Why Hitler lost the war to the USSR. view from germany

Current page: 1 (the book has 27 pages in total)

Why did Hitler lose the war? german look
(Second World War. Life and Death on the Eastern Front).

Foreword by Alexei Isaev

"Twilight state of mind", temporary or permanent clouding of the mind is one of the convenient and common explanations for the adoption of military and political decisions of non-obvious expediency. Often, journalists and historians, like the screenwriters of mediocre Hollywood films, offer their readers mental disorders as an explanation for certain moves with disastrous consequences. Memoirists even more often pat on the back, or even after the fact generously hand out cuffs to the leaders, before whom they trembled in their time at the helm of power. However, most often this is nothing more than an attempt to find a simple answer to a complex question and the desire to avoid a deep analysis of the situation. To the greatest extent, the passion for the personal decision-making factor affected the history of the Third Reich. In some places, the really eccentric behavior of Adolf Hitler, repeatedly reinforced by third-hand retellings, provided enormous opportunities for shifting the burden of responsibility from objective factors to subjective factors. At the same time, critics of the decisions of the “possessed Fuhrer” did not always take a critical enough approach to the issue of the feasibility of theoretically correct versions of orders and instructions. All the more difficult is the understanding of the cause-and-effect relationships of events for foreigners, including the domestic reader.

The presented collection of articles fills this gap to some extent, covering the military and political aspects of the rise and fall of the Third Reich through the eyes of German specialists. It collects research on a wide range of topics, from weapons production to the strategic and political aspects of World War II.

The collection opens with an article by X. Hemberger on the German economy and industry on the eve and during the Second World War. The article describes the titanic work that was done in the 30s with the aim of turning the Third Reich into an autarchy capable of doing without imports certain types raw materials and food. Shortly after Hitler came to power, a plan was proposed and put into practice to replace several strategically important raw materials with synthetic counterparts. This primarily concerned rubber and hydrocarbon fuels. In the Third Reich, due to large-scale state investments in the chemical industry, the production of synthetic rubber and synthetic gasoline was launched. Hemberger traces the system of economic and political decisions of the German leadership, which made it possible to big step to the creation of an autarky capable of existing under blockade conditions.

At the same time, the image of Germany as a country experiencing a total shortage of all kinds of natural resources. Full provision of domestic needs with coal made it possible to spend large volumes of this fuel on the production of synthetic fuel. In addition, the situation has changed significantly since the First World War, not least due to the progress technical means waging war. Unlike the USSR, Germany not only covered its needs for aluminum and magnesium, but even had the opportunity to export these materials, which were essential for the aviation industry. In contrast, in the Soviet Union, the scarcity of bauxite deposits led to the widespread use of wood as a material for the production of aircraft. In the 1930s and 1940s, aviation became one of the most important instruments of warfare. The natural resources of Germany created all the possibilities for the production of high-quality combat aircraft. And terrorized European cities"Heinkels", and which became a symbol of the blitzkrieg, dive bombers "Ju-87", "Stuka", and "Messerschmitts" were built from "winged metal".

All-metal aircraft had undoubted advantages over Soviet aircraft, in the design of which the base material was wood. For example, hitting a 20-mm airgun projectile into a metal wing did not lead to damage that threatened to destroy the entire structure. On the contrary, for the wooden wing of a domestic aircraft during the war, the same hit threatened much more serious consequences. The wooden wing turned out to be heavier than a metal wing comparable in strength, in wartime conditions it was difficult to withstand its geometry and quality of finish. All these factors played a role in the air war on Eastern Front.

Moreover, German designers could afford the luxury of using aluminum alloys not only in aircraft construction, but even replacing steel with them in gun carriages (in particular, on the 150-mm heavy infantry gun "sIG-33") and producing from "winged metal » massive pontoons for the construction of floating bridges. All of these facts have been neglected in national historiography. The USSR was declared an inexhaustible pantry of natural resources, although this was generally not true. There were very few deposits of the main source of aluminum - bauxite - in the USSR, and the country experienced a severe shortage of aluminum, which was even supplied under lend-lease from the United States.

The view of German historians is also useful in terms of understanding the role of the Soviet Union as a subject of big European politics. characteristic feature Soviet historical school was an exaggeration of the importance of the USSR for Germany as an object for military operation. The “young Soviet state”, around which, like planets around the Sun since 1917, the world superpowers have been revolving, seeking to deal with it at all costs, is a highly distorted picture of world politics.

Another German historian, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, whose work is included in this collection, writes: “However, it was by no means the “living space in the East”, the forcible conquest of which already from the 1920s permeated Hitler’s political calculations, served as the main activating moment; no, the main impetus was the Napoleonic idea of defeating England by defeating Russia.”

Such an approach to the problem of the emergence of the Barbarossa plan was not typical for domestic historians, who focused more on long-term plans for the conquest of "living space" and the capture of natural resources. However, Adolf Hitler himself formulated the reasons for the attack on the USSR in a speech at a secret meeting at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht on January 9, 1941 as follows: “The British are supported by the hope that the Russians might intervene. They will only give up resistance when this last continental hope of theirs is crushed. He, the Fuhrer, does not believe that the British are "hopelessly stupid"; if they do not see any prospect, they will stop fighting. If they lose, they will never find the moral strength to save the empire. If they can hold out, form 30-40 divisions, and if the United States and Russia provide them with assistance, then a very difficult situation will be created for Germany. This cannot be allowed.

Until now, he [Hitler] has acted on the principle of striking at the most important positions of the enemy in order to advance one step further. Therefore, now it is necessary to defeat Russia. Then either England will surrender, or Germany will continue to fight against England under the most favorable conditions. The defeat of Russia will also allow Japan to turn all its forces against the United States. And this would keep the latter from entering the war.

The question of time is especially important for the defeat of Russia. Although the Russian armed forces are a clay colossus without a head, it is impossible to accurately predict their further development. Since Russia must be defeated in any case, it is best to do so now, when the Russian army is leaderless and ill-prepared, and when the Russians have to overcome great difficulties in the military industry created with outside help.

Nevertheless, even now the Russians cannot be underestimated. That's why German offensive must be carried out to the maximum. Under no circumstances should the frontal pushing back of the Russians be allowed. Therefore, the most decisive breakthroughs are needed. The most important task is to quickly cut off the Baltic Sea area; for this it is necessary to create a particularly strong grouping on the right wing of the German troops, which will advance north of the Pripyat marshes. Although the distances in Russia are large, they are no more than the distances that the German armed forces have already coped with. The goal of the operation should be to destroy the Russian armed forces, to seize the most important economic centers and to destroy other industrial regions, primarily in the Yekaterinburg region, in addition, it is necessary to capture the Baku region.

The defeat of Russia will be a great relief for Germany. Then only 40-50 divisions would have to be left in the East, the size of the land army could be reduced, and the entire military industry could be used to arm the air and naval forces. Then it will be necessary to create a reliable anti-aircraft cover and move the most important industrial enterprises to safe areas. Then Germany will be invulnerable.

