet...(p. 242).

It so happened that the First World War began for Russia at sea and there, on the Baltic Sea, it ended with the heroic defense of the Moonsund Archipelago in October 1917. At the same time, the main bloody battles took place, of course, in the land theaters of operations, where the Russian army lost two million killed and died from wounds during the war years. For comparison:

The participation of the Russian Navy in the First World War was mainly coastal defensive in nature. At the same time, 32 warships were lost, and the casualties amounted (together with the wounded and captured) to 6063 people.

Russia and the USSR in the wars of the XX century: losses of the armed forces :
stat. research / Under the total. ed. G.F. Krivosheeva. M., 2001. S. 103.

To begin with, let's name a number of general publications containing systematic information about military operations at sea in the First World War:

Combat chronicle of the Russian fleet: a chronicle of the most important military events. Russian history. fleet from the ninth century. to 1917/ Ed. Dr. voen.-mor. sciences cap. 1st rank N.V. Novikova; comp. V.A. Divin; Acad. sciences of the USSR. Institute of History. M. : Military Publishing House, 1948. 490 p., map.

In 2 volumes / ed. N.B. Pavlovich. M.: Military Publishing House, 1964. T. I; 647 p. T. II. 383 p.

V.A. Zolotarev, I.A. Kozlov. Three centuries Russian fleet, 1914-1941 . Moscow: AST; SPb. : Polygon, 2004. 750 p. : ill., portr. (Military History Library).

This is the third volume of the four-volume edition of the same name (the 1st volume is devoted to the history of the Russian fleet of the 18th century; the 2nd volume covers the period from the beginning of the 19th century to the beginning of the First World War; the 4th volume tells about the history of the fleet in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 , about the exploits of Soviet sailors at sea and on land).

A.A. Kersnovsky in the final, 4th volume of his "History of the Russian army"[Kersnovsky A.A. History of the Russian Army: in 4 volumes / Commentary. S.G. Nelipovich. M. : Voice, 1992-1994. T. 4. 1915-1917 M., 1994. 368 p.] found it necessary, “at least in the most general terms, to describe the work” during the world war of the Russian fleet. As always, impartial in relation to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command:

The leadership of the naval forces was concentrated in Headquarters. The fleet was commanded a thousand miles away from the swamps of Polesye and commanded like a swamp.

The headquarters forbade any activity to the Baltic Fleet, despite the insignificance of the German forces of Prince Heinrich, which consisted exclusively of old ships. Throughout the war, we had at our disposal the German naval cipher, thanks to which all the intentions of the enemy were known to us in advance. We got this cipher when the cruiser Magdeburg was destroyed at the very beginning of the war. The Germans had no idea about this discovery of ours. We immediately shared this most valuable discovery of ours with the British. With such an unprecedented trump card, we could have acted offensively throughout the war, crushing the German Baltic forces, evading the High Seas fleet.

But there was no naval commander in Baranovichi-Mogilev, just as there was no commander. They also had no idea about the naval strategy there, as well as about the land strategy. All orders of the Headquarters on the naval part were imbued with the fear of "losing ships." The fleet was doomed to inaction and inevitable demoralization... Fearing to lose one or two ships, the Headquarters destroyed the entire Russian naval force. Our four Ganguts gave us an overwhelming advantage over the forces of Prince Henry. Having a squadron speed of up to 24 knots (speed above the contract) and armed with more long-range guns than the Germans, they could have fought with excellent success with units of the High Seas fleet that went to the Baltic and had a squadron speed of no more than 18 knots. The two-time sad experience of managing the fleet from the shore - Menshikov in 1854, the governor Alekseev in 1904, both times leading the fleet to death, was completely in vain ...

Admiral Essen, who commanded the Baltic Fleet, died untimely in the spring of 1915, just before the new ships were commissioned. His successor, Admiral Nepenin, for all his outstanding qualities, did not have enough authority in the eyes of the Stavka and had to obey its hopelessly passive directives. The intelligence organized by Admiral Nepenin caused great harm to the enemy - the British fleet used its fruits throughout the war: all British operations at sea were the results of Russian intelligence. The Russian fleet was the brains of the British. The German naval command guessed in Nepenin and its highly qualified officers their most dangerous enemies.<…>

With all this, the Baltic Fleet completed the more than modest tasks assigned to it quite successfully. The Black Sea Fleet did not work so successfully, showing higher combat qualities, but having a much worse leader in the person of Admiral Ebergardt. In general, if the army was demanded more than what it could give without strain, then all the capabilities of the fleet were not used (pp. 233-235).

Osip Mandelstam. From the poem "Petropolis"
May 1916 (published in)

From the book “The Combat Chronicle of the Russian Fleet” mentioned above:

The first period of the war on the Baltic Sea passed under the sign of the expectation of the offensive operation of the Germans on the Gulf of Finland ...
It was assumed that the German offensive could follow even before the start of the declaration of war, while setting up a barrier across the Gulf of Finland, ending freedom of navigation on a busy trade route, was in itself an event with major consequences. The uncertainty of the situation and the general confusion that accompanied the days of July 30-31 instilled uncertainty in the solution of this most important issue for defense. Fleet commander Essen telegraphed several times to St. Petersburg asking for instructions: to put up a barrier or not? Unable to obtain permission, anxious to ensure the deployment of the fleet, he finally sent a telegram, warning that if he did not receive a definite answer about the political situation, then on the morning of the 31st he would lay a minefield. A positive response came when the fleet was ready to weigh anchor to carry out and cover this operation.

A few hours later the barrier was put up. On the same day, the fleet completed its deployment. The sentinel curtain of cruisers was put out to sea on the night of July 25-26.

Order of the Commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet, July 19, 1914, No. 2:
By the will of the Sovereign Emperor, war has been declared today.
I congratulate the Baltic Fleet on the great day for which we live, for which we have been waiting and preparing.
Officers and teams!
From this day on, each of us must forget all our personal affairs and concentrate all our thoughts and will on one goal - to protect the Motherland from the encroachment of enemies and engage in battle with them without hesitation, thinking only about inflicting the most severe blows on the enemy, which are only for us. possible.<…>
Remember that the only help that should be given to each other in battle lies in the effort of the enemy’s attack, the tension in order to deliver the strongest blows to him. Using for this all their forces and combat means.
May each of us fulfill the greatest duty to the Motherland - to protect its integrity with his life - and may he follow the example of those who, two hundred years ago, with the Great Emperor, with their deeds and blood, laid the foundation for our fleet in these waters.
Admiral von Essen(pp. 13-14).

This order is reproduced in the book: G.K.Graf. Fleet and War: The Baltic Fleet in the First World War. M. : Veche, 2011. 320 p. : ill. (Marine chronicle * ).

[* The RSL stores 94 books of the Naval Chronicle series, of which 28 digitized, you can scroll through their first pages (1/10 of the volume) directly in electronic catalog RSL on the links "More", and full electronic versions can be obtained by registered readers NEB.]

Its author is Harald Karlovich Graf (1885-1966), senior officer of the Novik destroyer, captain of the 2nd rank, participant in the Russian-Japanese, World War I and Civil Wars, an emigrant since 1921. The book is the first part of his great work - On the Novik: The Baltic Fleet in War and Revolution, published in Germany in 1922. This publication covers the period from the beginning of the First World War to the end of 1916.

As the author notes, destroyer "Novik" was built at the Putilov shipyard in St. Petersburg at the expense of the Committee for the collection of voluntary donations to strengthen the Russian navy. She brilliantly fulfilled all the requirements of the latest naval technology, and in terms of her artillery and mine armament, as well as her course, she was one of the best ships of this class in the world.(p. 15).