The gigantic expanses of Russia are fraught with incalculable riches. Germany must take possession of these areas economically and politically, but not annex them. Thus, she will have all the possibilities for waging a future struggle against the continents, then no one else will be able to defeat her. 1
Dashichev V.I. Bankruptcy strategy of German fascism. M.: Nauka, 1973. S. 93–94 with reference to KTV OKW, Bd.I. S. 253–258.

A balanced look at the roots of the Barbarossa plan gives dynamics to the attitude of the leadership of the Third Reich towards the USSR. Initially, the campaign against the Soviet Union was auxiliary to the main (as it seemed to Hitler) events of the war in Europe, which were to unfold at sea and in the air. The collapse of the Barbarossa made the ancillary campaign the main content of the Second World War for Germany, relegating the air and sea war with England to the background.

In addition to the most significant issues of relations between the USSR and Germany for the domestic reader, German historians pay much attention to the consequences of the air battle over the Reich. Before us is a picture of the destruction of large cities, generated by the imperfection of weapons of air warfare. Bombers of the Second World War, armed with free-fall bombs dropped from a height of several kilometers, could only effectively hit a target of the “large city” type. Contrary to Douai's theory, the effect on big cities did not lead to the surrender of Germany. Air terror only embittered people in the rear and at the front. However, the German people had to pay dearly for testing the theory of the Italian military theorist in practice. Gerhard Schreiber writes: "As a result of the bombing, almost five million apartments were destroyed - a quarter of the total housing stock in 1939." At the same time, monuments of history and culture, created long before Hitler came to power, were destroyed.

On the contrary, industrial enterprises defended by strong air defense systems and represented relatively compact targets suffered much less. Schreiber gives the following estimates of the impact of Anglo-American aviation on German industry: “In general, the damage to the buildings and technical equipment of industrial enterprises caused by enemy air raids, ground battles and destruction by one’s own hands amounted to 10 to 15 percent of structures, if we take for the starting point of 1936 with its full workload.

Of course, the hopelessness of air terror was realized by the Anglo-American command, and in search of targets for a direct impact on the functioning of the German military machine, they turned their attention to communications. Schreiber writes: "After all, the Allies dropped seven times as many bombs on Germany's transport system - as well as on its civilian population, than on its military-industrial enterprises." It was the destruction of the transport network that prevented the rapid restoration of pre-war production volumes by German industry. At the same time, it should be noted (this moment was missed by Schreiber) that a massive impact on the transport network of the Third Reich began only in the autumn of 1944. Until September 1944, sporadic Allied bomber strikes were carried out on German railway and river communications, but they did not have any noticeable effect on transportation. Accordingly, the military industry of the Third Reich was able to reach peak performance. Bridges, railway junctions, and the infrastructure of the German river fleet were really hit hard only in September and October 1944. These strikes achieved their goals. On March 16, 1945, Speer reported to Hitler: "The German economy is in for an inevitable collapse within 4-8 weeks."

In addition to strategic economic issues, much attention is paid to big politics in the collection. Here, German historians also depart from the classic version of setting Germany against the USSR, on the one hand, and avoid sweeping accusations of suggestibility and weakness among major politicians. In particular, it is subjected to a thoughtful analysis of the politician Neville Chamberlain, the "father" Munich agreement. Sebastian Haffner: “The basis of the “pacifying” calculations was Hitler's anti-Bolshevism and his openly proclaimed plans for conquest in the East. They, as Chamberlain expected, made it impossible for Germany and Russia to act together. And while both continental giants kept each other at bay, England, together with France, dragging along in the wake of her policy, could, as has long been customary, play a decisive role. In addition, the old cordon sanitaire still existed between Germany and Russia - the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, etc. This cordon could prevent or at least complicate a direct military clash between Germany and Soviet Union". Thus, as we see, there was a desire of the British Prime Minister to create a system of "checks and balances" in Europe and avoid military action.

Explanations other than doubts about Hitler's mental capacity, Haffner also gives German policy towards the United States during 1940-1941: "The thirteen-month duel (from November 1940 to December 1941) between Roosevelt and Hitler looks funny, because Hitler acted in it in a completely unusual role: Roosevelt, full of rage, was opposed by the meek, almost like a lamb, Hitler. The German historian invites readers to look at the relationship between Roosevelt and Hitler from a different angle, and such a theory is quite worthy of the right to exist.

There is also a bridge in Haffner's work from politics to military operations. He explained the offensive of the German troops in the Ardennes from a political point of view: "Hitler wanted to put the Western powers before a choice: either at the last minute to come out with him against the Soviet Union, or stay with nothing." So big politics influenced strategy, proposing to attack in the West in the face of the threat of a strike in the East, which was to follow any day and really took place at the beginning of January 1945.

One can argue with the points of view expressed in the German View, but one thing is certain: they were expressed by people who understood well the realities of the country that was the enemy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

Hans Adolf Jacobsen
HOW THE SECOND WORLD WAR WAS LOST

At dawn on August 26, 1939, six days before the start of the war, the German Wehrmacht Special Forces suddenly captured the Yablunkovsky Pass in Poland. She had the task of keeping it open until the advance units arrived. ground forces; more than 2,000 Polish soldiers were captured at the same time. Hitler's order to postpone the offensive planned for August 26 could no longer reach this "detachment for operations in the dark" in time. He had to withdraw in small groups to the German border.

Only on August 31, 1939, Hitler gave the final order for the offensive: on September 1, at 4:45 am, the German divisions entered Poland. The Second World War broke out when England and France (including the dominions), fulfilling their allied obligations to Poland, declared war on Germany on September 3 after the expiration of their ultimatums. They did not stop even before the serious consequences of their step, as Hitler hoped to the very end, being in a state between illusion and self-deception. When the chief translator of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs translated the fatal words of the note from the Western powers to him, he "as if frozen ... and sat in his chair completely silent and motionless." Hitler's idea of the cowardly and accommodating position of England and France was not confirmed; his big trump card, the August 23 non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, did not play either: the allies were determined to put an end to Hitler's expansionist policy, which they had realized back in the spring. The time when they put up with the fait accompli is over. From the moment of the German occupation of the Czech Republic and Moravia, they, supported in that by the President of the United States, turned the steering wheel of their policy by 180 degrees: by entering Prague, Hitler "crossed the Rubicon."

In contrast to 1914, in relation to 1939, the problem of guilt for the war as such, in fact, does not stand, although its historical assessments could be more differentiated than is formulated in numerous post-war studies.

With regard to the outbreak of the First World War, West German and foreign researchers agree that we should talk about shared responsibility. All participants in this war, as Lloyd George once put it, were "drawn into" the conflict to a greater or lesser extent, and each of them, entering into it, sincerely believed that he had to defend himself, arms in hand, against attack from outside. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which placed the blame for the war solely on Germany and its allies, placed a fatal burden on the shoulders of the young Weimar Republic. After the collapse of the European state system as a result of the First World War, the failed attempt to reorganize Europe in 1919 provided fertile ground for a further, fraught with grave consequences, course of development. The Treaty of Versailles, neither territorially nor politically, much less morally, could satisfy the European nations, especially the defeated ones; Nor was he capable of promoting the desired comprehensive understanding. The then-created League of Nations, despite some of its achievements, was unable to resolve disputes at the international level, since it had to make decisions only unanimously and, moreover, did not have sufficient executive power. But the United States of America, which emerged from the First World War as a power-political and especially ideological leading force, stood especially far away from the League of Nations, and then again fell into isolationism.

In this era, which was also characterized by economic depression and spiritual crises, the demagogues found obedient masses who enabled them to carry out their own political ideas with promises and promises. One thing is certain: in 1933, Hitler began his foreign policy from the struggle against the Versailles "dictatorship". Under the slogan of “peace”, he freed Germany step by step from the restrictions imposed on her and, in his own way, helped to restore the full effectiveness of the unilaterally formulated right of peoples to self-determination in 1919. But behind this nationalistically framed policy of revision of the Treaty of Versailles, which its propagandists portrayed in the most favorable light, something much more was hidden from the very beginning. Along with internal consolidation and the creation of a totalitarian Fuhrer state, the formation of which Hitler accelerated by cruel means and methods, he purposefully pursued (at first only poorly realized as the realization of the ideas of his book " mein kampf”), two major goals: the risk-free conquest of “a corresponding population of living space” in the East (while settling scores with Bolshevism) and the establishment of his dominance in Europe, with which he intended to associate its nationalist transformation in the spirit of his racial theory . However, he always left the decision on the time and direction of this or that action (acting “this way or that way”) to himself, not making it until the very last moment.

Driven by his inherent impatience and fear of not being able to finish own life to carry out his historically unique "cause", Hitler in his policy did not take into account any rules of human and national coexistence. Since his actions, since 1935, did not encounter any significant resistance from the European powers, he acted more and more boldly: the restoration of universal conscription and the introduction of troops into the remilitarized Rhineland, combined with forced armaments - these were the first stages of his beginning prestigious successes. Instead of putting it in its place from the outset, which was still possible with the military superiority of the Western powers in the early years of National Socialist domination, England and France (underestimating the methods and dynamics of the totalitarian National Socialist system) believed that they could more quickly contribute to the solution all contentious issues with a policy of appeasement. In 1936, Hitler brought about the rapprochement with Italy that he sought (the Berlin-Rome axis), and also strengthened Germany's position as a bulwark against Bolshevism by concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan. A year later, at a secret meeting on November 5, 1937, in the narrowest circle, he declared that for him in resolving the issue of German living space there is only one path of force, and without risk this path is unthinkable.

When, on February 4, 1938, Hitler removed from their posts the Imperial Minister of War, Field Marshal von Blomberg and the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Baron von Fritsch, and took command of the Wehrmacht directly, another important step was taken: the strongest tool of the state, hitherto unified only politically, has now lost its professional-military independence. Thus, in a future war, the role of commander was to fall to Hitler's lot! At the same time, diplomacy also came under his influence when he appointed Ribbentrop as Reich Foreign Minister instead of Baron von Neurath. After the Anschluss of Austria, when Hitler's authority among the people was further strengthened, he began to strive for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. But first he had to content himself in Munich in September 1938 with a partial solution: Germany received the Sudetenland, which was occupied on October 1, 1938. Although Hitler on September 26 declared publicly in the Reichstag: "We do not need the Czechs", already in mid-December he gave the headquarters

The Supreme High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW), albeit with some reservations, an order to take all preparatory measures to defeat the rest of the Czech Republic.

* * *

The entry into Prague marked the beginning of a decisive turn towards war: far from being satisfied with this booty, Hitler turned his gaze to Poland. Since 1935, he tried to win her over to his side for a joint struggle against the Soviet Union. But he had to abandon this plan at the end of 1938, since the leading figures of Poland did not even think of allowing themselves to be made an instrument of the National Socialist aggressive policy, hoping to pursue an independent policy as a "third force" in Europe. They also rejected Hitler's proposals for resolving the question of Danzig and the corridor of March 21, 1939, while the Western powers on March 31 gave their guarantees to Poland. Hitler denounced the German-English naval agreement and the German-Polish non-aggression pact (April 28) and at the same time entered into a military alliance with Italy (the "Steel Pact"), and also, competing with the Western powers, stepped up diplomatic efforts against Moscow to get a free hand against Poland. This led on August 23, 1939 to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. After Hitler made the final decision to attack Poland in early August, German-Polish relations became more and more aggravated. The excesses of many Poles against the Volksdeutsche, deliberately exaggerated by the National Socialist press, gave Hitler a welcome pretext for a violent invasion. True, the conclusion of the Polish-British Mutual Assistance Pact of August 25 and Italy's declaration that it was not ready for war led once again to the postponement of the attack. But on August 31, 1939, Hitler ordered the entry of the Wehrmacht, after direct Polish-German negotiations did not take place and Poland, completely unaware of its actual military capabilities, announced mobilization on the afternoon of August 30.

The critically thinking politician of those dramatic August days of 1939 [the German ambassador in Rome] W. von Hassel described his impressions as follows: “... Hitler and Ribbentrop wanted war against Poland and deliberately risked war with the Western powers, until the last days temperature the illusion that they will remain neutral. The Poles, with their Polish arrogance and Slavic pliability to the course of events, imbued with confidence in England and France, missed any remaining chance to avoid war. The London government, whose ambassador did everything to keep the peace, last days stopped this race and made a kind of "Vogue la galiere" 2
Ibgue la galiere - the curve will take you out (fr.).

France followed this path with much greater hesitation. Mussolini spared no effort in order to avoid war ... ”It is characteristic that already in this first campaign, Hitler’s military goal went far beyond the defeat of the enemy armed forces: he wanted to fight until the complete annihilation of Poland!

Of course, the Second World War did not arise only as a result of the ambition and lust for power of an individual. But hardly any power was free from the blame for this second European catastrophe, for all the states that later participated in the war had previously rendered more or less strong assistance to the National Socialist policy. However, the fact remains that Hitler deliberately unleashed a war against Poland and thereby caused the Second world war. Therefore, he bears such responsibility for it, which is generally “conceivable within the framework of major global political processes” (Herzfeld).

The outbreak of World War II, which caused the German people not to delight, but to skepticism and gloomy forebodings, found the Wehrmacht in the midst of its construction. It was carried out at a very fast pace, almost in a hurry, and, moreover, in breadth, and therefore it lacked depth in the field of weapons and personnel. Thus, Germany still possessed an instrument of war that was far from being ready for action, even though in terms of production modern species weapons, and she was ahead of the Western powers. Of the required four-month supply of weapons of any kind, an average of 25% was available; ammunition for anti-aircraft artillery and aerial bombs was enough for only three months, while fuel supplies from reserves and current production, at best, covered the needs of only four war months. The General Staff of the Ground Forces did not undertake any operational preparations for the offensive, with the exception of those related to Poland, because it considered the ground forces exclusively as a combat-ready means of defense. Contrary to the allegations of the prosecution Nuremberg Trials major German war criminals (1945-1946), that the German General Staff had already developed plans for an offensive against the Western powers even before 1939, today it is firmly established: the first directive of the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops is dated October 19, 1939.