G.K. Graf tells in detail about the hostilities in which Novik participated, about the operations of the entire Baltic Fleet, the service and daily life of Russian naval officers. The author highly appreciates the commander of the Baltic Fleet, Admiral Essen, whom he knew from the Russo-Japanese War:

The activities of N.O. Essen in Port Arthur did not go unnoticed. Arthur nominated him and gave him the right to be considered one of the most outstanding officers of our fleet ...

In 1906, he was entrusted with a detachment of mine cruisers. Under his talented leadership, this detachment becomes the nucleus of a reconstituted fleet, and a number of excellent commanders and young officers grow up in it. The Essen school is being created, just as the schools of Lazarev, Butakov, Makarov once were ...

In 1908, already a rear admiral, N.O. Essen was appointed head of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea, and then approved by the commander of the fleet and remained in this position until last day own life.

In a little over seven years, he literally revived the fleet and destroyed the routine that had already taken deep roots (pp. 96-97).

The life of the destroyers became richer and more full-blooded:

On the seas, playing, worn
with a destroyer destroyer.

Clings like a sedge to honey,
to the destroyer destroyer.
…………………………
And why is it unbearable to us
peace in the minosin family?
Vladimir Mayakovsky. From a poem
1915

Destroyers! Whoever loves them is enchanted forever.
High speeds are why sharp and courageous people.
There is nowhere for them to hide in battle - there is no armor here.
“I know from my own experience,” said Artenyev, laughing. - Well, where is there to hide on our bridge? One defense is a piece of sailcloth. And when it explodes nearby, you will definitely dive under the tarpaulin, and it seems that you have already become immortal ...
In a small team it is difficult to hide your weaknesses. This is not a battleship for you, where a person is lost, like a passer-by on Nevsky. Here any scoundrel will immediately declare himself that he is a scoundrel ...

V.S. Pikul. Moonsund (p. 153; more on this book later).

Particularly interested in the work of the destroyers, the book is addressed: L.G.Goncharov, B.A.Denisov. The use of mines in the world imperialist war of 1914-1918. M.; L.: Voenmorizdat, 1940. 176 p. : ill. schemes.

From the preface: During the war of 1914-1918. mines as a means of fighting at sea were first used in large quantities. The scale of the mine warfare turned out to be so large that it far exceeded all preliminary calculations. The very experience of mine warfare, which provides examples of the use of mines in various maritime situations, deserves deep study and analysis. Some methods of using mines will certainly find application in modern warfare at sea.

This work is the first attempt at a systematic presentation of extensive factual material on the use of mines during the imperialist war of 1914-1918. fleets of all warring states.

bulging eyes,
lighthouse
because of the mountains
wept across the oceans;
and in the oceans
squadrons writhed,
planted mines on a stake.
Vladimir Mayakovsky.
1915-1916

Military archivists, historians, publishers timed the publication of the book to coincide with the centenary of Russian diving V. A. Merkushov "Notes of a submariner, 1905-1915"(compiled and scientific ed. V.V. Lobitsyn. M.: Consent, 2004. 622 p. : ill., portr.).

Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of submarines of three projects, commander of a flotilla of strategic nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Lev Matushkin says in his address "To the reader":

We are justifiably proud of our modern submarine fleet, serving in the oceans, making trips in the ice of the Arctic. But this was preceded by a hundred-year history - the first Russian combat submarine was commissioned into the fleet as Destroyer No. 150 back in 1903, and in June 1904, having received the name Dolphin, it became a training ship for training crews. In 1906, submarines were singled out as a special class of military vessels, and this date was decided to be considered the beginning of Russian diving.

The book you are holding in your hands was written by one of the first Russian submarine officers, Vasily Alexandrovich Merkushov, who began his service on a submarine in April 1905. Its author resurrects the time when everything was first in Russian scuba diving. At the same time, the traditions of the Russian submarine were formed and developed new type naval submarine officers. The main thing for them was the interests of the service, which required fearlessness and exceptional endurance ... It was not for nothing that the selection of personnel for service on submarines was special: they were recruited exclusively from volunteers.

V.A. Merkushev (in the pre-revolutionary lists his surname was spelled Merkushev) in November 1912 received command of the Okun submarine, on which he launched the First world war and became one of the most famous submarine commanders of the Baltic Fleet. For two torpedo attacks by German ships (May 21 and June 15, 1915), the commander of the Okun boat was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree, respectively (he became the first Baltic Fleet officer to receive this high military award during the First World War) , was awarded the St. George weapon and the Cavalier Cross of the French Order of the Legion of Honor.

After October - a white officer, served in the Black Sea Fleet. Since January 1920, he was at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. In March 1920, he was appointed commandant of the steamship "Kharaks", which in November evacuated the Don Cossacks from Kerch. May 19, 1920 promoted to captain of the 1st rank. In November 1922, commanding the tug "Skif", he participated in the transfer of Russian ships requisitioned by the French government from Constantinople to Marseille. Then he settled in Paris. He died on December 4, 1949, and was buried in the cemetery of Sainte-Genevieve-des-Bois. On his tombstone there is an inscription: “The commander of the Okun submarine, St. George Cavalier Captain 1st Rank V.A. Merkushov 1884-1949.”

At the same time, he was also a talented naval writer, a chronicler of the Russian fleet. In the book "Notes of a submariner, 1905-1915" in thirty-two short stories by V.A. Merkushov, the formation of a new class of ships in the fleet, which in future wars at sea was to play one of the main roles, is described. An excerpt from the story “The sinking of the cruiser Pallada on September 28, 1914” will give an idea of ​​what an exciting reading it is:

Armored cruiser Pallada

The highest review on the cruiser "Pallada". Revel, 1913:

Shortly after the lunch break, the terrible news spread around the Admiralty Basin, where the Okun was anchored, about the death of the Pallada cruiser, blown up by a German submarine in the Gulf of Finland. This news shocked everyone, and some rushed to the harbor in the hope of finding out details from those accidentally surviving or wounded when they were taken to the pier, but there were none ...

Subsequently, from conversations with the officers of the Bayan cruiser and other ships that witnessed the explosion of the Pallada cruiser, the following emerged.

Despite a formidable warning in the form of an unsuccessful attack by the Admiral Makarov by a German submarine, the next morning, September 28/October 11, the Pallada and Bayan cruisers, preceded by the Stroyny destroyer, left the Ere raid on patrol at the mouth of the Finnish bay. The first cruiser brigade had finished its duty, and both ships were now on their last cruise (p. 262).

At 12:14 pm, the Bayan watch officer, Lieutenant Selyanin, noticed three flashes on both sides of the Pallada in front, as if from the explosion of three mines. Following this, clouds of brown smoke mixed with steam rose, and columns of water rose, hiding the unfortunate ship from prying eyes. There was a terrible explosion. Probably, a mine from a German submarine hit the bomb cellars or the mine cellar, which detonated - at the same time, eighteen boilers that were under steam exploded, which caused the instant death of the cruiser.

The commander of the watch immediately stopped the Bayan vehicles and sounded the combat alarm, and the commander, who ran up to the bridge, gave full reverse. After one and a half to two minutes, smoke rose from the water, and in place of the Pallada cruiser with a displacement of 7835 tons, armed with two 8-inch, eight 6-inch and twenty-two 75-mm guns, some small debris floated, and it was not visible not a single person...