Moreover, Hitler imposed this directive on the leading officials of the OKH. After all, back in September, he faced a choice: either to neglect his latest political and just completed military seizures, or to “finally” settle accounts with the Western democracies, which, as he later told the generals, had been opposing the consolidation of the Reich for several decades. Considering the speed with which the German troops, brilliantly led by the OKH and the army group command, marched from success to success in Poland (while France, almost inactive, sat behind their Maginot Line!), and the growing awareness of the fact that Great Britain, entering the war, will fight to the last, Hitler wanted to use the imaginary favorable moment and force the enemy to a decisive battle. At the same time, the problem of neutrality did not play any role for him; if Germany won, no one would ask about it - that was his argument.

An impulsive and shameless course of action, in which he did not consider the views of others and the assessments of the situation by his closest military advisers, led Hitler in October to a hasty decision: while he seemed to have military superiority, it was necessary to attack the Western powers as soon as possible and destroy their. When Hitler, after the so-called peace proposal of October 6, 1939, ordered to speed up operational preparations for the offensive and, without waiting for the Western powers to respond to his proposal, set the first date on November 25, 1939, this caused indignation among the commander of Army Group C, Colonel General von Leeba. He wrote in his diary: “[…] all the orders […] indicate that this crazy offensive against the neutrality of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg is really going to be launched. So, Hitler's speech in the Reichstag was just a deception of the German people. Not only he and the General Staff of the Ground Forces, but also a number of other commanders of the armies involved in the west, rightly doubted that a decisive victory would be achieved that same autumn; in addition, the Polish campaign revealed the obvious shortcomings of the ground forces. At various meetings to discuss the situation, they repeatedly drew Hitler's attention to how little the German army at the moment, in terms of personnel training and armament, meets the high requirements of the march to the west. Of course, based on the experience of the First World War, they assessed the combat capability of the enemy, including the French, very highly. Colonel-General von Brauchitsch [Commander-in-Chief of the Army] tried to do this for the last time in a dramatic conversation with Hitler on November 5, and together with the Chief of his General Staff, General Halder, again and again made attempts to soberly state all military points of view and convince Hitler to use any the possibility of peace. This tragic contradiction (on the one hand, the desire to prevent the expansion of the conflict and turning it into a new world fire, and on the other hand, the need to move forward with all professionalism the preparations for a military campaign) made the highest demands on their moral sense of responsibility and on their soldierly sense of duty. . The full depth of this conflict with one's own conscience can be appreciated, however, only by one who was forced to act in the same position and received the same upbringing. Today we can only guess what state of internal struggle the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces was in if he wondered if the elimination of Hitler was not the only way out of this tangled situation. But he and his like-minded people did not dare to take this last step, for they believed that such an act would be a violation of tradition, and besides, there is no suitable successor; in addition, the young officer corps, who believed in the Fuhrer, is unreliable, but above all, the mood within the country has not yet matured for this.

Why did Hitler lose the war? German view Petrovsky (ed.) I.

THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA IS THE "CORRECT" WAR

In 1940 and 1941, Hitler had no reason to fear or complain about the Soviet Union. The non-aggression pact concluded in August 1939 functioned satisfactorily. Despite some friction, the Soviet Union adhered to Germany exclusively defensive tactics and was quite loyal. The attitude of the USSR towards England was more than cold. Significant and timely deliveries of raw materials and food from the East made Germany invulnerable in the event of a blockade. The desire, through benevolent neutrality towards Germany, not to be drawn into the war was also fully in line with the interests and position of the Soviet Union. The USSR was still far from completing its industrialization, and it could not expect anything good from the war with Germany, on the contrary, it could only fear the worst. And it was not for nothing that in August 1939, when Russia was being lured by both sides, it settled on Germany. And Major General Erich Marx wrote quite correctly, who on August 5, 1940, on the instructions of Hitler, presented the first development General Staff campaign to the East: "The Russians will not render us a friendly service - they will not attack us."

And yet, in the second half of 1940, Hitler decided to attack Russia. This decision, which turned out to be suicidal, makes a completely inexplicable impression. How could Hitler, weighed down by the war with England (and the threat of war with America), unnecessarily start a war with Russia? It was he who, as a prerequisite for a war with Russia, always preached partnership with England? And yet, in these arguments, in which the inevitable war with England seemed to Hitler now an additional argument for a war with Russia, there is a certain paradoxical logic. It is expedient with all impartiality to follow the course of Hitler's thoughts.

The war with England reached a standstill in the autumn of 1940. The invasion of England with the available means proved to be impracticable. The air war remained inconclusive from a strategic point of view. At least at this time, Hitler could not approach England. But England, for the time being, could not get close to Germany either. She lagged behind Germany in armaments by at least two years, and even with the full mobilization of all her forces, they would never have been enough for a successful invasion of the continent. She had to wait for America, which was at least three years behind Germany in armament.

Thus, the war in the West was to remain for the next two or three years a positional war and be accompanied by an arms race. However, such a prospect did not suit Germany at all for two reasons.

Firstly, the combined Anglo-American military potential was greater than the German one and, if fully deployed, would inevitably surpass it. Germany could not win the arms race unless she greatly expanded her own potential.

Secondly, due to its superior armament, Germany reached at that time just the climax of military superiority, which, even at best, could not be repeated.

Arming a modern industrial state is a process that takes four years. Once Churchill very figuratively described it: “In the first year - almost nothing; in the second - very little; in the third - a significant amount; starting with the fourth - as much as needed. In 1940, England was stuck in the second year of its armament (“very little”), America even in the first (“almost nothing”), while Germany was in the fourth (“as much as needed”).

Thus, for at least another two years, Germany was guaranteed against a major offensive by the West and had free hands. If she used these two years to significantly expand her own potential, she might hope that she would not succumb to her Western opponents later. Germany, however, did not take advantage of this opportunity and therefore had to expect that from about 1943 onwards it would fall further and further behind. So she had to use those two years. But how and where?

Germany was preparing for a war not against England and America - it did not have a large fleet and long-range bombers - but in accordance with Hitler's foreign policy concept - for a war on land against France and Russia. Its strength lay in the army and aviation, which was created as an auxiliary weapon for the ground forces, like flying artillery. However, this instrument of war could only be used on the continent, and there was only one target on the continent - Russia.

Hitler could not approach England (especially America), but he could approach the USSR. And if he succeeded during these two years in subordinating this country to his will and making its people and machines work for Germany, then he could hope that in 1943 or 1944 he would be ready for the final showdown with England and America and successfully repulse the attempt Anglo-American invasion.

This is the logic that guided Hitler in 1940, when he turned his ultimate goal, namely the conquest of the Soviet Union, into a necessary intermediate stage for the war with England. If Germany wanted to use these two years of undisturbed freedom of action created by her predominance in the field of armaments, then this could only happen through a victorious war against the Soviet Union, even if the USSR did not give any reason or pretext for such a war. Other aggressive plans, such as Fleet Commander Raeder's plan for a deep invasion of the Middle East or penetration into West Africa through Spain, did not correspond to the nature of Germany's armaments. Such plans exposed the German army, abandoned across the ocean, to the danger of being cut off by the predominant English fleet and did not promise, even if successful, any results that could have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war. It was necessary to decide: Russia or nothing.

Two other considerations strengthened Hitler in his decision to start a war against the USSR, which had always been and remained his true intention, and not to postpone the campaign to the East until the end of the war with the West. The first moment was of a psychological nature and consisted in the fact that in this case to postpone meant, apparently, to refuse altogether. Hitler repeatedly stated that after a victorious war with the West and the conclusion of peace, he would hardly be able to "overworked by two major wars" the German people "to raise again against Russia." Now, however, there was a war going on, and therefore at the same time it was possible to solve this problem.

It was precisely to justify the war with the USSR that Hitler often resorted to lies, only some of his statements on this set of issues can be taken at face value. But even they are plausible only because they make it possible to see that the war against the Soviet Union has always remained his cherished goal.

The second point was the extremely unpleasant thought of the growing dependence that Hitler would inevitably fall into from the USSR during the war with the West if he abandoned his plan. True, since 1939, the USSR has behaved as a completely loyal partner and supplier, and the difference between what this country voluntarily did for Germany and what could be obtained by force from a defeated, war-torn and embittered Russia, at least in the first the decisive years of the war would not have been so big at all. There was also no reason to believe that Stalin would have stabbed Germany in the back when she was fighting the decisive battle with the Western powers on the Atlantic coast. Stalin could not seriously desire the defeat of Germany, since he needed it as a counterbalance and barrier from the Western powers, which inspired him with even greater fear and distrust than Germany. However, Stalin could be expected to raise the political price of his benevolence and support as Germany got into trouble in the West.

The partnership between Hitler and Stalin was not an amicable union, including on the part of Stalin. If it were possible to turn a wayward and self-willed partner - the USSR - into a defenseless and subjugated, at least compliant, Russia, then Hitler would always prefer this option.

But was it even possible? It is at this point that we encounter Hitler's mistake.

Hitler endured the war with the Soviet Union, which he now wanted to wage to a certain extent only as an intermediate stage in the war with the West, without checking and changing the ideas that he had formed for himself from the very beginning on this case. At that time, he hoped that he would be able to wage war without any deviations and complications, in full agreement with England, with a solid rear support and a concentrated use of all the forces of the German Empire, and would have unlimited time for this.

The war planned earlier was to become a colonial war, which means it was especially cruel. The defeat of the Russian armed forces would be only the first act, which was to be followed by the total occupation of this vast country, the complete elimination of the state power of the Soviet Union, the extermination of the leading cadres and intelligentsia, the creation of a mobile German colonial apparatus and, finally, the enslavement of the 170 million population. It is doubtful whether such a plan was even feasible under the most favorable circumstances. In any case, it was a plan for the fulfillment of which the life of a whole generation was needed.

Now Hitler had only two years to go to war with the USSR. But even in these two years, a quarter of the German army and a third of the air force were tied up in the West. By the end of this period, Hitler would have been forced to redeploy most of his troops to the Atlantic coast, and Russia, apart from a minor occupying force, would have been left to her own devices.

Under these changed conditions, however, Hitler could only hope at best to win against the Soviet Union a "European normal war" with limited objectives - a kind of extended version of the blitzkrieg against France. This was also consistent with military plans, which provided for an offensive only as far as the Volga-Arkhangelsk line. A prolonged occupation also of the Asian part of the Soviet Union beyond the Urals, even in the event of a military victory, would completely exhaust the German forces and make it impossible to continue the world war.

With limited time and resources, Hitler's plans could only succeed if the Russians did him a favor and, like the French in 1940, engaged with the whole force of their mobilized armies in a decisive struggle near the border, instead of using the expanses of Russian territory . Only in this case it would be possible to win the decisive battle. In addition, a Russian government was to be found that would recognize such a military solution as unchangeable and, like the government of Pétain in France, would prefer a quick military truce to a long desperate struggle.

But even in this case, Hitler would have had to, as in France, show readiness to put forward acceptable, "normal" conditions for such a truce. He should at least recognize the authority of this Russian government in his country and create more or less normal living conditions for the Russian population in the occupied regions. Only in this case could Hitler hope to force the defeated Russia to "collaborate", just as it was with the defeated France. Only in this case could he think that after two, at most three years, he would again turn to the defeated

Russia's back, without fear of an immediate unleashing of a war of liberation by the Russians, which would mean a war on two fronts at the time of the Anglo-American invasion.

This was the dilemma that confronted Hitler in the event of a war with the USSR. Even a quick military victory, which was far from self-evident, threatened to worsen rather than improve Hitler's position in the decisive phase of the world war, if it were not possible to immediately transfer the victory in the East to the world - moreover, to establish friendly relations between defeated Russia and Germany.

But any thought of such a policy was very remote for Hitler. He was still captivated by his fixed idea of a German living space in the East. He did not admit or did not want to admit that this idea now breaks the boundaries of his strategic possibilities. Due to the lack of time, which ruled out a colonial war with Russia, from the very first day of the war he set in motion colonial measures of extermination and enslavement. Thus, from the very beginning, he showed the people and the army of the enemy what awaits them in case of defeat, and plunged them into despair, not yet victorious.

Even in a European, "normal" war, Russia would obviously have been the winner: its population was more than twice that of Germany. The USSR then had rich military traditions, a high degree of armament, and for defense it had such an almost insurmountable weapon as space. The Soviet Union was not at all "ripe for the fall" - it was a young, powerfully developing state that was going through a stage of extensive modernization and industrialization.

From the moment that Russian combat morale was no longer questioned, Russia, with her military-technical balance and her numerical and territorial superiority, could no longer lose the war, and Germany could not win it. Even the major Russian retreats on the Southern Front in the 1942 war year did not change the state of affairs. During these retreats, there were no more mass captures, as was the case during major defeats in the first months of the war. In 1942, Russia deliberately used its space as a weapon, the long retreat ended with Stalingrad.

The war against the USSR, started in 1941, had no diplomatic background. Unlike the war with England, it was not preceded by a dispute, a tense situation, a disagreement, or an ultimatum. Apart from its existence, the USSR did not give Hitler any reason to start a war. It was Hitler's sole decision to start a war against the USSR and wage it as a colonial war. However, it should be emphasized that there was not the slightest sign of resistance against this decision in Germany, as was still the case in the crises that preceded the Munich Agreement of 1938, the outbreak of the war in 1939 and the campaign against France in 1940. Never before had Hitler had such a cohesive German Empire behind him as in his murderous and suicidal war against the Soviet Union.

The war with the USSR does not have, despite big number bloody battles, own military history. Not once in the course of a war did its outcome depend on the best or worst plan of individual operations, the audacity of the battle project, the strategic talent of this or that leading general. The subsequent dispute over Hitler's decision to carry out an attack in September 1941 first on Kyiv and not on Moscow is useless. The opposite decision, even if it led to the capture of Moscow, would not change the course of the war. From the moment when the true intentions of Hitler became clear to the Russian people, the strength of the Russian people was opposed to the German strength. From that moment on, the outcome was also clear: the Russians were stronger not only because they were outnumbered, but primarily because the issue of life and death was decided for them, but not for the Germans.

For the Germans, it was only about victory or defeat. The victory was lost from the moment when the Russians pulled themselves together, that is, already in December 1941. However, defeat by the Russians did not mean for the Germans that their country would be transformed into what Russia would have become had it been defeated by Hitler.