The spectacle was so amazing that the Bayan officers and crew, who jumped onto the upper deck right from the dining tables, seemed to freeze in their places, and the ship's doctor immediately fell into quiet insanity (the doctor was decommissioned ashore and gradually recovered) .

The height of the column of water, steam and smoke, as determined from the Aurora cruiser, was 3,000 feet (914.4 m), while its top was blown somewhat to the side by the wind, forming a giant letter "G". The smoke stayed in the air for about seven minutes and was visible from various ships and coastal posts at a distance of up to thirty miles ...

Here is how the auditor of the Bayan cruiser, Lieutenant Lemishevsky, tells about this, who only changed from watch at noon and went down to the cabin to change clothes.

“I didn’t have time to do this, when I heard sounds, as it were, from a pistol shot. Putting on his tunic and binoculars on the move, he jumped out onto the upper deck. In front of me was a column of brown smoke mixed with steam. When the smoke rose, there was no one in the place of the Pallas.

At this moment, "Bayan" was 1-1.5 cables from the place of death. Through the binoculars, flying caps, papers and various trifles were visible. The cruiser stopped and slowly moved back... (pp. 263-264).

Having received a report about the death of the cruiser, the commander of the Baltic Fleet immediately sent all free destroyers to the sea, who for two days in a row searched the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, but did not see the German boat.

From the official German publication "The War on the Baltic Sea", volume one, we learn the following. “The submarine U-26 at 10:30 a.m. saw both of our cruisers on the east course and, having entered the line of their course, went towards the west course. During the attack to the right of the boat, in 10-20 cables, a large Russian destroyer passed the same course. The rapprochement went quickly. Shortly after 11 o'clock, the submarine, being 20-30 cables from the lead cruiser and moving at low speed, turned to the right to fire from the stern mine apparatus. The speed of the cruisers was considered to be 15 knots. At 1110 hours a shot was fired at the lead four-tube cruiser from a distance of 530 m. A mine hit right in the middle of the cruiser. The commander of U-26 saw the fall of chimneys through the periscope, after which he should have gone 20 meters, since he was fired upon by the destroyer accompanying the cruiser "...<…>

As you know, unfortunately, there was not a single destroyer with our ships (due to a lack of them), but Bayan, according to Lieutenant Lemishevsky, opened fire ten minutes after the Pallada explosion. Thus, the muffled blows heard on the German submarine, taken for shell explosions, were in fact nothing more than a hail of large and small fragments of the unfortunate ship falling around U-26, as well as a series of separate, successive explosions inside the sinking Pallada ". Due to the small distance between the opponents - about 3 cables - the effect of such a terrible explosion should have been very large on the submarine, which is why its commander went full speed, went to a depth of 20 meters and did not appear on the surface for twenty minutes. Although in his official description wars at sea, the Germans often do not stop at distorting the truth, it seems that they are telling the truth ...

There was no one to save, because not only not a single living person, but not a single corpse floated at the place of death. This is explained by the fact that all the personnel, except for the watch department, at the time of the mine explosion were having lunch in the interior of the ship and did not have time to jump out to the upper deck.

A few days later, off the island of Koksher, they found a ship image of the Pallada cruiser, the Savior Not Made by Hands, rising from the abyss, to everyone's amazement, which had not only no damage, but even scratches. The image was handed over to the Church of the Savior on the Waters in Petrograd, built in memory of the sailors who died in the war of 1904-1905.
On October 8/21, 1914, in the Ganges region, the body of the senior artillery officer of the Pallada, Lieutenant L.A. Gavrilov, was washed ashore, which turned out to be tied to some tree and without boots. When he managed to take off his boots, get a tree and tie himself to it, forever remained a mystery. It was the only corpse thrown out by the sea out of the entire ship's personnel of 25 officers and 572 crew members... (pp. 265-266).

The effect produced by the death of the Pallas was amazing. The ironic attitude to submarines is gone. How did it happen? everyone said. How to protect ships from submarine attacks? How to be? These are the constant topics of conversation in the wardrooms.

There was no panic, but the mood of the spirit is very depressed.<…>

In the order dated October 27 / November 9, 1914, No. 332, Admiral von Essen had the civil courage to admit his own and the entire personnel of the Baltic Fleet's mistakes. Here is the penitent order.

“The last weeks of the war clearly indicated that in some maritime theaters, which include the Baltic, submarines, minefields and aeronautic vehicles receive great importance.
All these factors were not sufficiently studied by us before the war, so I draw the attention of all the Messrs. officers on the desirability of a serious acquaintance with issues related to diving, minefields and aeronautics, since knowledge of the matter can not only clarify many misconceptions and misconceptions, but will also cause the proposal of various methods of actively and passively combating these elements of naval warfare ”(with . 267-268).

The death of the dashing enemy
The heart is always kind:
No place for compassion
Everyone has the same fate!

Sailors rejoice,
And on the back of an iron
This iron fish -
Jokes, accordion, laughter.

But the propeller buzzed -
The steel bird flies
Bomb ripe drop
Hanging in her paw.

The boat went into the abyss
And lurks under the water
A bird is circling above her
A predatory shadow is watching.

Bomb after bomb;
Like whales, fountains
Avidly they rise
They dig both deep and bottom ...

submarine wounded,
And from an open wound
iridescent pops up
Oil stain.

The sea is deserted. Waves
Walking at a leisurely pace
Seagulls whistling their wings
Groaning from all sides ...

Someone with blonde hair
Quietly walks on the waters
mourning on green
His white chiton.
Arseny Nesmelov. Episode

Several books by the Deputy Head of the Institute are devoted to the combat operations of the Russian Baltic Fleet military history Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Vice-President of the Russian Association of Historians of the First World War, Candidate of Historical Sciences D.Yu.Kozlova. The first one is "Memel operation" of the fleet of the Baltic Sea. June 1915"(M. : Tseikhgauz, 2007. 48 p. : ill. ( Battles of the Great War ) ) introduces the reader to the operation, the significance of which is still disputed by historians. In the face of the defeats and retreat of the Russian armies in 1915, the success of this operation was primarily of political significance.

The higher authorities did not tire of reminding the Baltic command that its main task remains to prevent the breakthrough of superior German naval forces into the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland for landing at the gates of the capital of the empire, and demanded that the fleet be protected from the slightest risk and save it for a decisive battle on the central mine and artillery positions. However, such close attention to the headquarters was initiated by the commander of the fleet, Admiral N.O. von Essen, who in the first days of the war, on his own initiative, almost provoked a war with neutral Sweden. At the same time, the Supreme Commander, who managed to stop the escapade of Nikolai Ottovich literally at the last moment, considered the actions of the admiral a defiant act and an undeserved insult to the Swedes who were loyal to Russia.

In October 1914, the commander was deprived of the right to use at his own discretion the main forces of the fleet entrusted to him (battleships), and all active operations in the middle and southern parts of the sea were carried out exclusively by cruisers, destroyers, and partly submarines (p. 3).

We dare not agree with the popular point of view, according to which the events of June 19 (July 2), 1915 are nothing more than “one of the combat episodes” and “cannot even be considered as a noticeable stage in the general course of events of the war in the Baltic Sea” (M .A. Petrov).

In this sense, it is very significant that the authors of the semi-official retrospective essay "Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet" (1978) did not at all consider it necessary to mention the only naval battle in the Great War in the open part of the Baltic. It seems to us that the success of the Russians in the battle near the island of Gotland - a very significant event by Baltic standards - had serious consequences. The defeats from the British in the battles at Heligoland (August 1914) and at Dogger Bank (January 1915) were followed by another failure of the German "small naval war" - this time an unfortunate embarrassment from the "inert", "locked", "poorly trained ”, “cowardly”, etc. Russian fleet in the Baltic (p. 46-47).