In addition, the Germans could still prevent the Russians from becoming their only victors. After December 1941, when the Russian counter-offensive near Moscow proved their newfound will to fight, Germany could no longer win the war, but it could drag it out for years until the Western powers were ready to enter the war. The Germans could, to a certain extent, choose whom they would like to be defeated and whom they would help to win - the East or the West. They might even hope to use East against West or West against East. From now on, however, they would put the unity of their state at stake.

From that time on, the Western powers played a different role for Germany, and the war in the West changed its face. While Germany was fighting for victory in the East, it was interested in delaying as long as possible the intensification of hostilities in the West, and especially America's entry into the war. But since Germany in the East could fight only to delay defeat, she should have been interested in hastening as much as possible the entry of the Western powers into the war, and hence the entry of America into the war. After all, only the active participation of England and America in the European theater of operations gave Germany a chance to replace the defeat in the East with a defeat in the West, or even cause a big war between East and West as a continuation of the war with the Soviet Union, during which to take one side or another (on which - there was almost no doubt) and thus still turn defeat into victory.

Hitler realized this new position on December 6, 1941, when the Russians launched an unusually powerful counter-offensive near Moscow. “When the winter catastrophe of 1941-1942 began,” says the war diary of the Wehrmacht’s main headquarters, “it became clear to the Fuhrer and Colonel General [Jodl] that the climax had been passed and ... victory could no longer be achieved.”

Five days later, And December 1941, Hitler declared war on America. There is a relationship between these two events.

by Yeager Oscar

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After the fall of the Third Reich, the beaten German generals tried to shift all the blame for both war crimes and the defeat of the Wehrmacht onto the Nazi leadership and Hitler personally - from memoirs to memoirs, curses roam the "possessed Fuhrer", his "fatal decisions" and "fatal mistakes" who allegedly predetermined the outcome of the war and the defeat of Germany. However, this common myth, picked up by Western propaganda, not only simplifies the true picture of events, reducing real history to ideological clichés, but also belittles the feat of the Soviet people, who won a well-deserved victory over a strong, intelligent and skillful enemy.

This book presents the works of leading German historians who resolutely refute propaganda clichés, revealing the true, and not fictitious, reasons for the defeat of the Reich and presenting the German point of view on the course of the armed struggle and the results of the Second World War.

Foreword by Alexey Isaev 1

Hans Adolf Jacobsen - HOW THE SECOND WORLD WAR 2 WAS LOST

X. Hemberger - ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY OF THE FASCIST GERMANY ON THE EVE AND DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR 21

Ernst Engelberg - ON THE THEORY OF LOST OPPORTUNITIES IN GERMANY ARMED 24

Wolfram Wette - IMAGE OF THE ENEMY: RACIST ELEMENTS IN GERMAN PROPAGANDA AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION 25

Christian Streit - SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMANY 32

Sebastian Haffner - SUICIDE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE 38

Gerhard Schreiber - SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE RESULTS OF THE WAR 58

L. Rendulich - GUERRILLA WAR 73

Annex 79

Notes 82

Why did Hitler lose the war? german look
(Second World War. Life and Death on the Eastern Front).

Foreword by Alexei Isaev

"Twilight state of mind", temporary or permanent clouding of the mind is one of the convenient and common explanations for the adoption of military and political decisions of non-obvious expediency. Often, journalists and historians, like the screenwriters of mediocre Hollywood films, offer their readers mental disorders as an explanation for certain moves with disastrous consequences. Memoirists even more often pat on the back, or even after the fact generously hand out cuffs to the leaders, before whom they trembled in their time at the helm of power. However, most often this is nothing more than an attempt to find a simple answer to a complex question and the desire to avoid a deep analysis of the situation. To the greatest extent, the passion for the personal decision-making factor affected the history of the Third Reich. In some places, the really eccentric behavior of Adolf Hitler, repeatedly reinforced by third-hand retellings, provided enormous opportunities for shifting the burden of responsibility from objective factors to subjective factors. At the same time, critics of the decisions of the "possessed Fuhrer" did not always take a sufficiently critical approach to the issue of the feasibility of theoretically correct versions of orders and orders. All the more difficult is the understanding of the cause-and-effect relationships of events for foreigners, including the domestic reader.

The collection opens with an article by X. Hemberger on the German economy and industry on the eve and during the Second World War. The article describes the titanic work that was done in the 30s with the aim of turning the Third Reich into an autarchy capable of doing without the import of certain types of raw materials and food. Shortly after Hitler came to power, a plan was proposed and put into practice to replace several strategically important raw materials with synthetic counterparts. This primarily concerned rubber and hydrocarbon fuels. In the Third Reich, due to large-scale state investments in the chemical industry, the production of synthetic rubber and synthetic gasoline was launched. Hemberger traces the system of economic and political decisions of the German leadership, which made it possible to take a big step towards the creation of an autarchy capable of existing under blockade conditions.

At the same time, the image of Germany as a country experiencing a total shortage of all types of natural resources is being destroyed. Full provision of domestic needs with coal made it possible to spend large volumes of this fuel on the production of synthetic fuel. In addition, the situation has changed significantly since the First World War, not least due to the progress of the technical means of warfare. Unlike the USSR, Germany not only covered its needs for aluminum and magnesium, but even had the opportunity to export these materials, which were essential for the aviation industry. In contrast, in the Soviet Union, the scarcity of bauxite deposits led to the widespread use of wood as a material for the production of aircraft. In the 1930s and 1940s, aviation became one of the most important instruments of warfare. The natural resources of Germany created all the possibilities for the production of high-quality combat aircraft. Both the Heinkels that terrorized European cities, the Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers that became the symbol of the blitzkrieg, and the Messerschmitts were built from "winged metal".

Moreover, German designers could afford the luxury of using aluminum alloys not only in aircraft construction, but even replacing steel with them in gun carriages (in particular, on the 150-mm heavy infantry gun "sIG-33") and producing from "winged metal "massive pontoons for the construction of floating bridges. All these facts have not been given due attention in Russian historiography. The USSR was declared an inexhaustible pantry of natural resources, although this was generally not true. There were very few deposits of the main source of aluminum - bauxite - in the USSR, and the country experienced a severe shortage of aluminum, which was even supplied under lend-lease from the USA.

The view of German historians is also useful in terms of understanding the role of the Soviet Union as a subject of big European politics. A characteristic feature of the Soviet historical school was the exaggeration of the significance of the USSR for Germany as an object for a military operation. The "young Soviet state", around which, like planets around the Sun since 1917, the world superpowers have been revolving, seeking to deal with it at all costs, is a highly distorted picture of world politics.

Another German historian, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, whose work is included in this collection, writes: "However, it was by no means the 'living space in the East', the forcible conquest of which had already permeated Hitler's political calculations since the 1920s, served as the main activating moment; no, The main impetus was the Napoleonic idea of defeating England by defeating Russia.

This approach to the problem of the emergence of the "Barbarossa" plan was not typical for domestic historians, who focused more on long-term plans for the conquest of "living space" and the seizure of natural resources. However, Adolf Hitler himself formulated the reasons for the attack on the USSR in a speech at a secret meeting at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht on January 9, 1941 as follows: "The British are supported by the hope that the Russians can intervene. They will only give up resistance when this last continental hope of theirs is crushed "He, the Fuhrer, does not believe that the British are 'hopelessly stupid'; if they see no prospect, they will stop fighting. If they lose, they will never find the moral strength to save the empire. If they can hold out, to form 30-40 divisions, and if the USA and Russia help them, then a very difficult situation will be created for Germany.