After the battle on June 19 (July 2), 1915, the Admiral Staff immediately sent the small cruiser Bremen and the new destroyer V-99, comparable in strength and speed to the Russian Novik, to reinforce the naval forces of the Baltic Sea. However, both German ships, as it turned out, came here to meet their imminent death: the Bremen cruiser died on Russian mines near Vindava on December 4 (17), 1915, taking 250 crew members with it, and the V-99 ran aground at Luserort after an inglorious defeat by Novik in the battle on August 4 (17), losing 43 people killed and wounded (p. 47).

The Riga case is a good illustration
to the stupidity that reigns in our fleet.
We made a jump into the void, and the Russians
won a major naval victory.

Grand Admiral Alfred Friedrich von Tirpitz

These words of the main creator and commander of the German Navy D.Yu.Kozlov put as an epigraph to another of his books - “Battle for the Gulf of Riga. Summer 1915"(M. : Tseikhgauz, 2007. 64 p. : ill. ( Battles of the Great War ) ).

After the bloody victories in the Carpathian passes at the beginning of 1915, where the last strategic stocks of ammunition were wasted and the last reserves thrown into battle, the entire tragic year for Russia in 1915, the Russian Imperial Army suffered one defeat after another, leaving not only Galicia, conquered at such a high price, but actually the lands of the empire: Poland, Courland and others. Against the backdrop of severe setbacks, the victory over the German fleet in the battle for the Gulf of Riga stands out especially clearly. The victory in this battle did not demonstrate the brilliant genius of the Russian naval commanders, but rightfully went to the side that made the fewest mistakes. After the failure of the Irben operation in the Gulf of Riga, active operations of the German fleet in the Baltic Sea ceased for more than two years. Only in October 1917, when the demoralized Russian army surrenders Riga to the Germans, the squadrons of the High Seas Fleet will reappear at the Moonsund Islands.<…>

The August events deprived the command of the Baltic Fleet of illusions about the readiness of the British fleet at the right time to assist the Russian allies with active operations in the North Sea. Since the Germans, without fear of a superior English fleet, could concentrate half of their naval forces (including a squadron of the most modern dreadnought battleships) in the Baltic Sea for an operationally significant period of time, the Russian command had to reckon with the possibility of enemy actions not only against the Riga, but also against Gulf of Finland(p. 60).

Ending

The book by Vyacheslav Meshkov can be purchased at the Assortment Room of the RSL (open door immediately to the left of the main entrance, to the turnstiles) or

Naval arms race

Stubborn rivalry in building up naval power unfolded before the First World War between Germany and England. England, which owned vast colonies on all continents, occupied the first place in the world in terms of naval forces and merchant marine. The German navy was significantly inferior to the English, as can be seen from the table.

Despite its naval superiority, England continued to build up its naval forces. In 1889, Parliament passed a law that increased loans for the construction of the fleet. This law was based on the principle that the fleet of England was to surpass the two fleets of the most powerful other countries (137).

Table. The composition of the fleets of England and Germany by 1897*

Ship types	Quantity (including those under construction)		Ratio
	England	Germany
Battleships I, II, III classes
Coastal defense battleships
Armored cruisers
Cruisers I, II, III classes
Mine cruisers
destroyer destroyers
destroyers

* "Comparative tables of the navies of England, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, the USA and the republics of South America." SPb., 1897, pp. 66 - 71. The table includes only ships that had combat value in 1897.

German imperialists, who became in the last quarter of the XIX century. on the path of colonial conquest, they decided to intensively develop their navy. Adopted in March 1898 by the Reichstag, a special "Law on the Navy" provided for a sharp increase in it. Within six years (1898 - 1903) it was planned to build 11 squadron battleships, 5 large armored cruisers, 17 cruisers with an armored deck and 63 destroyers (138). German shipbuilding programs steadily expanded in 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912. According to the law of 1912, the size of the German fleet was supposed to be increased to 41 battleships, 20 armored cruisers, 40 light cruisers, 144 destroyers and 72 submarines (139). The pace of construction of battleships was especially accelerated. From 1908 to 1912, 4 battleships were laid down in Germany annually (instead of 2 in the previous period) and a corresponding number of cruisers and destroyers (140).

The British bourgeoisie understood that the decisions of the German government in the development of the navy threatened the naval power of England. Not wanting to lose her superiority on the seas, England also intensified the naval arms race. She set a goal of having 60% more battleships than there were in the German fleet (141). In addition, in 1905 the British government began building battleships of a new type - "dreadnoughts", which had a significant advantage over previous ships. By building dreadnoughts, England intended to make a major leap in the development of her naval power and force Germany to admit that she was powerless to shake England's naval hegemony.
However, Germany sought not only to catch up with England in the number of ships, but also not to be inferior to her in their quality and "to build ships so that in the event of a conflict they would be at least equivalent in combat power to the ships of the enemy" (142). Therefore, as soon as the first dreadnought was built in England, Germany began to build similar ships. Already in 1908, England had 8 dreadnoughts (some of them were under construction), and Germany - 7. The ratio of the old type of battleships was as follows: 51 for England and 24 for Germany (143).

In view of the growing threat to British naval power from Germany, England in 1909 decided to build two ships for every newly laid down German ship (144). Adopted in March 1909, the naval budget for 1909/10 allowed the government to build up to eight dreadnoughts, not counting a large number of smaller ships. In fact, nine dreadnoughts were laid - one ship of this type was built at the expense of New Zealand (145).
England also sought to preserve its naval power through diplomacy. After the adoption in Germany of the Naval Law of 1906, the British government came up with a proposal to limit the scale of construction of new warships. At the Hague Peace Conference in 1907, British diplomacy came up with a proposal to limit naval armaments (146). But this diplomatic step of England was rejected by Germany. German diplomacy spoke out extremely sharply and rudely against any kind of arms limitation.
The competition in the construction of the navy between Germany and England continued until the outbreak of the First World War. By 1914, the German fleet firmly took second place among the fleets of the largest maritime powers.

The frenzied arms race that engulfed England and Germany marked the approach of war. V. I. Lenin, noting this in 1911 in the article “Congress of the British Social Democratic Party”, wrote: “It is known that in recent years both England and Germany have been arming extremely intensively. The competition of these countries in the world market is becoming more and more aggravated. The military clash is approaching more and more menacingly” (147). This scientific prediction of V. I. Lenin came true only three years later.
Other states (France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary) also sought to increase their fleets by building new, more modern ships. However, the financial and economic capabilities of these countries did not allow the full implementation of the adopted shipbuilding programs. Russia can serve as a typical example in this respect.
The tsarist government, which lost during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. almost the entire Pacific squadron and the best ships of the Baltic Fleet sent to Far East, directed efforts towards the restoration and further development of the navy. To this end, in the period from 1905 to 1914, several shipbuilding programs were developed, which included the completion of the previously laid down 4 squadron battleships, 4 armored cruisers, 4 gunboats and 2 submarines, 2 minelayers and the construction of new 8 battleships, 4 battleships and 10 light cruisers, 67 destroyers and 36 submarines. However, by the beginning of the war, none of these programs had been completed (148).

Ship classes, combat assets and weapons

The experience of the first wars of the era of imperialism, especially the Russo-Japanese war, presented new requirements for various classes of ships, weapons and military equipment of the navies.