1941 - the most powerful military machine of that time, spurred on by its leader Hitler, already completely dominating Europe, was moving towards Moscow.

The Germans are implementing the Barbarossa plan. He assumed complete occupation of strategically significant areas of the territory of the Soviet Union just six months after the start of the invasion. The German military command set itself the task of capturing Moscow by the end of August 41st. Georgia and Azerbaijan, as the last industrial segments of the USSR, were to be conquered already in the first days of November.

On secret papers at the headquarters of the operational leadership supreme command armed forces of the Wehrmacht, the Soviet Union ceased to exist five months after the June attack by Germany.

The optimism of the fascist headquarters was understandable - the army groups "North" and "Center" were indeed quite successfully fulfilling the deadly schedule. But the “South” began to seriously tie up in Ukraine. Hitler began to get nervous, demanding the speedy capture of the Donbass region - the supply of coal, weapons and oil from the Caucasian basins gave the USSR a chance to transfer the war from lightning to protracted ..

With all its superiority in armored vehicles and the best training of the army, Germany was not ready to wage a long war with the USSR - an awakened bear could stand on all fours very soon. The rapid industrialization and the transfer of Soviet industry to a military footing began to bear fruit, and Hitler saw this as a threat to the entire campaign.

The Barbarossa plan envisaged the division and transfer of the former territories of the Union under the control of coalition governments in order to facilitate control over such vast spaces. No Germany could have swallowed such a large bitten piece on its own. Therefore, in the minds of fascist strategists, the captured Russia should have been divided in this way - the north (Stalingrad) controls the Finnish Axis corps, the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belarus are transferred under the protectorates of Italy and Greece.

Something went wrong?

However, an extremely important condition for the implementation of this program was the cutting off from the industrial organism of the country of Kharkov with its strong industrial component and the resource-rich South-East of Ukraine. Hitler, prioritizing according to the current state of affairs on the fronts by the end of the summer of 1941, was ready to sacrifice the initial capture schedule and even abandon the planned assault on Moscow, postponing it until the beginning of winter. And the situation at that time was such that neither the "North" nor the "South" could boast of full-fledged success in the Baltic states or in Central Ukraine.

There were serious fears that without supporting their “wings” and having attempted to storm the capital of the USSR, the Army Group “Center” could be subjected to counterattacks from the flanks at the most inopportune moment for this. The battles for Kiev brought tactical success to the Wehrmacht army, but in a strategic sense, the delay in the development of the offensive on the southern sector of the front led to a loss of time and initiative - the planned advance to Moscow began only by mid-autumn, when weather conditions were already playing against the attacking side. The plan of "Barbarossa" was already broken - its main creed about defeating the enemy before the start of the autumn-winter period failed.

Beginning of the End

The main reasons why the Barbarossa plan was not destined to be realized are considered to be an erroneous assessment of the mobilization potential of the Union and an underestimation of the defensive capacity of the Red Army. Based on intelligence, the strategic geniuses of the Wehrmacht assumed that with the rapid development of the offensive, the Red Army would not have time to transfer its forces located in Siberia and Far East to the western borders of the country. And the local mobilization capabilities of the Soviet command will be able to oppose the invaders by the end of the year with no more than 40 hastily formed divisions. From this calculation, a combat reserve was formed, which allocated a limited contingent of up to half a million people from occupied Europe. Even with the predicted expected losses in manpower from the German troops, this reserve could feed the front for no longer than a few months.

The bogged down offensive threatened not only to disrupt plans to seize the territory of the Soviet Union, but also put at stake the combat capability of the Fuhrer's armies in Europe itself. To the unpleasant surprise of the German generals, the leadership of the Red Army ensured the mobilization of as many as three hundred and twenty divisions in the first couple of months of the war alone, instead of the fifty expected by the enemy. Also struck by the defense Soviet troops, who managed to deploy already at the very initial stage of the war from some two hundred and twenty active divisions a quite tangible obstacle course for the German armies. The stubborn resistance of the Soviet Union during the Typhoon operation by the Nazis demonstrated the final failure of the Barbarossa plan - the battle for Moscow turned out to be the beginning of the end of the entire Third Reich. At that moment, when in December the 41st part of the Red Army, defending Moscow, launched a counterattack, giving rise to the subsequent January offensive operation, Hitler understood - all hopes for a quick and easy victory over the USSR are now buried forever!

Back to the lair

Even for Hitler, who believed in the special exclusivity of the Nordic Aryan race, it was clear that a country like Germany, with a size comparable to Belarus, simply could not control the whole of Europe, being in a state of protracted war with the giant Soviet Union. Germany simply would not have had enough diplomatic or military resources. Hitler cannot be called a failed strategist, but he made a serious mistake by attacking the USSR in 1941. Even ahead of the development of the military-industrial complex, all European countries and the Union for the whole five-year plan, Germany did not have sufficient potency to control all the occupied lands. After the capture of Europe, it would take Hitler another seven years to fully assimilate the resource potential from the acquired territories.

And only after that it would be possible to talk about the full expansion of Nazism to the East. But, obviously, Hitler did not trust Stalin so much, was so afraid of the effectiveness of the totalitarian-communist approach in industry and the economy, that he made a risky bet on the Barbarossa plan. However, the fascist reptile choked on a too large piece that she managed to bite off. And although Hitler, thanks to his stubbornness and sick ego, will desperately send the faithful sons of Germany to death for another three years, it becomes clear to him and to most of his entourage that the stop in December 1941 near Moscow of the German military ice rink, which managed to crush the entire Europe is a verdict on the dream of the dominance and supremacy of the Nazi ideology over the entire civilized world.

I don't drink vodka - I disinfect my soul with it.

This article lists 10 reasons for Germany's defeat in the war that I think are the most important. These 10 reasons are derived solely on a subjective basis, therefore, their correctness should be assessed in this context. I do not in any way insist that I am right, therefore this article should not be regarded as a factual document, but only as a representation of a private opinion. Nor should one think that if Germany had avoided the miscalculations cited here, she would have won the war. I believe that Germany, in the end, would still lose, if only it would be given to countries anti-Hitler coalition at a much higher cost and would take longer. One more thing I want to say: you should not assume that wars are won and lost due to some specific set of circumstances or a list of certain reasons. War is such a complex manifestation of human existence that I doubt that this phenomenon can even be analyzed to the end. I would just like to note the 10 main miscalculations of Germany in that war, which, if they did not decide the outcome of the war, then had a huge impact on its course.

1. Operation Barbarossa
By invading the USSR, Germany signed its own death warrant, as it faced an adversary that it could never defeat. Although the German troops almost reached Moscow, a huge miscalculation was made in assessing the resistance potential of the USSR Armed Forces. Germany did not expect that the Red Army would fight against any losses and hold back the enemy at all costs. It was a lesson that Germany learned too late. In addition, Germany opened a second front for itself, which devoured the lion's share of German manpower, weapons and military equipment. Who knows, if Germany had managed to stay at peace with the USSR or, moreover, enter into a military-political alliance with the USSR, then, most likely, today's world order would be very different from the one we know.