For battleships, it became necessary to strengthen the artillery of the main caliber 305 - 381 mm to 8 - 12 guns and the anti-mine caliber 120-150 mm to 14-18 guns due to the abandonment of the medium caliber, strengthening the armor of the main belt to 305 - 350 mm and expanding the armor area in order to increase the survivability of the ship in battle, increase the displacement to 25 - 27 thousand tons and speed to 23-25 ​​knots.
The first battleship of a new type called the Dreadnought was built in England (commissioned in 1907) and, in terms of its tactical and technical data, differed sharply from the squadron battleships of the period of the Russo-Japanese War. Table 10 provides a visual representation of this.

Table 10. The performance data of the Russian squadron battleship "Borodino" and the English battleship "Dreadnought" *

	"Borodino"	"Dreadnought"
Year of commissioning
Displacement, t
Machine power, l. With.
Cruising range, miles
Travel speed, knots
Armament:
artillery (number/caliber of guns, mm)
torpedo (number/caliber of torpedo tubes, mm)
Booking, mm
onboard
tower
deck

* A. P. Shershov. The history of military shipbuilding from ancient times to the present day. M. - L., 1940, pp. 144, 241-242, 346 - 347; S. P. Moiseev. List of ships of the Russian steam and armored fleet (from 1861 to 1917). M., 1948, pp. 58 - 59.

The table shows that the English ship was significantly superior to the Russian battleship in terms of machine power, speed, main caliber artillery and armor.
Following England, other major maritime powers began building battleships of the "dreadnought" type.
It should be noted that two trends were observed in the development of the class of battleships, which were most clearly manifested in the English and German fleets. They were explained by different operational and tactical considerations. The Germans, expecting an attack by a stronger, English fleet near their coasts, paid their main attention to strengthening the armor and increasing the number of guns, neglecting to a certain extent even the speed of movement. The British, on the other hand, attached paramount importance to the speed and caliber of the guns, so that they could deprive the enemy of the initiative in choosing the time and place of the battle. These trends can be traced by comparing the performance data of the English battleship Queen Elizabeth and the German battleship Koenig (Table 11), which were built at the same time (1911-1914).

Table 11 Tactical and technical data of the battleships "Queen Elizabeth" and "Koenig"*

* F. Jane. Fighting Ships, 1915; AT. Weger. Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten, 1914; x.wilson. Battleships in battle. Per from English. M., 1936, pp. 414, 422; "Operational-tactical views of the German Navy". Digest of articles. M. - L., 1941, p. 16.

French and Italian battleships of pre-war construction also had quite good tactical and technical elements. A characteristic feature of the Italian battleships was the advantage in speed with the same power equipment and armor. The battleships of the Austro-Hungarian fleet were somewhat inferior to the French and Italian ones.
The idea of ​​creating a new type of battleship was first developed by Russian sailors and shipbuilders S. O. Makarov, A. N. Krylov, I. G. Bubnov. But due to economic backwardness tsarist Russia and the inertia of its ruling circles, this idea was not implemented in a timely manner. The construction of new battleships in Russia began with a great delay and was carried out at a slow pace.
The first Russian dreadnought ships ("Sevastopol", "Gangut", "Petropavlovsk" and "Poltava") were laid down in the summer of 1909 at the Baltic and Admiralty plants in St. Petersburg in accordance with the shipbuilding program of 1908. Their construction was delayed, and they entered into operation only in November - December 1914, that is, after the start of the world war (149). The battleships of the Sevastopol type, designed taking into account the experience of the Russian-Japanese war and the achievements of advanced Russian shipbuilding science, surpassed not only the first dreadnoughts of England, Germany and other states, but also the battleships of foreign fleets built simultaneously with them or even later.
On the eve of the war, a new type of heavy cruiser was born - a battle cruiser, which had a high speed for that time (almost 30 knots), strong artillery (up to 12,356 mm main caliber guns) and powerful armor (up to 300 mm). Cruisers of this type had turbine engines and took a large amount of liquid fuel. In terms of their combat qualities, they left the old armored cruisers far behind.
In Russia, the battlecruisers ("Izmail", "Borodino", "Navarin" and "Kinburn"), intended for the Baltic Fleet (laid down in December 1912), were the most powerful in the world in terms of artillery weapons. But by the beginning of the war they remained unfinished (150).
In all fleets, great attention was paid to the development of light cruisers and destroyers. An increase in the speed and anti-mine artillery of battleships and cruisers required a significant increase in speed (up to 30 knots and more) and the strengthening of artillery and torpedo weapons of light cruisers and destroyers. The old types of these ships could no longer perform their tasks in squadron combat.
In 1910, the construction of new destroyers of the Novik type began at the Putilov Plant, and in 1913 - light cruisers of the Svetlana type. The first destroyer entered service in 1913, but the cruisers could not be completed during the war (151) .
The experience of using mine weapons in the Russo-Japanese War revealed the need to create special ships for setting and sweeping minefields - minelayers and minesweepers

However, in all fleets, with the exception of the Russian fleet, no attention was paid to the construction of such ships. It was believed that with the outbreak of war, merchant ships could be equipped for such ships. In Russia, after the war with Japan, two special minelayers "Amur" and "Yenisei" were built, and in 1910 the world's first underwater minelayer "Crab" was laid. The construction of special minesweepers of the Zapal type also began.
In the prewar years, insufficient attention was paid in the West European fleets to the construction of submarines. This was due to two reasons. Firstly, the then dominant naval doctrine of "ownership of the sea" assigned the submarine one of the last places in the struggle at sea, since victory was achieved, as she believed, by linear forces in a pitched battle. Secondly, in previous wars, the submarine has not yet revealed its combat capabilities. This happened already during the First World War. As a result, by the beginning of the war, its main participants had a small number of submarines in their fleets. France had 38 of them, Germany - 28, Russia - 23. And only England had 76 boats, but among them there were many obsolete ones. One of the best submarines of pre-war projects was considered to be Russian submarines of the Bars type, laid down in 1912.

In the prewar years, work began on the creation of seaplanes in the largest imperialist states. Several types of such machines were designed and built, but almost all of them did not leave the stage of experimental testing before the start of the war. Only in the course of the war did the fleets begin to receive aircraft suitable for solving combat missions, among them the Avro (England), Borel (France), Flugbot (Germany) (154).
The situation was different in Russia. Russian aircraft designer D. P. Grigorovich in 1912-1913. created several models of the M-type seaplane (M-1, M-2, M-4, M-5), which were immediately found practical use in the fleet. The M-5 aircraft turned out to be especially successful. He had high tactical flight qualities (flight weight - 660 kg, payload - 300 kg, ceiling - 4450 m, speed - 128 km / h). In 1914, he was accepted into service with the fleet as a naval reconnaissance officer. It remained in the hydroaviation until 1921. The M-9 aircraft, created by Grigorovich in 1916, had higher tactical flight data.

Russian engineers also took care of special ships - carriers of seaplanes. In 1913, engineer Shishkov designed a high-speed air transport that could take up to seven aircraft. Since the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet was equipped with several such aircraft, the aircraft of which conducted aerial reconnaissance and covered the ships of the squadron from the air in remote areas of the sea.
The development of various classes of ships, the increase in the number of submarines in the fleet and their combat capabilities, as well as the emergence of naval aviation, required further improvement of all types of weapons and the creation of new means of combat. Particular attention was paid to improving the tactical and technical data of naval artillery, since it continued to be the main weapon of the fleet. By the beginning of the First World War, the caliber of heavy guns had increased to 356 - 381 mm, mine artillery - up to 152 mm; anti-aircraft guns with a caliber of up to 76 mm appeared. The initial speed of the shells also increased - up to 950 m / s, the rate of fire of large guns - up to two rounds per minute, the firing range - up to 120 cables (156).
At the same time, the relative weight of the shells increased, their penetrating and high-explosive actions increased, as the shells began to be filled with stronger explosives; improved methods of controlling artillery fire. The art of fire control has always been the most important factor in the battle of surface ships.

Speaking of this, it should be noted that the English fleet entered the First World War less prepared for artillery combat than the German fleet. In terms of range, the British and German guns of the main calibers were approximately the same. But the high-explosive shells of the British, which had sensitive fuses, did not penetrate the armor of the German ships, and in the event of penetration they did not cause major damage. The German shells, on the other hand, pierced the weaker armor of the English ships and caused severe damage. The British were also unable to develop their own artillery fire control system before the war. Already in the course of the war, they realized that they were lagging behind in this matter, and used many of the Russian methods of controlling fire (157).
A major contribution to the development of artillery weapons was made by Russian engineers and gunners-sailors. Before the war, Russian factories mastered the production of improved models of naval guns of caliber 356, 305, 130 and 100 mm (158). The production of three-gun ship turrets also began. In 1914, the engineer of the Putilov factory F.F. Lender and the artilleryman V.V. Tarnovsky were pioneers in the creation of a special anti-aircraft gun with a caliber of 76 mm (159).

The development of torpedo and mine weapons was especially influenced by Russo-Japanese War. The improvement of the torpedo went along the line of increasing its destructive power, firing range and speed. The most common in all fleets was the 450-mm torpedo, which had a range of 16 cables (about 3000 m) at a speed of 29 knots. In some fleets during the war, ships were armed with torpedoes of larger calibers (500, 530 and 550 mm), with a speed of 45 knots at a distance of 15 cables.
In Russia, in the prewar period, three new models of torpedoes were developed (1908, 1910 and 1912), which surpassed the same type of torpedoes of foreign fleets in speed and range, despite the fact that they had a slightly lower total weight and charge weight (160) .
Before the war, multi-tube torpedo tubes appeared. The first such (three-pipe) apparatus was produced in 1913 at the Putilov plant in St. Petersburg. He provided volley fire with a fan, the methods of which were developed and mastered by Russian torpedoists before the start of the war.
The development of mine weapons was characterized by an increase in the mine charge to 150 kg, which consisted of a stronger explosive (tol), improved fuses, and an increase in speed and depth of setting. On the eve of the war, the fleets were armed with shock and galvanic impact mines. During the war, antenna mines appeared, and at the very end of it, magnetic mines.

The first place in the development of mine weapons was occupied by the Russian fleet. Before the World War, the Russian fleet developed galvanic and shock-mechanical mines of the 1908 model and the 1912 model. According to the tactical and technical data, these mines were much superior to foreign ones, especially in the reliability of action. In 1913, a floating mine "P-13" was designed, which was kept under water at a certain depth due to the action of an electric navigation device. Mines of old samples of this type were kept under water with the help of buoys that did not ensure the stability of the mine, especially in stormy weather. "P-13" had an electric shock fuse, a charge of 100 kg of tol and could stay at a given recess for three days. None of the foreign fleets had a similar mine. Russian miners created the world's first river mine "R" ("Rybka").
At the beginning of the war, Russian designers of mine weapons and practical miners provided great assistance to the allied English fleet in organizing the production of mines and training personnel in the methods of using mine weapons, since the British were far behind in this matter. At the request of the British Admiralty, a group of miners was sent to England with a supply of mines in 1000 pieces.

The Russian fleet went ahead of foreign fleets also in the creation of more advanced models of minesweeping weapons. In 1911, undercutting kite and boat trawls entered service. The use of these trawls significantly reduced the time of minesweeper work, since mines that were cut and floated to the surface were immediately destroyed. Previously, mines had to be towed to a shallow place and destroyed there, which took a lot of time.
The Russian fleet was the cradle of radio. Radio has become a common means of communication in the navy in general, and in particular it has found wide application in command and control of forces in battle. Before the war, Russian radio engineers created radio direction finders, which made it possible to use radio as a means of reconnaissance.

Organization and management

The navies of the major imperialist states (Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and others) consisted of fleets (flotillas) deployed in different maritime theaters. The fleet (naval forces of the theater) was the highest operational formation, which, depending on the composition of its forces, goals and the nature of the war, could solve not only operational, but also strategic tasks.

The squadron was the main operational formation of battle forces (battleships, battleships and armored cruisers) in all fleets, with the exception of the Turkish one. Squadrons could be homogeneous, consisting of ships of the same class (for example, battleships or cruisers), and mixed, which included ships of different classes (battleships, cruisers, destroyers). If there were several squadrons in one theater, they were reduced to large operational formations (for example, the British 1st, 2nd and 3rd fleets). From light surface forces (light cruisers, destroyers, destroyers), submarines and special-purpose ships (minelayers, minesweepers, patrol ships, gunboats, etc.), homogeneous or mixed were created (again, depending on the availability of ships of these classes ) operational and tactical formations - flotillas, divisions, brigades, divisions, detachments. At the same time, it should be noted that the same type of formations in different fleets had different names. For example, formations of destroyers and destroyers in the English, German, French and Austro-Hungarian fleets were called flotillas, in Russian - divisions, and in Italian - brigades, regardless of the number of ships that were part of them. The numerical composition of associations and formations was the most diverse.

The organization of command of the naval forces in different countries was also different. In England, the main governing body of the fleet was the Admiralty, which in the fall of 1911 was headed by W. Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty (Minister of the Navy). The Admiralty was engaged in planning the construction of the fleet and its combat training, developing plans of operations and managing combat operations on an operational-strategic scale. In the English naval forces there was still the post of the first sea lord, that is, the commander in chief of all fleets. This post was held by Admiral Lord Fisher from October 1914. In 1912, the Naval General Staff was created, but before the start of the war it did not find its place in the fleet management system. Head of the Marine general staff at the beginning of the war was Vice Admiral Sturdee, and from November 1, 1914 - Rear Admiral Oliver (163). The rights and obligations of the commanders of individual fleets were limited to the development and conduct of combat operations on an operational-tactical scale, the combat training of the personnel of ships and formations and their maintenance in a combat-ready state.

The supreme command of the naval forces in Germany belonged undividedly to the Kaiser, who was subordinate to: the Naval Ministry (State Secretariat of the Imperial Naval Administration), headed by Grand Admiral Tirpitz, the Kaiser's Naval Cabinet, headed by Admiral Müller, and the Admiral Staff (Naval General Staff) , led by Admiral Pohl. The Naval Ministry was in charge of the organization, management and material support of the fleet. It had no direct influence on the management of the combat activities of the fleet during the war. The Naval Cabinet dealt mainly with the recruitment and service of officers. Admiral Headquarters as an organ supreme commander(Kaiser), carried out the development of plans of operations, the distribution of forces in maritime theaters in accordance with the tasks assigned to the fleet. The commanders of forces in the North and Baltic Seas were directly subordinate to the Kaiser. They were responsible for combat training, manning, the technical condition of the ship's composition, and in wartime, for the conduct of hostilities of their fleets (164). As can be seen from the above structure of the fleet control bodies and the functions they performed, in Germany, in fact, there was no high naval command that would be fully responsible for waging war at sea. This circumstance had an extremely unfavorable effect on the combat activity of the fleet.