2. Hitler's intervention in military matters
Many cite Hitler's illiterate military orders as the main reason for Germany's defeat in the war. However, not all so simple. In any case, the German army suffered from Hitler's intervention in resolving military issues, and so much that it cost Hitler several attempts on his life. Instead of leaving military planning to his generals, he selfishly proclaimed himself commander-in-chief and interfered in virtually all military operations. Even when it became clear to Hitler that the war was lost, he still chose to continue fighting, determined to drag the entire German people into the abyss.

3. Incompetent Intelligence
Throughout the war, Germany was at an unfavorable position when it came to obtaining information about the enemy and keeping its own secret information secret. Simply put, Germany has lost too many of its secrets, and has been deceived too often by the enemy's secret services. And the reason here was not only a higher level of intelligence of the enemy, but also the frequent transitions to the side of the allies of agents of the German special services. The intelligence of Germany's opponents received extensive intelligence through German double agents, captured equipment and intercepted secret messages, which greatly hastened the final agony of the Third Reich. Throughout the war, the Germans were many times unpleasantly surprised how the enemy knew what the German armed forces were going to do and how they were going to do it.

4. Overestimation of one's own strengths
This was the greatest miscalculation of many empires, and the Third Reich did not escape it either. In the first years of the war, after the impressive quick victories of German weapons, almost all of Europe was in Hitler's hands, which gave him reason to think about his own genius and invincibility. Hitler long time tried his luck, and after the Battle of Britain he should have realized that the German armed forces are not omnipotent either. Moving further and further into Europe, the German army as a result began to melt, and received too extended supply lines. Aggression against the USSR, with its vast expanses, turned into a disaster.

5. Low level of military production at the initial stage of the war
Although Germany had a huge industrial potential, she was not able to use this advantage until recent years war, when in the course of the war a turning point had already occurred not in favor of Germany. Hitler derisively spoke of the American mass production system based on the use of assembly lines, focusing primarily on quality rather than quantity. Hitler also did not allow the idea of using women and children in the military industry. The US and the USSR had a completely opposite strategy, trying to send as many manpower and equipment as possible against the enemy, and, in the end, the overwhelming superiority of the Allies over Germany in manpower and equipment brought them a long-awaited victory at the end of the war. After suffering the heaviest losses of the German armed forces on the Eastern Front, Hitler switched to mass production and standardization, but it was too late.

6. Failed to get Britain out of the war in 1940
The first half of 1940 was a terrible time for the Allies, especially for Great Britain. German troops pressed to the sea and surrounded Dunkirk (Dunkirk) most of the Allied troops. But then an event occurred, the causes of which historians are still writing about. Hitler gave the order to stop the German tanks. This was the greatest mistake that allowed 340,000 Allied soldiers to evacuate. Later, the same troops again entered the fight against the German armed forces. Instead of winning a brilliant victory at Dunkirk, Hitler gave the Allies a break, which they used to regroup and boost their morale, which would keep them going through the subsequent Battle of Britain and help them win. Hitler underestimated the Royal Air Force (RAF) and overestimated the capabilities of the Luftwaffe. This time, for the second time, he missed the chance to bring Great Britain into disaster and out of the war, which would have greatly weakened the ranks of the Allies.

7. Excessive bureaucratization of military and state structures
The Third Reich is called the most disorganized and disordered system among the developed government devices bygone century, and Germany had to pay its price. Despite the fact that Hitler had absolute power, his promises of a "better future" were so ambitious that it was not uncommon for there to be situations when several people, and sometimes the efforts of one interfere with the success of others. This labyrinth of inconsistency and slander extended its tentacles to the highest echelons of the German military command. Hitler encouraged hostility and rivalry to lower the authority of anyone else in the shadow of his own authority. Hitler could not understand that such inactivity and weakness of the system would collapse as soon as people began to despise him.

8. The ideology of Nazism
The Nazi official Hans Frank once said that, sadly, empires built on democratic principles last forever, while empires built on the principles of hatred and physical violence always have a rather short lifespan. The Nazis fully confirmed this axiom, opposing themselves on a racial basis, political and military actions, to the rest of humanity. Thus, exalting themselves above all other peoples, the Nazis gave these peoples another reason for hatred and the desire to take revenge. The racist ideology gave the Nazis the deceptive impression that they would always emerge victorious against the "inferior races" whom they condemned to extermination. Considering the Slavs to be "second-class" people, Germany pushed away potential allies with its own hands - the peoples who initially met the German troops as liberators. Considering the Russians to be "second-class" people, Germany made an unforgivable mistake by underestimating the enemy, who was able to offer worthy resistance to the German military machine even without the direct help of the Western Allies.

9. Failure to achieve technological superiority
The Nazis managed to develop many advanced types of weapons that had no analogues in the world at that time, but they did not succeed in using them in full in combat operations. The Germans had the world's first guided missiles (V-1 and V-2), but Hitler used them exclusively for harassment attacks on London. The Germans had the world's first jet aircraft, such as the Me-262, but Hitler chose to use them as bombers rather than as superior Allied fighters. The Germans had scientists who were able to create a German atomic bomb, but this never happened. Again and again, the Germans had a chance to gain an advantage over the enemy in new types of weapons (as, for example, in the case of the new AG-42 assault rifle, on the basis of which, after the war, Soviet designers created the famous AK-47, which underwent several upgrades and is in service with until now), but they used new developments very rarely or not properly.

10. Failure to effectively use the human and military potential of their allies
The Germans almost always relied only on their own forces, so it was a big mistake on their part to allow the Italians to wage their own parallel war in the Mediterranean and Africa. The Germans were doomed from the very beginning to intervene in this war and take the reins of leadership into their own hands. Italian troops could be used more effectively if they were initially introduced into the German Wehrmacht, as was later done with the armed forces of other European allied countries of Germany. In general, Germany showed an inability to effectively use the allied armed forces. A vivid example of this is the encirclement of the Germans near Stalingrad, where the German 6th Army was covered by the Romanian troops. They were quickly surrounded, which played an important role in the defeat of Germany in this operation. One of the unrealized aspects of allied cooperation that historians have pointed out for years is that the Germans were unable to use the Japanese military as 100% allied forces. Of course, Japan would not have a significant impact on the European theater of operations in the long run, but, of course, such interaction would be beneficial for both Germany and Japan.

Why did Hitler lose the war? german look (Second World War. Life and Death on the Eastern Front).

Foreword by Alexei Isaev

Hans Adolf Jacobsen HOW THE SECOND WORLD WAR WAS LOST

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Why did Hitler lose the war? german look (Second World War. Life and Death on the Eastern Front).

Foreword by Alexei Isaev

Something went wrong?

Beginning of the End

Back to the lair

Why did Hitler lose the war? german look
(Second World War. Life and Death on the Eastern Front).

Hans Adolf Jacobsen
HOW THE SECOND WORLD WAR WAS LOST

Why did Hitler lose the war? german look
(Second World War. Life and Death on the Eastern Front).