At the head of the management of the naval forces of France was the Minister of Marine with his operational body - the Naval General Staff. He was directly subordinate to the commander of the fleet of the Mediterranean Sea and the commander of the naval forces of the Channel. The General Staff developed plans for operations and supervised their implementation.

The commander-in-chief of the Italian fleet (he is also the commander of the first squadron), the Duke of Abrutsky, was subordinate to the chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral di Rivel, who was in charge of the combat activities of the fleet. The Naval Ministry, with its directorates and departments, was in charge of shipbuilding, manning and mobilization, all types of weapons, the development of coastal defense, as well as the equipment of naval bases and ports and the logistics of the fleet, i.e., everything related to general preparation of the fleet for war (166).
In Austria-Hungary, the fleet was subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces. The Maritime Ministry did not exist. Its functions were performed by the Naval Department of the War Ministry. The head of this department had great independence and could personally report to the emperor on all the most important issues of building, maintaining and managing the fleet.

In Turkey, the fleet management system was violated before the start of hostilities in the Black Sea. With the arrival of the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau, the German Admiral Souchon became the commander of the naval forces, who often gave orders over the head of the Minister of the Navy, Ahmet Dzhemal.
The Naval Ministry, which since 1911 was headed by Admiral I.K. Grigorovich, was the governing body of the naval forces of Russia as a whole. The Naval Ministry included: the Admiralty Council, which was directly chaired by the Minister of Marine, the Main Naval Headquarters, the Main Naval Court, the Main Naval Ship Administration, the Main Shipbuilding Administration, the Main Hydrographic Administration, the Main Maritime Economic Administration and other administrations, departments and divisions (169).

In 1906, the Naval General Staff was created, which was entrusted with solving strategic problems, planning the construction of the fleet, conducting its mobilization, and managing general training naval forces for war. The establishment of the Naval General Staff was a positive factor in the restoration of the Russian naval forces. With its creation, the functions of the Main Naval Staff changed significantly, which now was in charge of the personnel of the fleet, the combatant, administrative and military training units, as well as the legislative part of the naval department (170).
In addition to naval formations and formations, the naval command in England, Germany and Italy was completely subordinate to the coastal defense of the country, including sea fortresses, naval bases and military ports with their garrisons.

This had a positive effect on the organization and conduct of coastal defense in these countries. This was not the case in other states. In France, for example, there was a dual system of subordination of coastal defense. The entire coast of the country was divided into maritime districts, each of which was divided into several sectors. At the head of the district was the naval commander, but in relation to the command ground forces of his district, he reported directly to the Minister of War. Naval or army officers were appointed as heads of sectors, depending on which forces prevailed there. In Austria-Hungary, coastal defense was the responsibility of the War Ministry. As for Russia, before the start of the war, there was no unified system of coastal defense on a national scale. The land defense of most naval fortresses and naval bases and ports was under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry. The commanders of naval bases (ports) and the heads of their garrisons (commandants) were independent of each other. Only in one Sevastopol the commandant of the fortress was subordinate to the chief commander of the port (171).
Picking system
There was no unified system for manning fleets with rank and file. In some countries, it was carried out by free hiring (recruitment), in others - by military service, and in others - by a mixed system, partly by recruitment, partly by military service.
In England, the rank and file of the fleet was completed by free hiring. Those who wanted to serve in the Navy signed a contract for 5 or 12 years, with subsequent continuation of service with a positive certification for another 6 years for the first and 10 years for the second. Those who signed a contract for 5 years were immediately sent to the ships as sailors of the 2nd article, and those who had a contract for 12 years entered junior schools, after which they were sent to ships and continued to serve as sailors there, receiving a promotion in the articles. The best of them were promoted to non-commissioned officers. For the training of junior specialists in artillery and mine specialties, there were schools for foremen, where cadets who graduated from schools were accepted. In other specialties, there were no schools for either foremen or for officers. Personnel on them were prepared in a practical way, right on the ships. After passing the relevant exams, non-commissioned officers were promoted to officers. To improve the skills of artillerymen, miners and navigators, there were special classes. In England there was a Naval Academy, but with a very short training period - only 4 months. Senior officers and admirals were accepted into it.

The system of manning the fleet adopted in England had the positive side that, as a result of long service, the personnel received extensive experience and good maritime training. But this system did not ensure the accumulation of the reserve. That is why, already during the war, the British were forced to partially introduce military service.
The German fleet was recruited for military service, as well as at the expense of the Jung and volunteers. The term of service in the Navy was set at three years, after which enrollment in the reserve of various degrees followed until the age of 40. The junior officers and specialists of the fleet were recruited from young graduates of the school and volunteers after appropriate training. Mechanical engineers for the fleet were trained from persons who had graduated from secondary technical schools and had experience in practical work at shipbuilding plants. They were sent to serve on ships, and then, after a year of training in the class of marine engineers, they were promoted to the exam in the mechanical engineer of the fleet. The German Naval Academy had a two-year term of study.

The officers of the English and German fleets were recruited according to the class principle - from the nobility and the bourgeoisie. Only mechanical engineers of the German Navy could come from other classes.
In France, the fleet manning system was quite complicated. The rank and file of the fleet was completed on the basis of the so-called naval record, the recruitment of "hunters" and general military service. The “marine record” consisted in the fact that the entire male population of the coastal strip of France aged 18 to 50 years was assigned to the fleet in relation to military service. However, in practice, the "recorded" served in the Navy for no more than 45 months, and then they could, if desired, either continue their service or be transferred to the reserve. The "recorded" enjoyed a number of privileges in receiving pensions, awards and sea fishing. In 1912, the period of compulsory service for them was reduced to 2 years. Those who remained to serve further had the right of their choice to enter the schools of naval specialists and advance in the service up to the officer rank.
When recruiting "hunters", a contract was concluded for 5 years according to the naval specialty chosen by them. The missing number of recruits after the admission of "recorded" and "hunters" was replenished through military service with a mandatory service period of 2 years. In the French fleet, as in other fleets, there was a junior school, which provided the main contingent for schools of junior fleet specialists.

The Austro-Hungarian and Italian fleets were recruited for military service from the population of coastal districts or persons who, before being drafted, had something to do with the sea (merchant sailors, fishermen) or the fleet (shipbuilders). In the Italian Navy, in addition, there was a cabin boy school. Terms of service: in the Austro-Hungarian fleet - 12 years, of which 4 years in active service, 5 years in the reserve and 3 years in the militia; in Italian, 4 years in active service and 8 years in reserve. For the training of junior specialists and officer cadres, there were appropriate schools and colleges (175).
The officer corps of the Austro-Hungarian fleet was formed taking into account not only the class, but also the national principle. The vast majority were Austrian Germans.

The rank and file, in addition to the Germans, was made up of Hungarians, Italians and representatives of the Slavic peoples.
The recruitment system of the Russian fleet was almost entirely based on conscription. According to the regulation approved in 1912, upon reaching military age and fit for health reasons, all persons who had navigational ranks and the ranks of ship mechanics, as well as those who sailed on merchant ships as sailors, helmsmen and stokers, were necessarily involved in the service in the navy upon reaching military age and fit for health reasons. Further, preference was given to recruits from factory workers who had specialties in metalwork and assembly, turning, boiler and blacksmithing, minders, electricians, telegraph operators and other specialists.

Therefore, among the rank and file of the fleet there was always a significant layer of factory workers, which created favorable conditions for the development of the revolutionary movement in the fleet. The missing part of the rank and file was recruited from the inhabitants of the coastal and riverine regions of the country.
The total service life for the ratings of the fleet was set at 10 years, of which 5 years in active service and 5 years in reserve (177).
In the prewar years, a Jung school was opened for the Baltic Fleet in Kronstadt. By creating it, the Naval Ministry not only had in mind the improvement of the quality of training of the fleet personnel, but also pursued political goals. Through the Jung school, it hoped to train servicemen devoted to the tsarist autocracy, who could be used in the fight against the revolutionary movement in the navy. However, the calculations of the tsarist authorities did not come true in this case either. Despite the brutal repressions and attempts to create a certain layer of trustworthy among the personnel, the revolutionary movement in the navy grew more and more.

For the training of non-commissioned officer rank specialists in the Baltic and Black Seas, there were training detachments, which included artillery and mine schools. In addition, various schools, classes and training teams were created that were not part of the training detachments: engine schools and schools for helmsmen and signalmen of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, a diving school (common for both fleets), a diving school for the Baltic Fleet, paramedic schools in Kronstadt and Nikolaev, training teams of non-commissioned officers of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, etc.

The officers of the fleet were recruited from the children of the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and officials. AT engineering schools people from other strata of the population were also accepted. Training of officers was carried out in the Naval Corps, special classes and the Naval Academy.
During the First World War, in many countries the system of manning the fleets with privates and officers underwent significant changes. The war caused a large expenditure of naval personnel. Recruitment and training of replacements could not be carried out according to pre-war norms and principles. The terms of training were reduced, some qualification restrictions were abolished in the service of officers, and admission to the officer corps was expanded for people from petty-bourgeois strata.

combat training

In the English and German fleets, combat training was carried out almost all year round. It usually began with a single preparation of the ship, then tactical exercises of homogeneous and heterogeneous formations followed, and as a result, final maneuvers of large formations and formations were carried out. In England, the maneuvers were predominantly operational in nature; Germany conducted bilateral tactical and operational maneuvers.
In the German Navy, much attention was paid to artillery firing, which was carried out at long distances against shields equal in area to ships. In terms of the level of artillery training, the British fleet was significantly inferior to the German one. The well-known English naval historian X. Wilson later admitted that "in the first period of the war, British ships ... showed in this regard a significant and very dangerous weakness compared to the German ones."

In both fleets, the destroyers carried out salvo torpedo firing, and the German destroyers, in addition, practiced daytime torpedo attacks. The Germans set up training minefields, and then they were cleared out by minesweepers equipped with obsolete destroyers.
In the English and German fleets, great importance was attached to the naval training of personnel and the training of formations in joint navigation. A major shortcoming in the combat training of both fleets was that they did not prepare for joint operations with the ground forces. If we talk about the level of combat training in general, then in the German fleet it was somewhat higher than in the English, especially in the field of tactics and the use of weapons. In other Western European fleets, combat training did not have any significant differences, except that it was carried out at a lower level compared to the fleets of Germany and England.

The Turkish fleet occupied a special position in terms of combat training. The rank and file of the fleet was recruited mainly at the expense of peasants of the Muslim faith. Cadres of junior specialists of the fleet and non-commissioned officers were not being trained. The states of the officers on the ships and in the units were incredibly inflated. By the beginning of the war, there were 8 for 10 sailors.
According to German officer Herman Lorey, who served in the Turkish Navy during the war years, Turkish warships were “mainly“ floating barracks ”, and life on them was reduced to food, uniforms and theoretical training ... Only a small part of the personnel was on the ships, but and she did not swim, but spent her time in inactivity in sheltered harbors ”(180). After the war with Russia 1877-1878. Turkish ships did not leave the Bosporus for the Black Sea until the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). “... Therefore,” Lorey continues, “the personnel were not used to the sea and had no maritime experience” (181).

Further, he notes major shortcomings in the organization of certain types of combat training (artillery and torpedo firing, ensuring the survivability of a ship in battle, navigation, etc.), poor provision of the fleet with combat stock, fuel and other types of supplies. Finishing the characterization of the Turkish fleet by the beginning of the war, Lorey writes that “by the time the German ships arrived, mobilization was in full swing, but neither the ships nor the shipyards showed any preparations for hostilities” (182). In many ways, Lorey was, of course, right. However, one cannot ignore the fact that Lorey and other Germans, who arrived in the Turkish fleet along with the Goeben and Breslau or later, tried in every possible way to inflate their role in the “transformation” of the Turkish fleet after the war. fighting on the Black Sea during the war showed that if we exclude the German ships that were part of the Turkish fleet, then the latter made very little progress in its combat capability.
A little more detail should be given to the combat training of the Russian fleet, since it had some characteristic features. The advanced officers of the Russian fleet had a hard time experiencing the tragedy of Tsushima. They paid attention primarily to the combat training of personnel. And, I must say, we have achieved considerable results in this direction, especially in the Baltic Fleet.

In the Baltic Sea, the combat training of the fleet was led by Vice Admiral N. O. Essen, who largely adhered to the views of S. O. Makarov. Since 1906, he commanded the 1st mine division of the fleet, based on the ice-free port of Libau. The division's ships sailed all year round, regardless of meteorological conditions, which contributed to the development of endurance, courage, initiative and perseverance in the personnel in achieving the set goal, that is, those combat qualities that were required in the war. The 1st Mine Division became a combat training school; many commanders of ships and fleet formations passed through it in the prewar years (183). In November 1908, N. O. Essen was appointed head of the united detachments of the Baltic Sea. The first important event that he carried out on a fleet scale was to bring together previously disparate ships and detachments into formations capable of solving operational and tactical tasks.

A major shortcoming in the combat training of the Russian fleet over a long period was the practice of predominantly raid exercises. Due to the saving of material resources, ships went to sea, as a rule, only in the summer, and even then not for long. Now fundamental changes were made to the organization of combat training. A stage-by-stage training system was introduced: first, a single ship was trained, then a tactical formation (a division, a brigade of ships), then a large formation (a division of ships) and, finally, at the end of the campaign, maneuvers of the entire operating fleet.
Much attention in the Baltic Fleet was paid to artillery preparation. The Russian ships of the pre-war period, in terms of the power of their artillery weapons, were somewhat inferior to the ships of the same type of the German fleet (184). Therefore, equality or superiority over the enemy could only be achieved through the art of artillery shooting. The number of practical shootings was significantly increased, and the provision of their ammunition was improved. In 1910, special devices were introduced for training gunners to control the fire of a single ship and devices for quick loading of guns.

An important place in terms of the war on the Baltic Sea was given to defensive minelaying. To implement them, advance and thorough preparation was required, especially since the Baltic Fleet did not have a sufficient number of special minelayers. In the autumn of 1909, a detachment of minelayers was formed, which, in the spring of the following year, began intensive combat training aimed at carrying out minelaying, determined by the war plan. The ships of the detachment and destroyers of the 1st mine division practiced laying training mines in the areas of future defensive minefields.
No less seriously organized in the Navy was training for the use of torpedo weapons in a future war. New types of torpedoes (1908, 1910, 1912) were put into service, which required a comprehensive test. The carriers of torpedo weapons - destroyers and submarines - also became others. It was necessary to develop more advanced methods of torpedo firing. The center for combat training in the use of torpedo weapons was the 1st mine division of the fleet. Here, new torpedoes were tested and a method was developed for salvo fire on the area from three destroyers armed with three single-tube devices. Since 1910, combat training in the use of torpedo weapons has also been developed in the submarine brigade of the Baltic Fleet.